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PREFACE .
The purpose of the writer has been to state the princi
ples of law applicable to the transfer of the title to real
property by deed , in such manner as to assist one in draft
in
g





one whose attention has been directed to the ques








drawing a deed ; he encounters serious practical dif
ficulties , however , when , in the examination of title , it
becomes necessary for him to construe instruments that





In the following pages a general view o
f
the deed is
first given ; it
s
several parts are then considered in
the order in which they follow one another in the form
that may b
e
used in any state . After the delivery of the
formally completed instrument is discussed , certain re
strictions o
n
the general freedom o
f
alienation are con
sidered . While the recording of conveyances has not
been made especially a subject o
f
discussion , it has been
necessarily referred to a
t many points , and a chapter is
given u
p
to suggestions as to the examination o
f
title and
one to the registration o
f
title under the so called “ Tor
rens System . ”
Statutes - practically so important - have been referred
to o
n most points , and often states in which legislation is
o
f similar import have been grouped ; but the statutes areTA
( iii )
PREFACE .
so numerous and so varied that it has been found imprac
ticable to cite all of them , although the several types have
been compared and the effects of legislation on common
law rules have been pointed out .
From the great number of decisions an attempt has
been made to select those - chiefly from among the more
recent — that best illustrate particular topics and indicate
modern tendencies . Some preference has been given to
those reported in the valuable series of annotated reports
known as the American Decisions , American Reports ,
American State Reports and Lawyers ' Reports Annotated ;
and the most useful notes found in these volumes have
been cited . The writer here acknowledges his obligations
to the annotators .
Those most familiar with this important part of the
law of real property will most readily conceive the diffi
culties involved in treating it within the compass of a
single volume . J. H . B .
University of Michigan ,
Ann Arbor, March , 1904 .




1. Alienation in general - Inter vivos and by will .
2. Conveyancing —What the term implies .
3. Controlling effect of lex situs - Power of states as to real property .
4. Power of the United States - Effect of treaties on state laws .
5. Application of the doctrine that lex situs cantrols — It
s
reason .
6 . Illustrations - Formal matters .
7 . Illustrations - Capacity .
8 . Illustrations - Construction and effect of instruments .
9 . Statutes adopting foreign law - Not exceptions to rule .
1













1 . Formerly no writing necessary — The feoffment .
1
2 . The bargain and sale - When deed necessary for .
1
3 . The lease and release .
1
4 . The feoffment - When a deed became necessary for .
1
5 . Deeds used though not necessary .
1
6 . Livery of seisin in the United States - - Conveyance generally by
deed .
1
7 . How title may still pass inter vivos without writing .
1
8 . Fines and recoveries .








19 . Definition and characteristics of the deed .
20 . Kinds of deeds – At common law - Under the statutes of uses .
21 . Kinds - Indenture - Deed poll .
22. Indenture - Deed poll - Forms .
23 . Indenture - Deed poll - Other differences in forms.
24 . Indenture - Deed poll - Difference in effect .
25 . Modern tendency to shorten deeds .
26 . Reasons for considering settled forms.
27. The deed conveys a present interest — To be distinguished from
other instruments .
28 . Deeds distinguished from contracts to convey .
29 . Deeds distinguished from instruments testamentary in character .
30. Statutory forms of deeds .




32 . The date not essential though desirable .
33 . Presumption ofdelivery at date .
34 . Date in deed and certificate of acknowledgment .
35. True date may be shown .
CHAPTER V .
THE PARTIES - THE METHOD OF DESIGNATING THEM .
SECTION
36 . Manner of introducing and referring to parties .
37 . Designation of parties — The grantor .
38. Designation of parties — The grantee .
39. Executing deed with grantee 's name blank - Question as to au
thority to insert his name.







1 . Use of names - Presumptions .
4
2 . Names — Effect o
f discrepancies - Idem sonans .
4
3 . Fictitious persons – Grantee must be in esse - Fictitious names .
4
4 . Additions to name by way of recital - Effect of .
TABLE OF CONTENTS . vii
SECTION
45 . Partnerships as parties .




47. Recitals in general .
48 . Recital often used to show purpose of conveyance .
49. Notice from recitals .
50 . Recitals in conveyances by sheriffs , administrators , etc .




52. Apparent conflict as to necessity of a consideration .
53 . No consideration necessary to a feoffment at common law - Effect
of American statutes .
54. Seal importing consideration .
55 . The equitable doctrine - Effect of the statute of uses .
56 . What makes a deed of bargain and sale .
57. How the foregoing principles operate .
58. Parol evidence as to consideration .
59. Farol evidence of additional consideration .
60. Such evidence not restricted by most courts .
61. Farol evidence rule more strictly applied by some courts .
Farol evidence when statement as to consideration is contractual .
63. The true consideration may generally be shown by parol .
64. Showing assumption of mortgage.
65. True consideration may not be shown as between the parties to
defeat deed .
66. Statement of consideration not binding on others.
CHAPTER VIII .
THE OPERATIVE WORDS .
SECTION
68. Special operative words for special conveyances .
69. Superfluous use of operative words - Rule of construction .
70. Effect of assignments indorsed on deeds .
71. Operative words of some kind essential .
72. Words generally considered sufficient.
viii TABLE OF CONTENTS .
CHAPTER IX .
THE DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY .
SECTION
73 . General considerations - Importance of the description .
74 . Descriptions in recorded conveyances - How far notice to subse
quent purchasers .
75 . Certainty necessary - Parol evidence to apply description .
76 . Parol evidence cannot supply description - Fatal uncertainty .
77 . How uncertainty arises — Undefined part of larger tract.
78 . Uncertainty avoided when part of larger tract is designated ,
though not fully described .
79. Fatal uncertainty avoided where grantee of part of larger tract
takes an undivided interest.
80 . Uncertainty caused by lack of starting point of boundary .
81. A general description allowable and not necessarily uncertain .
82 . Descriptions usually more specific —What particulars are to be re
garded .
83 . Conflicting parts of descriptions .
84 . Rules for construing descriptions with conflicting parts .
85 . The maxim , “ Falsa demonstratio , ” etc .
86 . Illustrations of the rules - Particular descriptions control general .
87 . Illustrations - Monuments control courses and distances .
88. The part of a monument taken as a boundary .
89 . Streets and highways as boundaries — When the grantee takes to
the center .
90. Streets and highways as boundaries - Decisions not in accord as to
what expressions exclude the way.
91 . Streets and highways as boundaries — When grantee takes the en
tire street .
92 . Description by courses and distances will control quantity named
- " More or less " —When statement of quantity important .
93 . Reference in descriptions to maps .
94 . Grantee ' s rights in streets shown on map .
95. Statutory plats —Maps may aid description though not expressly
referred to .
96 . Incorrect maps controlled by monuments .
97. Reference may be made to other deeds , etc., for description .
98 . Lands bounded by waters - General rule .
99 . The basis of the rule - Application to cases where water is not
named as boundary .
100 . Application of general rule , how limited by grantor .
101 . How far rule applies to public grants .
102 . Public grants - The “meander line ."
103 . When the meander line will be taken as the boundary .
104 . How far does title extend under water ? — Tidal waters .
105 . How far does title extend - Rivers - At common law .





. Rivers in United States - Private title to bed in some states .





. Rivers - No private title to bed in some states .




. Non -tidal , non -navigable rivers .
111 . Boundaries on lakes - Public and private ownership .





































. Difference in effect .
121 . Expressions causing doubt .






















. Exceptions and reservations repugnant to grant - Effect o
f
.
127 . Reservation to a stranger .
CHAPTER XI .
THE LIMITATION OF THE ESTATE - THE HABENDUM .
SECTION
128 . The habendum , its function .
129 . Effect o
f




. Where habendum is not repugnant , it may explain and qualify
the premises .








. Naming the grantee in habendum - Effect of naming other or dif
ferent persons .
134 . Trusts may be declared in the habendum .
135 . Use o
f
the word " heirs " a
t
common law in limiting an estate in
fee .
TABLE OF CONTENTS .
SECTION
136 . Effect of statutes on the rule requiring the word " heirs . "
137 . When the word “ heirg " is not essential to create a fee , irrespec
tive of statute .
138 . Use of the word " assigns ” in limiting estates .
139 . The fee simple and the fee simple conditional .
140 . The statute De donis conditionalibus - Estates tail.
141. Kinds of estates tail — What terms are necessary to create .
142. Estates tail in the United States .
143 . Estates tail in the United States - The states classified .
144 . Reversions - Remainders .
145 . The rule in Shelley 's Case .
146 . Not a rule of construction , but one of law - When does not apply .




148 . Concurrent ownership in general.
149. Joint tenancy - Its characteristics .
150 . Alienation by a joint tenant .
151 . Joint tenancy not now favored - American statutes concerning it .
152 . Statutes reversing the common law presumption — The estate still
created by apt words .
153 . Exceptions to the modern rule favoring estates in common
Trustees - Mortgagees .
154 . Statutes abolishing survivorship — They do not destroy joint ten
ancy .
155 . Joint tenancy expressly abolished .
156 . Tenancy in common - It
s
characteristics — How created .
. 157 . Alienation b
y




158 . Conveyance of the entire property b
y
tenant in common - Ouster .
159 . Coparcenary .
160 . Partition - B
y
deed .
161 . Parol partition .
162 . Tenancy by entireties .
163 . Has been generally recognized as common law in the United
States — Exceptions .





ancy and married women .
165 . In what states not recognized because of statutes .
166 . Conveyance of estates b
y
entireties .
167 . The community system .







. Conditions and limitations in general .
169 . Implied conditions .
170 . Express conditions - Conditions precedent .
171 . Express conditions - Conditions subsequent .
172 . Conditions precedent and subsequent compared .
173 . Determinable o
r special limitations .




. Conditional limitations .
176 . Causes o
f
difficulties in construing .




. The place fo
r
the condition .
179 . The re -entry clause .
180 . Particular classes of cases - Conveyances for specified purposes .
181 . Effect in such cases of consideration and nature of purpose .
182 . Particular classes - Building restrictions - - Restrictions as to use .
183 . Particular classes - Conditions and stipulations for support .













. General suggestions for drawing and construing conditions .
CHAPTER XIV .
COVENANTS .





. Covenants — Effect , in general , of the presence or absence of cov
enants for title .
189 . Covenants for title in mortgages .
190 . The usual covenants for title .
191 . The form o
f
covenants for title .
192 . The designation o
f parties to be bound - The covenantor himself .














. Designation of parties — The covenantee , hi
s
heirs , etc .
197 . The covenantee ' s " heirs and assigns . "
xii TABLE OF CONTENTS .
SECTION
198 . The covenants for seisin , and good right to convey .
199 . The covenant against incumbrances - Form .
200 . What are incumbrances ?
201 . Mortgages , building restrictions, dower - Incumbrances .
202 . Leasehold interests as incumbrances .
203 . Distinction between incumbrances visibly affecting the physical
condition and others .
204 . If an incumbrance is to be excepted from the covenant, it should
be so expressed .
205 . The covenant for further assurance .
206 . The covenants for quiet enjoyment and of warranty .
207 . The covenant of warranty attaches only to the estate conveyed .
208 . Effect of describing land as subject to an incumbrance .
209 . Eviction necessary to a breach of covenant of warranty .
210 . What is eviction - Constructive eviction .
211 . Covenants implied - Common law - Statutory deeds .
212 . Effect of such statutes .
213 . Whether lex situs or lex loci contractus controls .
214 . The running of covenants for title with the land .
215 . Conflicting views as to the running of some covenants .
216 . The “ English rule " as to the covenant of seisin running .
217. The “ American rule . ”
218. The rule as to the covenant against incumbrances .
219. Covenants for quiet enjoyment and warranty run with the land .
220 . Subsequent grantees by quit claim deeds have the benefit of such
covenants as run with the land .
221. “ Personal " and " real" as used with reference to covenants for
title .
II . Covenants Other than Covenants for Title.
222 . General features of these covenants .
223 . Form - No technical words essential.
224 . Form - Effect of “ heirs and assigns” or similar words in covenant .
225 . The form of the deed in which covenants are - Effect of acceptance
by grantee of deed poll containing covenants .
226 . Distinction sometimes made between benefits and burdens .
227. Restrictive covenants and conditions , as to use of land , buildings ,
etc .
228 . Building restrictions in pursuance of a “ general plan ."
229 . The duration of such restrictions - Effect of laches , waiver ,
changes in neighborhood .
230 . Provisions in effect restraining competition in trade .
231. Covenants in conveyances relating to party walls .
232 . Agreements as to party walls without a conveyance .




233 . Signing not essential at common law .









f signature - Signing by mark .
237 . Form of signature - Part o
f
name - Initials .
238 . Signing by another for grantor .
239 . Signing under power o
f attorney .
240 . Execution o
f conveyance by corporation .
241 . Conveyances b
y municipal , religious o




242 . The seal - When necessary a
t
common law .
243 . Tendency to dispense with the seal - Effect of statutes .



















one seal by several persons — Time and method o
f
affixing the seal .




250 . Witnesses to conveyances at common law .
251 . Witnesses under statutes in the United States .
252 . The method o
f
attesting .









254 . Terms used .
255 . What writings may be acknowledged .
256 . The subject regulated by statute - Form of acknowledging deeds
generally the test .
257 . General purposes of acknowledgment .
258 . First, to entitle the instrument to be recorded .
259 . Purpose of acknowledgment - Statute relating to evidence .
260 . Some points to notice as to such statutes .
261 . When necessary to validity of conveyance .
262 . Necessary to convey legal title in some states .
263 . In many states acknowledgment necessary to validity of convey .
ance of homestead .
264 . When necessary in conveyance by married woman .
265. The form of the certificate of acknowledgment .
266 . Certificate should show facts necessary .
267 . Substantial compliance with statutes enough - Clerical errors .
268 . What is substantial compliance .
269. Substantial compliance - Fact of acknowledgment.
270 . When the word “ acknowledged " should appear .
271 . Substantial compliance - Identity of party .
272 . Identity of party — “ Personally known .”
273 . Who may take the acknowledgment .
274 . Authority to take wholly statutory .
275 . Who may take - When acknowledgment is taken in the state
where the land is .
276 . Who may take - When acknowledgment is taken in another state
- The commissioner of deeds .
277 . When taken in another state - Questions as to what officers may
take, etc .
278 . Taken in another state - Showing as to official character , et
c
.
279 . Taken in another state - Certificate o
f conformity to foreign law .
280 . Acknowledgments taken out o
f
the United States .
281 . Competency of officer affected b
y
interest - Party cannot take ac
knowledgment .
282 . Practical effect o
f
rule that party cannot take acknowledgment .
283 . Rule disqualifying party generally applies to acknowledgments of
all instruments .
284 . Effect o
f relationship on officer ' s competency .
285 . Undisclosed interest as affecting competency o
f
officer to take .
286 . Undisclosed interest as affecting competency .
287 . Officer o
f
corporation not generally disqualified unless also a
shareholder .
TABLE OF CONTENTS . XV
SECTION
288 . Agent or attorney of party to a conveyance may generally take ac
knowledgment .
289 . The parts of the certificate - Venue.
290 . Date .
291 . Signing by officer - His official , not his personal signature .
292 . Sealing .
293 . Impeachment of the certificate - When it is conclusive .
294 . Form of certificate to conveyance of corporation or by attorney .




296 . Delivery essential to a deed and to the transfer of title .
297 . Exception to rule that delivery is essential.
298. Elements of delivery - Surrender of control by the grantor .
299. Elements — The intent of the grantor .




. Acceptance by the grantee .
302 . If acceptance is prevented there is generally no delivery .
303 . Presumption o












. Effect of grantor ' s retention of possession and control of the deed .
307 . Effect o







. Effect of reserving control b
y grantor in such cases .





f grantee ' s obtaining possession of escrow wrongfully .




THE CONVEYANCE OF THE REAL ESTATE OF INFANTS .
SECTION
312 . Restrictions on alienation - Disabilities — " Void ” and “ voidable ”
conveyances .
313 . Conveyances b
y
minors - - Voidable .
314 . Former distinctions between different kinds o
f conveyances - In
fants ' powers of attorney still sometimes held void .
315 . When conveyance b
y
a
n infant may be disaffirmed .
316 . How soon after majority must infant disaffirm - Doctrine that he
has statutory period o
f
limitation .





. How soon after majority must disaffirm — “ Within a reasonable
time . "
318 . Former infant may disaffirm though his grantee has conveyed to
another .
319 . Infant ' s heirs may disaffirm - Others may not generally .
320 . Effect o
f
infant ' s misrepresentation as to age .
321 . The restoration of the consideration on disaffirmance .
322 . What constitutes disaffirmance .
323 . Effect o
f conveyance to an infant .
324 . How infants ' real property may be conveyed .
325 . The general principle controlling in such cases .
326 . The application by proper party - Notice .
327 . Such conveyances allowed for certain purposes .
328 . Hearing on the application - Guardian ' s bond - Approval by court .
329 . Statutes curing effect o
f irregularities .
330 . Power of chancery court to order conveyance of minor ' s lands .
CHAPTER XXI .
THE CONVEYANCE OF THE REAL ESTATE OF PERSONS OF
UNSOUND MIND .
SECTION
331 . Insane persons ' conveyances similar to infants ' — Yet the two
classes differ .
332 . Conveyance of insane person , under guardianship , void .
333 . While guardianship continues ward presumed incompetent - But
not ifmerely adjudged insane or guardianship ended .
334 . Effect o
f guardianship o
f spendthrifts and drunkards .
335 . Conveyance of insane persons not under guardianship generally
voidable .




337 . Whether such a voidable deed conveys title without being
affirmed .
338 . The kinds and degrees of insanity .
339 . The question as to insanity must relate to the time o
f the act .
340 . Presumption o
f sanity - Not overcome by mere weakness o
f
mind
- Partial insanity .
341 . Weakness of mind combined with inadequate consideration - Fi .
duciary relations .
342 . The conveyance where regarded as voidable may be affirmed .
343 . Deed of insane grantor may be disaffirmed by him when sane .
344 . May be disaffirmed b
y
his guardian .
345 . Insane grantor ' s heirs may disaffirm - Creditors generally may
not .





. As to the return o
f




. Whether conveyance may be disaffirmed as against subsequent




. Statutes providing for the disposal of insane persons ' interests in
lands .
CHAPTER XXII .
CONVEYANCES IN WHICH MARRIED WOMEN ARE INTERESTED .
SECTION
319 . The married woman ' s different interests in real property .
350 . The husband ' s rights in , and control over , his wife ' s property at
common law .
351 . The common law not wholly obsolete in this country .




. The intention to create the separate estate must generally be
clearly expressed .




. The wife ' s power over her separate estate in the absence of such
restraint .
356 . Manner o
f conveying separate estate .




the equitable separate estate .
358 . Constitutional and statutory provisions creating a separate estate .
359 . Statutes creating separate estate do not always remove the married
woman ' s disability to convey .
360 . Common law methods of alienation by married women - Deeds
unusual - Fines .




common law — The separate exami
nation .
362 . Early usages in the United States — The joint deed - Statutes re
quiring joinder .
363 . When the husband ' s joinder or assent is now necessary .
364 . Whether husband and wife should join as grantors or merely ex
ecute the deed .
365 . The married woman ' s acknowledgment — The separate examina
tion .




. How far compliance with statutory provisions as to particulars is
necessary .
368 . Conveyances between husband and wife .
369 . Conveyances between husband and wife through a third person .
370 . Equitable view o




. Rule as to conveyances between husband and wife affected b
y
statute .
372 . Dower and its statutory substitute .
ii - Brews . Con .
xviii TABLE OF CONTENTS .
SECTION
373 . Generally no act of the husband alone can defeat dower - Excep
tions to this rule .
374 . Inchoate right of dower not strictly property - Released not con
veyed .
375 . Wife cannot generally release dower to her husband .
376 . Release of dower generally by deed of husband and wife .
377 . Married women 's powers of attorney to convey lands or release
dower .
CHAPTER XXIII.
THE HOMESTEAD IN CONVEYANCING .
SECTION
378 . The homestead in general.
379 . Who may have a homestead - Not necessarily a married person
only .
380 . But restraints on its alienation apply usually to married persons
only .
381 . Restraints on alienation apply usually to residents only .
382 . Occupancy generally essential — " Constructive occupancy . "
383 . Occupancy - Abandonment — “ Temporary absence . "
384 . Occupancy as a home - Use for business purposes .
385 . The selection of the homestead - By record - By occupancy .
386 . The limits of the homestead .
387 . May be a homestead in an estate less than fee simple - Joint es
tates .
388 . Owner of a homestead may alienate it unless restrained — Partial
restraints .
389 . Some restriction on voluntary alienation usual .
390 . Usually husband and wife must concur in the transfer .
3
9 ! . Effect of non -compliance with statute .
392 . Effect o
f
non -compliance with statute – The alienation void in
many states .
393 . Effect of wife ' s insanity .
394 . Subsequent abandonment will not make the conveyance valid
Nor death o
r
divorce - Transfer b
y
wife alone .
395 . To what extent husband may lease - Sell timber - Grant rights of
way .
396 . The defective conveyance valid as to the excess over homestead .
397 . Non -compliance with statutes does not make alienation void in
some states .
398 . The mode o




399 . The acknowledgment to the conveyance o
f
the homestead .
400 . Conveyance o
f
the homestead between husband and wife .





CORPORATIONS TO PURCHASE AND CONVEY
REAL PROPERTY .
SECTION
401 . Capacity of corporation to take title at common law - Statutes of
mortmain .
402 . Capacity to take title — May take in fee though its duration is
limited .
403 . Effect o
f corporation ' s dissolution on title .
404 . May purchase and hold only lands appropriate to corporate pur




. When its power is exceeded the state only may complain - Con
veyance to corporation in such case voidable , not void .
406 . Capacity o




. Capacity of public and quasi -public corporations to alienate real
property .
CHAPTER XXV .






. At common law aliens could acquire title b
y




409 . Nature o
f




. Alien may convey before office found .
411 . Common law as modified b
y
statute .
412 . Power of the states to remove disabilities .
CHAPTER XXVI .






. Attainder at common law - Statutory changes in England .
414 . Effect o
f
sentence for crime in this country - - Statutes .
XX TABLE OF CONTENTS .
CHAPTER XXVII .
THE DISABILITY OF A GRANTOR ARISING FROM ADVERSE
POSSESSION .
SECTION
415 . Disability of disseisee at common iaw - Statute 32 Henry VIII.
416 . Statutes in this country adopting the principles of this statute .
417 . Digseisee ' s conveyance not void for all purposes .
418 . The principle recognized in some states without legislation .
419 . To what transfers the rule does not apply .
420 . Character of possession rendering the transfer void .
421 . The old rule generally abrogated in the United States .
CHAPTER XXVIII .
THE EXAMINATION OF THE TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY .
SECTION
422 . General characteristics of the recording system .
423. Imperfections in title .
424 . Defects shown by original instruments in the chain of title , and
by records of them .
425 . Defects shown by other records — The abstract of title.
426 . Defects not shown by records - Forged instruments .
427. Defects not shown by records - Identity of person - Delivery - In
fancy - Homestead .
428 . Defects not shown by records - Questions on death of landowner .
429 . Purchaser 's risk in relying on the records alone .
430 . Possession , not shown by records, always easily investigated .
431 . Possession by grantor , after conveyance , as notice .
CHAPTER XXIX .
REGISTRATION OF TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY .
SECTION
432 . Defects in present system suggest desirability of reform in regis
tration laws.
433 . The " Torrens System ” - Briefly historical .
434 . General principles of the title registration acts .
435 . Proceedings to determine and register title are judicial — The ap
plication — The court .





. Notice to adverse claimants - Process — Constitutional objections .
437 . The investigation o
f






. Appearance of interested parties — The conclusive effect of decree .




. No title can be acquired to registered land b
y
adverse possession .
441 . Transmission o
f
title on death o
f
owner of registered land .
442 . The assurance o
r indemnity fund .
443 . Voluntary , o
r compulsory , registration .







[ References are to Sections . ]
Abbott v . Allen , 14 Johnson (New York ) 24
8
. . . . . . .
v . Cremer (Wisconsin ) , 95 Northwestern 38 . .
Abney v . De Loach , 84 Alabama 393 . . . . . . . .
Adams v . Akerlund , 168 Illinois 632 . . . .
v . Bishop , 19 Illinois 395 . . . . . . .
v . Buford , 6 Dana (Kentucky ) 406 .
V . Gilbert (Kansas ) , 72 Pacific 769 . .
v . Medsker , 25 West Virginia 127 . . . . 234
v . Noble , 120 Michigan 545 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
v . Ross , 30 New Jersey Law 505 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
1 ,
v . Teague , 123 Alabama 591 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 , 363 , 364
Adams Paper Co . v . Cassard (Pennsylvania ) , 5
5 Atlantic 949 . . . 363
Adkins v . Tomlinson , 121 Missouri 487 . . . . 198
Agan v . Shannon , 103 Missouri 661 . . . . . . . .
Akerly v . Vilas , 23 Wisconsin 207 . . . . . . . .
Albany Bridge Co . v . People , 197 Illinois 199 . . 102
Albany County Savings Bank v . McCarty , 149 New York 71 . .
Albright v . Albright , 70 Wisconsin 528 . . . . . . .
v . Cortright , 64 New Jersey Law 330 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Alexander v . Vennan , 61 Iowa 160 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Algonquin Coal Co . y . Northern & c . Co . , 162 Pennsylvania State
114 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
Allbrigbt v . Hannah , 103 Iowa 98 . . . .
Allebach v . Hunsicker , 132 Pennsylvania State 349 .
Allen v . Allen , 48 Minnesota 462 .
v . Baskerville , 123 North Carolina 126 .
v . Berryhill , 27 Iowa 534 .
v . Drake , 109 Missouri 626 . . .
v . Withrow , 11
0
United States 119 .
Allore v . Jewell , 94 United States 506 . 341
Alt v . Banholzer , 39 Minnesota 511 . . . .
v . Graff , 65 Minnesota 191 . .
v . Stoker , 127 Missouri 466 . . . . .
Alvarado v . Nordholt , 95 California 116 . . .




. . . . . . . . . .












[References are to Sections. ]
American Freehold Co . v . Dykes, 111 Alabama 178 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 316
American Freehold Land & Mortgage Co . v . Thornton , 108 Alabama
258 . .. . . . .. .. .. . . . ... . .. . . .. 293
American Home Missionary Society v . Wadhams , 10 Barbour (New
York ) 597 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356
American Savings and Loan Association v . Burghardt , 19 Montana
323 . . . . . .. . 394 , 399
Amerman v . Deane , 132 New York 355 . . . . . 229
Ames v . Ames , 160 Illinois 599 . . . 148
v. San Diego , 101 California 390 . . 407
Amick v . Woodworth , 58 Ohio State 86 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 253 , 281
Ammant v . New Alexandria Turnpike Co ., 13 Sergeant & Rawle
( Pennsylvania ) 210 . . . . . 407
Anderson v. Cosman , 103 Iowa 266 . . . . 387
v . Gaines , 156 Missouri 664.. . . . . . . .
v. Logan , 99 North Carolina 474 . . . . . .. .
v . Smith , 159 Illinois 93 . .. . . . . . . . 400
v . Stadlemann , 17 Washington 433 . . . . 393
Andrews v . Appel , 22 Hun (New York ) 429 . . . .. . . .
v. Dyer , 81 Maine 104 .. 40
v. Pearson , 68 Maine 19 . . . . .
Andrus v . Smelting Co ., 130 United States 643 .
Angell v. Rosenbury , 12 Michigan 241
Anglade v . St. Avit , 67 Missouri 434 .. . . . . . . .
Answer of Court , 4 New Hampshire 565 . . 330
Appeal of . See name of party .
Arambula v . Sullivan , 80 Texas 615 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Arents v. Long Island R . Co., 15
6
New York 1 . . . . . . .
Argo v . Coffin , 142 Illinois 368 . . . .
Armstrong v . Combs , 15 New York Appellate Division 246 . . . . . 283
v . Darby , 26 Missouri 517 . . .
Arrington v . Arrington , 122 Alabama 510 . 30
1
Arthur v . Caverly , 98 Michigan 82 . . . . . . . . . 194
Ashcraft y . DeArmond , 44 Iowa 229 . . 347
Ashelford v . Willis , 194 Illinois 492 . . . . . .
Ashland v . Greiner , 58 Ohio State 67 .
Ashmead v . Reynolds , 134 Indiana 139 . . . . 341
Askey v . Williams , 74 Texas 294 . . 314
Atherstone v . Bostock , 2 Manning & Granger 511 . 21
Atherton v . Roche , 192 Illinois 252 . 143
Atkins v . Atkins , 18 Nebraska 474 . . . . . . . . . . . 373
Atkison v . Henry , 80 Missouri 151 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
Atlanta Consolidated Street R . Co . v . Jackson , 108 Georgia
634 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Attorney General v . Woods , 108 Massachusetts 436 . . . . . 110
Aultman v . Obermeyer , 6 Nebraska 260 . . . .













. . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .
. . . 17
5
TABLE OF CASES . XXV
[ References are to Sections. ]
Austerberry v . Oldham , 29 Chancery Division 750
Austin y. Dean , 40 Michigan 386 .
v . Dolbee , 101 Michigan 292 . . . .
v . Rutland R . Co ., 45 Vermont 21
5
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Aveline v . Whisson , 4 Manning & Granger 801 . .
Avery v . Everett , 110 New York 317 . . . rrrrrrr
Axtell ' s Case , 95 Michigan 244 . . . . .
Ayer v . Brick Co . , 157 Massachusetts 57 . . . .
112
307
Bachelor v . Korb , 58 Nebraska 122 . . . . . . . .
Backus v . McCoy , 3 Ohio 211 . . . .
Bacon v . Sandberg , 179 Massachusetts 396 . . . .
v . Thornton , 16 Utah 138 . .
Bader v .Dyer , 10
6
Iowa 715 . . . .
Bagby v . Emberson , 79 Missouri 139 . .
Bailey v . Platte & c . Canal Co . , 12 Colorado 230 . . .
Baird v . Baird , 145 New York 659 . . . . . . . . . .
Baker v . Atchison & c . R . Co . 122 Missouri 396 . .
v . Bradt , 168 Massachusetts 58 . . . . . . .
v . Haskell , 47 New Hampshire 479 .
v . Kennett , 54 Missouri 82 . . . . . . . . . . .
v . Mather , 25 Michigan 51 . . . .
y . Stone , 136 Massachusetts 405 .
v . Westcott , 73 Texas 129 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
v . Whiting , 3 Sumner (United States ) 47
5
Baldwin v . Emery , 89 Maine 496 . . . . .
v . Erie Shooting Club , 127 Michigan 659 . . . . . .
Ball v . Foreman , 37 Ohio State 132 .
v . Houston , 11 Oklahoma 233 .
Ballance v . Peoria , 180 Illinois 29 . .
Baltimore v . Chester , 53 Vermont 315 . .
Bangor v . Warren , 34 Maine 324 . . . .
Bank y . Delano , 48 New York 326 . .
v . Fleming , 63 Kansas 139 . .
v . O 'Brien , 94 Tennessee 38 . . . . . . . . .
Bank o
f
Benson v . Hove , 45 Minnesota 40 . .
Bank o
f
Boone v . Radtke , 87 Iowa 363 . . . . . . . . . .
Bank o
f
Greenbrier v . Effingham , 51 West Virginia 267
Bank o
f
Louisville v . Gray , 84 Kentucky 565 .
Bank o
f
Woodland v . Oberhaus , 12
5
California 320 . . . . . . . .
Banks v . Ogden , 2 Wallace (United States ) 5
7 .
v . Poitiaux , 3 Rand (United States ) 136 . .
Banzer v . Banzer , 156 New York 429 . . . .
Bardsley v . Bank , 113 Iowa 216 .
Barker v . Southern R . Co . , 125 North Carolina 596 . .
Barnard v . Gantz , 140 New York 249 . . .
Barnes v . Barnes , 161 Massachusetts 381 . . . .




[ References are to sections. ]
Barnett v . Barnett , 104 California 300 . . .. 132
v . Bull, 81 Kentucky 127 . . . .. 328
Barney v. Pforr , 117 California 56 . . . . . . . . . . . . 249
v . Keokuk , 94 United States 324 . .. . . . . . 109
Barnsdall v. Boley (United States ), 119 Federal 191 . .
Barnum v . LeMaster ( Tennessee ) , 75 Southwestern 1045
352, 353, 355 , 356 , 370
Barrett v. Cox , 112 Michigan 220 . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . 395 , 398 , 399
v . Davis , 104 Missouri 549 .. . .
Barron v. Mercure (Michigan ) 93 Northwestern 1071 .
Barry v . Guild , 126 Illinois 439 . . . .
Bartels v . People , 152 Illinois 557 .
Bartlett v . Bartlett , 34 West Virginia 33 . . .
v . Cowles, 15 Gray (Massachusetts ) 445 . . . .
v Drake , 100 Massachusetts 174 . .
v . Williams, 27 Indiana Appellate 637 .. .. . . . . .
Barton v. Drake, 21 Minnesota 299 . . .
Bason v . Mining Co ., 90 North Carolina 417 . .
Bassett v. Hawk , 114 Pennsylvania State 502 . . . .. 239
Batchelor v . Brereton , 112 United States 396 . . . 364
Batley v. Foerderer , 162 Pennsylvania State 460 .. 200
Baum v . Lynn , 72 Mississippi 932 . . .
Bay v . Posner , 78 Maryland 42 .
Beach v . Miller, 51 Illinois 206 . . . . . . .
Beal v. Beal, 79 Indiana 280 . . . .
v . Blair , 33 Iowa 318 . . . ..
v . Harmon , 38 Missouri 435 . . . . . . . .
Bean v . Stoneman , 104 California 49 . .
Beard v . Johnson , 87 Alabama 729 .. . . . . . .. .
Beardsley v . Hotchkiss , 96 New York 201
y . Knight , 10 Vermont 185 . . .
Beasley v . Beasley , 180 Illinois 16
3
. . . . . . . . . . . 342
v . Phillips , 20 Indiana Appellate 185 .
Beattie v . Crewdson , 124 California 57 . . . . . . .
Beckel v . Pettigrew , 6 Ohio State 247 . . . . .
Beckman v . Kreamer , 43 Illinois 447 .
Beckwith v . Howard , 6 Rhode Island 8 . . . . . . . . .
Bedford v . British Museum , 2 Mylne and Keen 552 .
Bedford Lodge v . Lentz , 194 Pennsylvania State 399
Beeson v . Green , 103 Iowa 406 . . . . . .
v . Patterson , 36 Pennsylvania State 24 . .
· Beezley v . Phillips (United States ) , 117 Federal 105 .
Beinlein v . Johns , 102 Kentucky 570 . . . . . .
Bell v . Bell , 84 Alabama 64 . . .
v . McDuffie , 71 Georgia 264 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Bellefontaine Imp . C














. . . . 378











[References are to Sections. )
Benedict v. Jones, 129 North Carolina 470 . . . . 293
v . Torrent , 83 Michigan 181 . . . . . . . . . 157
Benevolent Society v . Murray , 145 Missouri 622 . . 46
Bennet v . Davis , 2 Peere Williams 31
6
. . . . . . . 352
Bennett v . Harms , 51 Wisconsin 251 . . . 373
v . Pierce , 45 West Virginia 654 . . . . . . . . . 363
v . Pierce , 50 West Virginia 604 . . . 158
v . Robinson , 27 Michigan 26 . . . . .
v . Waller , 23 Illinois 97 . . . . . . . . . .
Beneieck v . Cook , 110 Missouri 173 . . . .
Bentley v . DeForest , 2 Ohio 221 . . .
v . Greer , 10
0
Georgia 35 . . . . . . .
Benton v . Elizabeth , 61 New Jersey Law 411 .
Bernard Township v . Stebbins , 109 United States 341 . . 245
Bernstein v . Humes , 60 Alabama 528 . . .
Beronio v . Ventura & c . Co . , 129 California 232 . .
Berrigan v . Fleming , 70 Tennessee 271 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
Berry v . Meir , 70 Arkansas 129 . . . . . . .
v . Seawall (United States ) , 65 Federal 742 . . . . .
v . Tennessee & c . R . Co . , 134 Alabama 618 . .
Berryman v . Schumaker , 67 Texas 312 . . .
Bertschy v . Bank , 89 Wisconsin 473 . . . . .
Bethell v . Bethell , 54 Indiana 428 ; 92 Indiana 31
8
. . . . . . . . . . . . 213
Betz v . Bryan , 39 Ohio State 320 . . . . 21
6
Bexar Building Association v . Heady , 21 Texas Civil Appeals
154 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Bidwell v . Sullivan , 17 New York Appellate Division 629 . . .
Biles v . T . 0 . & G . H . R . Co . , 5 Washington 509 . . .
Bingham v . Weiderwax , 1 New York 509 . . . .
Bingler v . Bowman , 194 Pennsylvania State 210 .
Birchall v . Ashton , 40 Chancery Division 437 . . . . .
Bissell v . Hively , 123 Michigan 106 . . . . .
Blagborne v . Hunger , 101 Michigan 375 . .
Black v . Singley , 91 Michigan 50 . . . . . .
Blackburn v . Nelson , 100 California 336 .
Blackman v . Henderson , 116 Iowa 578 .
Blair v . Bruns , 8 Colorado 397 . . . .
v . Osborne , 84 North Carolina 417 . . . 133
Blaisdell v . Leach , 101 California 405 . . . . . . . .
Blakeley V . Adams (Kentucky ) , 68 Southwestern 393 127
Blanchard v . Railroad , 31 Michigan 43 .
v . Tyler , 12 Michigan 339 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Blass v . Terry , 156 New York 122 . . . .
Blight v . Schenck , 10 Pennsylvania State 285 . . . .
Blondeau v . Sheridan , 81 Missouri 545 . . .
Blood y . Goodrich , 9 Wendall (New York ) 68 . . . 245



























[References are to Sections. ]
Bloomer v . Henderson , 8 Michigan 395 . .
Bloomingdale v . Chittenden , 74 Michigan 698 15
Blough v. Parry , 144 Indiana 463 . . . . . . . . .
Blumer y. Albright, 64 Nebraska 249 . .
Blythe v. Hinckley , 127 California 431 .
v. Hinckley , 180 United States 333 . . .
Boardman v . Scott , 102 Georgia 404 . 117
Boddie v . Bush , 136 Alabama 560 . . 336 , 337
Bohannon v . Travis , 94 Kentucky 59 . . . . . . 371
Bolio v . Marvin , 130 Michigan 82 .
Bolles v. Beach , 22 New Jersey Law 680 . . ..
Bond v . Bond, 7 Allen (Massachusetts ) 1 .
Bone v. Tyrrell, 113 Missouri 175 328
Book v . West , 29 Washington 70 . . . 118
Booker v. Tarwater, 138 Indiana 385 . 40
Bool v . Mix , 17 Wendall (New York ) 119 .. . . .315 , 322
Boon v . McHenry , 55 Iowa 202. . . . . . . . . 216
Boothroyd v . Engles , 23 Michigan 19 . . . . . 23
4 , 237 , 271
Boreel v . Lawton , 90 New York 293 . . 211
Boreham v . Byrna , 83 California 23 .
Borer v . Lange , 44 Minnesota 281 . . . . . . . . .
Borland ' s Lessee v . Marshall , 2 Ohio State 308 . .
Boston v . Richardson , 13 Allen (Massachusetts ) 146 . 8
8
v . Richardson , 105 Massachusetts 351 . . . . . . . .
Bostick v . Williams , 36 Illinois 65 . . .
Bourne v . Bourne , 92 Kentucky 211 . .
Bowdoin College v . Merritt (United States ) , 75 Federal 48
0
.
Bowen v . Beck , 94 New York 86 .
v . Chase , 94 United States 812 . . . .
Bowler v . Bowler , 176 Illinois 541 . . . . . . . . .
Bowling v . Hax , 55 Missouri 446 . . 250
Bowne v . Walcott , 1 North Dakota 497 . . . .
Boyd v . De La Montague , 73 New York 498 . . . . . 369
v . Haseltine , 110 Missouri 203 . . . . . . . .
Boyer v . Berryman , 12
3
Indiana 451 . . . . . . . . . . .335 , 34
6
v . Sims , 61 Kansas , 593 . . . . . . . . . . 153
Bozeman v . Browning , 31 Arkansas 364 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 319
Bradley y . Railroad , 91 Missouri 493
v . Walker , 138 New York 291 . . . . 366
Bradshaw v . Van Winkle , 133 Indiana 134 .
Brady v . Huber , 197 Illinois 291 . .
v . Spurck , 27 Illinois 478 . . . . . . . . . .
Bragdon v . Blaisdell , 91 Maine 32
6
. . .
Bramberry ' s Estate , 156 Pennsylvania State 628
Branch v . Jesup , 106 United States 468 . . . .
v . Polk , 61 Arkansas 388 . . . .














. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
320
304
TABLE OF CASES . xxix
374
208
[References are to sections.]
Brasington v . Hanson , 149 Pennsylvania State 289 . . . . .
Brastow v . Rockport Ice Co ., 77 Maine 100 . . . . . . . .
Brattle Square Church v . Grant, 3 Gray (Massachusetts ) 142
Bray v. Adams, 114 Missouri 486 . . . . . . . . . .
v . Clapp , 80 Maine 277 . . .. .. . . . . .
Breitenwischer v . Clough , 111 Michigan 6 . .
Breitling v. Marx , 123 Alabama 222 . . . . . . ..
Bressler v . Kent, 61 Illinois 426 . . .. . . . .
Brew v. Van Deman , 6 Heiskell (Tennessee ) 433 . . . 223
Brewery Co . v. Primas , 163 Illinois 652 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 179 , 182 , 229 , 230
Bricker v . Bricker , 11 Ohio State 240 . . . 208
Brigham v . Fayerweather , 144 Massachusetts 48 . . .
v. Palmer , 3 Allen (Massachusetts ) 450 . . . . . . 250
Brine v . Insurance Co., 96 United States 627 . . .. . .
Bristow v . Cormican , 3 Appeal Cases 641 . ..
Broadwell v . Phillips , 30 Ohio State 255 . .. . .. . .
Brockway v . Harrington , 82 Iowa 23 . . . .
Brokken v . Baumann , 10 North Dakota 453 . . . . . . . . .
Bromberg v. Smee , 130 Alabama 601 . . . . . .
Brooklyn Park Commissioners v . Armstrong , 45 New York 234 407
Brophy v . Richeson , 137 Indiana 11
4
. . . . . . . .
Brothers v . Bank , 84 Wisconsin 381 . . . .
Brown v . Bank , 148 Massachusetts 300 . . . . .
v . Barboo , 98 Wisconsin 273 . .
v . Brown , 39 Michigan 792 . . . . . . . . . . . .
v . Brown , 61 Texas 56 . . . . .
v . Farmers ' Supply Co . , 23 Oregon 541 . . 240
v . Hartman , 57 Nebraska 341 . . . . .
v . Jordhal , 32 Minnesota 135
v . Mattocks , 103 Pennsylvania State 16 . .
v . Parker , 127 Michigan 390 . . . .
v . Southern Pacific R . Co . , 36 Oregon 128 . 224
v . Sims , 22 Indiana Appellate 317 . . . .
v . Westerfield , 47 Nebraska 399 . . . . . . . .
Browne y . Dolan , 68 Iowa 646 . . . . . .
Broyles v . Cox , 153 Missouri 242 . . . . . . .
Bruce v . Osgood , 113 Indiana 360 . . .
Bruckner ' s Lessee v . Lawrence , 1 Douglass (Michigan ) 19 . . . . .
Bruguier v . Pepin , 106 Iowa 432 . . . . . . .
Bruner v . Bateman , 66 Iowa 488 . . 394
Brunswick Gas Light Co . v . United Gas Co . , 85 Maine 532 . . .
Bryan v . Ramirez , 8 California 462 . . . . . . . . . .
Bryant v . Richardson , 126 Indiana 145 . . . . . . . . .
Buchanan v . Hazzard , 95 Pennsylvania State 240 . . . .
Buchanan v . Hubbard , 96 Indiana 1 .
Buck v . Squiers , 22 Vermont 494 . . . . . . . . . .
Buckey v . Buckey , 38 West Virginia 16
8














XXX TABLE OF CASES .
250
172
[ References are to Sections.]
Buckler 's Case , 2 Coke 55 . . .
Buell v. Irwin , 24 Michigan 145 . . . . . . . 276
Building Association v. Scanlan , 144 Indiana 11 . . 370
Bullock v . Sprowls , 93 Texas 188 . . . 321
Bumstead v . Cook , 169 Massachusetts 410 . 118
Bunnell v . Bunnell (Kentucky ), 64 Southwestern 420 . 298
Burdeno v . Amperse , 14 Michigan 91. 371
Burdett v. Spilsbury , 6 Manning & Granger 456 .
Burdis v . Burdis , 96 Virginia 81 . . . .
Burk v . Hill , 48 Indiana 52 . .
v . Sproat, 96 Michigan 404 . . . . . .
Burke v . McCowen , 115 California 481 . 96
Burkett v . Burkett , 78 California 310 . . . . . . . . 400
Burling v . King , 96 Barbour (New York ) 633 .
Burnap v. Sharpsteen , 149 Illinois 225 . . 310
Burnett v. Burnett , 17 South Carolina 545 . .
Burnham v . Kidwell , 113 Illinois 425 .
Burr v . Lamaster , 30 Nebraska 688 . . . 232
Burrows v . Pickens , 129 Alabama 648 . 36
6
Burton v . Perry , 146 Illinois 71 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 421
Bush v . Genther , 174 Pennsylvania State 154 . . .
Butler v . Barnes , 60 Connecticut 170 . . . . . . . . . . . .
v . Grand Rapids & Indiana R . Co . , 85 Michigan 246 .
v . Huestis , 68 Illinois 594 . . .
v . Seward , 10 Allen (Massachusetts ) 466 . . . 189
Butler & Baker ' s Case , 3 Coke 26 . . . . . . . .
Butrick v . Tilton , 141 Massachusetts 93 .
Butterfield v . Beal , 3 Indiana 203 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Butterworth & Lowe v . Kritzer Milling Co . , 11
5
Michigan 1 . .
Byers v . Byers , 183 Pennsylvania State 509








Cable v . Cable , 146 Pennsylvania State 451 . . .
Cadematori v . Gauger , 160 Missouri 352 . . . . .
Cagle v . Parker , 97 North Carolina 271 . . . ,
Caldwell v . Manufacturing C
o . , 121 North Carolina 339 . . . . 249
California Canneries C
o . v . Scatena , 11
7
California 447 . . . . . . . 23
5
Fruit Transportation Co . v .Anderson (United States ) , 7
9 Federal 404 . 390
Callis v . Day , 38 Wisconsin 643 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 321
Cameron v . Calkins , 44 Michigan 533 . . . . . . . . . . . . 255
v . Gray , 202 Pennsylvania 566 . . . . . . . . .
Camp v . Carpenter , 52 Michigan 375 . . .
Campbell y . Equitable Loan & c . Co . (South Dakota ) , 94 Northwest
ern 401 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 416
v . Everts , 47 Texas 102 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 421
Canal Co . v . Russell , 68 Illinois 426 . . . . .
Candee v . Hayward , 37 New York 653 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 419
303
293














(References are to Sections . ]
Caperton v . Hall , 83 Alabama 171 . . . . 262
Caple v . Switzer , 122 Michigan 636 .
Cardinal v . Hadley , 158 Massachusetts 352 .
Carder v . Culbertson , 100 Missouri 269 . . . .
Carnagie v . Diven , 31 Oregon 366 . .
Carnall v . Wilson , 21 Arkansas 62 . . . .
Carney v . Hopple , 17 Ohio State 39 . .
Carpenter v . Bell , 96 Tennessee 294 .




. . . . . . . . . . . .
v . Dexter , 8 Wallace (United States ) 513 . .
v . Van Olinder , 127 Illinois 42 . . 147
Carr v . Maltby , 165 New York 557 . . . . . . . . . . 426
v . Moore ( Iowa ) , 93 Northwestern 52 . . .
v . Winlock , 109 Kentucky 488 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 388
Carroll County Academy v . Gallatin Academy Co . , 104 Kentucky
621 . . . . . . . . . . .
Carter v . Day , 59 Ohio State 96 . . . .
v . Denman , 23 New Jersey Law 26
0
. . . . . . . .
v . Goodin , 3 Ohio State 75 . . . . . . . 376
Carty v . Connolly , 91 California 15 . . . . . . . .
Cary v . Cary , 189 Pennsylvania State 6
5 . 25
9
Case v . Kelly , 133 United States 21 . 405
Case v . Owen , 139 Indiana 22 . 152
Case Threshing Machine C
o . v . Joyce , 89 Tennessee 337 . . . . . . . . . . 387
Cass County Bank v . Weber 83 Iowa 63 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Cassedy v . Jackson , 45 Mississippi 397 . . . . . . . . .
Cassidy ' s Succession , 40 Louisiana Annual 827 . .
Castro v . Geil , 110 California 292 . . . . . 337
Cassilly v . Cassilly , 57 Ohio State 582 . . 63
Catlin C
o . v . Lloyd , 180 Illinois 398 . . . . . . . .
Cazassa v . Cazassa , 92 Tennessee 573 . 301
Center v . Banking Co . , 185 Illinois 534 , . . . . . . . .
v . Davis , 113 California 307 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Central Land Co . v . Laidley , 32 West Virginia 134 . . .
Central Transportation Co . v . Pullman ' s Palace Car Co . , 13
9
United
States 24 . . . . . .
Chaffee v . Browne , 109 California 211 . . . .
Chamberlin v . Gleason , 163 New York 214 . . . . .
Chamblee v . Broughton , 120 North Carolina 170 . .
Chandler y . Simmons , 97 Massachusetts 508 . . . . . . 321
Chandos v . Mack , 77 Wisconsin 573 . . . . 10
6
Chapin v . Shafer , 49 New York 407 . . .
Chapman v . Chapman , 91 Virginia 39
7
. . . . .
V . Charter , 46 West Virginia 769 . 69
v . Jones , 149 Indiana 434 . . . . . . 418
Chappel y . Railroad ,62 Connecticut 19
5
. . . . .















. . . . . . . . . .
125












76 , 179, 182
. . . . . . . . . 38
[References are to Sections. ]
Chase v . Swayne , 88 Texas 218 . . . .
Chesebro v . Palmer , 68 Connecticut 207 . . .
Chevalier v . Carter , 124 Alabama 520 . .
Chicago v . Middlebrooke , 14
3
Illinois 265 . . . . . . .
Chicago C
o . v . Powell , 120 Michigan 51 . . .
Chicago & c . R . Co . v . Ward , 128 Illinois 349 . . .
v . Titterington , 84 Texas 218 . .
Chick v . Sisson , 95 Michigan 412 . .
Child v . Baker , 24 Nebraska 188 . . . . .
v . Singleton , 15 Nevada 461 . . . . .
v . Starr , 5 Hill (New York ) 369 . . . . . . .
Childs v . Rue , 84 Minnesota 323 . . . . . . .
Chiles v . Conley ' s Heirs , 2 Dana (Kentucky ) 21 .
Chippewa Lumber Co . v . Tremper , 75 Michigan 36 .
Christopher v . Christopher , 64 Maryland 583 . . . . . . .
Church v . Case , 110 Michigan 621 . . .
v . Meeker , 34 Connecticut 421 . . . .
Cincinnati & c . R . Co . v . Iliff , 13 Ohio State 235 .
Citizens ' Loan Co . v . Witte , 116 Wisconsin 60 . . . . .
City o
f . See name o
f
city .
Clapp v . Wilder , 176 Massachusetts 332 . . .
Clark v . Butts , 73 Minnesota 361 . . . . . . .
v . Clark , 16 Oregon 224 . . . . .
v . Fisher , 54 Kansas 403 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
v . Graham , 6 Wheaton (United States ) 577 .
v . Lineberger , 44 Indiana 223
v . Wilson , 127 Illinois 449 . .
Clarke v . Clarke , 178 United States 186 . .
v . Courtney , 5 Peters (United States ) 319 . .
v . Priest , 21 New York Appellate Division 174
Clay v . Hammond , 199 Illinois 370 . . .
Clement v . Bank , 61 Vermont 298 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Clements v . Lacy , 51 Texas 15
0
. . . . . . .
Cleveland v . Burnham , 64 Wisconsin 347 . .
v . Choate , 77 California 7
3 . .
Cline v . Jones , 111 Illinois 563 . .
Clink v . Russell , 58 Michigan 242 . .
Clute v . Fisher , 65 Michigan 48 . .
Cobb v . Davenport , 32 New Jersey Law 369 .
v . Taylor , 133 Indiana 605
Cochran v . Benton , 126 Indiana 5
8 .
v . Pascault , 54 Maryland 1 .
Cocke v . Bailey , 42 Mississippi 81 . . . . . . . .
Coe v . Columbus & c . Railroad C
o . , 10 Ohio State 372
Colby v . McOmber , 71 Iowa 469 . . . .
v . Osgood , 29 Barbour (New York ) 249 . . . . . . . . .
364













2 . . . . . . . . 407
291













[References are to Sections.]
Cole v. Cole , 12
6
Michigan 569 . . 387
v . Hadley , 162 Massachusetts 579 . . .
v . The Lake Co . , 54 New Hampshire 242 . . . . . 135
v . Mette , 65 Arkansas 503 . . .
Colee v . Colee , 122 Indiana 109 . . . . . . .
Coleman v . Improvement Co . , 94 New York 229
v . Manhattan Beach Co . , 94 New York 229 .
v . State , 79 Alabama 49 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Colgan v . McKeon , 24 New Jersey Law 566 . . 410
Collamore v . Collamore , 158 Massachusetts 74 . . . . 143
Collins v . Asheville Land Co . , 128 North Carolina 563 . .
v . Cornwell , 131 Indiana 20 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 364
Colorado Central R . Co . v . Allen , 13 Colorado 229 . . .
Commonwealth v . Clemmer , 190 Pennsylvania State 202 . . . . . . . . . .
v . New York & c . R . Co . , 132 Pennsylvania State 591 . . . . . . . . . .
Compton v . White , 86 Michigan 33 . . . . . .
Concord Manufacturing Co . v . Robertson , 66 New Hampshire 1
Conduitt v . Ross , 102 Indiana 166 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
Congregational Society v . Stark , 34 Vermont 243 .
Conlan v . Grace , 36 Minnesota 276 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
Conley v . Finn , 171 Massachusetts 70 . .
v . Nailor , 118 United States 127 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 338
Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co . v . Smith , 117 Missouri 261 . 404
Conrad v . Long , 33 Michigan 78 . . . . .
Converse v . Converse , 21 Vermont 16
8
. .
Cook v . Higley , 10 Utah 228 . . . .
v . Walling , 117 Indiana 9 . . . . 363
Cooley v . Kinney , 109 Michigan 34 . . . . . 153
Cooper v . Hamilton , 97 Tennessee 285 . . . . 286
v . Smith , 75 Michigan 247 . . . . 266
Copeland v . McAdory , 10
0
Alabama 553 . . . . . . . . . . . . 203 , 209
Coppage y . Alexander ' s Heirs , 2 B . Monroe (Kentucky ) 313 . .
Corbett v . Norcross , 35 New Hampshire 99 . . .
Cordova v . Hood , 17 Wallace (United States ) 1 .
Corey v . Smalley , 106 Michigan 257 .
Cornell v . Maltby , 165 New York 557 . . . . . . . .
Cosgrove v . Cummings , 195 Pennsylvania State 497 . . 245
Cosner v . McCrum , 40 West Virginia 339 . 247
Costigan v . Pennsylvania R . Co . , 54 New Jersey Law 233 . .
Council Bluffs Savings Bank v . Smith , 5
9 Nebraska 90 . . . . 293
Coursolle v . Weyerhauser , 69 Minnesota 328 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 314
Cover v . Manaway , 115 Pennsylvania State 338 . . .
Covington v . Neftzger , 14
0
Illinois 608 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 344
Cowan y . Southern R . Co . , 118 Alabama 544 . . . . 392 , 395
Cowell v . Springs Co . , 100 United States 55 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 , 18
6 , 405
Cowen v . Truefit , 1899 , 2 Chancery Division 309 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85













xxxiv TABLE OF CASES .
75
. . . . . . . .
:
73
[References are to Sections.]
Cox v . Holcomb , 87 Alabama 589 .. . .. . . . . . . . . . 367
v . Hart , 145 United States 37
6
. . . . . . . .
v . James , 45 New York 557 . . . . . 94
Crane v . Reeder , 21 Michigan 24 . . . . . . . . . . . 410
Cravens v . Rossiter , 11
6
Missouri 338 . 302 , 304
Crawford v . Crawford , 24 Nevada 410 . . . . 371
v . Nimmons , 180 Illinois 143 . . . . . . . . . . . 208
v . Scovell , 94 Pennsylvania State 48 . . . . . . . . . . . . 337 , 346
Cray v . Willis , 2 Peere Williams 529 . . . . . 151
Creath v . Creath , 86 Tennessee 659 . 390
Cresinger v . Welch , 15 Ohio 156 . . . . . .
Cribben v . Deal , 21 Oregon 211 . . . . .
Crocker v . Cotting , 166 Massachusetts 183 .
v . Smith , 94 Alabama 295 . . . . . . .
Crooks v . Crooks , 34 Ohio State 610 . . . .
v . Whitford , 47 Michigan 283 . . . . . . . . .
Cross v . Noble , 67 Pennsylvania State 74 . . . . .
Crossen v . Oliver , 37 Oregon 514
Crouse v . Murphy , 140 Pennsylvania State 335 . . .
Crowley v . Lumber Co . , 66 Minnesota 400 . . . . . . . . . .
v . Vaughan , 11 Bush (Kentucky ) 517 . . . . . . . . .
Croxall y . Shererd , 5 Wallace (United States ) 268 . . 142
Culbertson v . Witbeck Co . , 127 United States 326 . . . . .
Cullen v . Sprigg , 83 California 56 . . . . . . . . . . .
Cunningham v . Neeld , 198 Pennsylvania State 4
1 . .
Currey , In re , L . R , 32 Chancery Division 361 .
Currier v . Woodward , 62 New Hampshire 63 . . . . . . . 382
Curry v Colburn , 99 Wisconsin 31
9
. .
v . Mortgage Co . , 107 Alabama 429 . . . .
Curtis v . Bunnell & c . Co . , 6 Idaho 298 .
v . Simpson , 72 Vermont 232 . . . . . . . . 353
Cutright v . Stanford , 81 Illinois 240 . . . .












Dagley v . Black , 197 Illinois 53 . . . . . . .
Dahlam ' s Estate , 175 Pennsylvania State 455 . . . . . . .
Dakin y . Dakin , 97 Michigan 284 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Daniel v . Whartenby , 17 Wallace (United States ) 639 . .
Danville v . Mott , 136 Illinois 289 . . .
Darling v . Butler (United States ) , 45 Federal 332 .
Darlington ' s Appeal , 86 Pennsylvania State 512 .
Davenport v . Gwilliams , 133 Indiana 142 . . .
Daugherty v . Daugherty , 69 Iowa 67
7
. . . . . . . . .
David v . Insurance Co . , 83 New York 265 . . . .
Davidson v . Iron Co . , 109 Alabama 383 . . . . . . . . . .
Davis v . Burton , 3 Scammon ( Illinois ) 41 . . . . .
v . Converse ( Texas ) , 46 Southwestern 910 . . .





















[References are to Sections. ]
Davis v . Davis , 92 Iowa 147 . .. 304
v . Davis , 61 Maine 395 . . .. 376
v . Dudley , 70 Maine 236 . . . . . . .
v . Hollingsworth , 113 Georgia 210 43
v . Jenkins , 93 Kentucky 353 . . .
v . Kelly , 62 Nebraska 642 . . . . . . . .
v . Laning , 85 Texas 39 . 414
v. McCullouch , 192 Illinois 277 . 379
v . McDonald , 42 Georgia 20
5
. .
v . McGrew , 82 California 135 . .
v . Semmes , 51 Arkansas 48 . . . . .
v . Shields , 26 Wendall (New York ) 341
v . Steeps , 87 Wisconsin 472 . . . . .
v . Sturgeon , 198 Illinois 520 . . .
v . Ward , 109 California 186 . .
Dawley v . Brown , 79 New York 390 . . . . . . 421
Dawson v . Shirley , 6 Blackford ( Indiana ) 531 .
Dean v . Long , 122 Illinois 447 .
v . Metropolitan R . Co . , 119 New York 540 . . . . .
v . Shelly , 57 Pennsylvania State 426 . .
Deason v . Taylor , 53 Mississippi 697 . . .
D
e
Blanc v . Lynch , 23 Texas 25 . . . . .
Decatur v . Niedermeyer , 168 Illinois 68
Deering v . Reilly , 167 New York 184 . .
Deery v . Cray , 10 Wallace (United States ) 263 . . . .
D
e Gray v . Monmouth Beach Co . , 50 New Jersey Equity 329 . . . . . . .
Dehority v . Wright , 101 Indiana 382 . . . . . . . 218
Delhi School District v . Everett , 52 Michigan 314 . . .
Delong v . Delong , 56 Wisconsin 514 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
Demars v . Koehler , 62 New Jersey Law 203 . . . . . . . . . . . .200 , 202
Dengenhart v . Cracraft , 36 Ohio State 549 . . . 324
Dennett v . Dennett , 44 New Hampshire 531 . 338 , 340
Denton v . Arnold , 151 Indiana 188 . . . . . . . . 373
Dentzel v . Waldie , 30 California 138 . . . . . . . . .
De Segond v . Culver , 10 Ohio 188 . . . 280
D
e
Silver ' s Case , 5 Rawle (Pennsylvania ) 111
Despain v . Wagner , 163 Illinois 598 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 371 , 400
Dettmer v . Behrens , 106 Iowa 585 . .
De Vaughn v . Hutchinson , 165 United States 566 .
Dever v . Hagerty , 169 New York 481 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418
Devereux v . McMahon , 108 North Carolina 134 . . . . . . . .
Devinney v . Reynolds , 1 Walls and Sergeant (Pennsylvania ) 328 . .
Devoe v . Sunderland , 17 Ohio State 52 . . . . . . . . . .
Devries v . Conklin , 22 Michigan 255 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357
Dewey v . Allgire , 37 Nebraska 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333 , 347
Dewey v . Campau , 4 Michigan 565 . . . . . . . . . . . 270
v . Goodman , 107 Tennessee 244 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 356








xxxvi TABLE OF CASES .




. . . . .
[References are to Sections . ]
Dewey v . Kimball (Minnesota ), 95 Northwestern 317 ; 96 Northwest
ern 704 . . . . . . .
Dexter v . Hall , 15 Wallace (United States ) 9 . . . . .
Dezendorf v. Humphreys , 95 Virginia 473 . . .
Dickle v . Abstract Co . , 89 Tennessee 431 . .
Dickson y . Desire 's Administrator , 23 Missouri 151 . . .
v . United States, 125 Massachusetts 311 .
Diefendorf v. Diefendorf , 132 New York 100 . . . . . .. . . 307
Dietrich v . Hutchinson , 73 Vermont 134 . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 37, 351 , 363 , 364
Disch y. Timm , 101 Wisconsin 179 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341
Dixon v . Bristol Savings Bank , 102 Georgia 461 . . 310
Doane v. Feather ' s Estate , 119 Michigan 691. . . . . . . .
Dodder v . Snyder , 110 Michigan 69. . . .
Dodge y . Hollinshead , 6 Minnesota 25 . . . . .. 293
Doe d . Griffith v . Pritchard , 5 Barnewall & Alderson , 765. . .. . . . . . 413
Doehrel v . Hillmer , 102 Iowa 169 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 7,
Doescher v . Spratt ,61Minnesota 326 . . . . . . . . . . .
Dohm v. Haskin , 88 Michigan 144 . . . . . . . . . . 10 , 278
Dohms v . Mann , 76 Iowa 723 .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .
Dolph v. Hand , 156 Pennsylvania State 91 . . . 313
Donahue v . Cricket Club , 177 Illinois 351 . . 396 , 39
8
Donegan v . Donegan , 103 Alabama 488 . . 165
Donnelly y . Eastes , 94 Wisconsin 390 . . . . . . . . 172
Donnelly ' s Estate , 125 California 417 . . . . . . . 414
Donovan v . S
t
. Anthony Co . , 8 North Dakota 585 . .
v . Ward , 100 Michigan 601 . .
Doran v . Butler , 74 Michigan 643 . .
Doren v .Gillum , 136 Indiana 134 . . . . . . .
Douglass v . Lewis , 131 United States 75 . . . . 211 , 212
v . Thomas , 103 Indiana 187 . . . . . . . . . 198
Downham v . Holloway , 158 Indiana 626 . 337 , 345
Downing v . Birney , 112 Michigan 474 . . . . . . . . .
v . Marshall , 23 New York 366 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Drew v . Carroll , 154 Massachusetts 181 . . . .
Drury v . Foster , 2 Wallace (United States ) 24 . . . .
v . Holden , 121 Illinois 130 . . . .
Duke v . Markham , 105 North Carolina 131 . . .
Duncan v . Terre Haute , 8
5 Indiana 104 .
Duncombe v . Richards , 46 Michigan 16
6
. . . . . . . .
Dundas v . Bowler , 3 McLean (United States ) 397
Dundy v . Chambers , 2
3 Illinois 369 .
Dunlap v . Henry , 76 Missouri 106 . . . .
Dupont v . Wertheman , 10 California 354 .
Durant v . Ritchie , 4 Mason (United States ) 45 .
Durfee v . Grinnell , 69 Illinois 371 . .





TABLE OF CASES . xxxyii
[ References are to Sections.]
Dyer v. Eldridge , 136 Indiana 654 . . . . . . . . .













Eagan v . Scully , 29 New York Appellate Division 617
Eames v . Preston , 20 Illinois 389 . . . . 247
Eare v . Snow , 2 Plowden 504 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Eaton y . Trowbridge , 38 Michigan 454 . . . .
y . Whitaker , 18 Connecticut 222 . . .
Eckler v . Alden , 125 Michigan 215 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Eckman v . Eckman , 68 Pennsylvania State 460
Ecroyd v . Coggesball , 21 Rhode Island 1 .
Edens v . Miller , 147 Indiana 208 . . . . .
Edgerton v . Aycock , 123 North Carolina 134 . . . .
Edwards v . Clark , 83 Michigan 246 . . . . . . .
Edwards Hall Co . v . Dresser , 168 Massachusetts 136 . . 127
Egan v . Horrigan , 96 Maine 46 . . . . .
Elcessor v . Elcessor , 146 Pennsylvania State 359 . . . . . 340
Elder v . Schumacher , 18 Colorado 433 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336
Eldredge v . Palmer , 185 Illinois 618 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346
Electric City Land & c . Co . v . West Ridge Coal Co . , 187 Pennsylva
nia State 500 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223
Eleventh Avenue , In re , 81 New York 436 . . . .
Eliason v . Bronnenberg , 147 Indiana 248 .
Elliott v . Plattor , 43 Ohio State 198 . . . . . . . . . . .
Ellis v . Alford , 64 Mississippi 8 . . . . 323
5 . Dasher , 101 Georgia 5 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ellison y . Branstrator , 153 Indiana 146 . . . .
Ellwood v . Northrup , 10
6
New York 172 . . . . . . . . . . .
Elmondorff v . Carmichael , 3 Littell (Kentucky ) 472 .
Elsey v . McDaniel , 95 Pennsylvania State 472 . . . . 36
3
Elston v . Jasper , 45 Texas 409 . . . . . . . .
Elweli v . Shaw , 16 Massachusetts 42 . . . .
Elwood v . O 'Brien , 105 Iowa 239 .
Ely ' s Administrator v . United States , 171 United States 220 . . . .
Elyton Land Co . v . Railroad , 100 Alabama 396 .
Emeric v . Alvarado , 90 California 444 . . . .
Engel v . Ayer , 85 Maine 448 . . . . . . . .
Engle v . Wbite , 104 Michigan 15 . . . . .
Englebert v . Trowell , 40 Nebraska 195 . . . . . . . . . . 321
Ennor v . Hodson , 134 Illinois 32 . . . . . . . . 35
5
Ensign v . Colt (Connecticut ) , 52 Atlantic 829 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209
Enveart y . Kepler , 118 Indiana 34 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
6
Equitable Life Assurance Society v . Brennan , 148 New York 661 . . 228
Eslava v . Lepretre , 21 Alabama 504 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 348
Essex v . Atkins , 14 Vesey 542 . . . . . . . . . 356
Estate o
f
. See name o
f party .
Eureka Co . v . Edwards , 71 Alabama 24
8








. . . . . . . . ..
313 , 317 ,. . . .




[References are to Sections . )
Evans v . Beaver , 50 Ohio State 190 . . . . . . . . .
v . Dickenson (United States ) , 11
4
Federal 284 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 365
v . Etheridge , 99 North Carolina 43 . . . . . . . .
v .Grand Rapids & c . R . Co . , 68 Michigan 602 .
Evenson v . Webster , 3 South Dakota 382 .
Everts y . Agnes , 4 Wisconsin 343 . . .
Ewertsen v . Gerstenberg , 186 Illinois 344 . .
Ewing v . Shannahan , 113 Missouri 188 . . . .
v . Smith , 3 Desaussure ' s Equity (South Carolina ) 417 . . . . . . . . . .












Fain v . Smith , 14 Oregon 82 . . . . . . . .
Fairfax v . Hunter , 7 Cranch (United States ) 603 . . .
Faith v . Bowles , 86 Maryland 13 . . . . . . . .
Fallon v . Chidester , 46 Iowa 588 . . . 428
Farmer v . Farmer , 129 Missouri 530 . . . .
Farmers ' Bank v . Pryse (Kentucky ) , 76 Southwestern 358
v . Wallace , 45 Ohio State 152 . . . . . . . . . .
Farnham v . Thompson , 34 Minnesota 330 . .
Farnsworth v . Noffsinger , 46 West Virginia 410 . 340
Farnum v . Peterson , 111 Massachusetts 148 . . . . . 417
Farr v . Sumner , 12 Vermont 28 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Farrar v . Farrar , 4 New Hampshire 191 . . . . 311
Farrell County v . Dart , 26 Connecticut 376 . . . . . .
Farrington v . Putnam , 90 Maine 405 . . . . . . . .
Farwell v . Des Moines Manufacturing Co . , 97 Iowa 286 . .
Faulkner v . Adams , 126 Indiana 459 . . . . . . . . . .
v . Davis , 18 Grattan (Virginia ) 651 . . . . . 330
Fayette Land C
o . v . Louisville & c . R . Co . , 93 Virginia 274 . . . .
Fears v . Brooks , 12 Georgia 195 . . . . . . . .
Feas ' s Estate , 30 Washington 51 . . . . . .
Feeney v . Howard , 79 California 525 .
Felix v . Patrick , 145 United States 317 . . .
Feurt v . Caster , 174 Missouri 289 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ferguson v . Houston R . Co . , 7
3 Texas 344 . .
Ferguson ' s Appeal , 117 Pennsylvania State 427 . .
Final v . Backus , 18 Michigan 218 . . . . .
Finch v . Garrett , 102 Iowa 381 . .
Fincher v . Hanegan , 59 Arkansas 151 . . . . . . . . . .
Findley v . Hill , 133 Alabama 229 . . . . . . . .
Finlay v . King ' s Lessee , 3 Peters (United States ) 346 . . .
Finley v . Prescott , 104 Wisconsin 614 . . . . .
v . Simpson , 22 New Jersey Law 311 . .
Firmstone v . Spaeter , 150 Pennsylvania State 616 . . . . . . . So
First English Evangelical Church v . Arkle , 49 West Virginia 92 . . . 405





















[References are to sections . ]
First National Bank v . Hollingsworth , 78 Iowa 575 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
v . Paul , 75 Virginia 594 . 36
5
First Parish in Sutton v . Cole , 3 Pickering (Massachusetts ) 232 . . . . 401
First Universalist Society v . Boland , 155 Massachusetts 171 .
Fisher v . Clark , 8 Kansas Appellate 483 . .
v . Meister , 24 Michigan 447 . . .
v . Parry , 68 Indiana 465 . 213
Fisk v . Brayman , 21 Rhode Island 195 . 126
v . Hopping , 169 Illinois 105 .
v . Osgood , 58 Nebraska 486 . . .
Fitch y . Johnson , 194 Illinois 111 . . . .
v . Reiser , 79 Iowa 34 . . .
Fitzgerald v . Fitzgerald , 100 Illinois 385 . .
v . Fitzgerald , 168 Massachusetts 488 . . . . . . . . .
v . Goff , 99 Indiana 28 . . . .
Fitzhugh v . Croghan , 2 J . J . Marshall (Kentucky ) 429 .
Flege v . Garvey , 47 California 371 . . . .
Fleming v . Katahdin Pulp Co . , 93 Maine 110 .
Fleschner v . Sumpter , 12 Oregon 161 . . . .
Fletcher v . Shepherd , 174 Illinois 262 .
Flowers v . Flowers , 89 Georgia 632 . . . . . . . .
Flynn v . Bourneuf , 143 Massachusetts 277 .
v . Flynn , 68 Michigan 20 . . . . . . .
v . Flynn , 171 Massachusetts 31
2
. . . . . . . .
v . Jackson , 93 Virginia 341
Folsom v . Asper , 25 Utah 299 . . . .
Fond du Lac v . Otto ' s Estate , 113 Wisconsin 39 . . . . . . .
Fontaine v . Savings Institution , 57 Missouri 552 . . . . .
Foote v . Clark , 102 Missouri 394 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 212
Fort Wayne v . Lake Shore & c . R . Co . , 132 Indiana 558 . . . 407
Forrester v . Boston & Montana Copper Co . , 21 Montana 544 . . . . . . 406
Fort Jefferson Improvement C
o . v . Dupoyster , 108 Kentucky 792 . . 417
Foster v . Foster , 62 New Hampshire 46 . . . . . . . . . . 201
v . Hall , 12 Pickering (Massachusetts ) 89 . . . . . .
v . Joice (United States ) , 3 Washington Circuit Court 498 . . .
v . Mansfield , 3 Metcalf (Massachusetts ) 412
v . Rank , 109 Pennsylvania 291 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Foundry C
o . v . Hovey , 21 Pickering (Massachusetts ) 417 .
Fowler v . Lewis , 36 West Virginia 112 . . . . .
v . Shearer , 7 Massachusetts 14 . . . . . . . . . . .
v . Poling , 2 Barbour (New York ) 300 . . .
Fox , In re , 52 New York 530 . . . . .
v . Reil , 3 Johnson (New York ) 477 . . . . . . . . .
France v . Bell , 52 Nebraska 57 . . .
Francis v . Wilkinson , 147 Illinois 370 ,
Franklin Institute v . Savings Bank , 14 Rhode Island 632 . . . . .





















[References are to Sections. )
Frazier v . Jeakins , 64 Kansas 615 . . . . . .
Frederick v. Emig , 186 Illinois 319 .
v. Wilcox , 119 Alabama 355 . . . .
Freeman y . Foster, 55 Maine 508 . . .
Freiermuth v . Steigleman , 130 California 392 .
French v . Lord , 69 Maine 537 . . .
French Lumber Co . v . Theriault , 107 Wisconsin 6
Frenche v . Chancellor , 51 New Jersey Equity 624 . . . . . . .
Frickee v . Donner , 35 Michigan 151 . .
Frey y . Clifford , 44 California 335 . .
Friedman v . Steiner , 107 Illinois 12
5
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Frink v . Hughes (Michigan ) , 94 Northwestern 601 .
Fritts v . Palmer , 132 United States 282
Fritz v . Pusey , 31 Minnesota 36
8
. . . . . . . . . .
Frost v . Courtis , 172 Massachusetts 401 . .
v . Wolf , 77 Texas 455 . . . . .
Fudickar v . East Riverside , 109 California 29 .
Fuhr v . Dean , 26 Missouri 116 . . . . . . . .
Fulkerson v . Holmes , 117 United States 389 . .
Fuller v . Shedd , 161 Illinois 462 . . . .
Fulmer v . Williams , 122 Pennsylvania State 191
Fulton v . Priddy , 123 Michigan 298 .
Funk v . Rentchler , 134 Indiana 68 . . .












5 ) , 307
342
400
. . . . . . . . . . . . .
417
363
G . V . B . Mining Co . v . Bank (United States ) , 95 Federal 23 . . . . . . . 249
Gadsby v . Monroe , 115 Michigan 282 . . . . . . . . 392 , 397
Gage v . Consumers ' Electric Light Co . , 194 Illinois 30 . . . . . . . . . .. . . . 437
v . Railroad , 11 Iowa 310 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 276
v . Wheeler , 129 Illinois 197 . 387
Galbraith v . Paine (North Dakota ) , 96 Northwestern 258 . . . . .
Gallagher v . Delargy , 57 Missouri 29 . . . . . . .
Galloway v . Henderson , 131 Alabama 280 . . . . .
Gamble v . McClure , 69 Pennsylvania State 282 . .
Games y . Stiles , 14 Peters (United States ) 322 .
Gann v . Free Fishers , 11 House of Lords Cases 192 .
Gannett v . Leonard , 47 Missouri 205 . . .
Gardner v . Batts , 114 North Carolina 496 . . .
v . Gardner , 5 Cushing (Massachusetts ) 483 .
v . Gardner , 123 Michigan 673 . . . .
Garner v . Black , 95 Texas 125 . . . .
Garrett v . Belmont Co . , 94 Tennessee 459 . . .
v . Hanshue , 53 Ohio State 482 . 250
v . Lister , 1 Levinz 25 (England ) . . . . . . . . . . . . 250
Garstang v . Davenport , 90 Iowa 359 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Garth v . Arnold (United States ) , 11
5









[References are to Sections .)
Gaston v . Dashiell , 55 Texas 517 . .
v. Portland , 16 Oregon 255 . . . . . . . . .
v. Weir , 84 Alabama 193 . . . . . . . . . .
Gate City Abstract Co. v . Post , 55 Nebraska 742. .
Gates v . Salmon , 35 California 576 . . . . . ..
v . Winslow , 1 Massachusetts 65 . . . . . . ..
Gault v . Van Zile, 37 Michigan 22 . . . . . . . . .
Geil v . Geil , 9 Virginia Law Register 530 . .. . . .
Geiszler v. DeGraaf, 166 New York 339 . . . .
Geofroy v . Riggs, 133 United States 258 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
George v . Bates, 90 Virginia 839 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Georgia & c . Railroad Co . v . Scott , 38 South Carolina 34 .
German -American Bank v . Carondelet, 150 Missouri 570 . . . . . .
German Saving Loan Society v. De Lashmutt (United States ) , 67
Federal 399 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336 , 347
Gibbs v . Swift , 12 Cushing (Massachusetts ) 393 . . . .. . .
Gibson v . Holden , 115 Illinois 199 . . . . . . . 232
v , Kelly , 15 Montana , 417 . . . . . . .
v. Richart , 83 Indiana 313 . . . . . . .. . . . .
Gilbert v. Berlin , 70 New Hampshire 396 . .
v . Emerson , 55 Minnesota 254 . . . . . . . .
v . Sprague, 196 Illinois 444 . . . . . . . .
Giles v . Miller , 36 Nebraska 346 . .
Gill v . Gill , 69 Arkansas 596 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gillenwaters v . Campbell , 142 Indiana 529
Gilmer v . Mobile & c . R . Co., 79 Alabama 569 .
Gilmore y . Sapp , 100 Illinois 297 . . . . . . . .. . .
Gladney y . Sydnor , 172 Missouri 318 . .
Glascott v. Bragg , 111 Wisconsin 605 . . .
Glaze v . Insurance Co . , 87 Michigan 349 298
Gleason v . Spray, 81 California 217 . ..
Glenn v. Canby, 24 Maryland 127 . . . . . . . .
v . Jeffrey , 75 Iowa 20 . . . . . . . . .
Globe Insurance Co . v. Reid , 19 Indiana Appellate 203
Glocke v. Glocke , 113 Wisconsin 303 . . .. . . . .
Glos y . Furman , 164 Illinois 585 . . . . . . . . .
v . Kingman & Co . ( Illinois), 69 Northwestern 632
v . Gerrity , 190 Illinois 545 ,
Glyon v . Glynn , 62 Nebraska 872 . .
Goad v . Lawrence (Kentucky ), 68 Southwestern 411 .
Goddard ' s Case , 2 Coke 4b , 5 . .
Godfrey v . Thornton , 46 Wisconsin 677 .... .. .. . . 39
0 , 398 ,
Goff v Cougle , 118 Michigan 307 . . . . . . . .
Goldsmith v . Goldsmith , 46 West Virginia 426 . .
Goodman v . Randall , 44 Connecticut 321 . . .
Goodnow v . Lumber Co . , 31 Minnesota 468 . . .
Goodrich v . Russell , 42 New York 177 . . . . . . . .
BO
428












xlii TABLE OF CASES.







(References are to Sections . ]
Goodwin v .Goodwin , 11
3
Iowa 319 . .
v . Keney , 49 Connecticut 563 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
v . Thompson , 83 Tennessee 209
Gordon v . Heywood , 2 New Hampshire 402
v . San Diego , 101 California 522 .
Gore v . Knight , 2 Vernon , 535 . . . . . . . . . .
Goree v . Wadsworth , 91 Alabama 416 . . . .
Gorman v . Mullins , 172 Illinois 349 .
Gormley y . Clark , 134 United States 338 . . . . . .
Gould y . Railroad , 142 Massachusetts 85 . . . . . . . .
Goulet v . Debreuille , 84 Minnesota 72 . . . . 293
Gouverneur v . National Ice Co . , 134 New York 355 . . 116
Gouverneur ' s Heirs v . Robertson , 11 Wheaton (United States ) 332 , 409
Grady v . McCorkle , 57 Missouri 172 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Graham v . Stern , 168 New York 517 . . . . . . . . .
Grand Rapids v . Hastings , 36 Michigan 122 . . .
v . Powers , 89 Michigan 94 . . . . . . . . . .
Grand Rapids Ice Co . v . Ice Co . , 102 Michigan 227 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
Grand Rapids and Indiana R . Co . v . Butler , 159 United States
87 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Granger v . Avery , 64 Maine 292 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
v . Granger , 147 Indiana 95 . . . . . . . . . . .
Grant v . Carpenter , 8 Rhode Island 36 . . . . . .
v . Oliver , 91 California 158 . . .
Graves v . Deterling , 120 New York 447 . . . . . . . . .
Gray v . Blanchard , 8 Pickering (Massachusetts ) 284 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
v . Chicago , Milwaukee and St . Paul R . Co . , 189 Illinois 400 . . . 181
v . Jones (United States ) , 14 Federal 83 . . . . . . . .
v . Schofield , 175 Illinois 36 .
v . Waldron , 101 Michigan 612 . . . . 249
Green v . Bennett , 120 North Carolina 394 . . . . . . 364
v . Cumberland & c . Co . (Tennessee ) , 72 Southwestern , 459 . .417 , 421
v . Green , 69 New York 553 . . .
v . Irving , 54 Mississippi 454 . . . .
v . Jordan , 83 Alabama 220 . . . . . . . .
y . Thomas , 11 Maine 318 .
v . Wilding , 59 Iowa 679 . . . . . . . . .
Greenby v . Wilcocks , 2 Johnson (New York ) 1 . . . . .
Greene v . O 'Connor , 18 Rhode Island 56 .
Greenslade v . Dare , 20 Beaver 284 . . . . . . . . .
Greenwood v . Jenswald , 69 Iowa 53 . . . . . . . . .
Greer v .Major , 11
4
Missouri 145 . . . .
v . Wintersmith , 85 Kentucky 516 . . . . . . . . .
Grier ' s Appeal , 101 Pennsylvania State 412 . . . . . . .
Griffin v . Catlin , 25 Washington 474 . . . .
..
. .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1 0
. . . . . . . . 178
,
180





[References are to Sections. ]
Griffith v . Godey , 113 United States 89 . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . 341
v . Holman , 23 Washington 347 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103 , 110
v. Pritchard , 5 Barnewall and Adolphus 765 . 413
Griswold y . Hicks , 132 Illinois 494 . . .
Groši v. Bank , 50 Minnesota 234 . . .. . . . .
Groneweg v . Beck , 93 Iowa 717 .. . . . . . .
Grove v . Todd , 41 Maryland 633 . . . .
Groves y . Groves , 65 Ohio 442 . . . 60
Grubbs v . Leyendecker , 153 Indiana 318 . . . .
Guerin v . Smith , 62 Michigan 369 . . .
Guertin y Mombleau , 144 Illinois 32 . . . . .
Guggenheimer v . Lockridge , 39 West Virginia 457 .. . .. .. . . .
Guilfoyle , In re , 96 California 598 . . . .
Gulf & Ship Island R . Co . v . Singleterry , 78 Mississippi 772 ..
Gulf R . Co . v . Jones , 82 Texas 156 . . . . . . . .
Gullett v . Arnett (Kentucky ) , 44 Southwestern 957
Gully v . Grubbs , 1 J . J. Marshall (Kentucky ) 387 . . 59
Gunnison v . Twitchel , 38 New Hampshire 62 . . . .. . . . . .
Guyer v . Smith , 22 Maryland 239 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .













Haberman v . Baker , 12
8
New York 253 . . . . . . . . . . .
Hacker ' s Appeal , 121 Pennsylvania State 192 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
Hackett v . Moxley , 68 Vermont 210 . . . . . . . . . 350 , 353
Hackney v . Butts , 41 Arkansas 393 .
Haddock v . Railroad , 146 Massachusetts 155 . . . .
Hafner v . St . Louis , 161 Missouri 34 . . . . . . .
Hagerstown Manufacturing & c . Co . v . Keedy , 91 Maryland 430 . .
Haggerty v . Wagner , 148 Indiana 625 . . . . . . 374
Haight v . Vallet , 89 California 245 . . . . . . .
Haldane v . Sweet , 55 Michigan 196 .
Hale v . Cottle , 21 Oregon 580 . . . . . . . . . .
v . Hale , 146 Illinois 227 . . . . . 330
v . Kobbert , 10
9
Iowa 128 . . . . . . . . .
Hall v . Alford , 114 Michigan 165 . . . 107
v . Cardell , 111 Iowa 206 .
v . Dean , 13 Johnson (New York ) 105 . . .
v . Fields , 81 Texas 553 . . .
v . Hall , 107 Missouri 101 . . . .
v . Powell , 8 Oklahoma 276 . . . . . . . .
v . Redson , 10 Michigan 21 . . . 252
v . Solomon , 61 Connecticut 476 . . .
v . Turner , 110 North Carolina 292 .
v . Walker , 118 North Carolina 377 . . 363
Hall ' s Lessee v . Ashby , 9 Ohio 96 . . . . .
Halstead v . Board Commissioners , 56 Indiana 363 410















. . . . . . . . . .




[References are to Sections . ]
Hamiel v . Donnelly , 75 Iowa 93 . . . . . . .
Hamilton v . Detroit , 85 Minnesota 83 . . . .
v. Harvey , 121 Illinois 469 . . . 77
v. Hubbard , 134 California 603 . . . 353
v . Nutt , 34 Connecticut 501 . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 49
Hamlen v. Werner , 144 Massachusetts 396 .
Hammers v. Dole , 61 Illinois 307 . . . . .. . . . .. .
Hammond v . Shepard , 186 Illinois 235 .
Hampton v. Cook , 64 Arkansas 353 . . . . 53
Hand v . Weidner , 151 Pennsylvania State 362 . . .
Hanlon v. Hobson , 24 Colorado 284 . . .
Hanna v . Palmer, 194 Illinois 41.
v . Reeves, 22 Washington 6 . . .
Hannah v. Davis , 112 Missouri 599 . .
Hanson v. Rice , 88 Minnesota 273 . . . . 116
Hardin v . Jordan , 140 United States 371 10
2 , 113 ,
v . Kirk , 49 Illinois 153 . . . . . 289
v . Osborne , 60 Illinois 93 . . . . . . . . . . 289
v . Shedd , 177 Illinois 123 . . . . .
v . Shedd , 190 United States 508 . . . . . . .
Harding v . American Glucose Co . , 182 Illinois 551
Hare v . Murphy , 60 Nebraska 135 .
Hargis y . Ditmore , 86 Kentucky 653 . . . . 37
Harkins v . Forsyth , 11 Leigh (Virginia ) 294
Harkness v . Burton , 39 Iowa 101 . .
Harley v . State , 40 Alabama 689 . . 10
Harlowe v . Hudgins , 84 Texas 107 .
Harmon v . Stearns , 95 Virginia 58 . .
Harms v . Coryell , 177 Illinois 496 . . .
Harral v . Leverty , 50 Connecticut 46 . . . 419
Harrass v . Edwards , 94 Wisconsin 459 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Harraway v . Harraway , 136 Alabama 499 . . .
Harriman v . Queen Insurance Co . , 49 Wisconsin 71
Harrington v . Bean , 89 Maine 470 . .
Harriot v . Harriot , 25 New York Appellate Division 245 . . 43
Harris v . McCann , 75 Mississippi 805 . . . . . . . . .
Harrison v . Des Moines R . Co . , 91 Iowa 114 .
v . Harrison , 105 Georgia 517 . . . . . . . . . .
v . Stipes , 34 Nebraska 431 . . . . .
v . Vreeland , 38 New Jersey Law 366 . . .
Harsh v . Griffin , 72 Iowa 608 . . . . . . . .
Harshbarger v . Carroll , 163 Illinois 636 .
Hart v . Burch , 130 Illinois 426 . . .
v . Church , 12
6
California 471 . . . .
v . Lyon , 90 New York 663 .
v . Randolph , 142 Illinois 521 . . . . . . . .























[References are to Sections . ]
Hatch ' s Estate , 62 Vermont 300 . . . . . . .
Hatfield v . Sneden , 54 New York 280 . . . 363
Hathaway v . Cass , 84 Minnesota 192 . .
v . Payne , 34 New York 92 . . .
Hatton v . Holmes , 97 California 208 . . . . . . . . . . .
Hauenstein v . Lynham , 100 United States 483 . . . . . . .
Haremeyer v . Dahn , 48 Nebraska 536 . . . .
Havens v . Seashore Co . , 47 New Jersey Equity 365 . .
Hawes v . Hawes , 177 Illinois 409 . . . . . . 306
v . Hawes , 1 Wilson 165 ; 3 Atkyns 524 . . . . 151
y . Railroad Co . , 64 Iowa 315 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hawke v . Chicago & c . R . Co . , 165 Illinois 561 428
v . Euyart , 30 Nebraska 149 . . . . . . . . .
Hawkes y . Pike , 105 Massachusetts 560 30
2
Hawley v . Northampton , 8 Massachusetts 3 . .
Haworth v . Taylor , 10
8
Illinois 275 . . . . . . .
Hayden v . Peirce , 165 Massachusetts 359 . . . 261
Hayes v . Association , 124 Alabama 663 . . . . . 285
Haynes v . Bennett , 53 Michigan 15 . . . . 322
Hays v . Peck , 107 Indiana 389 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
v . St . Paul ' s Church , 196 Illinois 633 . . . . . . .
Head y . Chesbrough , 13 Ohio Circuit Court 354
v . Chesbrough , 60 Ohio State 594 . .
Healey v . Babbitt , 14 Rhode Island 533 .
Heath v . Hewitt , 127 New York 166 .
Hedbloom v . Pierson (Nebraska ) , 90 Northwestern 218 . . . . . 282
Heintz v . Thayer , 92 Texas 658 . . 269
Heisen v . Heisen , 145 Illinois 658 . . . . . . . . . 363
Heinsen v . Lamb , 117 Illinois 549 .
Heller v . Cowen , 154 New York 299 . . . 85
Helvie v . Hoover (Oklahoma ) , 69 Pacific 958 . . . 163
Hemphill v . Holford , 88 Michigan 293 . 345
Henderson v . Hatterman , 146 Illinois 555 . . . . . . . 89
Henry v . Root , 33 New York 526 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 323
Henschel , In re (United States ) , 10
9
Federal 861
Herd v . Catron , 97 Tennessee 662 . . . . . 185
Hershman v . Hershman , 63 Indiana 451 . . . . . . .
Heyn v . Ohman , 42 Nebraska 693 . . 210
Heywood v . Lumber Co . , 70 New Hampshire 24 . . . . 84
Hibblewhite v . M ’Morine , 6 Meeson & Welsby 200 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245







0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
4 ,
225
Hicks v . Blakeman , 74 Mississippi 459 . . . . . .
Higgins v . Higgins , 121 California 487 . . . . . . . .
v . Ormsby , 156 Indiana 82 . . . . . . . .
Higinbotham v . Stoddard , 72 New York 94 . . . . . . . .




. . . . . . . . 87
xlyi TABLE OF CASES .


















[References are to Sections.]
Hileman v. Bouslaugh , 13 Pennsylvania State 344 . . .. ..
Hiles v . Fisher , 144 New York 306 . . . . . . . .. 164 , 16
6
Hill v . Banks , 61 Connecticut 25 . . . . . . . . .
v . Chambers , 30 Michigan 422 . . . . . . .
v . Reynolds , 93 Maine 25 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
v . West , 8 Ohio State 222 . . . . . . . 195
Hills v . Metzenroth , 173 Massachusetts 423 . . . 2 ,28
Hilmert v . Christian , 29 Wisconsin 104 . . .
Hilpire v . Claude , 109 Iowa 159 . 428
Hinchliffe v . Shea , 103 New York 153 . . 374
Hitner ' s Appeal , 54 Pennsylvania State 110
Hitz v . Jenks , 123 United States , 297 . 18 , 293 , 365
Hoard v . Stone , 58 Michigan 578 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hoback v . Miller , 44 West Viaginia 635 . 330
Hoban v . Cable , 102 Michigan 206 . . . . .
Hobson v . Hale , 95 New York 588 . . . . . . .
Hodge v . Sloan , 107 New York 244 . . . . . 230
Hoffman v . Port Huron , 102 Michigan 417 .
Hofsass v . Mann , 74 Maryland 400 .
Hogan v . Barry , 143 Massachusetts 538 . . .
v . Manners , 23 Kansas 551 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hogg v . Beerman , 41 Ohio State 81 . .
Hollenbeck v . Hollenbeck , 185 Illinois 101 . 299
Holliday y . Hively , 198 Pennsylvania State 335 . . .335 . . . . . . . . . . 353 , 355 , 357
Holloway y . Southmayd , 139 New York 390 . . . 90
Holmes v . McDonald , 119 Michigan 563 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 304
Holmes & c . Manufacturing Co . v . Holmes & c . Metal Co . , 12
7
New
York 252 . . . .
Holston v . Needles , 115 Illinois 461 . . . . . .
Hopkins v . Smith , 162 Massachasetts 444 . . .
Hopper v . Calhoun , 52 Kansas 703 . . . . .
Horbach v . Tyrrell , 48 Nebraska 514 . . . . . . . . .
Hornbrook v . Hetzel , 27 Indiana Appellate 79 . . . . .
Horne v . Smith , 159 United States 40 . 103
Horner v . Chicago , Milwaukee & St . Paul R . Co . , 38 Wisconsin
165 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Horton v . Upham , 72 Connecticut 29 . . . . . . . .
Hostetter v . Railroad , 108 California 38 . . . . . . .
Hottell v . Farmers ' Association , 25 Colorado 67
House v . Jackson , 50 New York 161 . . .
Houston v . Blackman , 66 Alabama 559 .
Hout v . Hout , 20 Ohio State 119 . . . . . . . . .
Houx v . Batteen , 68 Missouri 84 . . . . . . . . . .
Hovey v . Hobson , 53 Maine 451 . . . . . . . .
v . Newton , 11 Pickering (Massachusetts ) 421 . .
Howard v . Lincoln , 13 Maine 122 . . . . . .
v . Russell , 104 Georgia 230 . . .
406
228
. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
.












[References are to Sections . ]
Howard v . Turner, 125 North Carolina 107 . . . . . . . . . . .
Howell v . Folsom , 38 Oregon 184 .
v . Jones , 91 Tennessee 402 . . . . . . 382
Howes v . Burt , 130 Massachusetts 368 . . .
Hoy v . Varner, 100 Virginia 600 . . . . . . .
Hoyt v . Hoyt, 69 Iowa 174 . . . .. . . . . . ..
v . Sprague, 103 United States 613 ..
v . Thompson , 19 New York 207 . . . . . . . . 10
Hrouska v . Janke , 66 Wisconsin 252 . .
Hubbard v . Greeley , 84 Maine 340 . . ... .. . . 309 , 310
v. Hubbard , 140 Missouri 300 . .
v . Norton , 10 Connecticut 423 . . . .. . . .. .
v . Sage Land & c. Co ., 81 Mississippi 616 . . . 398
Hudgins v . Chupp, 103 Georgia 484 .
Huff v . Hastings Express Co ., 195 Illinois 257
y . McCauley , 53 Pennsylvania State 206 . .
Hughes v . Jones, 11
6
New York 67 .
Hull v . Glover , 126 Illinois 123 . . . . . .
v . Hull , 35 West Virgina 155 . . . . . . . . .
v . Louth , 109 Indiana 315 . . . . .
Hume v . Dickson , 37 Ohio State 68 . . . . . . . .
v . Hopkins , 140 Missouri 65 . . . . . . . . . . .
Hummelman v . Mount , 87 Indiana 178 . . .
Humphreys v . McKissock , 140 United States 304 .
Humphries y . Nix , 77 Georgia 98 . . . . . . .
Hunnicutt v . Summey , 63 Georgia 586 .
Hunt v . Widdlesworth , 41 Michigan 448 . . . .
v . Tolles (Vermont ) , 52 Atlantic 1042 .
Hunter v . Eastham ( Texas ) , 67 Southwestern 1080 .
Hunton v . Wood (Virginia ) , 43 Southeastern 186 . . . . . . . . .
Huron Land C
o . v . Davison (Michigan ) , 90 Northwestern 1034 . .
v . Robarge , 128 Michigan 686 . . .
Hurst v . Dulaney , 87 Virginia 444 . . . . . . . 373
v . Wilson , 89 Tennessee 270 . . . . . 147
Hart v . Long , 90 Tennessee 445
Hutchins v . Barre Water Co . , 74 Vermont 36 . . 240
Huvck v . Andrews , 113 New York 81 . . . . . . . . . 200 ,
Hyne v . Osborn , 62 Michigan 235 . . . 245 , 311











. . . . . . . . . : . 81
. 330
203
Nlinois Central R . Co . v . Chicago , 173 Illinois 471 ; 17
6
United States
646 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
v . Illinois , 146 United States 387 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105 , 112
Illinois Land Co . v . Speyer , 138 Illinois 137 ,
Illinois Steel Co . v . Bilot , 109 Wisconsin 418 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .101 , 112
Imhoff v . Witmer ' s Administrator , 31 Pennsylvania State 243 . . . . . 332
In re . See name o
f
party .
. . . . 421









[References are to Sections.]
Indianapolis & c . R . Co . v. Hood , 66 Indiana 580 ..
Inman v. Swearingen , 198 Illinois 437 . . .
Insurance Co . v . Nelson , 103 United States 544 . . .
v . White , 106 Illinois 67 . . . . .
Ireland v . Geraghty (United States ), 15 Federal 35 . .
Iron Belt Building Association v . Groves , 96 Virginia 138 .
Irons v . Webb ,41 New Jersey Law 203. . . .. . . . .
Irvine v. Irvine , 9 Wallace (United States) 617 .
v. McCreary , 108 Kentucky 495 . . .
Irving v. Campbell, 121 New York 353 . . .
Irwin v. Dixion , 9 Howard (United States ) 10 . .
v . Longworth , 20 Ohio State 581 ..
v . Powell , 188 Illinois 107 . . . . . . . ..
Isham v. Bennington Iron Co., 19 Vermont 230
Ison v . Cornett (Kentucky ), 75 Southwestern 204 . .
Ivarson v . Mulvey , 179 Massachusetts 141 ,
Ivey , v .Granberry , 66 North Carolina 223 .
. 94
33










Jackson v . Adams, 7 Wendall (New York ) 367 .
v . Alexander , 3 Johnson (New York ) 484 .
v . Green , 112 Indiana 34
2
. .
v . Lynn , 94 Iowa 151 . . . . . . . .
v . McChesney , 7 Cowen (New York ) 36
0
. . . .
v . Myers , 3 Johnson (New York ) 388 . .
v . Phillips , 9 Cowen (New York ) 94 . . . . . .
v . Phipps , 12 Jonnson (New York ) 41
8
.
v . Railroad , 54 Missouri Appellate 636
v . Schoonmaker , 2 Johnson (New York ) 230
v . Stevenson , 156 Massachusetts 496
v . Wood , 12 Johnson (New York ) 73 . . .
Jaeger v . Hardy , 48 Ohio State 335 . . .
James v . Patten , 6 New York 9 . . .
Jarvis v . Seele Milling Co . , 173 Illinois 192 . .
Jenkins v . Dewey , 49 Kansas 49 . . .
Jenks v . Pawlowski , 98 Michigan 110 . . .
v . Quinn , 137 New York 223 . .
Jenness v . Smith , 58 Michigan 280 .
Jennings , Ex parte , 6 Cowen (New York ) 518 .
v . Bloomfield , 19
9
Pennsylvania State 638
Jensen v . Crosby , 80 Minnesota 158 .
Jerdee v . Furbush , 115 Wisconsin 277 . . .
Jerome v . Ortman , 66 Michigan 668 . . . . . . .
Jewell v . Walker , 109 Georgia 241 . . . . . . . .
v . Warner , 35 New Hampshire 17
6
. . . . . . . .
Jinright v . Nelson , 105 Alabama 399 . . . . . . . . . .


























[References are to Sections.]
Johnson v. Elmen , 94 Texas 168 ..
v. Hilton , 96 Georgia 577 . . .
v . Hollensworth , 48 Michigan 14
0
. . . . . . . . .
v . Johnson , 170 Missouri 34 . . . .
v . Johnson (Rhode Island ) , 54 Atlantic 378 .
v . Jouchert , 124 Indiana 105 .
v . Moore , 28 Michigan 3 . . . . . . .
v . Nichols , 105 Iowa 122 . . . . . . . .
V . Warren , 74 Michigan 491 . . 170 ,
v . Williams , 37 Kansas 179 . . . . . 188
Johnston v . Markle Paper Co . , 153 Pennsylvania State 18
9
. . . . . . .
y . Virginia Coal Co . , 96 Virginia 158 . . . . . .
Jones , Es Parte , 18 Chancery Division 108 ( England ) . . . .
v . Chesapeake and Ohio R . C
o . , 14 West Virginia 514 . . 170
v . Clifton , 101 United States 225 . 352
v . Des Moines , 43 Iowa 209 . . . . . . . . . .
v . Gurlie ,61 Mississippi 423 . . . . 234
v . Jones , 137 New York 610 . . . . 340
v . Jones , 96 Virginia 749 . . . . . . . 357
v . Minogue , 29 Arkansas 637 . . . .
v . Morris ,61 Alabama 518 . . .
v . Port Huron Co . , 171 Illinois 502 . . 186
v . Porter , 59 Mississippi 628 .
v . Smith , 73 New York 205 . . . . . . . . . . .
y . Soulard , 24 Howard (United States ) 41 . 101
V . Swayzee , 42 New Jersey Law 279 . . . . . . 300
V . Warner , 81 Illinois 343 . .
Joseph v . Bigelow , 4 Cushing (Massachusetts ) 82 .
Jossman v . Rice , 121 Michigan 270 . . . . . .
Jourdan v . Patterson , 102 Michigan 602 .
Joyner v . Sugg , 131 North Carolina 324 . . . 397
Judd v . Randall , 36 Minnesota 12
Justice v . Lawson , 46 West Virginia 163 . . 161









Kaeding v . Joachimsthal , 98 Michigan 78 . . .
Kansas v . Railroad Co . , 77 Missouri 180 . . . . . . . . .
Kansas City Street R . Co . v . Railway Co . , 129 Missouri 62 . . . . . 291
Karcher v .Gans , 13 South Dakota 383 . . . . . . . . . . . 399
Karchner v . Hoy , 151 Pennsylvania State 383 . . . 131
Karmaller v . Krotz , 18 Iowa 352
Kash v . Coleman , 145 Missouri 645 .
Kaufman v . Burgert , 195 Pennsylvania State 274 . .
Kean v . Calamet Canal & c . Co . , 190 United States 452 . . . 115
v . Roby , 145 Indiana 221 . . . . . . .
Keil v . Healey , 84 Illinois 104 . .313 , 317
Kelley v . Shimer , 152 Indiana 290 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
iy - Brews . Con .
161
186

















[References are to Sections . ]
Kellogg v. Cook , 18 Washington 516 . .
v . Malin , 50 Missouri 496 203
v. Peddicord , 181 Illinois 22 . . . . ..
Kellum v . Insurance Co ., 101 Indiana 455 .. . . . . . .
Kelly v . Bourne , 15 Oregon 476
v . Duffy , 31 Ohio State , 437 . . . . . . . .
v . Nypano R . Co . , 200 Pennsylvania State 229
v . Rosenstock , 45 Maryland 389
Kendall v . Lawrence , 22 Pickering (Massachusetts ) 540 . . . . . . 319
v . Powers , 96 Missouri 142 . . . 387
Kennedy v .Gaines ,51Mississippi625 . . . 326
v. Haskell (Kansas ), 73 Pacific 913 . . . . .
v. Owen , 136 Massachusetts 199 . . . . . . . 225
Kenney v . Parks, 125 California 146 ; 137 California 527 . . . . . . .308 , 299
Kentucky Lumber Co . v. Green , 87 Kentucky 257 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kenyon v . Charlevoix Improvement Co . (Michigan ), 97 Northwest
ern 407 . . . . . . . . . . 425
v . Saunders , 18 Rhode Island 590 414
Keppel v . Bailey , 2 Mylne and Keen 517 ( England ) . . . .
Kerner v. McDonald , 60 Nebraska 663 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
Kettle River Co . v . Eastern & c . Co ., 41 Minnesota 461 . . . . . . .
Kettleschlager v . Ferrick , 12 South Dakota 455 . . . . . . . ..
Key y. Snow , 90 Tennessee 663 . . . .
Kickland v . Menasha Woodenware Co ., 68 Wisconsin 34 . . . .
Kiesel v. Clemens, 6 Idaho 444 . . . . .. 384
Kilgore v . Jordan , 17 Texas 341 . . . . 321
Kilpatrick v. Baltimore , 81 Maryland 179 . . . 180
Kimball v . Fenner , 12 New Hampshire 248 . .
Kimm v . Griffin , 67 Minnesota 25 232
King v . Brown , 54 Indiana 368 . . . . . . . . . . .
v. Gilson , 32 Illinois 348 .
v . Kilbride, 58 Connecticut 109 .
v . Mead , 60 Kansas 539 . . .
v. Merritt , 67 Michigan 194 . . . . . . .
v. Norfolk & Western R . Co. , 99 Virginia 625 .
v . Rhew , 108 North Carolina 696 .
v . Welborn , 83 Michigan 195 . . . . . . . . .
v . Wight, 15
5
Massachusetts 444 . . . . . . . .
Kingdon v . Nottle , 1 Maule and Selwyn 355 ; 4 Maule and Selwyn
(England ) 53 . . . . . 221
Kingman v . Loyer , 40 Ohio State 109 . . . . . . .
Kingsley v . Holbrook , 45 New Hampshire 313 . . . .
Kinney v . Vinson , 32 Texas 126 440
Kirby v . Boyette , 118 North Carolina 244 . . . . . . . . 356
Kirkendall v . Mitchell , 3 McLean (United States ) 144 206
Kister v . Reeser , 98 Pennsylvania State 1 . ,
Kitchell v . Mudgett , 37 Michigan 81 . . . . . . 194























[References are to Sections. ]
Kleimann v. Geiselmann , 114 Missouri 437 . . . .
Klenke v . Koeltze , 75 Missouri 239 . . . . . . . . .
Knapp v. Woolverton , 47 Michigan 292 . . . .. .
Knight v . Leary, 54 Wisconsin 459 . . . . .
v . Mahoney , 152 Massachusetts 523
Knight v. Thayer, 125 Massachusetts 25 . . . .
Knowlton v. Railroad , 72 Connecticut 188 .
Knox 's Estate , 131 Pennsylvania State 220 .
Knudsen v . Omanson , 10 Utah 124 . . . . . . . . . . .
Knutson v . Bostrak , 99 Wisconsin 469 . .
Koch v . Hustis , 113 Wisconsin 604 . . . . .
Koppelmann v. Koppelmann , 94 Texas 40 . . . . . . .
Kothe v. Krag-Reynolds Co ., 20 Indiana Appellate 293
Kramer v . Carter , 136 Massachusetts 504 . . .
Krieger v. Crocker , 118 Missouri 531. . . .. . . . . .
Kreuger v . Schultz , 6 North Dakota 310 . .
v. Walker , 80 Iowa 733 . . . . . . .
Kruger v. Walker , 94 Iowa 506 .












La Chapelle v . Burpee , 69 Hun (New York ) 43
6
. . .
Lacy v . Pixler , 120 Missouri 383 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
6 , 31
8
Ladd v . Noyes , 137 Massachusetts 151 . . . . . . . . . . . .218 , 219
Lafferty v . Lafferty , 42 West Virginia 783 . . . 39
La Franc v . Richmond , 5 Sawyer (United States ) 601 . 80
Lagger v . Loan Association , 146 Illinois 283 .
Lake Erie R . Co . v . Priest , 131 Indiana 413 . . 225
v . Whitham , 155 Illinois 514 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 , 86
Lake Shore R . Co . v . Platt , 53 Ohio State 254 . . . . 98 , 99 , 106 , 11
6
Lamb v . Pierce , 113 Massachusetts 72
Lambert v . Smith , 9 Oregon 185 .
Lamont v . LeFevre , 96 Michigan 175 . .
Lamprey v . Danz , 86 Minnesota 317 . . . 116
v . State , 52 Minnesota 181 ,
Lancaster v . Roberts , 144 Illinois 213 . . . . . 376
Lancy v . Snow , 180 Massachusetts 411 . . . .
Land v . Shipp , 98 Virginia 284 . . . . . .
Land Company y . Saunders , 103 United States 316 . . . .
Landell v . Hamilton , 175 Pennsylvania State 327 . . . . .
Lane v . Utz , 130 Indiana 23
5
. . . . . . . . .
Lang v . Dietz , 191 Illinois 161 . . . . .
Langdon v . Clayson , 75 Michigan 204 . . . . . . . 323
Lange v . Geiser , 138 California 682 . . . . . . . . . 394
Langley v . Chapin , 134 Massachusetts 82 . . . .
Langmede v . Weaver , 65 Ohio State 17 . . . . . 251
Lanman v . Crooker , 97 Indiana 163 . . . . . . . .






. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .









[References are to Sections . ]
Lariverre v . Rains , 112 Michigan 276 . . . . . . . . .
Lathrop v . Commercial Bank , 8 Dana (Kentucky ) 114 .
v . Elsner , 93 Michigan 599 . .
v . Foster , 51 Maine 367 .
Latimer v . Latimer , 53 South Carolina 483 . . . . . .
Lautenschlager ' s Estate , 80 Michigan 285 . . .
Lawe v . Hyde , 39 Wisconsin 345 .
Lawrence v . Heister , 3 Harris and Johnson (Maryland ) 371 . . . . . . .
v . Hennessy , 165 Missouri659 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
v . McArter , 10 Ohio State 37 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lawyer v . Slingerland , 11 Minnesota 447 . . . 398 ,
Leach v . Rains , 149 Indiana 152 . . .
Leacox v . Griffith , 76 Iowa 89 . . . . . . . . .
Learned v . Cutler , 18 Pickering (Massachusetts ) 9
Leathers v . Gray , 101 North Carolina 162 . . . . .
Leavitt v . Lamprey , 13 Pickering (Massachusetts ) 382 . . . . . .
v . Leavitt , 179 Illinois 8
7
Leazure v . Hillegas , 7 Sergeant & Rawle ( Pennsylvania ) 31
3
Leddy v . Enos , 6 Washington 247 .
Lee v . Kellogg , 108 Michigan 535 .




. . . . . . . .
Leftwich v . Richmond , 100 Virginia 164 . . . . . . . .
Leggate v . Clark , 111 Massachusetts 308 . . . .
Lego v . Medley , 79 Wisconsin 211 . . . . . . . . .
Lehigh Coal C
o . v . Early , 162 Pennsylvania State 33
8
. . . . . . . . . 179 , 187
Lehndorf v . Cope , 122 Illinois 319 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .143 , 207 , 212
Lemav v . Furtado , 182 Massachusetts 280 .
Lembeck y . Nye , 47 Ohio State 336 . . . . .
LeMesnager v . Hamilton , 101 California 532 .
Lemon v . Graham , 131 Pennsylvania State , 447 . . . .
Leonard v . Leonard , 1
4 Pickering (Massachusetts ) 280 . . .
Leroy v . Jamieson , 3 Sawyer (United States ) 369 297
Leuders v . Thomas , 35 Florida 518 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lewis v . Baldwin , 11 Ohio 352 . . . . . . .
v . Watson , 98 Alabama 479
Lewis ' s Appeal , 85 Michigan 340 . . . . . . 162
Ligare v . Semple , 3
2 Michigan 438 . .
Lincoln v . Burrage , 177 Massachusetts 378 .
v . Davis , 53 Michigan 375
v . Lincoln , 107 Massachusetts 590 . . .
Lindley v . Lindley , 92 Texas 446 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 272
Link v . Connell , 48 Nebraska 574 . .
Linton v . National Life Insurance Co . (United States ) , 104 Federal
584 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .584 . . . . . . . . . . . 293
Lippincott v . Mitchell , 94 United States 767 . . . . . . . .d t t s 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 353


























[References are to sections . ]
Little Sawmill Co . v . Federal R . Co . , 194 Pennsylvania State 144 . . 249
Littlefield v . Mott , 14 Rhode Island 288
Live Stock Co . v . Springer , 35 Oregon 312 ; 185 United States 47 . . 103
Lloyd v . Quimby , 5 Ohio State 262 . . . . .
v . Taylor , 1 Dallas (United States ) 17 .
Locke v . Hale , 165 Massachusetts 20 . .
v . Homer , 131 Massachusetts 93 .
v . Redmond , 6 Kansas Appellate 86 . . . . .
Lockhart v . Vandyke , 97 Virginia 356 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
Lombard v . Chicago Sinai Congregation , 6
4 Illinois 477 241
Long v . Cockern , 128 Illinois 29 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 274
v . Georgia Pacific R . Co . , 91 Alabama 519
v . Moler , 5 Ohio State 271 . . . . . . . 204
Longworth v . Bank , 6 Ohio 536 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Loomis v . Pingree , 43 Maine 299 . .
Loree v . Abner , 6 United States Appeals 649 . . .
Lorimer v . Judge , 11
6
Michigan 682 . . 498428




6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 224
Losey v . Stanley , 147 New York 560 . 330
Louisville & c . R . Co . v . Neafus , 93 Kentucky 53
Love v . Blauw , 61 Kansas 496 . . . . .
v . Breedlove , 75 Texas 649 . 431
Lovejoy v . Lovett , 124 Massachusetts 270 . . .
Low v . Anderson , 41 Iowa 476 .
Lowe v . Lowe , 83 Minnesota 206 . . . 363
v . Morris , 13 Georgia 147 .
Lowman v . Crawford , 99 Virginia 688 . . .
Lowenthal v . Coonan , 135 California 381 . .
Lowndes v . Huntington , 153 United States 1 . . 112
Lozo v . Sutherland , 38 Michigan 168 . , .
Ladeke v . Sutherland , 87 Illinois 481 . . .
Luhrs v . Hancock , 181 United States 567 .
Lamb v . Jenkins , 100 Massachusetts 527 . .
Lumpkins v . Johnson , 61 Arkansas 8
0 .
Lansford v . La Motte Co . , 54 Missouri 426 . .
Lattrell v . Boggs , 168 Illinois 361 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lyddal v . Weston , 2 Atkyns (England ) 20
Lyle v . Richards , 9 Sergeant and Rawle (Pennsylvania ) 322
Lyman v . Conkey , 1 Metcalf (Massachusetts ) 31
7
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
7
Lynch v . Doran , 95 Michigan 395 . . 400












Maatta v . Kippola , 102 Michigan 11
6
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 387
McAllister v . Purcell , 12
4
North Carolina 262 . . .
McAnaw v . Tiffin , 143 Missouri 667 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .179 , 335 , 337
. . . . . . . . . . . . 284







[References are to Sections . ]
McBreen v . McBreen , 154 Missouri 323 . . . .
McBride v . Whitaker (Nebraska ) , 90 Northwestern 966 .
McCandless v . Engle , 51 Pennsylvania State 309
McCann v . McCann , 197 Pennsylvania State 452 . .
McCardia v . Billings , 10 North Dakota 373 . .
McCartney v . McCartney , 93 Texas 359 . . . . . .
McCarty v . Rochel , 85 Iowa 427 .
McCleary v . Ellis , 54 Iowa 311 . . 354
McCleery v . Wakefield , 76 Iowa 529 . . . . . . . . .
McClelland v . McClelland , 176 Illinois 8
3 . . . . . . . 184
McClunn v . McClunn , 176 Illinois 376 . . . 336 , 339
McClure v .Gamble , 27 Pennsylvania State 288 . 193
v . Herring , 70Missouri 18 . . . . . . . . . 239
McCord v .Massie , 155 Illinois 123 . . . . . . . . 201
McCorry v . King ' s Heirs , 3 Humphreys (Tennessee ) 267 . 169
McCoy v . Fabney , 182 Illinois 60 . 48
McCrae v . McCrae , 103 Tennessee 719 . . . . . . . . . 378
v . Purmort , 16 Wendall ( New York ) 460 . 61
McCreary v . McCorkle (Tennessee ) , 54 Southwestern 53 . . 377
McCullock v . Holmes , 111 Missouri 445 . 133
McDonald v . McElroy , 60 California 484
McDougal v . Musgrave , 46 West Virginia 509 . . 126
McDowell v . Creditors , 103 California 264
McElroy v . Hiner , 133 Illinois 156 . . .
McElwain , Ex parte , 29 Illinois 442 . . 348
McGahan v . Bank , 156 United States 218 . .
McGee v . Allison , 9
4 Iowa 527 . . .
McGinn v . Tobey , 62 Michigan 252 . . . . . . . . 42
6
McGoon v . Scales , 9 Wallace (United States ) 23 .
McGraw ' s Estate , In re , 111 New York 66 . 405
McGrael v . Taylor , 167 United States 688
McGregor v . Comstock , 17 New York 162 . . . . . . . . .
McGrew v . Harmon , 164 Pennsylvania State 115 .
McGuire v . Caskey , 62 Ohio State 419 .
McIlhinny y . McIlhinny , 137 Indiana 411 . 147
Mackay v . Easton , 19 Wallace (United States ) 619 . . . 236
McKenzie v . Donnell , 151 Missouri 431 . . . 316
v . Sifford , 52 South Carolina 104 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 366
v . Shows , 70 Mississippi 388 . 395
McKinley Creek Mining Co . v . Alaska Mining Co . , 18
3
United
States 563 . . 409
McLaughlin v . Ham , 84 Georgia 786 . . . . . . . . 357
v . Randall , 66 Maine 226 . , 246
McLean v . Webster , 45 Kansas 644 . . . . . . . . . 209
McLeod v . Tarrant , 39 South Carolina 271 . . . . . . . 133 , 164
McMahan y . Bowe , 114 Massachusetts 140 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 416






















[References are to Sections . ]
McManus v . Carmichael , 3 Iowa 1 . . . . . . .
y . Commow , 10 North Dakota 340 . . .
McMichael v . McMichael , 51 South Carolina 555 ,
Jelinn v . O 'Connor , 27 California 238 . . . . . . . .
McNeeley v . South Pennsylvania Oil Co . , 52 West Virginia 616 . . .
McPike v . Heaton , 131 California 109 .
McQuade v . Whaley , 31 California 526 . . . . . . . .
McRoberts v . McArthur , 62 Minnesota 310 . .
Mahoning Co . v . Young , 16 United States Appeals 253 . . . . . . . . 179 , 18
0
Main v . Main (Arizona ) , 60 Pacific 888 . . . . . . . 167
Mallett v . Simpson , 94 North Carolina 37 . 405
Manchester v . Hough , 5 Mason (United States ) 67 . . .
Mandlebaum y . McDonnell , 29 Michigan 78 . . . . . . .
Mann v . Keene Co . (United States ) , 86 Federal 51 . .
Vanning v . Perkins , 86 Maine 419 . . . . . . 246
Mansfield v . Gordon , 144 Massachusetts 168 . . .
Mansur v . Blake , 62 Maine 38 . .
Manuel v . Wulff , 152 United States 505 . 408
Manufacturing Co . v . Railroad , 121 North Carolina 514
Jaratta v . Anderson , 172 Illinois 377 299
Marden v . Dorthy , 160 New York 39 . . 426
Markoe v . Wakeman , 107 Illinois 251
Jarler v . Handy , 88 Texas 421 . . . . . . 394
Jarston v . Brashaw , 18 Michigan 81 . . 291
v . Brittenham , 76 Illinois 611 , 25
9
v . Hobbs , 2 Massachusetts 433 . . . . . . . . 198
Martin v . Almond , 25 Missouri 313 . 239
v . Baker , 5 Blackford (Indiana ) 232
v . Cook , 102 Michigan 267 .
v . Dwelly , 6 Wendall (New York ) 9 . 18 , 361
v . Flaharty , 13 Montana 96
v . Gilson , 37 Wisconsin 360 . . . . . . . .
v . Harrington , 73 Vermont 193 . 397
v . Jones , 62 Ohio State 519 . .
v . Lloyd , 94 California 195 .
v . Martin , 170 Illinois 639 . . . .
v . Martin , 1 Maine 394 . . . . . . 368
v . Nixon , 92 Missouri 26 . . . .
v . Smith , 5 Binney (Pennsylvania ) 16 . .
Marvel v . Phillips , 162 Massachusetts 401
Marvin v . Anderson , 111 Wisconsin 387 . . .
Marx v . Threet , 131 Alabama 340 . . 384 , 399
Mason v . Brock , 12 Illinois 273 . . 292
v . Mason , 140 Massachusetts 63 374
Massie v . Hiatt , 82 Kentucky 314 . . . 193
Masterson v . Munro , 10
5
California 431 . . . . . . . . . . 9
3 , 95

















[References are to Sections . ]
Matney v . Linn , 59 Kansas 613 . . . . . . . . . .
Matteson v. Vaughn , 38 Michigan 373 .
Mattson v . Mattson , 29 Washington 417 .
Maverick v. Burney , 88 Texas 560 .
Maxwell y. East River Bank , 3 Bosworth (New York ) 124
v. Roach , 106 Louisiana 123 . . . . . . . .
May v . Sturdivant , 75 lowa 11
6
Maynard v . Davis , 127 Michigan 571 . .
Mayor v . Mabie , 13 New York 151 .
Mays v . Pryce , 95 Missouri 603 . 293
Mead v . Fitzpatrick , 74 Connecticut 521 . . .
v . Parker , 115 Massachusetts 413 .
Meazles v . Martin , 93 Kentucky 50 . . . . . .
Mecklem v . Blake , 22 Wisconsin 495 . . .
Medara v . Dubois , 187 Pennsylvania State 431 .
Mee v . Benedict , 98 Michigan 260 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Meech v . Wilder (Michigan ) , 89 Northwestern 556 .
Meeks v . Stillwell , 64 Ohio State 541 . 299
Meier v . Portland Cable Co . , 16 Oregon 500 . . . . . . . . . .
Meigs v . Dexter , 172 Massachusetts 217 . 340
Melley v . Casey , 99 Massachusetts 241 . . . . . . . . . . 36
4
Memmert v . McKeen , 112 Pennsylvania State 3 : 5
Memphis & c . R . Co . v .Grayson , 88 Alabama 572 . .
Mendenhall v . Elwert , 36 Oregon 375 . . . . . . . .
v . Parish , 53 North Carolina 105
Mercantile Trust Co . y . South Park Co . , 94 Kentucky 271 . . .
Merrick v . Merrick , 37 Ohio State 126 .
Merritt y . Yates , 71 Illinois 636 . . . .
Merwin v . Morris , 71 Connecticut 555 . . . . . . .
Meservey v . Snell , 94 Iowa 223 . . .
Messer v . Oestreich , 52 Wisconsin 693 . . . .
Methodist Church v . Hoboken , 33 New Jersey Law 13
v . Remington , 1 Watts (Pennsylvania ) 218 . .
Mettler v . Miller , 129 Illinois 630 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Meyer y . Kinzer , 12 California 247 . . .
Michener v . Cavender , 38 Pennsylvania State 334 . 293
Michigan Trust Co . v . Chapin , 106 Michigan 384 . . .
Mickey v . Barton , 194 Illinois 446 . . . . .
Middlebrook v . Barefoot , 121 Alabama 642 .
Middlecoff v . Hemstreet , 135 California 173 . . . . . . . . . .
Middlesex R . Co . v . Boston & c . R . Co . , 115 Massachusetts 347 . . .
Middleton v . Findla , 25 California 76 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
v . Pritchard , 4 Illinois 510 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Midgett v . Brooks , 12 Iredell Law (North Carolina ) 14
5
. . . . .
Midgley v . Walker , 101 Michigan 583 150
Miles v . Fisher , 10 Ohio 1 . . . . . . . . .
Mill River Manufacturing Co . v . Smith , 34 Connecticut 462 . . . . . . .
.



























[References are to Sections. ]
Miller , Ex parte , 49 Arkansas 18 . . . . .
v . Miller , 140 Indiana 174 . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . .
v . Miller , 89 North Carolina 402 .
v . Parsons , 9 Johnson (New York ) 336 . . .
v . Ruble , 10
7
Pennsylvania State 395 . . . . . . . . .
y . Smith , 26 Minnesota 248 .
Millett v . Mullen , 95 Maine 400 . . .
Mills v . Seattle & Montana R . , 10 Washington 520
Milner v . Nelson , 86 Iowa 452 . . . . . . . .
Miner v . Wilson , 107 Michigan 57 . . . . . . . . .
Mineral Co . v . James , 97 Virginia 403 . .
Minneapolis Stockyards C
o . v . Halonen , 56 Minnesota 469 .
Minnesota Stoneware Co . v . McCrossen , 110 Wisconsin 316 . . .
Miskey ' s Appeal , 107 Pennsylvania State 611 . . . . .
Mitchell v . Kepler , 75 Iowa 207 . . . . . . . . . . .
y . Leavitt , 30 Connecticut 587
v . Smale , 140 United States 406 . . . . .
Mitchell ' s Lessee v . Ryan , 3 Ohio State 377
Mittel v . Karl , 133 Illinois 65 . .
Moffitt v . Lytle , 165 Pennsylvania State 173 . . . . . . .
v . Maness , 102 North Carolina 457
Monroe y . Arthur , 126 Alabama 362
v . Bowles , 187 Illinois 346 . .
Montello , The , 20 Wallace (United States ) 430 .
Montgomery v . Sturdivant , 41 California 290 .
Moore v . Baker , 92 Kentucky 518
v . Cornell , 68 Pennsylvania State 320 . .
v . Farmer , 156 Missouri 33 . . . . . . . . .
v . Graves , 97 Iowa 4 . . .
v . Harmon , 142 Indiana 555 . . . . . . .
v . Page , 111 United States 117 . .
Moran v . Clark , 30 West Virginia 358 . . .
v . Lezotte , 54 Michigan 83 . . . . .
v . Moran , 10
6
Michigan 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .mennes 33
5 , 33
7
Moreau v . Detchemendy , 18 Missouri 522 . . . .
Morehead v . Hall , 126 North Carolina 213 . . . . . . . . . .
Moreland v . Strong , 115 Michigan 211 . . .
Morgan v . Snodgrass , 49 West Virginia 387 .
Morley Bros . v . Loan Co . , 120 Michigan 171 . . . . . . .
Mormon Church v . United States , 136 United States 1
Morris v . Caudle , 178 Illinois 9 . .
v . Hastings , 70 Texas 26 . . .
v . Jansen , 99 Michigan 436 .
v . Linton ,61 Nebraska 537 . .
v . McCarty , 15
8
Massachusetts 1
1 . . . . . . . .













lviii TABLE OF CASES .
07
[References are to Sections. ]
Mott v . Danville Seminary , 129 Illinois 403 . .
v . Oppenheimer , 135 New York 312 . . . . . . .
v . Smith , 16 California 533 .
Mueller v. Conrad , 178 Illinois 27
6
. . . . . . . .
Muldoon v . Deline , 135 New York 150 . . .
Mullen v . Penobscot Co . , 90 Maine 55 . .
Muller v . Landa , 31 Texas 265 . . . . . .
Mullins v . Butte Hardware Co . , 25 Montana 525
Munn v . Worrall , 53 New York 44 . . .
Murphy v . Copeland , 51 Iowa 515 : . . . . . . . .
v . Gabbert , 166 Missouri 596 . . . . . . . .
v . Lockwood , 21 Illinois 611 . . . . . . . .
v . Ryan , 2 Irish Common Law 143 (Ireland ) .
Murray v . Hoyle , 92 Alabama 559 . . . . . . . . . . .
v . Klinzing , 64 Connecticut 78 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56 , 95
v . Quigley ( Iowa ) , 92 Northwestern 869 . . . 158
v . Tulare Co . , 120 Californa 311 . . . . . . . . . . . . 281
Muskingum Co . v . Ward , 13 Ohio 120 . . .
Musson v . Trigg , 51 Mississippi 172 . . . . . . . . . . 357
Mutual Life Insurance Co . v . Corey , 135 New York 326 . 293
v . Shipman , 119 New York 324 . .
Muzzarelli v . Hulshizer , 163 Pennsylvania State 643 . . .
Myers v . Ford , 22 Wisconsin 139 . 380
v . Knabe , 51 Kansas 720 . . . . . . .
v . McGavock , 39 Nebraska 843 . 324 , 326
Mygatt v . Coe , 152 New York 457 . 363 , 194
y . Coe , 124 New York 212 . . . . . . . . 217


















National Bank v . Matthews , 98 United States 621 . . . . . . . . . .
v . Segar , 39 New Jersey Law 173 . . . . . . . . .
v . Wheelock , 52 Ohio State 534 . . . . . . . .
National Building and Loan Association v . Cunningham , 130 Ala
bama 539 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Naylor v . Minock , 96 Michigan 182 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Neal v . Nelson , 117 North Carolina 393 . . .
v . Neales , 9 Wallace (United States ) 1 . .
Neely v . Hoskins , 84 Maine 386 . . . . . . . .
Nevels v . Kentucky Lumber Co . , 108 Kentucky 550 . . . . . .
New England Co . v . Spitler , 54 Kansas 560 . . . . . . .
Newberry v . Newberry , 114 Iowa 704 . . . . . . .
Newman v . Tymeson , 13 Wisconsin 172 . . . . . . .
New Orleans Pacific R . Co . v . Parker , 143 United States 42 . .
Newpoint Lodge v . Newpoint , 138 Indiana 141 .
Newton v . Emerson , 66 Texas 142 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
v . McKay , 29 Michigan 1 . . . . .












[References are to Sections . ]
Nichols v . Boston , 98 Massachusetts 39 . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
v . Furniture Co . , 100 Michigan 230 . . .
Nicoll v . New York and Erie R . Co . , 12 New York < 121 . . . . . 402
Nicrosi v . Phillipi , 91 Alabama 299 . . .
Nightingale v . Hidden , 7 Rhode Island 115 . . . 134
Niles v . Cedar Point Club , 175 United States 300
Noble v . Googins , 99 Massachusetts 231 .
Ncbleboro v . Clark , 68 Maine 87
Xoblitt v . Beebe , 23 Oregon 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
Norcross v . Griffiths , 65 Wisconsin 599 . . . . . . . . 98 , 99
v . James , 140 Massachusetts 188 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214 , 230
Norfolk v . Cooke , 27 Grattan (Virginia ) 430 . . . . . . . . . . . 108
Norris v . Dains , 52 Ohio State 215 . 240
v . Hall , 124 Michigan 170 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Northern Lake Ice Co . v . Orr , 102 Kentucky 586 . .
Northumberland v . Cobleigh , 59 New Hampshire 250 . .
Norwalk Heating & c . Co . v . Vernam , 75 Connecticut 662
Noyes v . Board , 104 Iowa 174 . . . .
v . Collins , 92 Iowa 566 . . . . . .
y . Kramer , 54 Iowa 22 . .
Nyce v . Obertz , 17 Ohio 71 . . . . . .
Nye v . Hoyle , 120 New York 195 . .
v . Lowry , 82 Indiana 316 . .
v . Taunton R . C




















Oakes v . DeLancey , 133 New York 227 . . . . . . . . . . .
Oakland v . Hewitt , 105 Iowa 663 . . . . . . . . . .
v . Oakland C
o . , 118 California 160 .
O 'Brien y . Wagner , 94 Missouri 93 . . . . . . . . .
O 'Conner v . O 'Conner , 100 Iowa 476 . .
Odom v . Riddick , 104 North Carolina 515 .
O ' Donnell v . Kelliher , 62 Illinois Appellate 641
Oelbermann v . Ide , 93 Wisconsin 669 . . .
Ogburn ' s Estate , 105 California 95 . . .
Ogden v . Ogden , 60 Arkansas 70 . . . . .
Ogden Building Association v . Mensch , 196 Illinois 554
Olcott v . Gabert , 86 Texas 121 . . . . . . . . . .
Olin v . Denver and Rio Grande R . Co . , 25 Colorado 177 . . . .
Oliver v . Dickinson , 100 Massachusetts 114 . . .
v . Olmstead , 112 Michigan 483 . . . .
v . Piatt , 3 Howard (United States ) 333 .
Olson v . Huntamer , 6 South Dakota 364 . . . . . . .
v . Seattle (Washington ) , 71 Pacific 201 . . .
v . Thorndike , 76 Minnesota 399 . . . .
Omaha Real Estate Co . v . Kragscow , 47 Nebraska 592
O 'Neill v . Wilcox , 115 Iowa 15 . . . . . . . . .







TABLE OF CASES .
293
(References are to Sections. )
Ormsby v . Budd , 72 Iowa 80 .. . . .
Oregon Mortgage Co . v . Carstens , 16 Washington 165 .
Oregon R . Co . y . Oregonian R . Co ., 130 United States 1 .
Osborne v . Cooper , 113 Alabama 405 . . . . . . ..
v . Eslinger , 155 Indiana 351 . . .
v. Kissler , 35 Ohio State 99 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ottumwa Woolen Mill Co . v . Hawley , 44 Iowa 57 . .
Outland v . Bowen , 115 Indiana 150 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Overacre v . Blake, 82 California 77. . . . . . . .
Overfield v. Christie , 7 Sergeant and Rawle (Pennsylvania ) 173. . 421
Overland Machinery Co . v . Alpenfels (Colorado ), 69 Pacific 574 . . . .








Pacific R . Co. v. Seely , 45 Missouri 212 . . . . . .
Packer v . Bird , 71 California 134 ; 137 United States 661. . . . . . .101,
Paddock v . Pulsifer , 43 Kansas 718 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 341
Page v. Heineberg , 40 Vermont 81 . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 401
Paine v . Woods , 108 Massachusetts 160 . . . . . . . . .. ..
Paine 's Executor v . Consumers' Storage Co . (United States) , 71
Federal 627 . .. .
Painter v. Water Co ., 91 California 74 . .
Palmer v . Farrell, 129 Pennsylvania State , 162 . . . 108
v . Palmer, 150 New York 139 . .
v . Ryan , 63 Vermont 227 . . . . . . . . . .
Paolillo v . Taber , 56 New York Appellate Division 241.
Papst v. Hamilton , 133 California 631. 181
Parent v . Callerand , 64 Illinois 97 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 359
Parish v. Whitney , 3 Gray (Massachusetts ) 516 . .
Park v. Wilkinson , 21 Utah 279 . . . . . . . .
Parker v . Marco (United States ), 76 Federal 510 . . .
Parks v. Hazlerigg , 7 Blackford (Indiana ) 536 . . .
Parmelee v . Simpson , 5 Wallace (United States ), 81 . .
Parrish v . Hawes , 95 Texas 185 . . . . . . . .
Parrott v. Avery , 159 Massachusetts 594 . . .. 06
Parsons v. Boyd, 20 Alabama 112 .
Patterson v . Galliher , 122 North Carolina 511. . .
v . Nixon , 79 Indiana 251. . . . . . . .
v. Patterson , 81 Iowa 626
Patton v. Nixon , 33 Oregon 159 .
Pawling v . United States , 4 Cranch 219 . . . . . . . . 309
Payette v. Ferrier , 20 Washington 479 .
Pearce v . Schotcher , 9 Queen 's Bench Division 162. 107
Pearl v . Lockwood , 123 Michigan 142 . . . ..
Pearsoll y. Chapin , 44 Pennsylvania State 9 . . . .. .
Pearson v . Adams , 129 Alabama 157 . . . . . 418
v . Allen , 151 Massachusetts 79 . . .. . .





















[References are to Sections . ]
Pearson v . Davis , 41 Nebraska 608 . . . .
Pease v . Bridge , 49 Connecticut 58 . . . .
v . Inhabitants of Whitman , 182 Massachusetts 363 . . . .
v . Lawson , 33 Missouri 35 . . . . . 246
Peck v . Denniston , 121 Massachusetts 17 . . . . . . . . . 90
v . Houghtaling , 35 Michigan 127 . . .
v . Sims , 120 Indiana 345 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418
Pemberton Building Association v . Adams , 53 New Jersey Equity
258 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 320
Penfold v . Warner , 96 Michigan 17
9
. . 377
Penn v . Garvin , 56 Arkansas 511 . . . . . . . . . .
Penny v . British & c . Mortgage Co . , 132 Alabama 357 . .
People v . Ballard , 134 New York 269 . .
v . Chase , 165 Illinois 527 . . .
v . Miller , 79 Michigan 93 . . . , . . . . . . . .
v . O 'Brien , 111 New York 1 . . . . . . .
v . Pullman ' s Palace Car Co . , 175 Illinois 125 .
v . Silberwood , 110 Michigan 103 . . . . .
v . Simon , 17
6
Illinois 165 . . . . . . . .436 , 442
v . Stockton Savings and Loan Society , 133 California 611 . . 405
Perkins v . McAuliffe , 105 Wisconsin 582 .
Perrin v . Carey , 24 Howard (United States ) 465 . . .
Peter v . Byrne (Missouri ) , 75 Southwestern 433 . 364
Peters v . Bowman , 98 United States 56 . . . . . . . .
v . Cartier , 80 Michigan 124 . . . . . . . . .
Pettigrew v . Dobbelaar , 63 California 396 .
Peuker v . Canter , 62 Kansas 363 . . . . .
Pewaukee v . Savoy , 103 Wisconsin ' 271 . .
Phillips v . Ferguson , 85 Virginia 509 . . .
v . Moore , 100 United States 208 . .
v . Providence Steam Engine Co . , 21 Rhode Island 302 406
v . Phillips , 30 Colorado 516 . . . . . 373
y . Swank , 12
0
Pennsylvania State 76 . . . . . . . . .
Philpot v . Bingham , 55 Alabama 435 . . . . .
Pickens v . Rymer , 90 North Carolina 283 .
Pierce v . Indseth , 106 United States 546 .
Pierson v . Lane , 60 Iowa 6
0 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pike v . Clark , 40 New Hampshire 9 . . . .
v . Pike , 121 Michigan 170 . . . . . . . . . .
Pilcher v . Atchison & c . R . Co . , 38 Kansas 516
Pillow y . Wade , 31 Arkansas 678 . 375
Pimental y . San Francisco , 21 California 351 . .
Pinkham v . Pinkham , 55 Nebraska 729 . . . . . . 29
v . Pinkham , 95 Maine 71 . 375
Pipkin v . Williams , 57 Arkansas 242 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pitts v . Seavey , 88 Iowa 336 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Pittsburgh Iron C



















































[References are to Sections . ]
Plaster v . Rigney (United States ) , 97 Federal 12 . . . .
Plympton v . Hall , 55 Minnesota 22 . . . .
Plummer v . Gould , 92 Michigan 1 . .
Poe v . Dixon , 60 Ohio State 124 . . . . . . . . .
Point Street Iron Works v . Simmons , 11 Rhode Island 496
Poley v . Lacert , 35 Oregon 166 . . . .
Polk v . Faris , 9 Yerger (Tennessee ) 209 . . .
Poliock v . Speidel , 27 Ohio State 86 . . .
Polson v . Stewart , 167 Massachusetts 211 . . . .
Porcher v . Daniel , 12 Richardson Equity 349 .
Porter v . Bradley , 7 Rhode Island 538 .
v . Cook , 114 Wisconsin 60 . . . .
v . Read , 19 Maine 363 . . . . . . .
y . Woodhouse , 59 Connecticut 568 . . . .
Post v . Bank , 138 Illinois 55
9
.
v . Campau , 42 Michigan 90 . . . . . .
v . Railroad Co . , 50 Hun (New York ) 301 .
v . Weil , 115 New York 361 . . .
Potter v . Adams , 125 Missouri 118 . . . .
v . Couch , 141 United States 29
6
. . .
v . Potter (Oregon ) , 72 Pacific 702 .
Pounds v . Clarke , 70 Mississippi 263 .
Powell v . Lantzy , 173 Pennsylvania State 543 . . . . .
v . Monson , 3 Mason (United States ) 355 . . . . . .
v . Patison , 100 California 236 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Powers v . Bank of Oroville , 136 California 486 . .
Pratt v . Morrow , 45 Missouri 404 .
v . Pratt , 161 Massachusetts 276 . . .
Pray v . Stebbins , 141 Massachusetts 219 . . . . . . . . . .
Prentice v . Railroad Co . , 154 United States 163 ,
v . Stearns , 113 United States 435 . . .
Prescott v . Edwards , 117 California 298 .
v . Trueman , 4 Massachusetts 627
Preston v . Bosworth , 153 Indiana 458 . . .
Prewit v . Wilson , 103 United States 22 .
Price v . Hall , 140 Indiana 314 . . .
v . Osborn , 34 Wisconsin 34 . .
v . Planters ' Bank , 92 Virginia 468 . . .
Pritchett v . Davis , 101 Georgia 236 . . . . . . . . . . .
Priewe y . Wisconsin Co . , 93 Wisconsin 534 .
Prouty v . Tilden , 164 Illinois 163 . . . . . . . . . . .
Provident C
o . v . Fiss , 147 Pennsylvania State 232 . . . . .
Prutsman v . Baker , 30 Wisconsin 644 . .
Pry v . Pry , 109 Illinois 46
6
. . . .
Pryne v . Pryne , 116 Iowa 82 . . .






















TABLE OF CASES . lxiii
[ References are to Sections . ]
Purdy v . Coar, 10
9
New York 448 .
v . Hayt , 92 New York 446 . . . . . . . . .
Purinton v . Railroad C
o . , 46 Illinois 297 . .
Pynchon v . Stearns , 11 Metcalf (Massachusetts ) 312 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
382
Quatman v . McCray , 128 California 285 . . . . . . .
Quebl v . Peterson , 47 Minnesota 13 . .
Quick v . Milligan , 108 Indiana 419 . . . . . . . . . .
Quicksall v . Philadelphia , 177 Pennsylvania State 301 . . .








Radford v . Carwile , 13 West Virginia 572 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355
Railroad v Bank , 178 Illinois 506 . . . . . . . . . . . 63
v . Platt , 53 Ohio State 254 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98 , 99 , 10
6 , 11
6
v . Schurmeir , 7 Wallace (United States )272 102
Rand Lumber Co . v . Atkins , 116 Iowa 242 .
Randall v . Ghent , 19 Indiana 271 . . .
v . Marble , 69 Maine 310 . . . . . . . . .
Ranken y . Donovan , 46 New York Appellate Division 225 . . . . . . 307
Rankin v . Miller , 43 Iowa 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 326
Rankin ' s Heirs v . Rankin ' s Executors , 6 T . B . Monroe (Ken
tucky ) 531 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414
Rannells v .Gerner , 80 Missouri 474 . . . . . . . . . . . . .332 , 333
Ransom v . Ransom , 30 Michigan 328 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .358 , 359 , 368 , 371
Rawles v . Reichenbach (Nebraska ) , 90 Northwestern 943 . . . . . . . . . .
Rawson v . School District , 7 Allen (Massachusetts ) 129 . . . . . . . 180 , 181
Ray v . Long (North Carolina ) , 44 Southeastern 652 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
Raymond v . Raymond , 10 Cushing (Massachusetts ) 140 . . .
Read v . Toledo Loan Co . , 68 Ohio State 280 .
Ready v . Pinkham , 181 Massachusetts 351 . . .
Rebhan v . Mueller , 114 Illinois 343 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Reck v . Clapp , 98 Pennsylvania State 581 . . . . . .
Redemptorist Fathers y . Lawler , 205 Pennsylvania State 24 .
Rector v . Hartford Deposit Co . , 190 Illinois 380 . . .
v . Rotton , 3 Nebraska 171 . . . . . . .
Redmond v . Chandley , 119 North Carolina 575 . . . . . . .
Reed v . Carlson (Minnesota ) , 95 Northwestern 303
v . Douthit , 62 Illinois 348 . . . . . . . . . . . .
v . Lane , 122 Missouri 311 . .
v . Smith , 125 California 491 . .
Reg v . Morton , 28 Law Times Reports (New Series ) 452 . . . . . . . . . . .
Regents o
f University v . Detroit Young Men ' s Society , 12 Michigan
138 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 404
Reid ' s Administrator v . Benge (Kentucky ) , 66 Southwestern 997 . .
Reiff y . Horst , 55 Maryland 42 . . . . . . . 874
Reilly v . Otto , 108 Michigan 330 . . . . . . . 229
Remington C























[ References are to Sections . ]
Rendleman 's Case , 156 Illinois 568 . . .
Revell v. People , 177 Illinois 468 . .
Reyes v . Middleton , 36 Florida 99 . . . . . . .. .
Reynolds v . Shaver , 59 Arkansas 299 . ..
Reysen v. Roate , 92 Wisconsin 543 . . . .
Rhea v . Bagley , 63 Arkansas 374 . . .
v . Rhenner , 1 Peters (United States ) 105 . .
Rhoades v . Davis , 51 Michigan 306 . . . . .
v. Fuller , 139 Missouri 179 . . . . . . . .
Richard v . Bent , 59 Illinois 38 . . . . .
v. East Tennessee & c . R . Co ., 106 Georgia 614 .. . .
Richards v. McClelland , 29 Pennsylvania State 385
Richardson v . Bates, 8 Ohio State 257 . . . . . . . . . . ..
v . Clements , 89 Pennsylvania State 503 . . .
v . De Giverville , 107 Missouri 422 . . .
v . International Pottery Co ., 63 New Jersey Law 248 . .
v. Pate , 93 Indiana 423 . . . . .
v . Richardson , 80 Maine 585 . . . . . .
v . Stodder, 100 Massachusetts 528 . .. . .. .. ..
v . Tobey , 121 Massachusetts 457 . . . . .
v . Woodstock Iron Co ., 90 Alabama 266
Richey v . Sinclair , 167 Illinois 184 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rico v. Brandenstein , 98 California 465 .
Ridden v . Baker , 86 Indiana 191 . . . . . . . . . .
Ridgeway v . Herbert , 150 Missouri 606 . .
Riggin v. Love, 72 Illinois 553 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Riggles v . Erney , 154 United States 244 .
Riley v. Burroughs , 41 Nebraska 296 . .
v . Carter , 76 Maryland 581. .. . . . . .
v . Wilson , 86 Texas 240 . . .
Rinard v . West, 92 Indiana 359 . . . .
Rines y . Mansfield , 96 Missouri 394 .
Ring v . Lawless , 190 Illinois 520 .
Ritchie v . Railroad , 55 Kansas 36 . . . .
Robeno v . Marlatt , 136 Pennsylvania State 35
Roberts v. Decker (Wisconsin ), 97 Northwestern 519
v . Morgan , 30 Vermont 319 . . ..
Robertson v. Pickrell, 109 United States 608 . .
Robbins , In re, 34 Minnesota 99 . . . . . .
y. Rascoe, 120 North Carolina 79 .
v . Webb , 68 Alabama 393 . . . . .
Robinson v . Bierce, 102 Tennessee 428
v. Coulter, 90 Tennessee 705 . . . . .. . . . . .
v . Thrailkill , 11
0
Indiana 117 . . . . . . .
Robinson ' s Appeal , 88 Maine 17 . . . . . . . .
Rockford R . Co . v . Beckemeier , 72 Illinois 267
































' [References are to Sections. ]
Rockwell v . Swift , 59 Connecticut 289 .. . .
Rogers v . Day , 115 Michigan 664 . . . . . . . ..
v. McFarland , 89 Iowa 286 . . . . .
v . Pell , 154 New York 518 . . . . . . . .
Rohrbaugh v . Hamblin , 57 Kansas 393 . ..
Rollet v . Heiman , 120 Indiana 511 . . . . .
Ronan v . Bluhm , 173 Illinois 277 . .
Rondot v . Rogers Township (United States ) , 99 Federal 202 . .
Rood v. Wallace , 109 Iowa 5 .. .. . . .. . .. . . . .
Root v . Brotherson , 4 McLean (United States ) 230 .
Rose v. Taunton , 119 Massachusetts 99 .
Ross v . Faust , 54 Indiana 471 . . . . .
Rossmiller v. State , 114 Wisconsin 169 . .
Rothschild v. Dougher , 85 Texas 332 . . . . .
Roulston v . Hall, 66 Arkansas 305 . . . . . . . .
Roussain v. Norton , 53 Minnesota 560 . . . . .
Row v . Row , 53 Ohio State 249 . 344
Rowe v . Hamilton , 3 Maine 63 ..
Rowland v. Miller , 139 New York 93 . .
v . Rowland , 93 North Carolina 214 . ..
v . Warren , 10 Oregon 129 . . . . .
Rowley v . Berrian , 12 Illinois 19
8
. . . . . . . . .
Rozier v . Graham , 146 Missouri 352 . . . . .
Ruch v . Rock Island , 97 United States 693 . . . . . . . .
Rackman v . Ruckman , 32 New Jersey Equity 259 .
Ruiz v . Dow , 113 California 490 .
Runnells v . Webber , 59 Maine 488 . . .
Rupert v . Penner , 35 Nebraska 587 . 130
Rushton v . Davis , 127 Alabama 279 . . . 364
Russell v . Doyle , 84 Kentucky 386 . . . . . . . . . 416
v . Russell , 122 Missouri 235
Rutherford v . Tracy , 48 Missouri 325 . . . . . .
Ryan y . Growney , 125 Missouri 474
Ryder v . Flanders , 30 Michigan 336 . . . . . . . . . . . .








14 . . . . . 320
328
. 94Sacramento v . Clunie , 120 California 29 . . . . . .
Sage v . Mayor of New York , 154 New York 61 . . . . . 104
S
t
. Louis & c . R . Co . v . Ramsey , 53 Arkansas 314 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108 , 109
S
t . Paul & c . R . Co . v . St . Paul & c . Pacific R . Co . , 26 Minnesota 31 . 10
8
Sala , Succession o
f , 50 Louisiana Annual 1009
Salem National Bank v . White , 159 Illinois 136 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 239 , 428
Salisbury v . Clarke , 61 Vermont 453 . . 66
Sallee v . Chandler , 26 Missouri 124 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Salmon Manufacturing Co . v . Goddard , 14 Howard (United States )
446 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- - BREWS . Con .
356
237





(References are to Sections.]
Samme 's Case , 13 Coke 54 . . ..
Sammon y . Wood , 107 Michigan 506 . . . .
Sanborn v . Flagler, 9 Allen (Massachusetts) 474 . . .. . ..
Sanders v. Godding , 45 Iowa 463 . .
Sands v. Lynham , 27 Grattan (Virginia ) 291 . . . .
Sandwich Manufacturing Co . y . Zellmer , 48 Minnesota 408 .
Sanford v. Kane , 133 Illinois 199 . . .
San Francisco v . Grote , 120 California 59 . . .
y . Itsell, 80 California 57 . . .
Sanger v . Merritt , 13 New York 614 . . . . . . .
v. Warren , 91 Texas 472 . . .
Sarazin v . Railroad , 153 Missouri 479 . . ..
Sartor v . Bolinger , 59 Texas 411 . . . . . . . .
Sassenberg v . Huseman , 182 Illinois 341 . . . .
Saunders v . Blythe , 112 Missouri 1. . .
v . Hackney , 78 Tennessee 194 . . . . .
v . Saunders , 115 Iowa 275 . . . .
Savage v . Savage , 80 Maine 472 . . . . . . . .
Savings Bank v . Kennedy , 58 Iowa 454 .
Savings Society v. Deering , 66 California 281 ..
Sayers v . Collyer , 28 Chancery Division 103 . .
Sayles v . Christie , 187 Illinois 420 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317 , 319
Scanlan v . Grimmer, 71 Minnesota 351 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
v . Wright, 13 Pickering (Massachusetts ) 523 .
Schafer y. Hauser , 111 Michigan 622 . .
Schaps v . Lehner , 54 Minnesota 208 .
Scharpf v . Schmidt , 172 Illinois 255 . . .
Schermerhorn v. Mahaffie , 34 Kansas 108 . . . . . . . 394
Schley v . Pullman Car Co ., 120 United States 575 . 364
Schlosser v . Hemphill, 118 Iowa 452 .
Schmisseur v . Pennsylvania , 47 Illinois Appellate 278 .
Schofield v . Homestead Co ., 32 Iowa 317 .
v. Jennings , 68 Indiana 233 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Scrimper v . Railroad , 115 Iowa 35 .
Schumacher y . Truman , 134 California 930 . .
Schurtz v . Colvin , 55 Ohio State 274 . .
Schweiss v . Woodruff , 73 Michigan 473
Schwindt v . Schwindt , 61 Kansas 377 . .
Scofield v . Hopkins, 61 Wisconsin 370 . . . . . . .
Scott y . Bassett , 174 Illinois 390 .
v . Kirkendall , 88 Illinois 465 . . 206
v . Trustees , 50 Michigan 528 . . . .. . . ..
Scott 's Estate , 147 Pennsylvania State 102 . .
Scovill v . McMahon , 62 Connecticut 378 . . . .
Scranton v. Wheeler , 113 Michigan 565 . . 106
v. Wheeler , 179 United States 141 . . . . . .















TABLE OF CASES . lxyii
. . . . 298
[References are to sections . ]
Serugham y . Wood , 15 Wendell (New York ) 545 . . .
Searcy v . Hunter , 81 Texas 644 . . . . . . . . . 318 , 319
Sears v . Ackerman , 138 California 583 . . . . 124
v. Broady (Nebraska ), 92 Northwestern 214 . . . . . . . . 218
Sebald v . Mulholland , 155 New York 455 . 232
Security Bank v . Holmes , 65 Minnesota 531 . . . . . .
v . Holmes , 68 Minnesota 538 . .
Security Co . v. Payne, 107 Alabama 578 . . . . . .
Security Land & c . Co . v . Burns , 87 Minnesota 97 .. . . ..
Security Loan Co . v . Kauffman , 108 California 214
Security Savings Bank v . Smith , 38 Oregon 72 .
Sedgwick v . Hollenback , 7 Johnson (New York ) 376 . .
See v . Deer , 57 Michigan 369 . . ..
Seeley v . Price , 14 Michigan 541 .. .. . . . . . ..
Seiffert & c. Lumber Co . v . Hartwell , 94 Iowa 576 .
Sell v . Miller , 11 Ohio State 331 . . ..
Sellers v . Sellers , 98 North Carolina 13. . . . . . . . .
Sengfelder v. Hill, 21 Washington 371 .
Sergeant v . Steinberger , 2 Obio 305 . . .
Serles v . Serles , 35 Oregon 289 . . . .
Sewell v . Sewell , 92 Kentucky 500 . . . .
Sever v . Lyons , 170 Illinois 395 . . . .
Seymour v . Bowles , 172 Illinois 521 .
Shaft v . Carey, 107 Wisconsin 273. .. . . . . . .
Shanks y . Seamonds , 24 Iowa 131.
Shannon v . Timm , 22 Colorado 167 .
Shapley v. Diehl, 203 Pennsylvania State 566
Sharp v . Bailey , 14 Iowa 387 .
Shattuck v . Lamb, 65 New York 499 . . . . .
Shaughnessy v . Lewis , 130 Massachusetts 355 . .
Shaw v . Kirby , 93 Wisconsin 379 . . .
Shea v . Murphy , 164 Illinois 614 . . . 340
Sheehan v . Davis , 17 Ohio State 571 . . . . 249
Sheeley v . Neidhammer , 182 Pennsylvania State 163
Shelby v. Chicago & c . R . Co ., 143 Illinois 385 . .
Shelden v . Freeman , 116 Michigan 646 . . . .
Sheldon v . Carter , 90 Alabama 380 . . . . . . . .
Shell v . Matteson , 81 Minnesota 38 . . . .
Shelley ' s Case , 1 Coke 93 . . . .
Shelton v . Aultman & c . Co . , 82 Alabama 315 . .
Sherwood v . Commissioner of Land Office , 11
3
Michigan 227
v . Landon , 57 Michigan 219 . . . . . . .
Sherrid v . Southwick , 43 Michigan 515 . . .
Shields v . Bush , 189 Illinois 534 . . .
Shipp v . McKee , 80 Mississippi 741 . . . . . .
Shipley v . Bunn , 125 Missouri 445 . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 315
Shively v . Bowlby , 152 United States 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 , 102 , 104 , 11
2


















[References are to Sections . ]
Shoemaker v . Collins , 49 Michigan 595
Short v . Conlee , 28 Illinois 219 . . .
Shrock v . Crowl , 83 Indiana 243 313
Shropshire v . Behrens , 77 Texas 275 . . . . . . . . .
Shroyer v . Pittenger (Indiana ) , 67 Northeastern 475
Sicard v . Davis , 6 Peters (United States ) 124 . .
Silcock v . Baker , 25 Texas Civil Appeals 508 . . . . . .
Silliman v . Cummins , 13 Ohio 116 . . . .
Sillyman v . King , 36 Iowa 207 . .
Silverman v . Kristufek , 162 Illinois 222 . .
Simmons v . Kichardson , 107 Alabama 697 . .
Simons v . Bollinger , 154 Indiana 83 . . . .
Simonton v . White , 93 Texas 50 . . . . . .
Simpson v . Commonwealth , 89 Kentucky 412 . .
Simpson v . Mikkelsen , 196 Illinois 575 . . . .
Simpson v . Railroad , 176 Massachusetts 359 . . . . 119 , 125
Sims v . Everhardt , 102 United States 300 . . . . . . . . .315 , 316 ,
v . Rickets , 35 Indiana 181 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 370
Simson v . Bank , 43 Hun (New York ) 156 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Singer Manufacturing Co . v . Lamb , 81 Missouri 221 . . . . . . . . . . .313 ,
Sioux City & St . Paul R . Co . v . Singer , 49 Minnesota 301 .
Sizor v . Logansport , 151 Indiana 626 . . .
Slater y . Granger , 165 Illinois 329 .
v . Gunn , 170 Massachusetts 509 . .
v . Nason , 15 Pickering (Massachusetts ) 315 . .
Sleeper v . Laconia , 60 New Hampshire 201
Slegel v . Lauer , 148 Pennsylvania State 236 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slingerland v . International Contracting C
o . , 169 New York 60 . . . .
Sloan v . Biemiller , 34 Ohio State 492 . .
Slone v . Grider (Kentucky ) , 44 Southwestern 384 . - 161
Smith v . Barrie , 56 Michigan 314 . .
v . Becker , 62 Kansas 541 . . . . . . . . . . .
v . Clark , 100 Iowa 605
v . Cuddy , 96 Michigan 562 . . . .
v . Furbish , 68 New Hampshire 123 . . . . . . 125
v . Howell , 11 New Jersey Equity 349 .
v . Ingram , 132 North Carolina 959 . . .
v . Jones , 97 Kentucky 670 .
v . Kneer , 203 Illinois 264 . . .
V . Lloyd , 29 Michigan 382 . . . . .
y . Lowry , 113 Indiana 37
v . Nelson , 110 Missouri 552 . . .
v . Olmstead , 88 California 582 . . . . . . . .
v . Porter , 10 Gray (Massachusetts ) 66 .
v . Richards , 155 Massachuseits 79 . . . . .
v . Scarbrough , 61 Arkansas 104 . . .
v . Sherman , 113 Iowa 601 . . .
111
410
. . . . . . . . . .
174
106











[References are to Sections. ]
Smith v . Smith , 22 Colorado 480 . . 373
v . Smith , 71 Michigan 633 .. .
v . Smith (Wisconsin ) , 93 Northwestern 452
v . Sweat , 90 Maine 528 . . . . . . . . . ..
v . Wheeler , 1 Ventris 128 . . . .
v . Youmans , 96 Wisconsin 103
Smith ' s Lessee v. Hunt , 13 Ohio 260 . . .
Snell v . Chicago , 152 United States 191 . . . .
Snoddy v . Bolen , 122 Missouri 479 . .. . . . . .
Snow v . Orleans , 126 Massachusetts 453
Society v . Haines , 47 Ohio State 423 . ..
Solon v . Bank , 114 New York 122
Soukup v . Union Investment Co ., 84 Iowa 448 . . . . .
South & North Alabama R . Co . v . Highland Avenue & Belt R . Co.,
119 Alabama 105 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Southport v . Stanley , 12
5
North Carolina 464 . . . . .
Spader v . Powers , 56 Hun (New York ) 153 . . 147
Spafford v . Warren , 47 Iowa 47 . . . . . . . . . . 312
Spangler v . Dukes , 39 Obio State 642 . . . . . . . 311
Spencer y . Austin , 38 Vermont 258 .
v . Reese , 165 Pennsylvania State 158 . . . 367
v . Spruell , 196 Illinois 119 . . . . . . . . . . .
Spencer ' s Case , 5 Coke 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Spicer v . Bonker , 45 Michigan 630 . . .
Spivey v . Rose , 120 North Carolina 163 . . . . . 293
Spokane v . Amsterdam School Trustees , 22 Washington 172 . .
Spreckels v . Spreckels , 116 California 339 .
Springfield Engine Co . v . Donovan , 147 Missouri 622 .
Springs v . Hanks , 5 Iredell (North Carolina ) 30 . .
Squires v . Amherst , 145 Massachusetts 192 . .
Stacey y . Elph , 1 Mylne and Keen 195 . . . .
Stackpole v . Robbins , 47 Barbour ( New York ) , 212 .
Stamm v . Bostwick , 122 New York 48 . . . .
Stanton v . Button , 2 Connecticut 527 . . . . 269
v . Hitchcock , 64 Michigan 316 . . . . . . . . .
Star Brewery C
o . v . Primas , 163 Illinois 652 . . . . . . . . . .179 , 182 , 229 ,
Starnes v . Allen , 151 Indiana 10
8
. .
Starr v . Child , 20 Wendell (New York ) 149 . . . .
State v . Commissioners , 39 Ohio State 58 . . . . .
y . Eason , 114 North Carolina 787 . . . . . . . . .
v . Fishing and Shooting Club , 127 Michigan 580 . . . .
v . Guilbert , 56 Ohio State 575 . .433 , 436 , 437 , 442
v . Hudson Land Co . , 19 Washington 85 . . . .
v . Lee , 21 Ohio State 662 . . .
v . McLaughlin , 77 Indiana 335 . . . . . . .
v . Ryland , 163 Missouri 280 . . .














107107. . . . . . . . . . .





[References are to Sections. )
State v . Smith , 70 California 153 .. . . . . . . 412
v. Stevenson , 6 Idaho 367 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 410
v . Thompson , 81 Missouri Appellate 549 . . . . . . . . . . . 272
v . Westfall , 85 Minnesota 437 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . .436 , 438 , 443
State Bank v. The State , 1 Blackford ( Indiana ) 267 . .
State Savings Bank v . Stewart , 93 Virginia 447 . . . . .. . . . . . .. 85 , 93
Stebbins v . Duncan , 108 United States 32 . . . . . . 41
Steeple v . Downing , 60 Indiana 478 . . . 418
Stelz v . Shreck , 128 New York 263 . . . .
Stephenson v. Osborne, 41 Mississippi 119 . . . 37
5
Sterling v . Jackson , 69 Michigan 488 . . . . . . . . .
Stetson v . Adams , 91 Maine 178 . . 9
6
Stevens v . Hulin , 53 Michigan 93 . 431
Stevenson v . Brasher , 90 Kentucky 23 .
v . Cofferin , 20 New Hampshire 150 159
Stewart v . Bailey , 28 Michigan 251 . . . .
v . Thomas , 64 Kansas 511 . . . . . . . 165
y . Welch , 41 Ohio State 483 . 421
Stickel v . Crane , 189 Illinois 211 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .392 , 400
Stidham v . Matthews , 29 Arkansas 650 . . . . . . . . . . . . 376
Stockbridge Iron Co . v . Hudson Iron Co . , 107 Massachusetts 290 . . 124
Stockton v . Weber , 98 California 433 . . . . . . . . . 170
Stockton Savings Bank v . Staples , 98 California 189 404
Stoever v . Whitman , 6 Binney (Pennsylvania ) 416 .
Stokes v .Maxson , 113 Iowa 122 . . .
Stone v . French , 37 Kansas 145
v . Marvel , 45 New Hampshire 481 . . 235
v . Sledge , 87 Texas 49 . . . . 37
Stoner v . Rice , 121 Indiana 51 . . . . . .
Stout v . Rayl , 146 Indiana 379 . 307
Strickley v . Hill , 22 Utah 257 . . 110
Strough v . Wilder , 119 New York 530 . . . 251
Studwell v . Shapter , 54 New York 249 .




. See name of party ,
Sullivan v . Cummins , 13 Ohio 116 . 264
y . Eddy , 154 Illinois 199 . .
v . Sherry , 111 Wisconsin 47
6
. . . .
v . Wichita , 64 Kansas 539 . . . . . . . .
Sulzberger v . Sulzberger , 50 California 385
Summers v . Beeler , 90 Maryland 474
Sumner v . Conant , 10 Vermont 9 . . . . .
v . Williams , 6 Massachusetts 162 . . . .
Sutton v . Head , 86 Kentucky 156 . .
Sutton ' s Hospital , Case o
f , 10 Coke 30a . . . . . . . . .
Suydam v . Jones , 10 Wendall (New York ) 180 .








TABLE OF CASES . lxxi
[References are to Sections.]
Swank v . Swank , 37 Oregon 439 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Swedish American Bank v. Germania Bank , 76 Minnesota 409 . . . . 35
Sweet v . Brown , 12 Metcalf (Massachusetts) 175 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sweetland v. Buell , 164 New York 541 . . . . .. . . .. .. . . . . . . . . 158 , 304









Taft v . Taft, 59 Michigan 185 . . . . .
Tallmadge v . East River Bank , 26 New York 105 .
y . Wallis , 25 Wendall (New York ) 107 . . .. .. .
Tardy v. Creasy , 81 Virginia 553 . . . . . .
Tarlton v . Griggs , 131 North Carolina 216 . . .
Tartt v . Clayton , 109 Illinois 579 .. . .
Tate v . Lawrence , 11 Heiskell (Tennessee ) 503 . . . .
Tatham v . Vernon , 29 Beavan 604 .
Taunton v. Pepler , 6 Maddock 166 . . . . .
Tavenner v . Barrett , 21 West Virginia 656 .
Taylor v. Armstrong , 24 Arkansas 102 . . . .
v . Glaser , 2 Sergeant and Rawle (Pennsylvania ) 502.
v. Jones, 1 Salkeld 389 . . . . . . . . ..
v. Meads , 4 De Gex , Jones and Smith 597 .
v. Peabody Co ., 65 Maryland 388 . . . . . .
y . Youngs , 48 Michigan 268 .
Tefit v . Munson , 57 New York 97 . . . . .
Ten Eyck v. Witbeck , 135 New York 40 . . .
Thalls v . Smith , 139 Indiana 496 . . .
Thaw v . Ritchie , 136 United States 519 . . . . .
Thayer v . Nehalem Mill Co ., 31 Oregon 437 . . . . .
v. Thayer, 14 Vermont 107 . . .
v. Torrey , 37 New Jersey Law 339 . . .. .. . . ..
Thomas v . Bland , 91 Kentucky 1 . . .
v. Caldwell , 50 Illinois 138 . . . . . . . .
v . Hunt, 134 Missouri 392 . .
v. Marshfield 10 Pickering (Massachusetts ) 364
v . Whitney , 18
6
Illinois 225
Thompson v . Becker , 194 Illinois 119 .
v . Carl , 51 Vermont 408 . . . . . . . . . . .
v . Catlett , 24 West Virginia 524 .
v . King , 54 Arkansas 9 . . . . . .
v . Leach , 2 Ventris 198 , 3 Modern Reports 301 . . . . . . . . . . . .
v . Lovrein , 82 Pennsylvania State 432 .
v . McConnell (United States ) , 107 Federal 33 . . . . . . .
v . Mills , 39 Indiana 528 . .
v . Mortgage C
o . , 110 Alabama 400 . . .
v . Scheid , 39 Minnesota 102 . . . . . . . . .
v . Waters , 25 Michigan 214 .
Thomson v . Kyle , 39 Florida 582 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .














Ixxii TABLE OF CASES .












. . . . . . . . . .
49
(References are to Sections . ]
Thorkildsen v . Carpenter , 120 Michigan 419 . . . . . . . . . 188
Thormaelen v. Kaeppel, 86 Wisconsin 378 . . . .. . . .. 317 , 32
0
Thorpe v . Hanscom , 64 Minnesota 201 . 333
v . Thorpe , 70 Vermont 46 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 396
Thrash v . Starbuck , 14
5
Indiana 673 . . . . . . 33
5 , 34
6
Thrush v . Graybill , 110 Iowa 585 . . . . . . . . . .
Thummel v . Holden , 149 Missouri 677 . . 3
9
Tierney v . Brown , 65 Mississippi 563 .
Tiffany v . Worthington , 96 Iowa 560 . . 344
Tiffin v . Shawhan , 43 Ohio State 178 . . . . . . . .
Tilley v . King , 109 North Carolina 461 . . 172
Tillotson v . Prichard , 60 Vermont 94 . . .
v . Webber , 96 Michigan 144 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tindell v . Tindell ( Tennessee ) , 37 Southwestern 1105 . .
Titman v . Riker , 43 New Jersey Equity 122 . . . . . .
Todd v . Eighmie , 4 New York Appellate Division 9 . .
Toledo Shooting Club v . Erie Shooting Club (United States ) , 90
Federal 680 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
Topeka Water Supply Co . v . Root , 56 Kansas 187 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
Towle v . Dresser , 73 Maine 252 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Town o
f
. See name of town .
Town v . Gensch , 101 Wisconsin 415 . . .
Townsend v . Blanchard , 117 Iowa 36 . . . 396
v . Hubbard , 4 Hill (New York ) 351 . . . 239
v . Outten , 95 Virginia 536 . . . . . . .
Townsend ' s Appeal , 68 Connecticut 358 . . . . . . . . . .
Townson v . Tickell , 3 Barnewald and Alderson 31 . . . . . . . .
Traynor v . Palmer , 86 Illinois 477 . . . . . . . 192
Treadwell v . Salisbury Manufacturing Co . , 7 Gray (Massachusetts )
393 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 406
Trich ' s Executor v . Trich , 165 Pennsylvania State 586 . . . . . . . . . . . . 340
Trout v . Lucas , 54 New Jersey Equity 361 229
Trowbridge v . Addoms , 23 Colorado 518 . 273
v . Cross , 117 Illinois 109 . . . . . . .
Troxell v . Stevens , 57 Nebraska 329 . . . . .
Trueblood v . Trueblood , 8 Indiana 195 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Truman v . Lore , 14 Ohio State 144 . . . . .
Trumbull v . Trumbull , 149 Massachusetts 200 . . . . . . . .
Trustees o
f
Union College v . New York , 173 New York 38 . . .
Trustees v . Haven , 11 Illinois 554 . . . . . . .
Trustees of Methodist Episcopal Church v . Hoboken , 33 New Jer
sey Law 13 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tucker v . Moreland , 10 Peters (United States ) 58 . . .
v . Tucker , 78 Kentucky 503 . . . . . . . . . .
Tulett v . Armstrong , 1 Beavan 1 . . .
Tunison v . Chamblin , 88 Illinois 379 . . . .








. . . 354
303
TABLE OF CASES . lxxiii
311
[References are to Sections. ]
Turner v . Bernheimer , 95 Alabama 241 . . . . . . 400
v . Rusk , 53 Maryland 65 . . . 343
v . Shaw , 96 Missouri 22 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 355 , 370
v . Turner, 107 Alabama 465 . . . .. . . .. 382
v . Warren , 160 Pennsylvania State 336





v . Jewett , 82 Alabama 93 . 387
v . Judges , 179 United States 405 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 436
v . Judges o
f
Court o
f Registration , 175 Massachusetts 7
1
8 , 436 ,438 , 442
v . Moore , 42 Pennsylvania State 374 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
Uecker y . Koehn , 21 Nebraska 559 . . . .
United States v . Crosby , 7 Cranch (United States ) 115 . . .
v . Fox , 94 United States 315 . . . . . . . .
v . Mission Rock Co . , 189 United States 391 . .
v . Pacheco , 2 Wallace (United States ) 587
v . Schurz , 102 United States 378 . . . . . . . .
United States Investment Co . v . Ulrickson , 84 Minnesota 14 . . . .
United States v . Sliney (United States ) , 21 Federal 894
Upington v . Corrigan , 151 New York 143 . . . . . . . . . .
Upton v . Archer , 41 California 85 . . . . . . . .






Valter v . Blavka , 19
5
Illinois 610 . . . . . . . . . . 298
Van Baalen v . Cotney , 113 Michigan 202 . .
Vance v . Funk , 3 Illinois 263 . .
v . Hill , 26 South Carolina 227 .
v . Vance , 103 United States 514 . . . .
Van Dyke v . Grigsby , 11 South Dakota 30 . .
Van Etten v . Newton , 134 New York 143 . . . . . . . .
Van Keuren v . Railroad , 38 New Jersey Law 165 . . 431
Van Ormer v . Harley , 102 Iowa 150 . .
Van Wagner v . Van Nostrand , 19 Iowa 422 . . . . . . . . 212
Velten v . Carmack , 23 Oregon 282 . . . . . . . . . . 363
Venable y . Wabash R . Co . , 112 Missouri 103 . . .
Vestal v . Garrett , 197 Illinois 398 . . . . .
Village o
f
. See name of village .
Virginia - Tennessee Coal C
o . v . McClelland , 98 Virginia 424
389 , 392 , 395
Virginia Coal Co . v . Kelly , 93 Virginia 332 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 148
Visalia Gas & c . Co . v . Sims , 104 California 326 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 407




Wachendorf v . Lancaster , 66 Iowa 458 . . . . . . . . .
Wadsworth v .Murray , 161 New York 274 . . . . .
Wager v . Wagoner , 53 Nebraska 511 . . . . . . .
204
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
. . . . . . 344 , 346
lxxiv TABLE OF CASES .








[References are to Sections . ]
Wait v . Baldwin , 60 Michigan 622 .. ..
v. Maxwell , 5 Pickering (Massachusetts ) 217 .
Wakefield v. Van Tassell , 202 Illinois 41 . . . .
Wales v . Coffin , 13 Allen (Massachusetts ) 213 . . . . .
Wall v . Mines , 130 California 27 . . . .
v . Wall , 126 North Carolina 405 . . . . . . . .
Wallace v . Berdell , 97 New York 13 . . .. .. . . . .
v . Insurance Co., 54 Kansas 442 . . .. . . . . .
v. McCullough , 1 Richardson Equity (South Carolina ) 426 .
Walling v . Christian & c . Co ., 41 Florida 479 . .
Walsh v . Barton , 24 Ohio State 28 .. ..
v . Ringer , 2 Ohio 327 . .
Walton v. Follansbee , 131 Illinois 147 . . . . . .
v. Gaines , 94 Tennessee 420 . .. . 313 , 319
Walz v . Walz , 101 Michigan 167 .
Wambole v . Foote , 2 Dakota 1. . .
Warbritton v. Demorett , 129 Indiana 346 . .
Ward v . Anderson , 111 North Carolina 115 . . .
v . Dougherty , 75 California 240 . . . . . . . .
v . Edge , 100 Kentucky 757 . . . . . . .
Ward v . Ward , 40 West Virginia 611 . . .. .
y . Ward , 104 Kentucky 857 . .
Warfield v . Lindell , 38 Missouri 581 . . .
v . Warfield , 76 Iowa 633 . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Warner v . Peck , 11 Rhode Island 431 .
Warthen v. Siefert , 139 Indiana 233 . .. . .. . .. . . .. . ..
Washburn v. Burns, 34 New Jersey Law 18 . .
Washington Ice Co . v . Shortall , 101 Illinois 46 . . .
Washougal & c . Transportation Co. v . Dalles & c. Navigation Co .,
Washington 490 . ..
Watkins v . Youll (Nebraska ), 96 Northwestern 1042 . . .
Watson v . Billings , 38 Arkansas 278 .
v. Muirhead , 57 Pennsylvania State 167 ... . .. . . .
v . Peters , 26 Michigan 508.. . . . . . ..
Watts v. Parker, 27 Illinois 228
Watuppa Reservoir Co . v. Fall River , 147 Massachusetts 548 . . . . . .
Waverly & c . Improvement Co. v . White , 97 Virginia 17
6
.
Wea Gas , Coal & c . Co . v . Franklin Land Co . , 54 Kansas 533 . . .
Webb v . Demopolis , 95 Alabama 11
6
. . . . . . .
v . Holt , 113 Michigan 338 . .
v . Mullins , 78 Alabama 111 . . .
Webber v . Pere Marquette Boom Co . , 62 Michigan 626 . . . . . . . .
Weber v . Christen , 121 Illinois 91 . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
v . Tanner (Kentucky ) , 64 Southwestern 741
Webster v . Harris ( Tennessee ) , 69 Southwestern 782 . . 11
6
v . Warner , 119 Michigan 461 . .








. . . . . . 198
. 98
108









. . . . . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . . .
[References are to sections .]
Weihl v . Robertson , 97 Tennessee 458 . . . . . . . .
Weiss v . Binnian , 178 Illinois 241 . . . . . . . . .
v . Heitkamp , 127 Missouri 23 . . . . . . .. 66
Weitzner v. Thingstad , 55 Minnesota 244 . 396
Welbon v . Welbon , 109 Michigan 356 .. . . . .
Welch y . Bunce , 83 Indiana 382 . . . . . . . . .. . . .
v . Sackett , 12 Wisconsin 270 . . . .
v . Welch , 183 Illinois 237 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Weld v. Johnson Manufacturing Co ., 84 Wisconsin
Welles v . Bailey , 55 Connecticut 292 . . . .. . . . 110
Wellman v . Churchill, 92 Maine 193 .
Wells v. Caywood , 3 Colorado 487 . .
v . Estes, 154 Missouri 291 . . . . . . . .
v. Tolman , 156 New York 636 . . .
Wescott v. Binford , 104 Iowa 645 . . .. 14
6
West v . Bretelle , 115 Missouri 653 . . . 97
v . Fitz , 109 Illinois 425 . . . .
v . Wright , 115 Georgia 277 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
9
West Side Auction C
o . v . Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co . ,
186 Illinois 15
6
. . . . . . . . . . . . 240
West Virginia Transportation C
o . v . Pipe Line Co . , 22 West Vir
ginia 600 . . . . . . . 230
Wetmore v . Bruce , 118 New York 319 . . . . . . . . . . . .201 , 223
Wetzell v . Richcreek , 53 Ohio State 62 .
Wheeler v . Laird , 147 Massachusetts 421 . . 17
v . Wayne Co . , 132 Illinois 599 . . . . . . .
Wheelock v . Cavitt , 91 Texas 679 .
Whitaker v . Brown , 46 Pennsylvania State 197 . 123
v . Miller , 83 Illinois 381 .
White v . Brocaw , 14 Ohio State 339 . . . . . . .
v . Foster , 102 Massachusetts 375 . .
v . Howard , 38 Connecticut 342 .
v . Howard , 46 New York 144 . . . . . .
y . Luning , 93 United States 514 . . . . .
v . New York & c . R . Co . , 15
6
Massachusetts 181 . . . . . . .
v . Wager , 25 New York 328 . . . . .
White Sewing Machine Co . v . Wooster , 66 Arkansas 382
White ' s Charities , In re , 1 Chancery Division 659 . . .
Whitehead v . Ragan , 10
6
Missouri 231 . . . . .
Whiteman v . Field , 53 Vermont 554 . . . . . . . . 397
Whitlock , In re , 19 Howard ' s Practice (New York ) 380 . . . . . . . 326
v . Gosson , 35 Nebraska 829 . . . . .
Whitney v . Clogson , 138 Massachusetts 49 . . 375
v . Detroit Lumber Co . , 78 Wisconsin 240 . . . . . . . . . 103
v . Fitchburg R . Co . , 178 Massachusetts 559 . . . . . . . . . . 119
v . Union R . Co . , 11 Gray (Massachusetts ) 359 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 , 228
Whitsett v . Wamack , 159 Missouri 14 . . . . . . . . . . . 160






















[ References are to Sections . ]
Whittemore v . Farrington , 76 New York 452 . . . .
Whittlesey v . Fuller , 11 Connecticut 337 . . . . . . . . . .151 , 163
Wicks v . Dean , 103 Kentucky 69 . . 369
Wieland v . Kobick , 11
0
Illinois 16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44 , 320
Wilber v . Wilber , 52 Wisconsin 298 . . . .
Wiley v . Lovely , 46 Michigan 83 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wilhelm v . Wilken , 149 New York 447 . . .
Wilkesbarre v . Society , 134 Pennsylvania State 616 . . . . . . . . . 137
Wilkins v . Bevier , 43 Minnesota 213 . . .
v . Young , 144 Indiana 1 . . . . . . . . .
Wilkinson v . Elliott , 43 Kansas 590 .
y . Kneeland , 125 Michigan 261 . . . . . 166
v . Scott , 17 Massachusetts 249 . . . . . .
Will of . See name of party .
Willard v . Cramer , 36 Iowa 22 . . . . . . . . . .
Williams v . Burrell , 1 Common Bench 402 . .
v . Daubner , 103 Wisconsin 521 .
v . Glover , 66 Alabama 189 . . . . . . . . . . . 109
v . Paine , 169 United States 55 . . 377
v . Sapieha , 94 Texas 430 . . . . . . . . .
v . Schatz , 42 Ohio State 4
7 . . . 308
v . Shackleford , 97 Missouri 322 . .
v . Spitzer , 203 Illinois 505 . . . . . 430
v . Wetherbee , 1 Aiken (Vermont ) 233 . . . . . .
Williamsburg Boom C
o . v . Smith , 84 Kentucky 372 . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Williamson v . Branning , 86 Hun (New York ) 203 . 276
v . Carskadden , 36 Ohio State 664 . . . . . . 293
Willow River Club v . Wade , 100 Wisconsin 86 . . . . . . . 10
6 , 10
7 , 108 , 110
Willingham v . King , 23 Florida 478 . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 414
Willwerth v . Leonard , 156 Massachusetts 277 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 333
Wilmans v . Robinson , 67 Arkansas 517 . . 146
Wilmurt v . McGrane , 16 New York Appellate Division 412
Wilson v . Alston , 122 Alabama 630 . . .
v . Campbell , 119 Indiana 28
6
. . . . . . . . . . . 17
v . Griess , 64 Nebraska 792 . . .
v . Hildreth , 118 Massachusetts 578 .
v . Leary , 120 North Carolina 90 . . 402
v . Peelle , 78 Indiana 384 . . . . . . .
v . Randall , 67 New York 338 . . .
v . Terry , 130 Michigan 73 . . . . . . .
v . Traer , 20 Iowa 231 . . . . .
v . White , 84 California 239 . . . . . .
v . Widenham ,51 Maine 567 . . .
v . Wilson , 158 Illinois 567 . 308
v . Wilson , 43 Minnesota 398 . . 165
v . Wilson , 6 Idaho 597 . . . . . . . . . . . 167 , 365 , 36
7
Windsor v . Collinson , 32 Oregon 297 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68




. . . . . . . . 132
43
198
. . . . . .
. . . .














[References are to Sections. )
Winscomb & Dunches Case , Godbolt 270 .. . . . ..
Windstandley v . Stipp , 132 Indiana 548 ..
Winsted Bank v. Spencer , 26 Connecticut 195 . . .
Winston v. Hodges , 102 Alabama 304 .
Winter v . Stock , 29 California 407 . . . . .
Winterbottom v . Patterson , 152 Illinois 334
Wolf v . Brass , 72 Texas 133 .
v . Holton , 104 Michigan 107 . . . . . . . .
Wolfe v . Sullivan , 133 Indiana 331 . .
Wood v . Bach , 54 Barbour (New York ) 134 .
v . Fleet , 36 New York 499 . . . . .
v . Fowler , 26 Kansas 682
v . Goodridge , 6 Cushing (Massachusetts ) 117
v . Leadbitter , 13 Meeson and Welsby 838 . ..
v . Wood , 83 New York 575 . . . . . . . .
Woodbury v . Fisher, 20 Indiana 387 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Woodhull y . Longstreet , 18 New Jersey Law 405 . . . .
Woodruff v . Woodruff , 44 New Jersey Law 349 . . . . . .
Woods y . James , 87 Kentucky 511 . . . .
Woolley v. Gaines , 114 Georgia 122 . ..
Workman ' s Mutual Aid Association v . Monroe (Texas), 53 South
western 1029 . . . .
Worley v . Hineman , 6 Indiana Appellate 24
0
.
Worrell v . Drake ( Tennessee ) , 75 Southwestern 1015 . . .
Worthington v . Middleton , 6 Dana (Kentucky ) 30
0
. .
v . Staunton , 16 West Virginia 209 . . . . .
Wright v . DeGroff , 14 Michigan 164 . . .
v . Nipple , 92 Indiana 310 . .
v . Whittock , 18 Colorado 5
4 . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wronkow v . Oakley , 133 New York 505 . .
Wunderle v . Wunderle , 144 Illinois 40 . . . .





Wysong v . Nealis , 13 Indiana Appellate 165 .
Yates v . Van De Bogert , 56 New York 526 . .
Young v . Cosgrove , 83 Iowa 68
2
. . .
v . Edwards , 33 South Carolina 404 . . . .
v . Lohr , 118 Iowa 624 . . .. . . . . .
v . McKee , 13 Michigan 552 . . . . . . .
v . Overbaugh , 145 New York 158 . . . . . . .
v . Shulenberg , 165 New York 385 . . . . . . .
266








. . . . .
Zann v . Haller , 71 Indiana 136 . . . . . . . .
Zent v . Picken , 54 Iowa 535 . . . . .
Zimpelman v . Robb , 53 Texas 274 . . . .
Zouch v . Parsons , 3 Burrow 1794 . ,
237
. . . . . . . . 19
8 , 21
6
. . . . . . . . . . . 167
. . . . . . . . . . 314

THE CONVEYANCE OF ESTATES




$ 1. Alienation in general - Inter
vivos and by will .
2. Conveyancing - What the
term implies.
















$ 5 . Application o
f
the doctrine
that lex situs controls — It
s
reason .
6 . Illustrations — Formal mat
ters .
7 . Illustrations - Capacity .




9 . Statutes adopting foreign law
- Not exceptions to rule .
1




§ 1 . Alienation in general - Inter vivos and by will .
One entitled to rights in land may , b
y
his voluntary act ,
alienate them , or transfer them to another , in one o
f
two
modes : his alienation may be inter vivos or it may be b
y
will .
Of these modes the former is more often used in the
practical affairs of life than the latter , and it is that mode
to which the following pages are devoted .
Alienation inter vivos is now generally accomplished
by a deed o
f conveyance , and it is proposed to consider
the essential features of the deed .
A will of lands is regarded as a conveyance operating
upon the death o
f the testator , but a will and a deed are
made under different circumstances , and ,moreover , the
rules a
s
to the interpretation o
f
the two classes o
f
instru
ments differ in many respects . It is intended , therefore ,
to refer but incidentally to the law of wills .
( 1 )
THE LAW OF CONVEYANCING . § 2
Owners of interests in lands have not always had the
power of transferring their interests , either inter vivos or
by will , but at the present time, speaking generally , the
owner of the fee has the absolute right of alienation .
In order , however, that the alienation may be effectual
the persons from whom and to whom the particular inter
est is intended to be transferred must be capable in law
of transferring it on the one hand and , on the other , of
taking and keeping it ; the object or purpose of the
transfer must be valid in law ; and the manner of aliena
tion prescribed by law must be observed .
Restraints upon the right of alienation - arising either
from the personal incapacity of the parties to the transfer
or from the nature of the particular interest intended to
be transferred , or from the purpose or object of the trans
fe
r
— are exceptions to the general doctrine that permits
alienation , and will therefore be considered after the deed
has been discussed .
§ 2 . Conveyancing — What the term implies . — The term
conveyancing , used in a broad sense , includes , it is true ,






f conveyance and devises are not the only written
instruments affecting interest in lands , as an estate for
years , for example , is generally created b
y
a " lease , " and
a “ mortgage ” in some states conveys the legal title to the
mortgagee .
Moreover , rights in land may be acquired without any













his death to his heirs , but valuable interests
may be gained b
y
prescription , and an estate in fee sim
ple may be acquired b
y
adverse possession .
One properly performing the functions o
f
a convey
See Digby Hist . L . Real Prop . , 5th ed . , p
p
. 100 , 133 , 157 , 376 ; Pola
lock and Maitland Hist . Eng . Law , 2d ed . , I , pp . 32
9
e
t seq . , II , p . 315 .
$ 3 INTRODUCTORY .
ancer should , therefore , have “ an acquaintance with the
general principles of the law of real property and a large
amount of practical knowledge , which can only be de
rived from experience ” , 2 for in his work is included not
merely the drafting ofmany different documents intended
to affect interests in real property ,but an inquiry into the
legal effect of acts and events which in the past have con
cerned the property .
However , almost innumerable decisions relating to title
indicate ignorance and carelessness on the part of those
actually acting as conveyancers , and irrespective of deci
sions , it is well known that thetask ofexamining titles and
the drafting and interpretation of instruments affecting
them are too often left to those wholly unfitted by study
and training for such work .
While the full duty of the conveyancer is not attempted
to be se
t
forth in this volume , it will probably be found
to b
e true that a study of the principles involved in the
preparation and interpretation of deeds will include a
consideration of most o
f
his important functions .




situs - Power of states as
to real property . - One principle of practical importance




this point . It




lating to the transfer o
f
title to real property are governed
by the law of the place where the property is situated
lex loci rei sitæ or lex situs .
It is especially important for the American lawyer to
keep this principle in mind because he must in practice
frequently consider questions as to the title to real prop
erty in states other than his own , and each state is as to
every other state sovereign in its power to regulate the
acquisition and transfer o
f
real property within its limits .
While the law of one state upon these subjects may re
semble in some particulars the laws o
f
other states much
2 Justice Sharswood in Watson v . Muirhead , 57 Pa . 167 .
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diversity in other respects exists , the general result being
that the real property laws of no two states are identical .
§ 4 . Power of the United States — Effect of treaties on
state laws . — Moreover , as to most matters relating to
such property the federal government has no power of
regulation .
The courts of the United States will generally respect




the state where the property is a
s
that law exists in the statutes and decisions o
f
the state . 3
The federal and state courts sometimes disagree as to
what the law of the state is , ' but such instances do not
affect the general principle that the federal courts will
apply the state la
w , when it is clear what that law is .





the United States that
" all treaties made , or which shall be made , under the
authority o
f
the United States , shall be the supreme law
o
f
the land . ” 5
The protection which should be afforded to the citizens
o
f foreign countries who may acquire property in this
country is a proper subject for regulation b
y
treaty , 6 and
the statutes o
f any state as to the property rights o
f
aliens , therefore , must be construed with reference
to a treaty , should there be one touching the matter ,
between the United States and the government of
the alien . The law o
f
the place where the land
is , still governs in such a case , because the treaty is the
la
w
and may abrogate or amend , as the case may be , the
s Gormley v . Clark , 13
4
U . 8 . 338 , 348 ; Brine v . Insurance Co . , 96 U .
S . 627 .





U . S . 371 , 380 , 384 , with that of Fuller v . Shedd , 1896 , 161
Ill . 462 , 49
0 ; 44 N . E . 286 ; 52 Am . St . R . 380 , which are discussed in
$ 114 , post .
5 Art . VI , $ 2 .
6 Geofroy v . Riggs , 133 U . S . 258 , 266 .
$ 5 INTRODUCTORY .
statute of the state ; allowing it, however, to remain in
force as to other cases not affected by treaty .?
$ 5 . Application of the doctrine that lex situs controls
- Its reason . — This principle , that the law of the place of
the real property controls , applies , generally speaking , to
the different kinds of instruments conveying or affecting
title , that is , deeds, mortgages, wills , etc . ; it applies to
matters of form ; to matters relating to the capacity o
f
the
person from whom the title proceeds and to the capacity
o
f
the person taking title , as well as , generally , to ques




The reason for the doctrine is to be found in the fact
that from the very nature o
f
the subject -matter , which is
immovable and fixed permanently at a particular place ,
no other rules o
f
law than those o
f
that place can ulti
mately control the disposition of the property . For no
court of one country or state could enforce it
s judgments ,
rendered in accordance with its own laws , relating to the
title to real property in another independent country or
state .
$ 6 . Illustrations - Formal matters . — ( a ) Formal mat








r conveyance under the hand and seal ” of the party
? Hauenstein v . Lynham , 10
0





treaties over state laws is stated broadly as it appears to be
laid down by the supreme court o
f
the United States . The govern
ment through the treaty -making power seems able to do indirectly
what it could not do directly by an act of congress . The consideration
o
f
treaties as affecting title to land arises most frequently in cases o
f
descent , and state courts admit the supremacy o
f
the treaty over state
laws : Scharpf v . Schmidt , 1898 , 172 Ill . 255 ; 50 N . E . 182 ; Adams v .
Akerlund , 1897 , 168 Ill . 632 ; 48 N . E . 454 ; Doehrel v . Hillmer , 1897 ,
102 Iowa , 169 ; 71 N . W . 204 ; Succession o
f
Sala , 1898 , 50 La . Ann .
1009 ; 24 So . 674 .
* See Minor , Conflict o
f
Laws , pp . 28 , 29 .
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conveying , and an instrument is executed in another
jurisdiction , the residence of both grantor and grantee ,
without a seal, sufficient , where executed , to pass real
estate there , it is not a good conveyance of the land in
question ;' or if the law of the place where the land is




land to be executed
in the presence o
f
two witnesses , a deed executed in
the presence o
f
one only is void . 10 So , a will executed
in one state and valid there , may be invalid as a will
devising real estate in another , and its probate in the
former state does not establish its validity in the latter
state unless the laws of the latter permit it ; and the
same is , of course , true of a will executed in a foreign
country . 11
§ 7 . Illustrations — Capacity . - ( b ) Capacity of those
from whom and to whom title passes . — A will executed b
y
a married woman in Kentucky , where a married woman
was ( a
t that time ) incompetent to make a valid will devis .
ing real property , is , nevertheless , held valid in Tennes
see a
s
to such property there , the formalities required by
the Tennessee statutes having been observed . 12 And though
in most states a mortgage is not , strictly speaking , a





to make the mortgage in question will be determined ,
generally , by the law o
f
the place where the mortgaged
premises are situated , rather than by the law of the
domicil of the mortgagor , should that differ from the





married woman is incompetent to make a valid mortgage
o
f
land situated there , her mortgage of land in another
9 United States v . Crosby , 7 Cranch 115 .
1
0 Clark v . Graham , 6 Wheat . 577 .
1
1 Robertson v . Pickrell , 109 U . S . 608 ; Vogel v . Lebritter , 1893 , 139
N . Y . 223 ; 34 N . E . 914 .
1 Carpenter v . Bell , 96 Tenn . 294 ; 3
4
S . W . 209 .
$ 7 INTRODUCTORY .
state where married women are competent , will be held
valid , though executed at her domicil .13
And , in general , the capacity of one to take title as
grantee , devisee or heir , is determined by the same prin
ciple . For example , one Fox died possessed of real and
personal property situated in New York , having by his
will devised and bequeathed all hi
s
property to the gov
ernment o
f
the United States . His heirs contested the
will and the state courts held 14 that the United States
could take the personal property , but could not take the
real property , because the New York statute of wills pro
vided that a devise o
f lands may be made to any person
capable by law of holding real estate ; but no devise to a






r by statute to take b
y
devise " .
The supreme court o
f
the United States , in affirming
the decrees o
f
the New York courts , stated the principle
that each state has power to regulate the tenure of real
property within it
s




and transfer , the rules o
f
descent and the extent to which
testamentary disposition o
f
itmay be made , and held that
" person ” in the New York statute signified a natural per
son , or an artificial person deriving its existence from leg
islation ; that the United States is not such a " person ” ,
1
3 Thomson v . Kyle , 1897 , 39 Fla . 582 ; 23 So . 12 ; 63 Am . St . R . 193 ;
Cochran v . Benton , 1890 , 126 Ind . 58 ; 25 N . E . 870 ; Sell v . Miller , 11
Ohio S
t
. 331 ; Post v . First Nat . Bank , 138 Ill . 559 ; 28 N . E . 978 . In
none o
f
these cases does it appear that the mortgage was given to
secure an obligation void where entered into and where it was to be
performed . They seem , therefore , distinguishable from such a case a
s
Evans v . Beaver , 1893 , 50 Ohio St . 190 ; 33 N . E . 643 ; 40 Am . St . R .
666 , in which the question was as to the validity o
f
a mortgage of Ohio
land , executed in Indiana by a married woman living there , to secure
an obligation as surety to be performed in Indiana where such a con
tract is void : and it was held that the mortgage , being merely the
security for the performance of a void obligation , could not be enforced .
1
4 In the matter o
f
will of Fox , 52 N . Y . 530 .
THE LAW OF CONVEYANCING . § 8
and that “ corporation ” applied only to such corporations
as are created by the laws of the state.15
The government of the United States has capacity ,
however, to take real estate as devisee, when it lies in a
state where no such restrictions as these exist ; 16 and a
New York corporation , having power to hold land and
whose charter contains no prohibition against taking by
will, may take Connecticut lands as devisee ,17 though it
cannot take New York lands under the same will .18
So the law of the state where the land lies will deter
mine who are the heirs of a deceased owner of the land ,
capable of inheriting it .
The laws of one state may provide , fo
r
example , that
aliens , whether resident or non -resident ,may take title b
y
descent , 19 while those of another may prevent non -resi
dent aliens from inheriting ( such laws being subject to
existing treaties ) . 20
$ 8 . Illustrations — Construction and effect of instru
ments . - ( c ) Validity and effect determined b
y
lex situs .
- Whether , for example , the effect of a conveyance to a
trustee is to vest the legal title in him o
r
in the benefi
ciary , will depend on the construction of its provisions
under the lex situs . 21 So the question whether under a
will there has been an “ equitable conversion ” into person
alty o
f
the testator ' s real estate situated in a state other
than that o
f
his domicil will be settled by the law of the
state where the land is . This law may be very different
from that o
f
the testator ' s domicil , and the result of the
1
5 United States v . Fox , 94 U . S . 315 .
1
6 Dickson v . United States , 125 Mass . 311 .
1
7 White v . Howard , 38 Conn . 342 .
1
8 White v . Howard , 46 N . Y . 14
4 , 167 .
1
9 Blythe v . Hinckley , 1900 , 127 Cal . 431 ; 59 Pac . 787 ; Lumb v . Jen
kins , 100 Mass . 527 .
2
0 Wunderle v . Wunderle , 144 Ill . 40 ; 33 N . E . 19
5 ; 19 L . R . A . 84 ;
Doehrel v . Hillmer , 102 Iowa 169 ; 71 N . W . 204 .
2
1 McGoon v . Scales , 9 Wall . 23 .
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application of the principle in such cases may be that
the testator 's real estate in one state will pass to persons
other than those to whom his real estate in another will
pass although all his property in different states is re
ferred to in the same terms in his will .22 And the
decision of a court of the testator 's domicil that his will
worked an equitable conversion into personalty of a
ll
realty wherever situated , is not conclusive on the courts
o
f another state where part of the realty is . 23
$ 9 . Statutes adopting foreign law - Not exceptions to
rule . — There are statutes in many of the states that pro
vide that instruments transferring or affecting real prop
erty within their limits , but executed beyond these lim
it
s , shall be valid for many purposes if they conform to ,
and are valid under , the law of the place where executed .
Cases arising under such statutes are sometimes inaccu
rately considered as exceptions to the general rule that
the law o
f
the place where the land lies controls in such
matters .
They are not , however , really exceptions to this rule ,
for the law o
f
the place where the property is , b
y
adopt
ing the foreign law for the particular cases specified ,
makes that foreign law for the time being and under the
particular circumstances its own law , and thus the prin
ciple still applies . The foreign law derives its efficacy in
such cases not from the law -making power of the place of
it
s
creation , but from that of the place which adopts it
for these special purposes . 24
And if there be no such adopting law in the placewhere
the real property is , the foreign la
w
cannot have the e
f
fect there that it would have in the place o
f
it
s origin . 25
2
2 Hobson v . Hale , 95 N . Y . 588 .
* Clarke v . Clarke , 1899 , 178 U . S . 186 . The principle as applied to
the construction o
f
devises is well discussed in 41 Am . L . R . ( N . S . ) ,
p
p . 623 , 718 .
2
4 Root v . Brotherson , 4 McLean 230 ; West v . Fitz , 109 Ill . 425 , 443 .
3
5 Trowbridge v . Addoms , 1897 , 23 Colo . 518 , 522 ; 48 Pac . 535 .
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10 . Limitations to the application of the rule.
But while the principle is of very extensive application ,
it does not necessarily follow that the law of the place of
the realty will determine the validity for all purposes of
every instrument which , though relating to real property ,
may create simply a personal liability ,26 nor of every in
strument through which title to real property may
be ultimately obtained . Hence , the Massachusetts
courts will enforce a covenant made in North Carolina
by a husband with his wife to release and extinguish his
rights in her land in Massachusetts , the contract being
valid under the law of North Carolina where the parties
lived , and being a personal covenant, though concern
ing Massachusetts land , and though it seems that the
same contract if made in Massachusetts would have been
invalid .27 So , while a mortgage of real estate is generally
governed by the law of the state where the realty is , an
assignment of the mortgage is often . regarded as a new
contract passing a chattel interest, and its validity will not
necessarily depend upon the law o
f
the place where the
property is , 28 though that law may control as to the
remedy and procedure when the assignee seeks to fore
close the assigned mortgage . 29
2
6
See post , $ 213 .
2
7 Polson v . Stewart , 1897 , 167 Mass . 211 ; 45 N . E . 737 ; 36 L . R . A .
771 ; 57 Am . S
t
. R . 452 .
2
8 Dundas v . Bowler , 3 McLean 397 , 401 ; Hoyt v . Thompson , 19 N .
Y , 207 , 224 .
3
9 Dohm v . Haskin , 88 Mich . 144 ; 50 N . W . 108 .
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§ 11 . Formerly no writing necessary — The feoffment .
Owing to repeated allusions in modern statutes and opin
ions to earlier law a brief view of formermethods of trans
ferring interests in real property will be found to be not
only interesting , but of practical importance .
From the Norman Conquest, 1066 , onward for a period
of over four hundred and sixty years no writing of any
kind was necessary for the legal transfer of a freehold es
tate in possession in corporeal hereditaments .
Such transfer was accomplished generally by “ the most
valuable of assurances ” - the feoffment . This consists
simply and solely in livery of seisin , that is the deliv
ery by the feoffor to the feoffee of possession of the land :
“ Some phrases in common use , which seem to imply a
distinction between the feoffment and the livery are so
far incorrect ." 1
Challis , Real Prop., ch . 28 . As to the conveyance of those interests
in land that could not be transferred at common law by feoffment, i. e.,
incorporeal interests , see post $ 242 .
( 11 )
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§ 12 . The bargain and sale — When deed necessary for.
- In 1535 , just after the Statute of Uses 2 was enacted , the
Statute of Enrolments required that " bargains and sales ”
intended to pass any estate of inheritance or freehold in
any hereditaments should be by writing , indented , sealed
and enrolled ” among certain records .3
Before this enactment " bargains and sales ” were not
required to be by deed , i. e ., a writing under seal , and
the statute was intended to prevent secret conveyances .
§ 13 . The lease and release . — The statute of enrolments
did not apply to interests less than a freehold , and there
fore a bargain and sale for a year, or a term of years ,
took effect in spite of the statute and without enrolment ;
the statute of uses did , however , apply to it, and imme
diately after the execution of the bargain and sale the
lessee became in possession by virtue of this statute , and
being thus in possession , he could take a release of the
reversion .5
This conveyance by lease and release was for more than
two centuries, 1620 _ 1841 , the common mode of convey
ing freehold lands in England , and is referred to occa
sionally in American decisions and statutes. It was not
necessary that the bargain and sale for a year should
be by deed , though after the Statute of Frauds ? it was
necessary that it should be in writing .
§ 14 . The feoffment - When a deed became necessary
for . — But the common law conveyance by feoffment was
still legal (and , indeed , was necessary in some cases , and
2 27 Hen . VIII, ch . 10.
3 See the Act, Digby, Hist . L . Real Prop ., 5th ed ., p . 368 .
42 B1. Comm . 338 .
5 2 Bl. Comm . 339 . See post , $ $ 20, 25 .
6 E . g . Ky. Stat., 1899, $ 492 : “ Every deed of release shall be as ef
fectual for the purposes therein expressed , without the execution of a
lease , as if the same had been executed .”
* (1677 ) 29 Car . II, ch . 3 .
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still no written instrument o
f any kind was required until
nearly one hundred and fifty years after " bargains and
sales ” were required by the Statute of Enrolments to be
b
y
deed . That is , until the Statute of Frauds , 1677 , no
writing was essential to a feoffment , and a deed was not









expression was concerned a feoffment
was (before these statutes ) an oral grant , and the words ,




the longest form o
f
deed ; but any form of




§ 15 . Deeds used though not necessary . Nevertheless ,
during the time when deeds were not necessary they ap




ing some record of the transaction .
The charter , or deed of feoffment , when used for this
purpose was properly enough expressed as testifying to a
past act : “ I have given and granted . ” 10
Many deeds now in ordinary use contain language
which is a relic o
f
this custom , but they also contain
words in the present tense — the combination expressing
something that in most cases is not true . For example :
“ I , A B , etc . , have given , granted , bargained , sold , re




o give , grant , bargain , sell , remise ,
etc . "
Aside from the needless multiplication o
f operative
words (which arose from overanxious care that the deed
& Digby , Hist . L . Real Prop . , 5t
h
e
d . , p . 412 .
9
8 and 9 Vict . , ch . 106 ; Williams ' Real Prop . , 17th ed . , p . 185 ; Shep
pard ' s Touchstone , Preston ' s ed . , 203 . Except in the case of a feoff
ment to a corporation aggregate and not being a gift in frank -almoigne ;
Challis Real Prop . , p . 326 .
1
0 See Digby , Hist . L . R . Prop . , 5th ed . , 60 , 61 , 145 ; 2 Bl . Comm . ,
Appendix , form 1 .
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might operate as one kind of conveyance , if not as an
other ), the employment of both tenses is a worse than
useless perpetuation of an old custom .
§ 16 . Livery of seisin in the United States -- Conveyance
generally by deed . It is sometimes stated that livery of
seisin has not been used in the United States , but as
late as 1827 a conveyance by feoffment with livery of
seisin was made in New York ,12 and it was not until 1830
that it was abolished in that state .
However , it appears that it is now either expressly
abolished or impliedly declared to be unnecessary in
every state .
The statute of Michigan on the subject is substantially
like those of many of the states :
“ Conveyances of lands * * * may be made by
deed * * * without any other act or ceremony what
ever . ” 13
In Illinois it is provided : “ Livery of seisin shall in no
case be necessary , ” etc ., 14 while in New York the statute
declares that , “ Conveyance by feoffment with livery of
seisin has been abolished .” 15
In some states it is excluded by the terms of the stat
ute ; for example , " Conveyances of land * * * shall
be by deed in writing, ” 16 or , “ An estate in real prop
erty * * * can be transferred only by operation of
law or by an instrument in writing, ” 17 while some stat
utes simply specify how deeds shall be executed without
reference or allusion to livery of seisin .18
11 E . g ., 4 Kent Comm . 489 .
12McGregor v . Comstock , 17 N . Y . 162, 171 .
13 C . L . Mich . 1897 , $ 8956 . So , also , e. g ., Kan . G . S. 1901 , $ 1205 ;
Minn , G . S . 1894 , $ 4160 ; Mo. R . S . 1899 , $ 900 ; Wis . St. 1898 , $ 2203 .
14 R . S . ch . 30 , $ 1 .
15 L . 1896 , ch . 547 , § 206 ; 3 Birdseye , p . 3050 , $ 206 .
16 Ind . Burns ' R . S. 1901 , 23335 .
17Cal. Civ . Co ., § 1091 .
18 E . g ., Ohio R . S ., $ 4106 .
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§ 17. How title may still pass inter vivos without
writing . From a consideration of such statutes as those
just referred to and the Statute of Frauds it might natu
rally be inferred , at first thought, that there could be now
no voluntary transfer of lands inter vivos , so as to convey
absolute title in fe
e simple , without a
t
least somewriting ;





voluntary transfer in fee simple without any writing what





parol gift , his legal title will become absolute if he con
tinues in possession , claiming as owner , for the period
prescribed by the statute o
f
limitations . 19 It will be no
ticed that in such cases as those just cited the transfer o
f
title to the donee is not dependent on any consideration
paid by him , nor on any improvements made b
y
him on
the property . By simply taking possession under the
gift his title may ultimately become perfect , although the
voluntary transfer b
y
the donor does not comply with the
formalities required b
y
the statutes , but may be repu
diated by him a





Such cases differ , therefore , from those in which parol
gifts have been made o
f
real estate , and the respective do
nees have taken possession and made valuable improve
ments on the property , relying on the gift .
In these latter cases , while the legal title may not have




s it has often been beld , protect his equitable title . 20
And where , instead o
f
a gift merely , there has been an
oral contract for the sale o
f
real estate which has been
partly performed by one party , a court of equity will gen
1
9 Schafer v . Hauser , 1897 , 111 Mich . 622 ; 70 N . W . 13
6 ; 3 D . L . N .
801 ; 35 L . R . A . 835 ; Wilson v . Campbell , 119 Ind . 286 ; 21 N . E .
893 ; Wheeler v . Laird , 147 Mass . 421 ; 18 N . E . 212 .
2
0 Neale v . Neales , 9 Wall . 1 , 9 ; Schwindt v . Schwindt , 1900 , 61 Kan .
377 ; 59 Pac . 647 ; Hubbard v . Hubbard , 1897 , 140 Mo . 300 ; 41 S . W .
749 ; Young v . Overbaugh , 1895 , 145 N . Y . 158 ; 39 N . E . 712 . See
Ellis v . Dasher , 1897 , 101 Ga . 5 , 7 ; 29 S . E . 268 .
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erally decree a specific performance of the contract in
favor of that party in spite of the statute of frauds. In
such cases the courts proceed on the general principle that
one who has made an oral promise, by reason of which
he has obtained some benefit from another , will not be
permitted to justify his refusal to perform that promise on
the ground that certain statutory requirements have not
been complied with .21
The cases cited in this section have one feature in com
mon , that is : the title to the real property involved in
each case has passed without the execution of any written
instrument by the former owner of the property .
§ 18 . Fines and recoveries . — The feoffment was an
ciently the only direct way of conveying a freehold inter
est in lands in possession from one person to another .
But as early as the reign of Henry II, 1154 - 1189,
forms of litigation were used for the purpose of effecting a
conveyance of land.
The law of fines was formerly most intricate , but as
this method of dealing with land is wholly abolished a
knowledge of its details seems unnecessary , though every
lawyer should understand the general nature o
f
a fine .









court , whereby the lands
in question in the action , were acknowledged to be the
right of one of the parties . Sometimes the concord put
a
n
end to genuine litigation , but generally the action was
begun merely in order that the pretended compromise
might be made . The plaintiff , the intending purchaser ,
was a
t
first called the demandant , and the defendant
(the vendor ) the deforceant , but afterward they became
known , the latter as conusor , and the former as conusee




the one party by the other .
2
1 Riggles v . Erney , 1894 , 154 U . S . 244 ; Pike v . Pike , 1899 , 121 Mich .
170 ; 80 N . W . 5 ; 6 D . L . N . 405 ; 80 Am . St . R . 488 ; Martin v . Martin ,
1897 , 170 Ill . 639 ; 48 N . E . 924 . See Pomeroy Eq . Jur . , § 1409 .
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The fine was so called because it put an end , not only
to the matter in dispute , but also to all claims to the land
by other persons than the parties who did not within a
given time assert their claims, unless they could excuse
themselves by showing infancy or some other disability .
Thus the advantages of a fine were : ( 1 ) that there was
indisputable evidence of the transaction (theconcord being
enrolled among the court records); ( 2 ) the title conferred
by the fine was a bar to the claims of al
l
persons (notun
der disability ) , whether o
r
not they were parties to the
action , who did not within due time put in their claims . 22
In considering a recent statute adopting the so -called
" Torrens System , ” Holmes , C . J . , in meeting an objec
tion to the constitutionality of the statute , refers to the
effect o
f
a fine in barring claims to land : 23 and in modern
decisions , where conveyances b
y
married women are con
sidered , references are necessarily made to the law of
fines . 24 Such instances afford illustrations of the truth
that " the study of what is obsolete in practice is not nec
essarily a waste o
f time . ” 25
A “ common recovery ” was a collusive action o
f
recov
ery , not compromised , but prosecuted to judgment by the
demandant o
r
recoveror against the tenant o
r
recoveree .
It was the mode of barring estates tail , and the result of
the proceeding was that the lands passed from the tenant
in tail to the claimant in fee simple , free from the claims
o
f
reversioner , remainderman or issue in tail , 26 and it






. Comm . 34
8 ; Pollock & Maitland , Hist . Eng . Law , II , 94 – 105 ;
Shep . Touch . , ch . 2 .
3
3 Tyler v . Court o
f
Registration , 1900 , 175 Mass . 71 , 74 ; 55 N . E . 812 ;
5
1
L . R . A . 433 .
2
4 Hitz v . Jenks , 1887 , 123 U . S . 297 , 301 ; Martin v . Dwelly , 6 Wend .
9 ; 21 Am . Dec . 245 ; Clark v . Clark , 16 Ore , 224 , 226 ; 18 Pac . 1 .
2
5 Williams Real Prop . , 17th ed . , 174 .
5 2 Bl . Comm . 357 .
2
1 See post , $ 142 .
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§ 19 . Definition and characteristics of the deed . — It
will be noticed that while such statutes as those referred
tot provide for the conveyance of interests in real prop





There are , it is true , in about one half the states short
statutory forms o
f conveyances that may be used , and
the statute prescribes their effect , but they are not
adapted by form to be used in all cases , and no statute
provides that such forms must be used . la
Statutes provide also certain things that are essential in
the execution o
f conveyances to make them valid or to
entitle them to record , but such statutes , while of great




* Ante , $ 16 . 18 See post , $ 30 .
( 18 )
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What a deed is , therefore , is generally to be deter
mined by the rules of the common law .
While it is desirable when possible to define legal
terms, it is by no means easy to define a deed — to state
concisely its essential characteristics so that the statement
shall be both properly inclusive and exclusive .
Washburn says : “ A deed is defined to be a writing
containing a contract sealed and delivered by the party
thereto ." 2
This and most modern definitions appear to be based on
Coke's definition : “ A deed signifieth in the common law
an instrument consisting of three things , viz .: writing ,
sealing and delivery comprehending a bargain between
party and party . ” 28
Coke also enumerates the ten requisites of a deed as
follows : ( 1 ) a writing ; ( 2 ) in parchment or paper ; ( 3 )
a person able to contract ; ( 4 ) by a sufficient name; ( 5 )
a person able to be contracted with ; (6 ) by a sufficient
name; ( 7 ) a thing to be contracted for ; ( 8 ) apt words
required by law ; ( 9 ) sealing ; ( 10 ) delivery .
One of the noticeable points in the foregoing and simi
lar definitions is the prominence given to “ contract" and
“ bargain . ”
But as pointed out in an interesting English decision ,3
where the question was as to whether there had been a
“ felonious forging of a deed , ” the alleged deed being
" letters of orders " by a bishop , under his seal, the term
is clearly not confined to contracts . There may be a valid
conveyance by deed of lands to an infant who cannot con
tract .
Such definitions and descriptions as the following ,
which are often seen , are , strictly speaking , incomplete
and inaccurate :
“ A writing under seal by which lands , tenements , or
? Real Prop ., II
I , 6th ed . , $ 2086 .
is C
o . Lit . , 171 b .
* Reg . v . Morton , 28 L . T . R . ( N . S . ) 452 ; 12 Cox C . C . 45
6
.
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estate not less than a
freehold ” ' - ( lands are not conveyed by the writing — the
writing is not a deed till delivered ) ; “ deed includes all
varieties o
f
sealed instruments ” — ( a magistrate ' s warrant
o
r
a will may be sealed instruments , but they are not
deeds ) .
It seems difficult to improve on the following defini
tion :
“ A deed is a writing sealed and delivered ; or , to speak
more particularly , it is a writing done on paper or parch
ment , testifying to the performance , by some person
named therein , o
f




f property or the making o
f
a contract ) , authen
ticated by the seal o
f
the person to be bound thereby ,
and delivered to the person intended to benefit thereun
der . " 4
The prominent features o
f
the deed are :
( a ) Writing testifying to the performance o
f
some act
in the law : i . e . , the instrument must be wholly written
before delivery - must not be incomplete , with blanks left
to b
e
afterward filled in ; 5 the writing — set forth with
certainty - testifies to some act intended to affect the
party ' s position in the law .
( b ) Seal : Of vital importance at common law — and it
will appear later that the doctrines associated with the




modern statutes “ abol
ishing ' ' seals .
( c ) Delivery : Always important and without which
themost complete and formal writing is not a deed - fac
tum , a thing done ; no title passes without it , and whether
there has been delivery is a constantly recurring ques
tion . 6
In its broad signification , “ deed ” applies , of course , to
many instruments in the law besides “ conveyances . "
* Ency . Laws Eng . IV , p . 171 .
5 Shep . Touch . , p . 54 .
6 See post , ch . XIX .
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We shall deal , however , with deeds of conveyance , and
in using the term deed , it will be generally used in its
popular sense a
s
the formal instrument prepared , but not
necessarily delivered .
$ 2
0 . Kinds of deeds - A
t
common law - Under the
Statute o
f
Uses . - According to English law as it existed
when this country was settled there were several different
kinds of deeds , each having it
s appropriate use and effect .
The general rules relating to them were introduced here
with other parts of the law , and while many o
f
the old
rules are obsolete , it is still necessary at times to recur to
them to appreciate the effect of modern conveyances or to
understand modern statutes and decisions .
At present it may suffice to simply classify and enu .
merate them .
The so - called common law deeds were :
The original o
r primary deeds ( i . e . , deeds creating
estates ) ; feoffment , creating a fee simple ; gift , creating
a fee tail ; grant , creating an estate in incorporeal real
property ; lease , creating an estate less than that o
f
grantor ; exchange , creating mutual estates in consider
ation of each other ; partition , creating estates in sev
eralty out o
f
estates in joint tenancy or in common ;
and the derivative o
r secondary deeds ( i . e . , deeds modi
fying estates already created ) : release , conveying to
present particular tenant the estate in remainder o
r re
version ; surrender , conveying to remainderman or rever
sioner the present particular estate ; confirmation , render
ing a voidable estate sure and unavoidable ; assignment ,
transferring the whole of an existing estate ; defeasance ,




Besides these common law deeds there were certain
deeds which derived their force and effect as legal convey
* The foregoing discussed 2 B
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ances from the Statute of Uses . These were : bargain and
sale , covenant to stand seised to uses , and lease and re
lease ; the last, being really composed of two instruments ,
is sometimes not classed as a deed by itself ; but, as the
lease was made in order that a release might immediately
afterward be made , and as the purpose of the whole
transaction was to convey , it is called by most authorities
“ conveyance by lease and release . ” 8 .
§ 21 . Kinds — Indenture - Deed poll. — A further classi
fication arises from a difference in the number of the par
ties executing the deed .
An indenture is or purports to be a deed between two
or more parties ; a deed poll is or purports to be the deed
of one party .
Indentures were formerly in at least two parts written
on the same parchment and afterward separated by cut
ting in an indented line; often before the parchment was
cut a word was written along the line of division : the
parts were called counterpanes or counterparts , and when
put together made the deed ; they were at one time inter
changeably executed , the one part by one party and the
other by the other party and exchanged ; then the prac
tice grew up of having each part executed by all the par
ties , making them “ duplicate originals ” ; where each
part was not executed by all parties, that part executed
by the party from whom the estate moved was sometimes
called the original and that executed by the party accept
ing the estate was called the counterpart. º American in
dentures were formerly actually indented as sold by the
stationer , but the practice became obsolete . In 1845 it
was enacted in England that a deed purporting to be an
indenture need not be actually indented . 10
8 2 Bl. Comm . 33
8
- and Appendix for form o
f
lease and release . See
ante , $ 13 .
9 Atherstone v . Bostock , 2 Man . & Gr . 511 , 518 , note ; 40 Eng . C . L .
Rep . 722 , note .
1
0
8 & 9 Vict . , ch . 10
6
.
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Deeds poll were so called because they were formerly
polled or cut even and not indented .
§ 22 . Indenture - Deed poll - Forms. — Because these
deeds were executed , the one kind by the several parties
to it, and the other kind by but one , there was naturally
a difference in form , and this difference is still main
tained , though the method of execution of the two kinds
may not always differ .
The indenture commences as follows :
This Indenture , made the — day of — , in the year
one thousand , etc . , - , between A B , of ( town , county
and state ) , party of the first part, and X Y, of — ,
party of the second part, witnesseth , that, et
c
.
The “ testimonium clause " and the end o
f
the instru
ment will vary with the circumstances , thus :
In witness whereof , to one part of these presents , re
maining with the said party of the first part , the said
party of the second part has , on the day first above
written , affixed his hand and seal ; and to the other part
thereof , remaining with the said party o
f
the second part ,
the said party o
f
the first part has on the said day affixed
his hand and seal .
Or ,
In witness whereof , the parties hereto have hereunto
interchangeably set their hands and seals , the day and
year first above written .
Or ,
In witness whereof , the said party of the first part
has hereunto set his hand and seal the day and year first
above written .
As the form of indenture is very commonly used for
a variety o
f
written instruments besides deeds — e . g . ,
mortgages of real and personal property , leases , agree
ments , etc . - - and as it is the appropriate form where there
are several parties who reciprocally bind themselves (and
there are often more than two ) , it may be noted that it is
convenient in practice to state immediately after the first
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introduction of the name of the party , the character or ca
pacity in which he acts, or some other brief description
of him , and thereafter refer to him by that description
throughout the instrument , rather than to refer to him as
" party of first part, ” etc ., or to repeat his name each
time (in instruments to which corporations or partnerships
are parties the names are long ) . For example :
This Indenture made, et
c
. , between A , B and C , co
partners doing business under the firm name of — ,
e
tc . , hereinafter called “ the mortgagors ” ( or vendors ,
lessors , etc . , as the case may be ) , parties of the first part ;
the M N Mfg . Co . , hereinafter called “ the Company , "
party o
f
the second part , and X Y ,hereinafter called " the
trustee , ” party o
f
the third part , etc . 11
The formal commencement o
f
the deed poll is :
Know all men b
y
these presents , that I , A B , of , etc . ;
O
r
(more rarely ) ,
T
o all to whom these presents shall come : I , A B , o
f ,
e
tc . , send greeting : Know y
e
that I , etc .
The English practice is to vary the formal commence
ment o
f
a deed poll according as the deed does or does not
contain “ recitals ” at its beginning , using the second form
above given when the deed contains recitals ; and this is








court , should recite
his authority and also that he gave notice , etc . , as fol
lows :
T
o all to whom these presents shall come : I , A B , of
- , executor o
f
the last will and testament of X Y , late
o
f





order ( reciting briefly the date o
f
the
court ' s order and the fact that A B was licensed to sell the
land ) and ,
Whereas , I , the said A B , have given due notice by
( reciting how the notice was given and the giving o
f
a
bond and the taking o
f
a
n oath , etc . ) .
" See Jones Forms , 5th ed . , p
p
. 316 , 560 ; Birdseye ' s Abbott , p . 67
6
.
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Now , therefore , know ye that I , said A B , by virtue of
the power and authority in me vested ( then stating that
he conveys , etc . ) .
The testimonium clause of the deed poll is:
In witness whereof I , the said , have hereunto se
t
my hand and seal this — day of —
Or , frequently : Signed ( and sealed , if so ) , this — day
o
f





the instrument ) .
$ 2
3 . Indenture - Deed poll - Other differences in form .
- In indentures the parties are generally referred to in
the third person - in deeds poll the party is referred to in
the first person ; this is , o
f
course , not an essential differ
ence in form ; but the reference in the same instrument
in one place to a party in the first person and in another
place to him in the third person should be avoided as an
awkward and somewhat misleading combination ; e . g . ,
see the form of deed given in Appendix to Missouri Stat
utes : 12




. , . . . do grant , etc . , unto John Jones the fol
lowing (describing the land ) . . . I , the said John
Smith , hereby covenanting to and with the said John
Jones , his heirs and assigns , fo
r
himself , his heirs , etc . ,
to warrant and defend the title , etc . ” ( John Smith
means to say : “ I , the said John Smith , hereby covenant
ing . . . . for myself ,my heirs , ” etc . )
S
o the combination , sometimes seen in printed forms ,
in one instrument of parts of an indenture with parts o
f
a deed poll is , to say the least , clumsy .
Instruments in the form o
f
the indenture are more
common in the United States than are those in the form
o
f
the deed poll .
In some o
f
the older states the deed poll is more usual
1
3 Vol . I , App . , No . 99 .
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than the indenture , but both forms seem to be used in
almost every state .
Where the instrument is not merely a grant or convey
ance , but contains stipulations binding both parties , the
indenture is the more appropriate form - as in the case of
leases , trust mortgages where the trustee agrees to certain
things , etc ., 13 while where the instrument is simply a
grant or conveyance - as in the case of the usual “ power
of attorney ” — the deed poll is better .
§ 24 . Indenture - Deed poll - Difference in effect . It is
often broadly stated that there is now no difference what
ever in effect between an indenture and a deed poll ,but it
is believed that this statement is not strictly accurate .
( a ) Effect on construction : It is a general rule of
construction in the case of private grants that if the mean
ing of the words be doubtful they shall be construed most
strongly against the grantor . This rule is sometimes held
to apply with most force to deeds poll , where the words of
the deed are considered as solely the words of the grant
or,14 while in an indenture actually executed by both par
ties the words may be taken either as the words of both ,
or, if there are stipulations proceeding from either party ,
doubtful terms are to be construed most strongly against
the party who may be properly held to make use of the
terms. 15
(b ) Remedy against grantee : Though a deed in form
an indenture is seldom executed by the grantee , he is
nevertheless ,when he accepts it, bound by its terms ; and ,
though it has been executed b
y
the grantor alone , it has
been held in some cases that it is the grantee ' s deed also ,
a
s if executed by him , and more strongly binding on him
than a deed poll would have been ; for example , in a case16
1
3 And see post , $ 225 .
1
4 Beeson v . Patterson , 36 Pa . S
t . 24 .
1
5 Beckwith v . Howard , 6 R . I . 8 .
1
6 Finley v . Simpson , 22 N . J . L . 311 . See briefs in this case .
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waswhere the question was whether the grantee could be held
in an action of covenant brought by the grantor upon the
agreement contained in a deed , called an indenture , that he
should pay a mortgage on the premises conveyed , though
he had not executed the deed ; and it was held that such
a deed accepted by the grantee is the deed of both parties ,
and the grantee is bound by the covenants contained in
it on his part, and may be held in an action of covenant.17
And the difference between the two forms of deeds is
noticed in a case 18 where the defendant was sought to be
held in an action of covenant on a similar clause in a
deed in which he was grantee ; his defense was that the
action should have been assumpsit, which was barred by
the statute of limitations , while covenant was not barred ;
the court refers to the fact that the deed purports to be an
indenture - a mutual deed of both , and for the purpose of
the remedy should be so regarded .
In Poe v . Dixon ,19 where an action was brought by the
grantor against the grantee on a similar clause in a deed
poll, the bar of the statute of limitations was successfully
interposed , as it was considered that the defendant had
made no agreement or promise in writing nor by spe
cialty .20
17 In Harrison v. Vreeland , 38 N . J . L . 36
6 , the doctrine of Finley v .
Simpson was restricted to the case o
f
a
n indenture , and held not to ap
ply to a deed poll . And see Woodruff v . Woodruff , 44 N . J . Eq . 349 ;
1
6 Atl . 4 .
1
6 Bowen v . Beck , 94 N . Y . 86 .
1
9 1899 , 60 Ohio S
t
. 124 ; 54 N . E . 86 ; 71 Am . St . R . 713 .
3
0 See further as to the remedy in such cases : Locke v . Homer , 131
Mass . 93 , 102 ; Rockford R . Co . v . Beckemeier , 72 Ill . 267 ; Baldwin v .
Emery , 1897 , 89 Maine 496 ; 36 Atl . 991 ; and note to Hickey v . L . S .
& c . R . Co . , 1894 , 51 Ohio St . 40 ; 36 N . E . 672 ; 23 L . R . A . 396 . The
form in which the assumption b
y
a grantee o
f payment of a mortgage
o
n the conveyed lands is expressed will be discussed later . Post , $ 65 .
Many courts have held that b
y
accepting any deed the grantee is bound
by stipulations in the deed intended to bind him , and in many reported
cases nothing is said a
s
to the form o
f
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§ 25 . Modern tendency to shorten deeds. — It is clear
that in early times deeds of conveyance , when used either
because they were required or because they were conve
nient , were simple and brief. And the modern tendency
is to return to such simplicity and brevity . However ,
from the first part of the seventeenth century till well
into the nineteenth the common mode of conveying land
in England was by the “ lease and release , ” which in
volved the making of two long deeds .21 Moreover , these
increased very much in length ,partly because ofthe greater
complication of interests to be dealt with and new precau
tions invented to meet new difficulties , and partly because ,
until recently in England , the pernicious practice pre
vailed of rewarding professional skill in proportion to
the number of words written . From 1833 until almost
the present time many acts of parliament have tended to
simplify the forms of deeds in England, and now in ordi
nary cases the use there of a comparatively few words pre
scribed by statute will incorporate in a deed the old
clauses which were before inserted at full length .
In this country statutes have been enacted in many
states21a expressly providing short forms of conveyances .
While these forms appear to be growing in favor and are
much used in some states , they are ignored in others ,
even where there are statutes authorizing them .
Irrespective of statute , very informal and brief docu
ments have often been sustained by the courts as deeds .
What is often called “ Kent's Deed ” is as follows :
“ I, A B , in consideration of one dollar to me paid by
C D , do bargain and sell (or in New York , grant ) to C
D and his heirs ( in New York , Virginia , etc ., the words
and his heirs may be omitted ) the lot of land (describe
it ). Witness my hand and seal, " et
c
. 22
And an instrument quite as short as , and even more
2
1 Ante , $ $ 13 , 20 .
3
la Post , $ 30 .
2
2 See 4 Kent Comm . 460 .
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informal than , this has been considered as having all the
requisites of a conveyance in fee simple , namely :
“ For value received , I bargain and sell unto A C ,
my whole right of improvement made by J B , and all
the land as far as T M 's claim interferes with my claim .
Given under my hand and seal , this 7th day , etc . ”
Test ( two witnesses ) . Signed and sealed .23
Many modern decisions may be found sustaining as
deeds almost equally simple instruments . See , fo
r
ex
ample , Evenson v . Webster , 24 where an informal instru
ment , called b
y
the draftsman “ a will , " was held to be a
deed - upon principles to be stated presently . 24
a
And the well -settled general rule is that courts will give
effect if possible to a
n instrument as a deed o
f conveyance





Nevertheless , it is not always possible to give such
effect to an instrument even much more formal in general
appearance than those set out in the cases just cited .




f conveyance , have been ineffectual will become
clear as the parts o
f
the deed are considered in detail .
§ 26 . Reasons for considering settled forms . — Coke ,
after stating that deeds may be good though informal ,
proceeds : “ And yet no well -advised man will trust to
such deeds which the law b
y
construction maketh good ,
u
t
res magis valeat ; but when forme and substance con
curre , then is the deede faire and absolutely good . ” ' 25
The fact that peculiarly informal writings have been
held to be deeds only after prolonged and expensive liti
gation , and the fact that the statutes justmentioned - pro
viding short forms — not only permit the use o
f
the old
forms , but in declaring the effect of the forms provided
2
3 Chiles v . Conley ' s Heirs , 2 Dana (Ky . ) 21 .
2
4




Post , $ 29 .
2
5 C
o . Litt . 7a .
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by them , refer to the principles which gave rise to the
former , induce many lawyers to agree with Coke that it is
not well to depart from well settled forms.
Morever , the circumstances attending the conveyance
of interests in real estate often require that the deed shall
be something more than a mere conveyance of a definite
piece of land from the present owner in fee to another per
son in fee. The estate or interest conveyed may be in
tended to be qualified or restricted in various ways ; the
land may be subject to various kinds of incumbrances ,
regarding which stipulations of one kind or another may
be desired ; there may be exceptions to be made from the
land granted ; rights may be intended to be reserved in
it ; conditions may be attached to it
s
use ; covenants , gen
eral or special , as to its condition or character may be
desired , etc . So that a simple o
r
short form 'will often be
found not so well adapted for use as one more prolix .
§ 2
7 . The deed conveys a present interest — To be dis
tinguished from other instruments . — Whatever be its
form the characteristic effect of a proper deed o
f convey





situs and delivered ) is that it con
veys a present legal interest .
When customary forms are disregarded in drawing a
deed , or peculiar provisions are inserted in it , it is apt to
b
e
confounded with other instruments from which it is
essentially distinct .








which the deed may
b
e
so confounded in particular cases , namely :
( a ) Contracts to convey .
( b ) Instruments testamentary in character .
§ 28 . Deeds distinguished from contracts to convey .
It is not easy to determine in all cases whether an instru
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ment purporting to transfer an interest in realty is a deed
of conveyance or simply an agreement for a deed .
In such cases its operation and effect a
s
to whether it is
the one o
r
the other depends , not necessarily on particu
lar words and phrases , but on the intention of the parties
to b
e gathered from the whole instrument , read , if need
b
e , in the light of the circumstances of the transaction .
Though the instrument may contain words o
f convey
ance , yet if it be clear that the parties contemplate the
execution o
f
a further conveyance , such an instrument is
not a deed o
f conveyance . 26
In Williams v . Paine27 there is a clause in an instru




under a letter o
f attorney , as follows :
" And I ( attorney ) hereby further agree in behalf o
f
(principals ) that they will as soon as convenient make
and execute a proper deed o
f conveyance of said premises
to said (grantee ) in fe
e
simple , " as to the effect of which
clause therewas a difference o
f pinion among the justices ,
some regarding the instrument a
s only an agreement to
convey , and not a deed of conveyance , the majority , how
ever , being o
f opinion that it was a conveyance of the
legal title , though defectively executed as the attorney ' s




9 . Deeds distinguished from instruments testamen
tary in character . — Sometimes instruments in the general
form o
f deeds will be construed to be wills , and those in
appearance wills will be construed to be deeds .
Writings in the form of absolute deeds often contain a
provision that they are not to take effect until at or after
the death o
f
the “ grantor ” ; for example , such provisions
are :
* Phillips v . Swank , 12
0
P
a . St . 76 ; 13 Atl . 712 ; 6 Am . St . R . 691 ;
Mineral Co . v . James , 1899 , 97 Va . 403 ; 34 S . E . 37 ,
2
7
1898 , 169 U . S . 55 , 76 .
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“ This indenture made , etc ., between , et
c
. (only to
take effect at the death of the grantor ) , witnesseth , et
c
. ; ' 28
Or , “ This deed is to take effect and be in full force on
and after the death of this grantor ; ” 29
Or , “ To have and to hold the above described premises
to the said B W , o
f
the second part , his heirs and as
signs , to be his atmy death and the death o
fmy wife . " 30
The question in such cases is whether the writing is a
deed o
f conveyance , o
r
is , in effect , a will . And the distinc
tion is important . If a deed , the interest o
f
the grantee can
not be defeated by the grantor after the execution and de
livery o
f
the instrument - if a will , it is revocable by the
maker a
t any time before his death .
Moreover , in many states ( e . g . , California , Colorado ,
Illinois , Indiana , Iowa , Kansas and Missouri ) , no wit
nesses are necessary to a deed , but , generally speaking ,
two witnesses a
t
least are necessary to a will . Hence , if
a
n instrument in general form a deed , and without wit
nesses be held to be really testamentary in character , the
result is , in such states , that the instrument is wholly in
operative — it cannot operate as a deed because testamen
tary in character , nor as a will because it lacks the wit
nesses necessary to a will .
In states where this result would follow , if unwitnessed
instruments containing such clauses a
s
those just quoted
were held to be testamentary in character , and hence not
deeds , the courts are apt to sustain the instrument as a
deed , if possible , rather than have it entirely fail . 31
2
8 Harshbarger v . Carroll , 1896 , 163 Il
l
. 636 ; 45 N . E . 565 ; Bowler v .
Bowler , 1898 , 176 Ill . 541 ; 52 N . E . 437 ; Murphy v . Gabbert , 1902 , 16
6
Mo . 596 ; 66 S . W . 536 ; 89 Am . St . R . 733 .
2
9 Kelley v . Shimer , 1899 , 152 Ind . 290 ; 53 N . E . 23
8 ; Pinkham v .
Pinkham , 1898 , 55 Neb . 729 ; 76 N . W . 411 .
3
0 Wynn v . Wynn , 1900 , 112 Ga . 214 ; 37 S . E . 378 .
3
1 Love v . Blauw , 1900 , 61 Kan . 496 ; 59 Pac . 1059 ; 78 Am . S
t . R . 334 ;
4
8
L . R . A . 257 ; Saunders v . Saunders , 1901 , 11
5
Iowa 27
5 ; 88 N . W .
329 . See West v . Wright , 1902 , 11
5
Ga . 277 ; 41 S . E . 602 .
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The decisions involving these points are numerous , and
in some respects conflicting .32
The general rule appears to be that if a present vested
right to property then owned by the maker of thewriting
passes to the person named as grantee , the instrument is
a deed , if properly executed and delivered , and the mere
fact that the enjoyment in possession is postponed does
not make it a will. On the other hand , if the instrument
passes no present interest or right, but requires the death
of the maker before either interest or enjoyment arises , it
is a will , if executed as such .
Therefore , if the writing passes a present interest it
may be held to be a deed ( if properly executed , etc .) ,
even though called by the maker a will , 33 while if it
passes no present interest (because , e. g ., themaker has
none to pass ) , it cannot operate as a deed , though having
the general form of one , but may operate as a will (if
properly executed as a will) .34
And a document in general form a warranty deed may
be admitted to probate as a will and take effect as a will ,
if properly executed , especially when not delivered as a
deed ,35while, on the other hand , an instrument in which
are used some of the terms appropriate to a will - as
" give , devise and bequeath ," instead of the usual opera
tive words of a deed - cannot be probated as a will, if, in
reality , a present estate is granted .36
In many cases of this general character the question of
delivery is the vital question , and the principles on which
they are decided will be discussed when the subject of de
livery is reached . 36
a
3
7 See note , 89 Am . St . R . 495 .
3
3 Evenson v . Webster , 1892 , 3 S . Dak . 382 ; 53 N . W . 747 ; 44 Am .
S
t
. R . 803 .
3
4 Crocker v . Smith , 1891 , 94 Ala . 295 ; 10 So . 258 ; 16 L . R . A . 576 .
3
5 Lautenschlager ' s Estate , 1890 , 80 Mich . 285 ; 45 N . W . 147 .
3
5 Ward v . Ward , 1898 , 104 Ky . 857 ; 48 S . W . 411 ; Goad v . Lawrence




See post , $ $ 307 , 308 .
3 - BREws . Con .
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§ 30 . Statutory forms of deed . 36
b
- As in practice the
Indiana short statutory form o
f
deed is much used , and as
the statute is similar to those o
f many other states ( some
having been but recently enacted ) , the section relating
to the statutory form o
f
the “ warranty deed ” is here
given : 37
“ Any conveyance of lands worded in substance as fol
lows , - ' A B conveys and warrants to C D (here de




(here insert the con
sideration ) ' — the said conveyance being dated , and duly
signed , sealed and acknowledged by the grantor - shall be
deemed and held to be a conveyance in fee simple to the
grantee , his heirs and assigns , with covenant from the
grantor for himself and his heirs and personal represent
atives that he is lawfully seized o
f
the premises , has good
right to convey the same , and guarantees the quiet pos
session thereof ; that the same are free from all incum
brances , and that he will warrant and defend the title to
the sameagainst all lawful claims . "
Statutes almost identical with the foregoing will be
found in Michigan and Kansas , 38 while a somewhat differ
ent form o
f
statute , producing much the same effect , ex
ists in Illinois and other states , 39 and still another form ,
producing in some respects a different effect , is used in
California and states adopting its statutes . 40 Reference is
now made to the foregoing statutes for the purpose o
f call
ing attention to their existence and , in a general way , to
resemblances and differences in form . Similar statutes
exist in several states besides those named , all having in








See ante , $ 25 .
3
7 Burns ' R . S . 1901 , § 3346 .
3
8 Michigan C . L . 1897 , § 9014 ; KansasGen . S
t
. 1901 , $ 1203 .
3
9 IHinois R . S . , ch . 30 , $ 9 ; Minnesota Laws 1901 , ch . 197 ; Utah R . S .
1898 , § 1981 ; Washington Ball . Ann . Co . 1897 , $ 4519 ; Wisconsin Stat .
• 1898 , § 2208 . See Iowa code , $ 2958 .
4
0 California Civ . Co . , $ $ 1092 , 1113 ; Montana Civ . Co . , $ $ 1501 , 1519 ;
South Dakota Ann . Stat . 1901 , $ $ 4435 , 4437 .
--
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One important consequence of such statutes is to im
port into the deed , by the use of certain words named in
the statute , the covenants specified in it with the same
effects on the rights and liabilities of the parties as if the
covenants had been fully expressed . The words neces
sary to accomplish this result vary in the different states ,
and the covenants thus implied by the use of certain
words are not always general in their nature , but are often
restricted or special. 41
It will be noticed that where there are such statutes
providing for a short " warranty ” deed , there are gener
ally those providing short forms for other conveyances
also ( e . g ., mortgages ).
In practice , these instruments ,when used ,are seldom as
short as the statutory forms , but have the formal begin
ning and conclusion of an indenture or deed poll, and
sometimes contain many of the parts of the older forms .
Statutes somewhat different from those just mentioned ,
though having the same general objects in view , are to be
found occasionally 42 in which pattern covenants ” are
set forth in brief terms as being fully equivalent to the
older long forms, which are also set out in the statute ;
and full forms of conveyances containing such short
clauses are provided : in New York a charge of $ 5 addi




made if the long
forms are used .
$ 3
1 . The parts o
f
a deed . - In none of the states hav
ing statutes such a
s
those just mentioned is it necessary
to use the statutory form , and longer conveyances are still
in general use .
Generally speaking , throughout the United States there
may be used a deed containing the following principal
and subordinate parts — not that all these parts need be in
4
1 See post , $ 211 .
« E . g . , N . Y . Th
e
Real Property Law , $ 22
3 ; Birdseye ' s ed . , N . Y .
R . S . 1901 , p . 3055 .
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every deed ( for plainly there may be deeds containing
neither “ exception , " " reservation , " " condition , " nor
“ covenant” ) , but when some or all are needed they
should appear in their proper relative places in the deed :
THE PREMISES , or introductory part, including date
(though in deed poll this is properly at end ) ; parties
(their names , residences , and , sometimes , occupation or
other special designation ) ; explanatory recitals ; state
ment of payment and receipt of consideration ; operative
words ; description of property conveyed ( followed in
some forms by the “ general words ” and “ a
ll
estate "
clause ) - exception .
THE HABENDUM - limiting or declaring the estate or in
terest granted . (Following the habendum was formerly
the tenendum , a clause used to express the tenure by
which the estate granted was to b
e
held by the grantee ;
prior to statute Quia emptores - 1290 — it was important
to state whether the grantee was to hold of the grantor or
o
f his lord , and the kind of tenure was also marked out ;
now it is a mere form and is joined with the habendum
in the clause " To have and to hold ' ' ) .
THE REDDENDUM - specifying what new thing is re
served to the grantor in the thing granted .
( This clause is more usual in leases where there is a
reservation o
f rent - " Yielding and paying , et
c
. " ' - than
in deeds o
f
absolute conveyance , but there may be impor
tant " reservations ” in the latter . )
CONDITIONS — qualifications o
r
restrictions affecting the
use and enjoyment o
f
the estate granted , b
y
virtue of
which it is made to vest , to be enlarged , or defeated , on
the happening or not happening o
f





a particular act .
COVENANTS — agreements o
r promises collateral to the
main purpose o
f
the deed - giving assurances as to things
already done or providing that some thing shall be ( or
shall not be ) done hereafter : the most common are the
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covenants for title , of which “ the usual covenants ” are :
fo
r
seisin , of good right to convey , against incumbrances ,
fo
r
quiet enjoyment , fo
r
further assurance , of warranty .
THE CONCLUSION — the testimonium clause , reciting the
fact o
f
execution ; the date , either expressly or by refer
ence to the beginning ; signing , sealing , attestation .
(Following is generally the certificate o
f acknowledgment
- not strictly a part of the deed , nor , generally speaking ,
necessary to its validity as a conveyance . )
The parts will now be taken up in detail in substan .
tially the order given above .
CHAPTER IV .
THE DATE .
$ 32. The date not essential ,
though desirable .
33. Presumption of delivery at
date .
$ 34 . Date in deed and certificate
of acknowledgment .
35. True date may be shown .
§ 32 . The date not essential, though desirable . - As
deeds are now drawn in most of the states the first recital
in the premises is the date .
While it has been fo
r
centuries the usual practice to put
a date to a deed , the date was not at common law neces
sary to the conveyance . So that if the date were omitted
entirely , or were an impossible time , as the 31st of Feb
ruary , it has been considered that the conveyance is nev
ertheless valid . 1
Most of our modern statutes permitting short forms o
f
deedsla provide among other things that they shall b
e
“ dated . ” How far the date in such cases would be con




the point , but , while it is believed that the omis
sion o
f
the date would not affect the validity o
f
such con
veyances , it is clearly best to date them .
And even though other deeds than these are valid with
out dating , still they ought regularly to be dated on the
day o
f
their execution . The rights o
f parties are often
made to depend upon an accurate statement of time , and




in ascertaining whether all the statutory
" Goddard ' s Case , 2 Rep . 4 b .
la Ante , $ 30 .
( 38 )
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requirements in force at the time of the execution of the
instrument have been complied with .2
The date may be stated in any part of the deed , but in
“ indentures ” the appropriate place is at the beginning ;
in “ deeds poll, ” near the end in the testimonium clause .
It is better in stating the date to write it out in words
rather than to express it in figures . Mistakes are more
likely to occur where figures alone are used than where
words are used , either alone or in addition to figures , and
a date in figures would seem to be less regarded than one
in a different form .3 .
§ 33. Presumption of delivery at date. — The all- im
portant time in regard to deeds is the time of delivery ,
and the date of a deed is often of value in fixing this
time .
The delivery of a conveyance having been shown ," it very
often becomes of great importance , in view of conflicting
claims to the property described in the conveyance , to de
termine when delivery took place .
In the absence of direct evidence on this point resort is
had to a presumption of law , and it is a general rule that
if a date is stated in the deed , that will be taken prima
facie as the date of the execution and delivery .5
§ 34. Date in deed and certificate of acknowledgment .
- When the date of the deed and that of the certificate of
* Smith v . Porter , 10 Gray 66 .
: Jackson v. Schoonmaker, 2 Johns . 230, 233. ,
* As to what constitutes delivery , see ch . XIX .
5 Purdy v . Coar , 10
9
N . Y . 418 ; 4 Am . St . R . 491 ; 17 N . E . 352 ;
Faulkner v . Adams , 1890 , 12
6
Ind . 459 ; 26 N . E . 170 ; Crossen v . Oliver ,
1900 , 37 Ore . 514 ; 61 Pac . 885 ; Farwell v . Des Moines Mfg . Co . , 1896 ,
9
7 Iowa 286 , 299 ; 66 N . W . 176 ; 35 L . R . A . 63 , 69 . (One question in




sessments were made ; the general rule as to date is applied , and it is
held that , though the deed was not recorded till some time after it bore
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acknowledgment are the same the presumption of de
livery at that date is strengthened , as the certifying off
cer is required by statute in many states to name the true
date , and generally would have no object in expressing it
falsely . ?
But it very often happens that the date of the deed and
the date of the certificate of acknowledgment differ .
In such cases the general rule appears to be that the
former (i. e ., date expressed in deed ) will, in the absence
of evidence to the contrary, be taken as the true date .8
The reason generally given for this rule is that the deed
may be delivered before its acknowledgment or without
acknowledgment — the acknowledgment , generally speak
ing, being unnecessary to its validity . 9
But this doctrine is not accepted by all courts , and it
has been held in some jurisdictions that , as the deed is
not usually delivered till it has been acknowledged , there
will be no presumption that there was delivery till the ac
knowledgment has taken place . 10
6 See post , ch . XVIII . .
* Cover v . Manaway , 11
5
P
a . St . 33
8 ; 8 Atl . 393 ; 2 Am . St . R . 552 . ( In
this case it was attempted to be shown that the deed was not executed
till some years after the time stated as its date . )
• Conley v . Finn , 1898 , 171 Mass . 70 ; 50 N . E . 460 ; 68 Am . St . R . 399 .
(Here there was a difference o
f twenty years between the date o
f
the deed
and that of acknowledgment — the acknowledgment being after the
death o
f
the grantee . ) And see L . E . & c . Ry . Co . v . Whitham , 1895 , 155
Ill . 514 ; 40 N . E . 1014 ; 46 Am . St . 355 ; 28 L . R . A . 612 ; Smith v . Scar
brough , 1895 , 61 Ark . 104 ; 32 S . W . 382 .
9 See post , $ 261 .
1
0 Loomis v . Pingree , 43 Maine 299 , 308 ; Fontaine v . Savings Inst . ,
5
7 Mo . 552 . This is the rule in Michigan : Blanchard v . Tyler , 12
Mich . 339 ; 86 Am . Dec . 57 ; Johnson v . Moore , 2
8 Mich . 3 ; Hoard v .
Stone , 58 Mich . 578 , 583 ; 26 N . W . 141 . But in any case the presump
tion may be overcome b
y
other direct evidence or by circumstances ;
e . g . , in Eaton v . Trowbridge , 38 Mich . 454 , 458 , where the acknowledg
ment was three years after the date o
f
the deed , and the grantee had
died after the date o
f
the deed and before the date o
f acknowledg
ment ; it was held that the fact that the grantor acknowledged the deed
after the death o
f
the grantee was a circumstance which overcame the
§ 35 41THE DATE .
§ 35 . True date may be shown . — The date not being
essential, it is a well-settled rule that the true date may
be shown by parol ,without regard to the date recited , and
the actual date of delivery may be shown though it be
different from the date of the conveyance .
· Applying this principle , it was held in Swedish Ameri
can Bank v . Germania Bank ,11 where the controversy was
as to the amount of indebtedness secured by a deed given
as security , that the deed might be shown to have been
delivered and to have taken effect at a later time than the
date named in it, at which later time a much larger sum
was due than at the date recited in the deed .
This deed was expressed to have been given and re
ceived “ as security for money owing, ” but it is worth
noting that a slight variation in the form of expression
might have materially affected the result . If, fo
r
exam
ple , the form had been : “ Owing at the date above
named , ” or a similar expression had been used , the date
a
s
named would , it seems , have been taken as the time




f many states require that certain instru
ments , more especially mortgages , shall be recorded
within a limited time after the date thereof ” or “ after
execution . ” In such cases the true date may be shown ,
and the time intended by such statutes would seem to be
presumption which would ordinarily prevail in Michigan - because if
the conyevance had not been delivered before the acknowledgment ,
that is , before the grantee ' s death , the ceremony of acknowledgment
would have been without effect . As there is a conflict of opinion on
this point , it is interesting to note the recent recommendation o
f
the
California Commission for the revision o
f
the codes and the amend
ment made to California Civil Code , $ 1055 , changing the time when a
grant is presumed to have been delivered from that o
f








f acknowledgment , “ this latter presump
tion being , in the opinion o
f
the commissioners , more usually in ac
cord with the facts . "
1
1 1899 , 76 Minn . 409 ; 79 N . W . 399 .
1
9 Joseph y . Bigelow , 4 Cush . 82 .
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the date of delivery rather than the date recited in the
instrument , should they differ .13
18Shaughnessy v . Lewis , 130 Mass . 355 ; Hornbrook v . Hetzel , 1901,




THE PARTIES — THE METHOD OF DESIGNATING THEM .
$ 36. Manner of introducing and
referring to parties ,
37 . Designation of parties — The
grantor .
38 . Designation of parties - -The
grantee .
39. Executing deed with gran
tee 's name blank - Ques
tion as to authority to in
sert his name.
40 . Parol evidence to identify
grantee - When deed void
for uncertainty as to
grantee
$ 41. Use of names - Presump
tions. .
42 . Names - Effect of discrep
ancies - Idem sonans .
43. Fictitious persons --Grantee
must be in esse — Ficti
tious names .
44 . Additions to name by way
of recital - Effect of.
45 . Partnerships as parties.
46 . Corporations as parties .
§ 36 . Manner of introducing and referring to parties .
- To a deed there must be parties — competent , on the one
hand , to give title, and on the other , to take . Assuming ,
for the present , that the parties are under neither natural
nor legal disability , there will be considered here the
manner or method of designating them .
In indentures the parties are described or referred to as
of different parts , there being as many parties of different
parts as are necessary in the particular instrument .
There may be several persons whose relations to the
subject -matter of the instrument are substantially the
same, and whose intentions regarding it are also the same.
They may all properly be joined as parties of the same
part — of the " first," " second ," " third , ” etc ., parts , re
spectively .
1 See post, $ 312 .
(43 )
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The order in which the several parties follow each other
is usually the natural order , the party who conveys some
thing being mentioned before the party to whom the
conveyance is made . Where there are but two parties , or
sets of parties , one conveying an interest and the other
taking it, the arrangement is a simple matter . Where
there are more than two parties, or sets of parties , the
order of arrangement becomes somewhat a matter of taste ,
regulated by practice and experience — the giver, however ,
generally preceding the taker; and , for example , trustees
who are made parties for the interest of those to whom
the conveyance is made generally being mentioned last .
Examples ,
One desires to purchase a part of mortgaged lands freed
from the mortgage . He, the mortgagor , and the mort
gagee , having agreed upon terms , et
c
. , could becomepar
ties thus :
This indenture , made the — day of — , etc . , between
(mortgagor ) o
f
— , party o
f
the first part ; (mortgagee )
of — , party of the second part , and (purchaser ) of — ,
party o
f
the third part .
Whereas (recital a
s
to the mortgage , the agreement of
the mortgagor to sell , the purchaser to buy and themort
gagee to concur and release the part on receiving a pro
portion o
f
the proceeds ) .
Now this Indenture witnesseth that in consideration ,
e
tc .
Or , in the above , the mortgagee might have been
named a
s
first party and the mortgagor a
s
second party .
A “ marriage settlement , " made in view of an intended
marriage , may be :
This indenture , made this — day of — , et
c
. , between
( intended husband ) , of — , party o
f
the first part ; ( in
tended wife ) , of — party of the second part ; and —
and — , o
f
— , trustees , parties o
f
the third part .
Whereas (reciting the intended marriage and the agree
ment that certain property " hereinafter described " should
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be settled " upon the trusts and to the uses hereinafter de
clared and limited ” ) .
Now this indenture witnesseth that, etc .
Strictly speaking , in deeds poll the parties are not re
ferred to as parties of different parts , being simply gran
tor and grantee ; though usage in some states authorizes
the practice of referring to the parties to a deed in form a
deed poll as parties of the first, second parts , etc .
Where there are but two parties they are frequently re
ferred to as parties of the " one part ” and parties of the
" other part ,” respectively , instead of as of the first and
second parts.
$ 37 . Designation of parties — The grantor . - What
ever be the form of the deed , the parties ought to be
named or otherwise designated in the body of the instru
ment .
To save a
ll question , the party intending to convey
should b
e designated as the granting o
r conveying party
in the deed , fo
r
the signing and sealing a deed b
y
one
who is not in some way so designated as intending to
convey is not , generally speaking , enough to convey his
interest . ?
Because o
f the carelessness or ignorance of those draw
ing deeds this question has often been before the courts in
one form o
r
another , and it is believed that the general
and proper rule is that stated above .
There are , however , decisions to the effect that one
signing a deed is bound as grantor , though he is not
named as such in the body o
f
the deed . 3
* Batchelor v . Brereton , 112 U . S . 396 , 404 ; Stone v . Sledge , 1894 , 87
Tex . 49 ; 47 Am . St . 65 ; 26 S . W . 1068 ; King v . Rhew , 1891 , 108 N . C .
696 ; 23 Am . St . 76 ; 13 S . E . 174 ; Adams v . Medsker , 25 W . Va . 127 ;
Davidson v . Iron Co . , 1895 , 109 Ala . 383 ; 19 So . 390 ; Bradley v . Mo .
Pac . R . Co . , 91 Mo . 493 ; 4 S . W . 427 ; Barnsdall v . Boley , 1902 , 119
Fed . R . 191 .
* Hargis v . Ditmore , 86 Ky . 653 ; 7 S . W . 141 ; Hrouska v . Janke , 66
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The reasoning in such cases is that the execution of a
deed manifests the intention of the one executing to be
bound by it , and that the instrument should be so con
strued as to give effect to the intention . But in answer
to this it is said , on the other hand , that the intention of
the parties to an instrument must be gathered from the
instrument , and when there is nothing in a deed to show
an understanding on the part of one of the signers and
sealers to convey , the mere execution of the deed does not
sufficiently manifest such a purpose ; and that when a
deed expresses in terms that it is the conveyance of A and
B we should do violence to its obvious intent were we
to hold that C also conveyed because he signed and
sealed it.
In properly construing deeds as to which this question
may arise , much , of course , must depend upon the context
as well as upon the purpose of executing the deed by one
not named as grantor .
For example , where no names are mentioned at all in
the deed , but such expressions are used as “ We convey , ”
— and the deed is executed by several, it should be held
to be the deed of all executing it.
Or, where a husband executes with his wife a convey
ance of her property , for the purpose of manifesting his
consent to her conveyance (as is required by some stat
utes ) , it may with some reason be held sufficient , though
he is not described as grantor in the conveyance , and
this would especially be so in states where the husband
has no freehold interest in his wife ' s real estate , as he had
at common law , for in such cases he has nothing to
grant.6
Wis . 252 ; 28 N . W . 166 - this case citing as authority Wash . R . Prop .
III, 566 .
Sheldon v. Carter, 1890 , 90 Ala . 380 ; 8 So . 63 .
5 Pease y. Bridge , 49 Conn . 58 , 61 ; Thompson v . Lovrein , 82 Pa . St.
432 ; Dentzel v. Waldie , 30 Cal. 138 ; Clark v . Clark , 16 Ore . 22
4 ; 18
Pac . 1 .
6 Bray v . Clapp , 1888 , 80 Maine 277 ; 13 Atl . 900 ; 6 Am . St . R . 197 .
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While such cases as these are sometimes cited as sus
taining the doctrine that one may be bound as grantor by
executing a deed without being otherwise designated as
grantor, it seems that they cannot properly be considered as
authorities fo
r
that doctrine , but , atmost ,merely for the
doctrine , that , under somestatutes , the husband ' s assent to
his wife ' s conveyance of her land may be shown b
y
his
merely executing her deed . And it has been held , on the
other hand , that the assent and concurrence of the
husband , required in some states , to give validity to a
conveyance o
f
the wife ' s lands , can be manifested only
by his joining in such a way as would be necessary to the
conveyance o
f his interest if the land belonged to him ,
especially where h
e
has a freehold interest in her real





8 . Designation o
f parties — The grantee . - - As in a
deed there must be a grantee , as well as a grantor , he
must also be designated .
He is , of course , usually designated in the premises b
y
his name , but this is not indispensable , for if from the
whole instrument it appears who he is , it is enough . 9
The grantee need not b




all , if he is otherwise definitely designated . He may be
identified b
y
other means than b
y
name , and any descrip
tion which indicates the person and distinguishes him
from others is enough , so far as the validity o
f
the deed
is concerned ; for example , a valid conveyance may be
made to the eldest son of a person named o
r
to his wife ,
without , in either case , naming the grantee .
If , however , there is nothing on the face of the deed
indicating the grantee , it is defective and passes no legal
* Adams v . Teague , 1898 , 123 Ala . 591 ; 26 So . 221 ; 82 Am . St . R . 144 .
* Dietrich v . Hutchinson , 1901 , 73 V
t
. 134 ; 50 Atl . 810 ; 87 Am . St . R .
698 .
9 Newton v . McKay , 29 Mich . 1 ; Bay v . Posner , 1893 , 78 MD . 42 ; 26
Atl . 1084 .
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title ; as, for example , if the name of the grantee is by
mistake placed among those of the grantors, and there is
nothing else in the deed to indicate the grantee , no legal
title is conveyed .10 So if the name of the grantee is left
blank , there being no other designation of him in the
“ deed , ” the instrument is wholly inoperative as a con
veyance so long as it remains in this condition , though
complete in other respects . 11
$ 39 . Executing deed with grantee 's name blank
Question as to authority to insert his name. — It is not
unusual in practice, however , for one to execute a “ deed ”
complete in all particulars except the name or other desig
nation of the grantee . If the blank thus left is afterward
filled by one having authority to fill it, the instrument
(which up to this time is really no deed because there is
but one party to it) becomes valid .
Whether in such cases the authority to insert the
grantee 's name must itself be conferred by deed , or may
be given by parol, is a disputed question . Formerly the
general rule was that such authority — which is authority ,
really , to make a deed — could be given only by an instru
ment of as high a character as the one to be made , and this
doctrine would , it seems, still be adhered to by some
courts . 12 But in many recent decisions the extremely
technical character of this rule is pointed out, and it is
held that parol authority to insert the grantee 's name is
sufficient ; and in some cases it is not considered necessary
to the validity of the deed that the blank shall be filled
before delivery . 13
10 Allen v . Allen , 48 Minn . 462 ; 51 N . W . 473.
11 Allen v . Withrow , 110 U . S . 119 , 128 ; Clark v . Butts, 1898 , 73 Minn .
361; 76 N . W . 199 ; Whitaker v . Miller , 83 Ill . 381 .
1 Mickey v . Barton , 1902 , 194 Ill . 446 , 455 ; 62 N . E . 802 ; Upton v .
Archer , 41 Cal . 85 ; 10 Am . R . 266 .
1
3 McCleery v . Wakefield , 76 Iowa 529 ; 41 N . W . 210 ; 2 L . R . A . 529 ;
Bank y . Fleming , 1901 .63 Kan . 139 ; 65 Pac 213 ; Thummel v . Holden ,
1899 , 14
9
Mo . 677 ; 51 S . W . 404 ; Cribben v . Deal , 1891 , 21 Ore . 211 ; 27
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§ 40 . Use of parol evidence to identify the grantee
When deed void for uncertainty as to grantee. - Even
where the grantee is named , some evidence outside the
deed must often be resorted to in order that the real
grantee may be identified . The name is simply a means
of identifying him .
While it is desirable to use his correct name, his iden
tity may nevertheless be shown should his name be erro
neously written . 14
It will be observed that in such cases an actual grantee
is designated , but imperfectly or incompletely ; and parol
evidence is admissible , not to add any new terms to the
deed , but for the purpose of completing what is imper
fectly expressed , and applying the terms to the person
thus erroneously designated . While it is inconvenient to
have such a state of facts occur , because the necessary
evidence is not always easily obtainable, nevertheless, the
validity of the deed is not affected by the error in name ,
because there is no error as to the person : the namemay
be one or another - is changeable , and , so far as the
validity of the deed is concerned is unimportant , but the
person is unchangeable and is essential to the operation
of the deed .
Hence there is a great difference between the errone
ous designation of a grantee and the designation of a
grantee by a description which is inherently uncertain ;
to correct the latter by parol evidence as to the person
intended , when the description given furnishes no means
of identification , is to add new terms to the deed , which
may not be done : therefore , in such cases the deed is
void for uncertainty as to the grantee .
For example : A grant to " one of the sons of A , ” he
Pac . 1046 ; 28 Am . St. R .746 ; Lafferty v . Lafferty , 1896 , 42 W . Va . 783 ,
787 ; 26 S . E . 262 .
1 Andrews v . Dyer , 81 Maine 104 ; 16 Atl. 405 ; Cleveland v . Burnham ,
64 Wis. 347 ; 25 N . W . 407 .
4BREws. Con .
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having several sons ; or to “ the poor relations ” of the
grantor ,when the deeds furnish no other means of identi
fying the persons intended , would be fatally defective or
“ incurably uncertain . ”
A grant to the inhabitants of a " neighborhood , ” with
out defining the neighborhood , would seem to be void for
uncertainty , 15 and a conveyance to the “ heirs ” of a living
person , with nothing appearing on the face of the deed
to indicate the grantor 's use of the word “ heirs " in other
than it
s
technical legal sense , is void fo
r
uncertainty . 16
But the general purpose of the law to sustain , if possible ,
conveyances rather than declare them void , is shown by
instances where the word “ heirs ' ' ( in cases similar to
that last cited ) is construed as “ children , ” which is
a proper construction when it is manifest from the deed ,
a
s
a whole , that the grantor did not use the word in its
technical sense . Such will be the result , fo
r
example , if
the fact that the ancestor is living at the time is recog .
nized b
y
the grantor in the deed . 17
§ 4
1 . Use of names - Presumption . — It is clear , then ,
that the better way to designate the parties is b
y
name ,
and this is , of course , the usual way .
Care should always b
e
used in ascertaining the names
o
f parties before drawing instruments , as the liability to
err in this respect is great ; the names of the grantors
occur in several parts o
f
a deed besides appearing as
signed to it , and again in the certificate of acknowledg
ment , and the amount of litigation in regard to titles that




to names in conveyances and
1
5 Thomas v . Marshfield , 10 Pick . 36
4 ; Hunt v . Talles ( V
t
. 1902 ) , 52
Atl . 1042 .
1
6 Booker v . Tarwater , 1894 , 138 Ind . 385 ; 37 N . E . 979 ; and it might be
held void for the reason that there are no such persons in existence ,
see post , $ 43 .
1
7 Heath v . Hewitt , 1891 , 127 N . Y . 166 ; 27 N . E . 959 ; 24 Am . St . R .
438 ; Seymour v . Bowles , 1898 , 172 Il
l . 521 ; 50 N . E . 122 ; Tucker v .
Tucker , 78 Ky . 503 ; Findley v . Hill , 1902 , 133 Ala . 229 ; 32 So . 497 .
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records is very great. Many ignorant persons spell their
names in different ways at different times , and many can
not spell them at a
ll .
Where in a chain of title we see land conveyed to a
person b
y
a certain name and afterward the same land is
conveyed by a person o
f
the same name , the legal pre
sumption arises that the persons are the same — the iden
tity of names prima facie establishes the fact o
f identity
o
f persons , and this presumption is generally sufficient
for practical purposes ; though , o
f
course , evidence may
be received to rebut it . 18
§ 4
2 . Names — Effect of discrepancies - Idem sonans
Middle name . — While it is desirable that the names of
parties , if possible , should always be stated correctly ,
nevertheless errors o
r discrepancies in names will not
invalidate the title , but will often make additional evi
dence necessary to identify the party , and this evidence
is sometimes difficult to obtain .











idem sonans — where to the eye the names
are different , by reason of difference in spelling , but to
the ear are the same . 19
S
o
other differences than those o
f spelling have been
sometimes held to b
e immaterial ; as , fo
r
example , a vari
ation o
f
the middle name or initial , or an omission o
f
it
entirely , has been held to be o
f
n
o consequence . 20
Such cases are based largely upon the common law doc
trine that the middle name o
r
initial is no part of a per
1
6 Stebbins v . Duncan , 108 U . S . 32 ; Tillotson v . Webber , 1893 , 96
Mich . 144 ; 55 N . W . 837 .
1
9
E . g . , where the grantee in a deed is Mitchell Allen and the next
deed in the chain o
f
title is from Mitchell Allain , it will be presumed
that they are the names o
f
the same person . Guertin v . Mombleau ,
1893 , 144 Ill . 32 ; 33 N . E . 49 .
2
0 Games v . Stiles , 14 Pet . 322 ; Schofield v . Jennings , 68 Ind . 233 .
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son 's name : this doctrine arose in times when the bap
tismal name was the important means of distinguishing
one person from another , and , as each person had prop
erly but one baptismal name, the early authorities re
garded but this alone— this “ Christian name” was spe
cially looked to , even to the neglect of the family name,
or “ surname" (which was “ super nomen , " a name over
or added to “ the name,” and in its origin of secondary
importance . )
The common - law rule recognizing but one Christian
name is still quite generally in force . But as it is evident
that the middle name or initial is now one of the usual
means o
f distinguishing persons having names other
wise the same , many courts have shown dissatisfaction
with the old doctrine , and , especially in matters involy
ing the title to real estate ; it is nowadays not prudent to
consider the middle initial or name as o
f
n
o importance . 21
§ 4
3 . Fictitious persons - Grantee must be in esse
Fictitious names . — A conveyance to a fictitious person is
void . If the owner of property , in order to escape some
burden o
r liability as it
s
owner , or for other reasons , con
veys it , not to some real person who takes it under an
assumed name , but to an imaginary or fictitious person ,
2
1 Cunningham v . Neeld , 1901 , 198 Pa . St . 41 ; 47 Atl . 954 ; Ambs v .
Railroad , 1890 , 44 Minn . 266 , 270 ; 46 N . W . 321 ,
The middle name has been regarded as o
f importance in cases involv
ing the question of record notice to third parties where the difference
in names has consisted solely in the difference of the middle name or
initial . For example , in Crouse v . Murphy , 1891 , 140 Pa . St . 335 ; 21
Atl . 358 ; 23 Am . St . R . 232 ; 12 L . R . A . 58 , the real name of the owner
o
f
land was Daniel J . Murphy , and the title to the land was held in




“ Daniel Murphy , "
o
n
a note signed in the same way and so indexed , was held not to be
a lien on the land as against a bona fide purchaser for value who had
searched for judgments against Daniel J . Murphy . See S . P . , Da
vis v . Steeps , 1894 , 87 Wis . 472 ; 58 N . W . 769 ; 23 L . R . A . 818 ;
Fincher v . Hanegan , 1894 , 59 Ark . 151 ; 26 S . W . 821 ; 24 L . R . A .
543 .
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the conveyance is entirely void , and title to the property
remains in the would -be grantor , fo
r
the simple reason
that there is no grantee in his attempted conveyance . 22
For a person not in being cannot be the grantee of an
immediate estate , as , for example , an unborn child ,
though en ventre sa mere , 23 o
r
a person deceased a
t the
time of the deed ' s execution . 24
Any real person , however , may be a grantee or mort
gagee under a fictitious or assumed name , 25 and the real
owner o
f property may make a valid conveyance of it u
n
der any name he may care to assume . 26
§ 44 . Additions to name b
y way of recital - Effect .
It is usual to add to the names of parties a statement
a
s
to their places o
f
residence ; often the occupation or
calling o
f
the parties is also designated , and these partic
ulars are o
f
assistance in identifying the parties .
2
2 Muskingum Turnpike Co . v . Ward , 13 Ohio 120 ; 42 Am . Dec . 191 ;
David v . Ins . Co . , 83 N . Y . 265 ; 38 Am . R . 418 .
2




m . St . R . 282 ; though he may be the grantee o
f
a
n estate in re
mainder . See v . Derr , 57 Mich . 369 ; 24 N . W . 108 . See Davis v . Hol
lingsworth , 1897 , 113 Ga . 210 ; 38 S . E . 827 ; 84 Am . St . R . 233 , and note .
2
4 Neal y . Nelson , 1895 , 117 N . C . 393 ; 23 S . E . 428 ; 53 Am . S
t
. R .
590 , though by statute in Kentucky the deceased ' s children take in such
case . Northern Lake Ice Co . v . Orr , 1898 , 102 Ky . 586 ; 44 S . W . 216 .
2
5 Scanlan v .Grimmer , 1898 , 71 Minn . 351 ; 74 N . W . 146 ; 70 Am . St .
R . 326 ; Wilson v . White , 1890 , 84 Cal . 239 ; 24 Pac . 114 .
2
6 David v . Ing . Co . , 83 N . Y . 265 ; 38 Am . R . 418 ; Weibl v . Robert
son , 1896 , 97 Tenn . 458 ; 37 S . W . 274 ; 39 L . R . A . 423 ; Blackman v .
Henderson , 1901 , 116 Iowa 578 ; 87 N . W . 655 ; 56 L . R . A . 902 . In David
v . Ins . Co . , 83 N . Y . 265 , defendant insurance company resisted pay
ment to plaintiff of a loss by fire on the ground that she had no title to
the property which she had insured with defendant . H . J . David , the
former owner , had conveyed the property to a fictitious person , “ Marx
David , " and then in the name o
f
“ Marx David ” had conveyed to
plaintiff , who insured the property , which afterward burned . The
court said that the conveyance to “ Marx ” was inoperative ; the title
remained in H . J . David , who then could convey , as he did , to plain
tiff , using the name " Marx . ” Hence , the plaintiff had title as against
H . J . David , and - no other claimant to the property appearing - - could
maintain her action against defendant .
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It is also customary to add further descriptions , as that




s these recitals aid in determining the identity o
f
the parties they are useful , but their effect is often misun
derstood b
y
those dealing in real property , and it is quite
generally assumed (among laymen , at least ) that such
statements are evidence o
f




But it is clear that the statement b
y
a grantor that he
is “ a single man , ” cannot preclude his wife , if he is




a description in a deed o
f
the grantors as “ heirs o
f
”
a former owner is not ordinarily proof of that fact . 27
When , however , recitals of such facts are found in
" ancient ” deeds — this term is applicable generally to a




prima facie evidence o
f the facts recited . 28 '
§ 4





to a partnership should not generally be
made in the firm name .
Where it is intended to take a conveyance o
f partner
ship real property the prudent method is to have a
ll
the
partners join in the conveyance , for , if they do not all join ,
those making and executing the conveyance must have
2
7 Wolf v . Holton , 1895 , 10
4
Mich . 107 ; 62 N . W . 17
4 ; McCarty v .
Rochel , 1892 , 85 Iowa 427 ; 5
2
N . W . 361 .
2
8 Norris v . Hall , 1900 , 124 Mich . 170 , 175 ; 82 N . W . 832 ; 7 D . L : N .
155 ; Fulkerson v . Holmes , 117 U . S . 389 , 397 ; Harmon v . Stearns , 1897 . 95
Va . 58 , 63 ; 27 S . E . 601 ; Young v . Shulenberg , 1901 , 165 N . Y . 385 ; 59 N .
E . 135 ; 80 Am . St . R . 730 ; and see Laws Wis . 1901 , ch . 28 ,making such re
citals prima facie evidence after twenty years 'record . And in many cases
recitals may estop the party making them , or one in privity with him
from disputing the facts recited . But even as to the party making them ,
they cannot be allowed in all cases to work an estoppel ; for example ,
a statement in a deed b
y
a minor that she is “ unmarried and o
f
age ”
will not prevent her disaffirmance o
f
the deed after she reaches her
majority . Wieland v . Kobick , 110 Ill . 16 ; see post , $ 320 .
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authority from the partnership to do so ; and while this
authority may be inferred from circumstances — such as
the presence of the other partners29 — it is not best to leave
such a matter open for proof .
A partnership not being a legal person , either natural
or artificial, cannot, as such , be the grantee of the legal
title to lands. 30
A conveyance of lands to partners for the purpose of
their business should contain their individual names in
full , with a recital that they are partners doing business
under their firm name, and that they wish the property
conveyed to them as partners and as part of their part
nership estate .
Should the conveyance be made to the partnership in
the firm name, its effect upon the legal title to the land
described will depend somewhat on the form of the firm
name . This form varies : it may be “ John Doe & Co . , ”
o
r
“ Doe & Roe , ” or - not containing the names of per
sons at all — " The United States Improvement Co . , ” or a
similar name more appropriate for a corporation .
There is not perfect agreement among the authorities
a
s
to the effect o
f conveyances in all such cases , but the
general rules appear to be , that :
Where the names of some of the partners appear in the
name , followed b
y
“ & C
o . " the effect is to vest the legal
title in those named , but not in those indicated b
y
“ & Co . " 31






the several partners , the effect is to vest the title in all
whose surnames appear . 32
Where the firm name does not contain the names of
persons , the conveyance to the partnership in such name
is not void for uncertainty as to the grantee ( as has been
2
9 McGahan v . Bank , 1895 , 156 U . S . 218 .
» Silverman v . Kristufek , 162 II
I
. 222 ; 44 N . E . 430 .
a Winter v . Stock , 29 Cal . 407 ; 89 Am . Dec . 57 .
5 Cole v . Mette , 1898 , 65 Ark . 503 ; 47 S . W . 407 ; 67 Am . St . R . 94
5
.
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sometimes contended ) , but an equitable title passes to
those who actually comprise the partnership .33
§ 46 . Corporations as parties . - So far as form is con
cerned , the chief features that distinguish the conveyance
of an ordinary business corporation from the conveyance
of an individual are the execution and acknowledgment .
Consideration will be given later to these features . 34
The corporation , whether grantor or grantee , must be
designated , and if it is grantor the conveyance must pur
port to be the conveyance of the corporation , and not
merely that of certain officers of the corporation .35
And , fo
r
the same reasons that a
n
unreal , fictitious and
non -existing individual cannot be a grantee , an alleged
corporation which , because o
f
some defect in organizing
it , is not in existence , cannot be a grantee . 36
But if such an attempt a
t conveyance has been made ,
though the legal title does not pass b
y
it for want o
f
a
grantee , the supposed corporation has an equitable title ,
and o
n incorporating properly , may compel the grantor ,
who retains the consideration paid for the conveyance , to
make a new conveyance to it . 37
8
8 Kelly v . Bourne , 15 Ore . 476 ; 16 Pac . 40 .
3
4
See post , $ $ 240 , 249 , 294 .
8
5 Norris v . Dains , 1894 , 52 Ohio St . 215 ; 39 S . E . 660 ,
3
6 Wall v . Mines , 1900 , 130 Cal . 27 , 43 ; 62 Pac . 38
6
.
» Benevolent Society v . Murray , 1898 , 145 Mo . 622 ; 47 8 . W . 501 .
CHAPTER VI.
RECITALS .
$ 47. Recitals in general .
48 . Recital often used to show
purpose of conveyance .
49. Notice from recitals.
$ 50 . Recitals in conveyances by
sheriffs, administrators ,
etc .
51. If not required , recitals may
yet be useful .
§ 47 . Recitals - In general. - There are many kinds of
recitals in deeds ; they may be very brief ( as in the in
stances cited above, § 44 ); they may be in the nature of
a preamble , beginning with “ Whereas ” and ending just
before the words “ Now this indenture witnesseth ,' l or,
they may contain a more or less extended history of the
title to the property conveyed - as, after the description of
the property — " being the same premises conveyed to
– by — by a deed duly recorded in , etc .”
Though this last kind of recital seems not used as often
as it formerly was, it is nevertheless still used by many
conveyancers . If such a recital were made accurately
and carefully in successive conveyances of the same prop
erty - each recital carrying back the title one step - in the
end the recitals combined would form a connected history
of the title .
Recitals , while generally introductory , and found in the
“ premises , ” are not always so ; the term is applied to state




example , ante , $ 36 . A
s
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§ 48 . Recital often used to show purpose of convey
ance , - A recital may set forth the purpose of the grantor
in making the conveyance ; in such a case it may throw
light upon ambiguous terms occurring in other parts of
the conveyance , and may be used in construing it where
the meaning is not clear .
For example , where a landowner conveys land to a
trustee by a deed reciting that he is “ desirous ofmaking
arrangements to liquidate said debts , and to secure a per
manent -support and maintenance for the use of his wife
and children , ” and by a later clause in the deed directs
the trustee , on the death of the wife , to convey the lands
to “ all the children ” of the wife — the court , in construing
the instrument , regards the expressed intention of the
grantor as contained in the recital and holds that
“ children ” means only the grantor 's children , and does
not include the wife 's children by a second marriage - in
spite of the later clause mentioning all the wife 's children .2
§ 49. Notice from recitals . - It should be remembered
in investigating titles that one important effect of a recital
in a conveyance is that of giving notice to all who derive
title through the conveyance .
If a purchaser of land accepts a conveyance which re
fers to the fact that some previous owner has granted an
interest in the land , he has notice of that fact when he
reads his own conveyance , and it makes no difference
that the grant by the former owner is unrecorded . If,
for instance , the vendee 's deed contains a recital that this
conveyance “ is subject to the oil lease given by a former
owner to a third person , the vendee must take notice of
the third person 's outstanding interest in the land under
the “ lease ” ; and if in legal effect the lease referred to is
a sale of a part of the land, the vendee must, by virtue of
2 McCoy v . Fahrney , 1899 , 182 Ill . 60 ; 55 N . E . 61 ( in this report the
deed is set out a
t length , and the general form o
f
recitals in such a case
is shown ) .
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such a recital, be regarded as having notice of a prior un
recorded absolute grant of the oi
l
in the land bought b
y
him . 3
The person accepting a conveyance containing such re
citals and references cannot plead ignorance o
f
them ; he
is presumed to have read his deed , and is chargeable with
notice o
f
the facts recited in it which affect his title . If ,
fo
r
example , he actually knows of one mortgage on the




n it , subject to themortgage he knows o
f
) , and accepts
a conveyance which refers to two mortgages , he must
take his title subject to the two mortgages , though one o
f
them is unrecorded , and though he did not read the ref
erence to the two in his conveyance . 4
Such are cases where the recital of some fact affecting
the title is in the conveyance under which the purchaser
immediately holds . But the principle applies to recitals
in all conveyances under which he must derive title ;
hence he is chargeable with notice of matters affecting the
title recited in a conveyance to his grantor ,though not re
cited in the conveyance to himself . 5





use contained in a deed from some former
owner , or it may be subject to a trust , o
r , by the recital





owner , through which conveyance the present grantee
must derive his title , that the consideration is “ to be
paid , ” the land in the present grantee ' s hands may be
subject to a vendor ' s lien for the purchase -money . 8 In
general , therefore , a purchaser o
f
real property is charged
* Jennings v . Bloomfield , 1901 , 199 Pa . 638 ; 49 Atl . 135 .
* Hamilton y . Nutt , 34 Conn . 501 .
5 Cordova v . Hood , 17 Wall . 1 ; Town v . Gensch , 1899 , 101 Wis . 445 ;
7
6
N . W . 1096 ; 77 N . W . 893 ; Baker v .Mather , 25 Mich . 51 .
& Whitney v . Union Ry . Co . , 11 Gray 359 ; 71 Am . Dec . 715 .
* Dean v . Long , 122 Ill . 447 , 460 ; 14 N . E . 34 .
• Cordova v . Hood , 17 Wall . 1 ; Deason v . Taylor , 1896 , 53 Miss . 697 .
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with notice of recitals in each conveyance in the chain of
title to the property ; and , if any of such conveyances con
tain references to others not in the direct chain of title ,
he is chargeable by such reference with notice of these
conveyances and their contents .9
§ 50 . Recitals in conveyances by sheriffs, administra
tors, etc . — Deeds of executors , administrators , guardians ,
sheriffs and others who are acting in representative or
official capacities , usually contain one or more formal
recitals setting forth the authority under which the
grantor acts, and briefly giving a history of the proceed
ings leading to the conveyance .
Such official deeds (especially those of sheriffs ) are
often required by statute to contain recitals of certain
facts, and it being thus the duty of the grantor to make
such recitals , they are , when made, prima facie evidence
of the truth of the facts stated . 10
While it is regarded as the better practice to have all
such deeds contain recitals , yet administrators ' or sheriffs'
deeds are not generally held invalid if the usual recitals
are lacking or incomplete , for the existence of the facts
giving authority to convey may be shown otherwise than
by the recitals .11
There are , however , decisions holding that a sheriff ' s
deed on execution must recite everything necessary to
make a valid title - -and a deed which does not recite the
existence of a judgment , execution and levy is fatally de
fective . 12
9 White v . Foster , 102 Mass . 375 , 380 ; Bank v. Delano , 48 N . Y . 326 ;
Gaston v . Dashiell , 55 Texas 517 ; Smith v . Lowry , 113 Ind . 37 ; 15 N . E .
17 .
10Bray v . Adams , 1893 , 114 Mo. 486 , 491 ; 21 S. W . 853 ; Longworth v .
Bank , 6 Ohio 536 ; Miller y . Miller , 89 N . C . 402 .
11'Hill v . Reynolds , 1899 , 93 Maine 25 ; 44 Atl. 135 ; Bartlett v . Bart
lett, 1890 , 34 W . Va . 33 ; 11 S. E . 732.
12 Byers v. Wheatley , 3 Baxt. (62 Tenn .) 160 .
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$ 51 . If not required recitals may yet be useful . - Ir
respective of statutes , recitals explaining the capacity in
which the grantor acts and his authority for acting are
quite customary in certain kinds of deeds.
Where an instrument has created a trust and has given
the trustee power to convey the property , if he afterward
carries out or executes the power thus given him , the con
veyance by which he does so ought regularly to indicate not
only the capacity in which he executes it, but also should
show by recital the facts which warrant it
s
execution .
For example , a deed by an executor under a will giving




This indenture made this (date ) between A B , of et
c
. , '
executor of the last will and testament o
f
C D , late o
f
- deceased , o
f





second part , witnesseth : Whereas , the said CD , by his said
last will bearing date the — of — , 19 — , devised the
lands hereinafter mentioned to his executor aforesaid , in
trust , to hold the same during the minority o
f
his son , N
D , and on his attaining his majority , or on his death , if it
should sooner occur , to sell and convert the same into money
for the purposes in said will specified , with power in such
case to sell in such manner as he should deem proper ;
and , Whereas , the said N D died on — , before attain
ing his majority , now this indenture witnesseth : That the
said party o
f
the first part , b
y
virtue of the power and
authority to him given in and b
y
said last will and testa
ment , and in consideration o
f
the sum o
f , etc . (words o
f
grant , description ) .
And the form may be varied to adapt it to other
circumstances — as where the trust is created and the
power given b
y
another instrument than a will .
Such recitals may be o
f importance to the grantee from
the trustee , for should his title be attacked on the ground
that the conveyance to him was not authorized b
y
the ex
isting circumstances , a recital o
f
those circumstances
showing that it was proper for the trustee to make the
62 $ 51THE LAW OF CONVEYANCING .
conveyance , will be , in many states , prima facie evidence
that the proper circumstances did exist.13
13Savings Society v . Deering , 66 Cal. 281 ; 5 Pac. 353 ; Beal v . Blair ,
33 Iowa 318 ; Tartt v . Clayton , 109 Ill . 579 .
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$ 52. Apparent conflict as to necessity of a consider
ation . - In the premises of a deed there is usually a recital
of the receipt of consideration by the grantor . The form
of this will vary with the circumstances of the case. The
simple receipt ofmoney may be stated , or the recital may
be in the form of a contract; as , “ In consideration of the
sum of one dollar , and the agreement of the party of the
second part' to do certain things .
Questions that arise at the outset are ,whether any con
sideration is necessary , and , if so , whether it should be
stated in the deed .
Upon these questions we find statements in the author
(63 )
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ities which are apparently conflicting . For example , it
is sometimes stated that “ A deed made upon no consider
ation , whether one be expressed or not , is valid ," I while ,
on the other hand , Blackstone , in speaking of the requi
sites of a deed , says : “ The deed must be founded upon
good and sufficient consideration .” ? And in a recent
case : a deed was offered in evidence , as a foundation for
plaintiff ' s claim of title , in which the consideration clause
had been changed by erasures three different times , the
result being that it read : “ In consideration of — dol
lars. " The court declared it inadmissible in evidence ,
because it was left without the consideration required by
law to support it .
The causes of this seeming conflict will be clearer if we
remember that there have been different kinds of convey
ances , each capable of transferring title to real property ,
but each depending for its efficacy upon different princi
ples . And while the authorities , in making statements
like the foregoing , often speak in general terms o
f
a
“ deed , ” they are not always , in reality , speaking of the
same thing .
$ 5
3 . No consideration necessary to a feoffment a
t
common law - Effect of American statutes . — By the an
cient common law a gift o
f





seisin , was effectual in law to
convey the entire estate without any consideration . This





possession . There need
have been no charter o
r
deed , and though , as before
stated , a deed became usual when not necessary , in this
deed there need have been n
o
consideration stated , a
t
common law , nor need there have been any proved .
?Randall v . Ghent , 19 Ind . 271 ; Howard v . Turner , 1899 , 12
5
N . C .
107 , 109 ; 34 S . E . 229 .
? B
l
. Com . II , p . 296 .
3 Catlin C
o . v . Lloyd , 1899 , 180 Ill . 398 ; 54 N . E . 214 .
sa See ante , $ 11 .
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Statutes of our states have been mentioned 4 which
provide that all deeds or other conveyances of land ,
duly executed by the grantor , shall be valid to convey the
land " without any other act or ceremony whatever; ” and
where such are not found , statutes of a slightly different
character exist , not alluding to livery of seisin , but im•
pliedly doing away with it by declaring how conveyances
of real estate shall be made . .
It was early considered in this country that statutes of
this kind made a deed properly executed equivalent to a
feoffment.
Green v . Thomas5 contains a clear statement of this
view . That was an action by the grantor 's heirs to re
cover land , and it was urged that the deed made by the
grantor was void , because without consideration . The
court says : “ At common law there could be no feoffment
without livery of seisin , and in some jurisdictions deeds
not accompanied with this ceremony can never be re
garded as feoffments ; but it is otherwise in Maine and
Massachusetts , where it is provided that all conveyances
signed and sealed , shall be valid to pass title to the lands
described in them without any other act or ceremony
whatsoever ; therefore a deed is regarded as having the
effect of a feoffment if necessary to uphold it. At com
mon law a feoffment was valid without any consideration ,
or, if any was implied , it was the feudal duty or service
to the grantor . This deed then operates under our stat
ute as a feoffment .”
As illustrating the view of this matter where the statute
is somewhat different , see Baker v . Westcott , where
the court states that it is not necessary that a considera
tion should appear on the face of the conveyance itself or
by pleading and proof, because the statute requiring that
* See supra , $ 16.
511 Maine 318 .
6 73 Texas 129 , 133 ; 11 S . W . 157 .
5 - Brews . Con .
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a conveyance shall be in writing , signed and sealed by
the grantor , was intended to dispense with the formality
of livery of seisin and to make such a deed practically
equivalent to the old feoffment .?
Hence American deeds under such statutes , being re
garded as equivalent in effect to the old common law
feoffment , may properly be said to require no considera
tion .
§ 54 . Seal importing consideration . — Another some
what peculiar doctrine has contributed to the same result,
i. e ., the dispensing with a consideration . This doctrine
is usually briefly expressed as “ A seal imports a consid
eration . "
It is interesting to note the way in which this doctrine
arose . Writing was not in early times employed fo
r
many
purposes . It was a solemn matter to express an agree
ment in writing , and as people could not sign their names ,
they affixed their seals . A charter or writing whereby a
man formally expressed an intention o
f gift , or bound
himself to do something , was held to afford conclusive
proof of the matter expressed in the sealed instrument
( unless fraud , force or forgery were shown ) .
In very early times it appears that even an unsealed
charter might have this effect . It came , however , to be
settled that the charter must have affixed to it the seal o
f
the person whose act or promise it recorded in order to be
admitted a
s
conclusive evidence against him .
When writing came into common use and men signed
their names , the old rule survived , so that deeds were re
garded as superior to other writings . B
y
other writings a
man was , in general , n
o more conclusively bound than b
y
spoken words ; agreements made b
y
deed , however , were




their formal and solemn
character , and without any exception in the case of gratu .
? And se
e
Ivey v .Granberry , 66 N . C . 22
3
.
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itous promises . As to agreements made without deed ,
though in writing , it became established that they could
not be enforced by the one to whom the written promise
was made , unless he had given some valuable considera
tion for the promise .
After this doctrine had become established , the efficacy
of a deed , in conclusively binding a man who executed
it , was explained by saying that a deed in law imports a
consideration . This explanation , though it is generally
regarded as erroneous , became a rule of law , so that we now
constantly see it stated that “ a seal imports a considera
tion . " 8
$ 55 . The equitable doctrine . — On the other hand ,
the doctrine that a consideration is necessary arose from
the importance which equity attached to the considera
tion . Equity disregarded the rule as to the feoffment ,
and disregarded the rule as to the seal importing a con
sideration .
When a conveyance was made without consideration ,
and without declaring the uses for which the conveyance
was made, the doctrine of the court of chancery was that
the intention of the donor must have been that the donee
should hold the land mentioned in the deed , not fo
r
his
own benefit , but for the benefit o
f
the donor . Itwas con
sidered , that is , that there was nomotive o
r
reason for the
grantor ' s conveyance , and , there being no motive or rea
son , it must have been the intention that the donee or
grantee was to hold to the use o
f
the grantor ; that is , the
use was said to come back , or “ result , ” to the grantor .
Brockway v . Harrington , 1891 , 82 Iowa 23 ; 47 N . W . 1013 ; Rendle
man ' s Case , 1895 , 156 Ill . 568 ; 41 N . E . 223 ; Saunders v . Blythe , 1892 ,
112 Mo . 1 ; 20 S . W . 319 ; Cosgrove v . Cummings , 1900 , 195 Pa . St . 497 ;
4
6 Atl . 69 . See Williams Real Prop . , pp . 180 , 181 ; Holmes Com .
Law , p
p





the sufficient character o
f
a deed that it imports
consideration . The statement is artificial on the face o
f
it , and it be
comes doubly so when we remember that deeds were binding before
the doctrine of consideration had been worked out . "
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Only two kinds of consideration were regarded as af
fording a sufficient motive : either blood (i. e ., natural
affection felt toward a relative ), or money . Where the
consideration was natural affection for a relative, the
grant took the form of a “ covenant to stand seized to
uses . ” The consideration of natural affection was suffi
cient to " raise a use " in favor of the covenantee . Where
the consideration was money — the grant being a " bargain
and sale ” — the amount was immaterial , for any amount
was sufficient evidence of the intention of the donor to
part with the beneficial, as well as the legal , interest in
the lands. 9
These different kindsof consideration came to be spoken
of as “ good ” and “ valuable ” — but a valuable considera
tion need not necessarily be pecuniary or capable of being
measured in money : for example , marriage is a valuable
consideration 10
§ 56 . Effect of the Statute of Uses. — The bargain and
sale . When the Statute of Usesli transferred the legal
estate to the use “ the bargain and sale ” and “ covenant
to stand seized ,” which had formerly been simply equita
ble conveyances , became legal. After that statute it be
came further necessary to a feoffment that there should
be either a consideration for the gift , or that it should be
expressed to be made , not merely as formerly to the
feoffee , but " unto and to the use of ” the feoffee . This
was regarded as necessary to prevent the resulting or
coming back to the feoffor of the estate ; fo
r , if there had





the feoffee , the donor would himself , according to the
doctrine o
f
equity , have had the use , and then the statute
9 Digby Hist . L . R . P . , p . 32
9 ; Jackson V . Alexander , 3 Johns . 484 ;
3 Am . Dec . 517 .
1
0 Prewit v . Wilson , 103 U . S . 22 .
1
1 2
7 Hen . VIII , ch . 10 , 1535 .
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of uses in effect directed that he who had the use should
have the legal seisin and estate .
Most of our American deeds have been based upon the
“ bargain and sale , ” and where a deed is considered as a
deed of bargain and sale and not as a feoffment at common
law , it is generally held that a consideration must either
be expressed in the deed or otherwise proved .
Hence , the court in Catlin Co . v . Lloyd , 12 which case
concerned a bargain and sale deed , is correct in holding
that there must have been a consideration for the deed in
question shown in some way ; but whether the erasures
did really leave the deed without consideration may be
doubted , for “ dollars ” would seem to mean some
dollars ; and recent similar cases hold such to be a
sufficient statement of consideration . 13
$ 57. What makes a deed of bargain and sale . — It is
not necessary that the words bargain and sale be used to
constitute a deed of bargain and sale .
In Havens v . Seashore Co., 14 the contest centered in a
deed made in 1788 (one hundred years before the case was
decided ) . The consideration stated in the deed was
sixteen pounds ; the words of conveyance used were
“ remise , release and quit claim , ” and it was con
tended that they were not words of conveyance , but
only of release , and that as the grantee was without
any right in the land it could not operate as a
deed of release to him . The court, however , says that
any instrument which shows that title was meant to be
given in return for value received is effectual . — “ Words
to raise a use and a consideration to support it , being all
that is requisite to call the statute of uses into operation ,





I . 398 (cited above $ 52 ) .
1
3 Jewell v . Walker , 1899 , 109 Ga . 241 , 245 ; 34 S . E . 337 ; Murray v .
Klinzing , 1894 , 64 Conn . 78 ; 29 Atl . 244 .
1
4
1890 , 47 N . J . Eq . 365 ; 20 Atl . 497 .
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shows on it
s
face that it was founded on a valuable con
sideration paid b
y
the grantee * * * effect must be
given to the deed as a bargain and sale . "
$ 5
8 . How the foregoing principles operate . — The
decision just cited enforces the principle acted on b
y
courts that deeds will be sustained , if possible , and made
to operate either a
s one kind or another when no settled
rule prevents .
And a consideration o
f
the preceding paragraphs will
enable one to appreciate the reason and effect o
f
a state
ment like that o
f Judge Sharswood , 15 that a deed shall
be so construed a
s
to give it effect , and that if it cannot
b
e treated as a bargain and sale because there was no
pecuniary consideration , yet if the consideration of blood
did exist it shall be supported as a covenant to stand
seized , and further that a recorded deed will be construed
a
s having the effect of a feoffment or as a deed under
the statute o
f




And a consideration o
f
the same principles will also
enable one to understand how it is , on the other hand ,
that a
n apparently solemn instrument , in general form a
deed , cannot always be sustained as one . For example ,
see Springs v . Hanks , 5 Ire . ( N . C . ) 30 , where such an
instrument could not b
e
sustained as a conveyance , be
cause there was neither a valuable nor a good considera
tion to make it operate under the statute o
f
uses , nor was
there livery o
f
seisin ( or it
s equivalent ) 16 to make it op
erate a
s
a feoffment at common law .
$ 5
9 . Parol evidence as to consideration — To contra
dict receipt . — There is a familiar rule of law regarding
written instruments , which in its most general form is
1
5 In Eckman v . Eckman , 68 Pa . St . 460 , 470 .
1
6 See above $ 53 .
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stated as : Parol evidence is inadmissible to contradict or
vary the terms of a written contract.
Doctrines have developed in regard to the admission of
parol evidence concerning the consideration of a deed ,
that, as applied , often materially change the apparent
effect of other clauses in the deed ; these doctrines also
have, in many cases , an important bearing on the ques
tion as to the proper method of stating the consideration
- and if we consider the matter of form merely , they
should be referred to at this point.
The acknowledgment of the receipt of the consideration
was by the earlier decisions held conclusive upon the
grantor ; hence after he had admitted the payment of the
consideration he was not allowed to show in an action
against the grantee fo
r
the purchase -money that it had
not in fact been paid . He was held estopped by his
statement under seal that he had been paid , from show
ing the contrary . This was the doctrine in some Ameri
can courts a
s
late as 1860 . 17
But , as a fact , the acknowledgment o
f payment was
generally a mere formal matter , having no special mean
ing , except to prevent a resulting trust , and , on the
ground that it was merely a receipt , it has come to be





case as in the case of any other receipt . 18
S
o upon this principle it is generally held that the
grantor may now , in an action against the grantee , show
that he has not received a consideration , though he ac
knowledges that he has .
It is quite usual for the consideration clause in a deed
1
7 See Mendenhall v . Parish , 53 N . C . 105 ; 78 Am . Dec . 269 .
1
8 This view seems to have been adopted in this country earlier than
in England . See Wilkinson v . Scott , 17 Mass . 249 , 1821 , where it was
held that the fact o
f payment may b
e disputed b
y
the grantor in a
n
action against the grantee , the court saying : “ A receipt is always open
to explanation ,and this acknowledgment , though under seal , is nothing
more than a receipt , fo
r
the seal gives it no additional solemnity . ”
And see , to the same effect , Gully v .Grubbs , 1 J . J . Marshall 387 .
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to recite more than a simple receipt of the money : as
“ In consideration of - dollars , to him in hand paid ,
the receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged ; and the said
party of the second part forever released and discharged
therefrom ; " that is , containing a release and discharge as
well as a mere receipt. The fact that this release is con
tained in the recital does not, it seems, interfere with the
now recognized rule that the statement of receipt of con
sideration may be disputed . 19
$ 60 . Parol evidence of additional consideration . — Be
sides admitting parol evidence to contradict the statement
of payment of a consideration , the courts now generally
admit parol evidence of an additional consideration ; as ,
where the sum named in the deed is $ 100 , and this has
been actually paid , it may be shown that it was also
agreed that more money should be paid in the future on
the sale of the land by the grantee . 20
Some courts hold that any other or additional consider
ation than that expressed cannot be shown in this way ,
unless it is of the same kind as that expressed .
Hence , according to this view , a deed from husband to
wife , expressed to be in consideration of love and affec
tion , cannot be shown to be fo
r
a valuable consideration ,
i . e . , $ 4 ,000 ; for to show this would be to change the
character o
f
the deed . 21 In Groves v . Groves , 22 a deed
was made from father to son , reciting a substantial
money consideration ; after the son ' s death his brother
and sister attempted to show that the land was a gift to
1




n extinguisher of itself , I do not understand the courts ( e . g . , 16
Wend . 460 , 474 ; 1 J . J . Marshall , 387 ) to mean the releasing clause in a
conveyance which usually accompanies an acknowledgment o
f receipt o
f
money , but an absolute , separate and distinct release . ”
2
0 Kickland v . Menasha Co . , 68 Wis . 34 ; 31 N . W . 471 ; Jensen v .
Crosby , 1900 , 80 Minn . 158 ; 83 N . W . 43 .
2
1 Houston v . Blackman , 66 Ala . 559 .
2
2
1902 , 65 Ohio St . 442 ; 62 N . E . 1044 .
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him , and that no consideration was paid ; for if the land
came to him by gift his widow would have but a life estate ,
and his brother and sister would have theremainder in fee ,
whereas if it came to him by purchase his widow would
take it in fee ; but it was held that it was not competent
to show that the title was acquired by gift rather than by
purchase , and thereby change the line of descent .23
§ 61. Such evidence not restricted by most courts.
But the general rule now is that not only may a greater or
less consideration than that recited in the conveyance be
proved , but that one of a different kind or quality may be
proved as well . For example , where the consideration
expressed in a deed was $ 5 , and an attempt was made
by an heir of the grantor to set aside the deed for fraud ,
shown by gross inadequacy of consideration , the grantee
was allowed to show a consideration of a different species ,
i. e ., " love and affection , as well as an additional valu
able consideration .24
And see the discussion in McCrae v . Purmort , 25 which
is considered a leading case , in which , though the ex
pressed consideration was money , it was permitted to be
shown that iron of a specified quality and at a stipulated
price was the real consideration .
Extending this principle , it has been held that though
the expressed consideration in a deed to a railroad is " the
benefit to be derived from the building of the road and
one dollar paid , ” the grantormay show by parol evidence
that the real consideration was the agreement of the com
pany to erect a depot on the land conveyed ,26 and in Dod
23 And that the character of the consideration cannot be shown by pa
rol to have been different from that recited in the deed , see Latimer
v. Latimer , 1897 , 53 S. C . 483 ; 31 S. E . 304 ; Christopher v . Christopher ,
64 Md. 583 ; 3 Atl. 296 .
24Carty v. Connolly , 1891 , 91 Cal. 15 , 19 ; 27 Pac . 599.
25 16 Wend . 460 ; 30 Am . Dec. 103.
26 Louisville & c. R . Co . v. Neafus, 1892 , 93 Ky. 53; 18 S . W . 1030 ;
Gulf Ry. Co. v . Jones, 1891, 82 Texas 15
6 ; 17 S . W . 534 .
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der v . Snyder ,27 under the rule that the true consideration
may be shown , the plaintiff , grantor , was permitted to
show that in addition to the expressed consideration of
$ 2 ,000 his grantee had agreed to build a fence between
the land conveyed and other land of the plaintiff ; and
the fence not having been built, plaintiff now sues fo
r
damages arising from the escape o
f
his cattle .
And the grantor may show that he was to have the
privilege o
f raising a crop for himself on the land con
veyed . 28
As illustrating how far the courts have gone in practi
cally incorporating new terms in a deed , under the rule
allowing the true consideration to be shown by parol , see
Hall v . Solomon , 29 which was an action b
y
the grantors to
restrain the grantee from using the premises for the sale o
f
intoxicating liquors , and evidence was offered of a parol
agreement that part o
f the consideration for the grant was
the understanding that the property should notbe used for
such purposes . It was objected by the grantee that such
evidence made what purported to be an absolute deed one
upon condition , and created b
y
parol a “ negative ease
ment , ” and that the parol agreement was inconsistent
with the deed . But the court held that the parol agree
ment , being a part of the consideration for the sale , could




the rule that parol evidence is not
admitted to contradict , vary or explain a written instru
ment .
And , again , the effect of this doctrine , that the true
consideration may be shown , has been to allow a parol
reservation to the grantor o
f






Mich . 69 ; 67 N . W . 1101 .
2
8 Breitenwischer v . Clough , 1896 , 111 Mich . 6 ; 69 N . W . 88 ; 66 Am .
S
t
. R . 372 .
2
9
1892 ,61 Conn . 476 ; 23 Atl . 876 ; 29 Am . St . R . 218 .
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land granted which would , under the deed , pass to the
grantee of the land. 30
$ 62. “ Parol evidence rule ” more strictly applied by
some courts . — Some of the decisions just cited plainly
make very uncertain the application of the rule rejecting
parol evidence , and , indeed , seem to practically do away
with it in particular cases .
They will not always be followed . For example ,where
it was attempted to be shown that a railroad company in
taking a grant of a right of way for the expressed consid
eration of $ 230 , had made a parol contract with the
grantor regarding a crossing over the right of way , the
court held that this agreementmust be treated either as a
reservation or a part of the consideration , and that it is
clear that a reservation cannot rest in parol , and that
when the consideration is “ fully stated ” it is not compe
tent to add to or vary it by parol evidence for the pur
pose of varying the effect of a deed . ” 31
§ 63 . Parol evidence when statement as to considera
tion is contractual . — While it is not always possible to
say how fa
r
the “ parol evidence ” rule will be recognized





the ordinary form , there are , nevertheless , limits placed
o
n the admission o
f parol evidence to show even what
may have been the true consideration , when the recital as
to the consideration is contractual in its form and char
acter .
The principle upon which oral evidence is admitted to
3
0 Bourne v . Bourne , 1891 , 92 Ky . 211 ; 17 S . W . 443 .
3
1 Schrimper v . Chicago & c . Ry . Co . , 1901 , 115 Iowa 35 ; 82 N . W . 916 ;
8
7
N . W . 731 . In Moffitt v . Maness , 1889 , 102 N . C . 457 , 459 ; 9 S . E . 399 ,
the court says : “ There is , we fear , too great a tendency to relax the
well settled rules o
f
evidence against the admissibility o
f parol testi
mony to contradict , vary o
r
add to the terms o
f
a written contract
. . , the courts . are gradually construing away a principle
which has always been considered one o
f
the greatest barriers against
fraud and perjury . ”
76 § 63THE LAW OF CONVEYANCING .
contradict an ordinary receipt ( that is , one not contained
in a deed ) is , that the receipt is generally not a contract ,
but is simply some evidence of a fact , hence the receipt,
being simply some evidence of a fact , may be disputed .
But when the receipt goes further , and embodies in itself
the terms of a contract , parol evidence is inadmissible to
vary or contradict it
s
terms , in the absence of fraud . 32
The acknowledgment in a deed o
f conveyance of the
receipt o
f
the purchase -money is ordinarily not contractual
in it
s
nature . It is therefore like the ordinary receipt , and
hence there is good reason fo
r
holding , as has been held ,
that the fact o
f paymentmay be disputed and contradicted .
Ordinary simple receipts - not , that is , in a deed
when they are contractual , may not be varied by parol .
So on the same principle when a statement as to consider
ation in a deed is contractual itmay not be contradicted
o
r varied any more than an ordinary receipt may be .
It is not unusual for a deed to recite the payment o
f
money , and also some further agreement .
For example , the consideration clause in a deed to a
railway company recited a payment o
f money , and that
the railway company was to provide and maintain for the
use o
f
the grantors certain grade crossings , cattle -guards ,
etc . The company had complied with the terms thus
expressed , and in this action , brought by the grantor for
damages to his land caused by overflow , the plaintiff
attempted to show that the cause o
f
the overflow was the
failure o
f
the company to dig and maintain a ditch , and
alleged that the company had agreed to do so as a part of
the consideration for this deed . But it was held that the
evidence was not admissible , the court saying : “ If the
parties express their contracts a
s
to the consideration in
terms which show that it is a contract , then it can no
more be altered or varied than any other contract . . . .
3
2 Squires v . Amherst , 145 Mass . 192 ; 13 N . E . 609 ; Cassilly v . Cas .
silly , 1898 , 57 Ohio St . 582 ; 49 N . E . 795 .
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When the common form of expression reciting a sum of
money is departed from and an unusual provision inserted ,
thereby evidencing a contractual intention , it is as bind
ing as any other contract ." 33
The statement of the consideration may be both a re
ceipt for money paid and a contract , as in the cases just
cited . In such cases , so far as it is a mere receipt it ought,
on principle , to be susceptible of contradiction , while so
far as it is a contract it should not be.34
In drawing deeds in which the statement of considera
tion is anything more than a mere recital of the payment
and receipt ofmoney , it is well to bear this principle in
mind, and if any further agreement is inserted in the con
sideration clause , it should be inserted accurately and
completely , so as to leave nothing open for parol proof.
§ 64 . The true consideration may generally be shown
by parol . — With the limitations suggested in the last
section ( i. e ., where the consideration clause expresses a
contract, or is evidently fully stated ) , the principle is
well established , in general, that the true consideration
may be shown .
One application of this principle is to cases where land
is sold by the quantity , at so much per acre or square
foot , and there is either an excess or a deficiency .
For example , where land conveyed is described as
" containing 140 acres more or less, ” the price being
twenty -seven dollars per acre , and the consideration stated
in the deed is what the number of acres mentioned would
$3 Jackson v . Railroad , 1893 , 54 Mo. App . 636 , 644 ; See also , Baum y .
Lynn , 1895 , 72 Miss . 932 ; 30 L . R . A . 441 ; 18 So . 428 ; Purinton v . Rail




4 This question , however , does not appear to have arisen in the case
of a conveyance , but the clauses are analogous to bills of lading , which
are held to be both receipts and contracts , and explainable in so far as
they are receipts . Railroad y . Bank , 1899 , 178 Il
l
. 506 ; 53 N . E . 326 ;
Van Etten . Newton , 1892 , 134 N . Y . 143 ; 31 N . E . 334 ; Manuf . Co .
v . Railroad , 1897 , 121 N . C . 514 ; 28 S . E . 474 .
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amount to at that price : the quantity proving in excess ,
the grantor may show an oral agreement that a survey
was to be made, and that the grantee was to pay fo
r
the
excess , at the price named per acre . 35 So , on the other
hand , if the grantor has been overpaid the grantee may
recover the excess , if it was orally agreed that the price of
the land was to depend on the number o
f square feet in
it , and a mistake was made in computing the area : the
grantee does not waive his right to recover the excess b
y
accepting a deed conveying all the land shown him , b
e
cause the agreement is not fo
r
a
n entire sum , in such a
case , but the price is to be fixed by the quantity . 36
$ 6
5 . Showing assumption of mortgage . — It is also
upon this principle — that the true consideration of the
deed may be shown by parol — that many courts have pro
ceeded in allowing an agreement to be shown outside the




the consideration , a mortgage on the land con
veyed .
The best way o
f establishing this agreement is b
y
insert
ing in the deed a recital that the grantee assumes and agrees
to pay the incumbrance . This recital may be imme
diately after the description , or where the usual cove
nants are inserted in the deed , it may be stated as an
exception to the covenant against incumbrances , briefly
thus : “ Said premises are free and clear from all incum
brances , except a certain mortgage (describing it ) which
the said party o
f
the second part hereby assumes and
agrees to pay . ”
But if a clause o
f
this kind is not inserted in the deed





the mortgage , may show by parol evidence that the
grantee agreed to assume and pay the mortgage as a part
3
5 Ludeke v . Sutherland , 87 II
I
. 481 ; 29 Am . R . 66 .
3
6 Cardinal v . Hadley , 1893 , 158 Mass . 352 ; 33 N . E . 575 ; 35 Am . St .
R . 492 .
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of the consideration .37 Many such cases are where the
grantor has given a warranty deed , and it is held in them
that he is not estopped by his covenants to show what the
true consideration was . This question is discussed in
a case 38 where the plaintiff had , by a deed containing a
covenant against incumbrances , conveyed land to the
defendant , there being in fact a mortgage on the land .
The grantor , having paid of
f
the mortgage , sued the
grantee for the amount paid , on the ground that the
grantee had agreed to pay it . The defendant ( grantee )
urged that the plaintiff (grantor ) was estopped b
y
his
covenant against incumbrances from proving the exist
ence o
f
the mortgage , or that the grantee undertook to
pay it . But the court held that the law o
f estoppel did
not apply , as the question was one merely collateral to
the deed , the action not being founded directly on the
deed o
r the covenants , and that the evidence offered was




the consideration , and therefore came within the doctrine
o
f
the American authorities .
It will be observed from an examination of the authori .
ties just cited that they are chiefly cases where the grantor ,
o
r
some person who has succeeded to his rights , seeks to
recover the real consideration , and where the agreement





the deed and a
s
not in conflict with the
express provisions o
f
the conveyance , the deed being re
garded a
s not the whole contract of the parties . 39
§ 6
6 . True consideration may not be shown as between
the parties to defeat deed . — While the true consider
3
7 Lang v . Dietz , 1901 , 191 Ill . 161 ; 60 N . E . 841 ; Society v . Haines ,
1890 , 47 Ohio St . 423 ; 25 N . E . 119 ; Bensieck v . Cook , 1892 , 110 Mo .
173 ; 19 S . W . 642 ; Hopper v . Calhoun , 1894 , 52 Kan . 703 ; 35 Pac . 816 ;
Ordway v . Downey , 1898 , 18 Wash . 412 ; 63 Am . St . 892 ; 51 Pac . 1047 ;
52 Pac . 228 ; Flynn v . Flynn , 68 Mich . 20 ; 35 N . W . 817 ; Perkins v .
McAuliffe , 1900 , 105 Wis . 582 ; 81 N . W . 645 .
2
8 Bolles v . Beach , 22 N . J . L . 680 ; 53 Am . Dec . 263 .
3
9 Where the action is directly on the covenants , see post , $ 204 .
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ation may thus be shown fo
r
almost every purpose , nev
ertheless , as between the parties and those in privity
with them , it is not permissible , in the absence of fraud
o
r





defeating the conveyance o
r
changing its legal effect as a conveyance . 40
Nor may the grantor defeat his deed b
y showing that
the consideration is illegal . 41
$ 67 . Statement of consideration not binding on oth
ers . — But the recital of the consideration is not generally
evidence a
s against third persons , 42 and creditors of the
grantor who seek to set aside the conveyance are never
conclusively bound b
y
such a recital .




eration is prima facie evidence in such cases of its pay
ment , 43 but the better rule appears to be that it is not evi
dence as against those claiming adversely to the convey
4
0 Salisbury v . Clarke , 61 V
t
. 453 ; 17 Atl . 135 ; Feeney v . Howard , 79
Cal . 525 , 530 ; 21 Pac . 984 ; 12 Am . St . R . 162 ; Weiss v . Heitkamp , 1894 ,
127 Mo . 23 ; 29 S . W . 709 ; Finch v .Garrett , 1893 , 102 Iowa 381 ; 71 N . W .
429 .
4
1 Allebach v . Hunsicker , 1890 , 132 Pa . S
t
. 349 ; 19 Atl . 139 . But in
Eckler v . Alden , 1900 , 125 Mich . 215 ; 84 N . W . 141 , the contrary is
held , and a grantor is permitted to deny the consideration " for the pur
pose o
f rendering the deed void . ” The decision may have been based
on fraud ; as reported , it seems contrary to the weight of authority .
This rule does not apply to mortgages . They may be defeated between
the parties or their representatives by showing that they are without
consideration . The mortgagor , on attempted foreclosure by the mort
gagee , is not estopped by the mortgage , but may show that there was
no consideration , and in this way defeat it . The executory character
of the instrument is regarded as making this difference . Baird y . Baird ,
1895 , 145 N . Y . 659 ; 40 N . E . 222 ; Chaffee v . Brown , 1895 , 109 Cal . 211 ;
41 Pac . 1028 ; Church v . Case , 1896 , 110 Mich . 621 ; 68 N . W . 424 .
4
2 Rose v . Taunton , 119 Mass . 99 ; King v . Mead , 1899 , 60 Kan . 539 ;
57 Pac . 113 ; Ten Eyck v . Witbeck , 1892 , 135 N . Y . 40 ; 31 Am . S
t
. R .
809 ; 31 N . E . 994 .
4
8 Foster v . Hall , 12 Pick . 89 ; 22 Am . Dec . 400 ; Jackson v . McChes
ney , 7 Cow . 360 ; 17 Am . Dec . 521 .
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ance , especially where the relationship of grantor and
grantee is such as to raise a presumption of fraud .14
* Sillyman v . King, 36 Iowa 207, 213 ; Kimball v . Fenner , 12 N . H .
248 ; Redmond v . Chandley , 1896 , 119 N . C . 575 ; 26 S . E . 255 ; Flynn v .
Jackson , 1896 , 93 Va . 341 ; 25 S . E . 1 ; Mendenhall v . Elwert , 1900 , 36
Ore . 375 ; 59 Pac. 805 ; 52 Pac. 22 ; Minneapolis Stockyards & c . Co . v .
Halonen , 1894 , 56 Minn . 469 ; 57 N . W . 1136 .
6 - BREWS . CON .
CHAPTER VIII .
THE OPERATIVE WORDS .
$ 68 . Special operative words for
special conveyances .
69 . Superfluous use of opera -
tive words - Rule of con
struction .
$ 70 . Effect of assignments in
dorsed on deeds .
71 . Operative words of some
kind essential.
72 . Wordsgenerally considered
sufficient.
$ 68 . Special operative words for special convey .
ances . — In that part of the premises known as the grant
ing clause occur the “ operative words . ” In former times
the particular words used were of special importance ,
each one of the several kinds of conveyances having its
appropriate operative word or words which made it effec
tive as the special kind of conveyance it purported to be .
The name of the particular conveyance ( see above ,
§ 20 ) is generally suggestive of the appropriate operative
words formerly always used in it . While these technical
words have lost much o
f
their former force and special
significance , they seem still appropriate if it be intended
that a particular conveyance shall have the characteristic
properties it possessed at the common law as distinguish
ing it from others .
For example , the “ exchange ” at common law was the
appropriate conveyance in special circumstances , and the
technical exchange was attended with results peculiar in
many respects to itself — there was a warranty with a con
dition of re -entry , so that if the title to either piece of
land exchanged proved bad , and the party or his as
signs were evicted , he or his assigns could recover the
(82 )
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other piece of land which had been given in exchange .
But to produce this result it was necessary that the word
“ exchange" should be used , and a modern conveyance
cannot operate as a technical exchange at common law
without the use of the same word ."
$ 69. Superfluous use of operative words - Rule of
construction . — It was formerly the practice always to use
a great many words without regard to their true meaning ,
and it is still the common practice to insert in deeds
nearly all the operative terms ever needed in transferring
real estate .
When deeds were construed technically this was done
in order that the deed might operate in one way if it
could not operate in another , but in modern conveyances
most of these words are surplusage.
The general rule of construction is that if from an ex
amination of the whole instrument an intent to convey
may be gathered , the absence of the usual or proper oper
ative words will not render the instrument void as a con
veyance.
Careful attention , of course ,must be given to words
from which covenants may be implied , under such stat
utes as are referred to above ( at § 30 ) , and the particu
lar effect in this respect produced by particular words
inust not be lost sight of. But as conveyances of the
property merely , the courts will construe deeds as operat
ive in one form or another if possible .
Illustrations : The words “ bargain and sell ” are not
needed to make a deed a bargain and sale, operating as
such , but the words “ remise , release and quit claim "
will accomplish the same result , the deed expressing that
it is made for a valuable consideration .
So where the statute provides a form of deed intended
" Windsor v . Collinson , 32 Ore . 297 ; 52 Pac. 26 ; Gamble v . McClure ,
69Pa . St. 282 .
? Havens v . Seashore Co., 1890 , 47 N . J . Eq . 365 , 372 ; 20 Atl . 497 .
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to transfer the grantor 's whole interest , in which form
the single operative word is “ grant, ” the word “ convey ”
used in a deed has been held equivalent to this word
“ grant." 3
And if a deed containing the words : “ bargain , sell
and convey " cannot operate as a deed of bargain and
sale , for want of consideration ,' it sometimes may as a
grant at common law , the word " convey ” being as
effective as “ grant ” for this purpose .5
Even where there were no distinctively operative words ,
but the deed stated that the grantee was " to have ” a des
ignated proportion of the estate , absolutely and in full
property , and it was contended that the deed was void as
containing no operative words , the court sustained it,
saying : “ The words were plainly intended to operate in
præsenti , and though the most apt words are not used ,
the intention appearing from the deed as a whole should
not be defeated .” 6
§ 70 . Effect of assignments indorsed on deeds. The
question has arisen whether indorsements on deeds “ as
signing ” the grantee 's interest in the deed are valid
transfers of the legal title to the land .
Where the grantee named in the deed indorsed on it
an assignment under his hand and seal of all his right ,
title and interest “ in and to the within deed ” to his son , for
value , such assignment , when delivered , was held to con
* Chapman v. Charter, 1899, 46 W . Va. 769 , 779 ; 34 S. E . 768 . The
statutory word here was not intended to import covenants into the
deed , but simply to transfer thc grantor 's entire interest. So such a
decision is not inconsistent with the general rule that, when certain
statutory words have a special and peculiar effect they alone should be
used to produce that effect ; as in the case of the statutory words in the
short statutory forms which have the dual capacity of transferring title
and importing covenants . See post , $ 212 .
* See ante , $ 56 .
5 Lambert v . Smith , 9 Ore . 185 .
6 Anglade v . St . Avit , 67 Mo. 434 .
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vey the title , the surrounding circumstances indicating
an intention to transfer the real property described in the
deed . ?
And the words “ I assign the within to A B fo
r
value
received ” indorsed on a deed , signed b
y
the grantee
named in the deed , and regularly acknowledged , have
been held sufficient to convey title to the land described
in the conveyance on which they were indorsed . 8
It has , however , been held in similar cases that such
a
n indorsement conveys no legal title to the land , one .
reason being , in most cases , that there are not words
effectual to transfer the legal title ; in such cases the
assignment is regarded as a
t
best entitling the assignee
to relief in equity as upon an executory contract . 9
$ 7
1 . Operative words of some kind essential . — Many
o
f
the foregoing cases illustrate the general rule , that
courts will sustain deeds in this particular , as in others ,
if possible , and make them effectual according to the
intent of the parties .





instrument probably intended to transfer it ,
because there are n
o words in it sufficient to give it effect
as a conveyance .
Even if the instrument purports in form to be a deed
o
f
indenture , duly signed , sealed and acknowledged , but
the only operative words in it are “ warrant and defend
unto C D , her heirs and assigns , forever , the receipt





the real estate described in it . 10
? Lemon y . Graham , 1890 , 131 Pa . St . 447 ; 19 Atl . 48 .
Harlowe v . Hudgins , 1892 , 84 Texas 107 ; 19 S . W . 364 .
9 Bentley v . De Forest , 2 Ohio 221 ; Dupont v . Wertheman , 10 Cal .
354 ; Porter v . Read , 19 Maine 363 .
1
0 Hummelman v . Mount , 87 Ind . 178 . In this case Judge Elliott
says : “ It is no doubt true that an instrument purporting to be a deed
will be effectual if it contains in any part of it apt words of conveyance .
In all well drawn deeds these words appear in their appropriate place .
But here there are none in any part of this instrument . "
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And " waive and renounce ” are not words of convey
ance sufficient to convey title. 11
In some states statutes provide that any instrument in
writing signed by the grantor is effectual to transfer the
legal title if such was the intention of the grantor to be
collected from the whole instrument .
Such a statute , however, is not intended to dispense
with operative words : it simply imposes upon the courts
the duty of construing liberally the words of transfer ;
hence , even under such statutes , some words of convey
ance are necessary .12
§ 72 . Words generally considered as sufficient . - In
spite of the long established practice of inserting in con
veyances all the words which have been appropriate to
the different forms of deeds, it appears that even as early
as Lord Coke 's time the word “ grant” was sufficient to
amount to a grant , a feoffment , a gift , a lease, a release ,
confirmation or surrender. 13 And the words " give , grant ,
bargain and sell” seem to be, according to the authorities ,
sufficient for all purposes as operative words transferring
the title .
While it is evident that many carelessly drawn convey
ances will be sustained by the courts , the only prudent
and proper practice is to use those terms which , after long
usage , have been determined by the courts with substan
tial unanimity to be effectual as words of transfer .
And while the difference between different conveyances
11 Davis v . McGrew , 82 Cal. 135 ; 23 Pac. 41 .
12 Bell v . McDuffie , 71 Ga. 264 ; Webb v . Mullins , 78 Ala . 111. In
the last case the instrument was substantially as follows : “ Know all
men by these presents : That I , A B , for and in consideration of love
and affection which I have toward my son , J B , the following de
scribed real estate . . . . To have and to hold to the said J B , his
heirs and assigns , forever. In testimony whereof , et
c
. ” It was held
that this instrument contained no words which could be construed to
transfer the legal title , even with the assistance o
f
such a statute .
1
3 Co . Litt . 301 b .
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in this respect is not as marked as formerly , there are still
other cases than those alreadymentioned where particular
operative words are more appropriate for the conveyance
than are others. This propriety may arise from statute or
usage . For example : " Mortgage ” is now by statute in
many states made the appropriate word to use in a mort
gage . In the creation of a term of years the appropriate
words are " grant, demise and to farm le
t , " the character
istic word being “ demise " (but here , as in conveyances
o
f larger interests , no particular form of words is abso
lutely necessary , and the words “ lease ” and “ let ” are
often used alone ) , and the words " remise , release and for
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. Rivers — No private title to
bed in some states .
109 . Navigable rivers — Practic
ally three rules in United
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lic and private owner
ship .
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size may be subject to
private ownership .
117 . States holding to the rule
that private title extends
to water ' s edge only .
118 . Appurtenances .
§ 7
3 . General considerations - Importance o
f
the de
scription . — In an orderly arrangement o
f
the parts of a
conveyance the description o
f
the thing conveyed appears
in the premises , immediately after the words of convey
ance , o
r operative words . Where printed forms are used
this part of the conveyance is not supplied by the printer ,
and when it is supplied to the draftsman b
y
his client it is
often inaccurate . There is , therefore , hardly a part of
the instrument to which more careful attention should be






f conveyances forming the chain o
f
title to
land . While descriptions will be construed liberally , so
a
s , if possible , to carry out the intention o
f
the parties ,
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nothing passes by a deed but what is described in it,
whatever the intention of the parties may have been , and
evidence is inadmissible to make the deed operate on land
not embraced in the descriptive words .
Many singularly indefinite , defective and inaccurate
descriptions in deeds , mortgages , or wills may be cured ,
as will appear from the decisions to be cited , either by the




f reaching the probable intent of the parties , or b
y parol
evidence ( used within limits not always easily defined ) of
circumstances under which the conveyance was made










e some description , for a wholly omitted description
cannot b
e supplied by evidence outside the deed o
r will . 1





the description arise in a great many
different ways ; fo
r
example , in equitable proceedings to
quiet title or to settle boundaries ; in bills for specific
performance o
f
contracts for the sale o
f
lands ; in actions
o
n
covenants brought because the land attempted to be
conveyed has not been conveyed ; in actions sounding in
tort brought for trespass ; in actions for purchase -money ,
o
r , on the other hand , in proceedings to restrain the
collection o
f
purchase -money ; and , probably most fre
quently , in ejectment . These controversies arise , o
f
course , not merely between the parties to the conveyance
themselves , but between them , or their successors , and
other parties , and it will be seen that what may be a
sufficient description a
s
between the grantor and grantee ,
o
rmortgagor and mortgagee , may not be good as against
third parties .
$ 7
4 . Descriptions in recorded conveyances — How far
notice to subsequent purchasers . — Under our general
Crooks v . Whitford , 47 Mich . 283 , 29
1 ; 11 N . W . 15
9
.
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system of recording conveyances , it is understood that
the record is notice to subsequent purchasers. But the
record is notice so far as the land is correctly described ,
and no farther , unless it is apparent that there is a mis
description , or unless there is enough in the record to put
the later purchaser , exercising reasonable diligence , on
inquiry as to property intended to be conveyed that
would lead to a correct knowledge of the matter .2
Therefore , a grantee with his conveyance on record ,
containing an inaccurate or insufficient description , is
not entitled to relief as to such mistakes against one, who
for a valuable consideration , has purchased the property
from the grantor without actual notice , unless this later
purchaser is chargeable with constructive notice , which
the record of the former conveyance , with its defective
description , does not necessarily impart . But descrip
tions of the same land may , of course , be made at differ
ent times in different language , owing to changed
conditions which render a former description inappropri
ate in a later conveyance . In such cases the rule just
stated does not apply . A purchaser , therefore , from one
who appears b
y




a former deed , containing a description
differing from that now found in his own deed , will not
always be allowed to take advantage o
f
the rule , against
the former grantee , simply because he finds a description
in the former deed not exactly corresponding with that
used in his own . One intending to buy land , finding
such a deed on record , should inquire outside the record
whether or not there was at the time the recorded deed
was made property to which the description therein might
have been applied , and ascertain , at his peril , whether
2 Schweiss v . Woodruff , 73 Mich . 473 ; 41 N . W . 511 .
3 Harms v . Coryell , 1899 , 177 III . 496 , 504 ; 53 N . E . 87 ; Ozark Land
& c . Co . v . Franks , 1900 , 156 Mo . 673 , 686 ; 57 S . W . 540 ; Davis v .
Ward , 1895 , 109 Cal . 18
6 ; 41 Pac . 1010 ; 50 Am . St . R . 29 .
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that deed conflicts with the title to the property he now
intends to purchase .
§ 75 . Certainty necessary - Parol evidence to apply
description . — The description of land cannot, of course ,
identify the land , but it can and should furnish themeans
of identification .
Among the essentials often stated to be of first impor
tance are certainty and particularity on the face of the
instrument . But no matter how certain and specific the
description is on paper, nothing will be conveyed unless
the description can be applied to the earth and the land
described located . A peculiar description in an Illinois
case will illustrate this proposition . In Glos v . Fur
man there was a bill filed to remove a cloud on title , it
being alleged that the defendant had given a mortgage on
the plaintiff 's lands. The defendant claimed under a tax
deed with the following description , and alleged that he
had given a mortgage only on the interest conveyed to
him by that deed : “ The east vigintillionth of a vigin
tillionth of the east one-sixty -fourth inch of lo
t
one , in
the southwest quarter , et
c




the east one - quarter inch o
f
lot two ,
etc . ” The court says of this description : " A tract of
land described a
s
the above may perhaps b
e pictured in
the imagination , but could not be bounded . It could not





land . . . . And where land in a deed is so





calls for premises not having an existence , o
r
that cannot
be found , the conveyance must be regarded a
s
void . ”
Indeed , as to certainty it may be noted that there may be
a clear description without any uncertainty o
r ambiguity
o
n its face , and another later description equally clear on
4 Sengfelder v . Hill , 1899 , 21 Wash . 371 ; 58 Pac . 25
0
.
51897 , 164 111 . 585 ; 45 N . E . 1019 .
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it
s
face , and in the identical language o
f
the former , and
yet the latter will apply to and include more land than
the former . 6
It is therefore evident that extrinsic evidence must be
resorted to where descriptions o
f
land are concerned ,
because the description must be applied to its subject
matter , and b
y
the rule requiring certainty in descriptions
it is not meant that no extrinsic evidence is allowable .
In Cox v . Hart , where it was doubtful as to which of two
pieces o
f
land , both in the same neighborhood , and both
owned b
y
the execution debtor , a description in a marshal ' s
deed applied , the court , quoting Ch . J . Marshall , says :
“ It is undoubtedly essential to the validity of a grant that
there should be a thing granted , which must be so
described as to b
e capable o
f being distinguished from
other things o
f
the same kind . But it is not necessary
that the grant itself should contain such a description as ,
without the aid of extrinsic testimony , to ascertain pre
cisely what is conveyed . ” And in Mead v . Parker , the
principle is stated as follows : " The most specific and
precise description o
f
the property intended requires some
parol proof to complete its identification . A more general
description requires more . ”
§ 76 . Parol evidence cannot supply description - Fatal
uncertainty . - While it thus appears not only allowable
but necessary to use extrinsic evidence to apply the de
scription , the difference must be noted between such evi
dence and evidence to describe the property intended to
be conveyed . What is meant b
y
the rule that descrip
tions must be certain , is , that the words used to describe
a tract o
f land must do so in such a manner as to show ,
with the help of this necessary extrinsic evidence to apply
6 How this may b
e ,will be clear from the diagram and description in
the case o
f
Smith v . Sweat , 1897 , 90 Maine 528 ; 38 Atl . 554 .
71892 , 145 U . S . 376 , 388 , 389 .
8 115 Mass . 413 .
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it, what tract is intended . For if the words used to de
scribe a tract of land fail to do so in such a manner as to
show (with proper extrinsic evidence to apply it) what
tract was intended , the deed will be void for uncertainty
of description , and in such a case parol evidence to ex
plain the intention of the party is inadmissible . The dif
ference between the required certainty , and the incurable
uncertainty which renders a conveyance void , will be
clearer from an examination of decided cases where the
question has occurred .
§ 77. — How uncertainty arises — Undefined part of
larger tract . - Uncertainty of description making void a
conveyance arises in a great variety of ways. A not unusual
way of creating this uncertainty is to name and partially
describe a part of a larger tract of land , without affording
the means of determining what part of the larger tract is
intended . As, fo
r
example , a deed fo
r
" a part o
f
the
west half ” of a certain quarter section “ containing one
acre , more or less , ” without designating what part of the
tract it is to be taken from , is void for uncertainty . ' So
a conveyance o
f
“ nine and three - quarters acres lying in
the north half of northwest quarter of section one , ” is
void for uncertainty . 10 In such cases even an experi
enced surveyor would be unable to locate the land . So
in Hamilton v . Harvey , 11 which was a bill to compel
specific performance o
f
a contract : “ I hereby agree to
lease my building , etc . , and will allow you as com
mission for said location one - third interest in five acres
located near said works , ” the conclusion is that this
description is to
o
uncertain to sustain a decree for specific
performance a
s
to the contract for commission .
9 Hanna v . Palmer , 1901 , 19
4
I1
1 . 41 ; 56 L . R . A . 93 ; 61 N . E . 1051 .
1
0 Gaston v . Weir , 84 Ala . 193 ; 4 So . 258 . And to the same effect ,
see McRoberts v . McArthur , 1895 , 62 Minn . 310 ; 64 N . W . 903 ;
Millett v . Mullen , 1901 , 95 Me . 400 , 412 ; 49 Atl . 871 ,
1
1
121 Ill . 469 ; 13 N . E . 210 .
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$ 78 . Uncertainty avoided when part of larger tract
is designated , though not fully described . The difference ,
however , between such descriptions as these and those
that indicate , though not in the best form , what part of
the larger tract is intended , should be noted . For ex
ample , such a description as : “ The south part of section
5 , et
c
. , being 225 acres , ” is not void for uncertainty , as
a parallelogram containing that number of acres may be
laid off . 13 And if the description is of a certain quantity
o
f
land , in or out of a designated corner o
f
a certain parcel ,
it will , generally , be taken as a square in that corner





a certain one -quarter section , " except two
acres in the southeast corner , ” is sufficiently certain and
definite , the exception being construed to mean two
acres in such corner lying in a square . 14 :
The result , however , in such cases as these last men
tioned will not always be to convey o
r
to except a square .
For example : In Lego v . Medley 15 the exception o
f
" one acre from the southwest corner , . . . together
with the buildings thereon , ” was held to render admissi
ble parol evidence to show the boundaries , and if it ap
peared from such evidence that the grantor was at the
time in possession of a dwelling and other buildings and
a tract sixteen rods long from east to west and ten rods
wide from north to south , on which such buildings were
situated , and that an acre could not be laid off a
t
that
corner which would include the buildings without being
o
f
the dimensions named , that then the exception must
not be considered as calling for a tract in a square form ,
1
2 Tierney v . Brown , 65 Miss . 563 ; 5 So . 104 ; 7 Am . St . R . 679 ;
Soukup v . Union Investment Co . , 1892 , 84 Iowa 448 ; 51 N . W . 167 ;
Cobb v . Taylor , 1892 , 133 Ind . 605 ; 32 N . E . 822 ; 33 N . E . 615 .
1
3 Richey y . Sinclair , 1897 , 167 Ill . 184 ; 47 N . E . 364 ; Smith v .
Nelson , 1892 , 110 Mo . 552 ; 19 S . W . 734 ; Walsh y . Ringer , 2 Ohio
327 ; 15 Am . Dec . 555 .
1
4 Green v . Jordan , 83 Ala . 220 ; 3 So . 513 ; 3 Am . St . R . 711 .
1
5
1891 , 79 Wis . 211 ; 48 N . W . 375 ; 24 Am . St . R . 706 .
96 $ 79THE LAW OF CONVEYANCING .
but as embracing such parallelogram ; parol evidence be
ing resorted to in such a case , not to contradict or vary
the words of the grant , but to show from the situation and
condition of the subject -matter what meaning the parties
attached to the words used .16
$ 79 . Fatal uncertainty avoided when grantee of part
of larger tract takes an undivided interest . - It will be
noticed that in most cases where descriptions are held
void for uncertainty because an attempt has been made
to convey an undesignated part of a larger tract (such as
are cited in section 77 above ) the evident intention has
been to convey a specific part of the larger tract in sever
alty . The description in such cases is void , because ,
while the deed purports to express this intention and
attempts to describe the smaller tract , it does so in such
an uncertain manner that no one can say what land is
described .
Where , however, the deed does not purport or attempt
to specifically describe a part of a larger tract , but, with
out locating the part , describes it as a certain quantity
out of the larger tract , it has often been construed as
granting an undivided interest in the larger tract, in the
proportion which the number of acres in the part named
bears to the whole area of the larger tract : the grantor
and grantee thus becoming tenants in common of the
whole tract .17
Such decisions illustrate the general rule , applied under
varied circumstances , and not merely in cases where the
description is concerned , that conveyances will not be held
16 It will be evident from these latter cases that the principles con
cerning the construction of descriptions apply to exceptions as well as
to the principal land conveyed . Where a good description is followed
by an exception which is void for uncertainty the grantmay be valid ,
the exception alone being void . Thayer v . Torrey , 37 N . J . L . 339 ;
Bromberg v . Smee , 1900 , 130 Ala . 601 ; 30 So . 483 .
17 Cullen v . Sprigg , 1890 , 83 Cal. 56 ; 23 Pac . 222 ; Morehead v . Hall,
1900 , 12
6
N . C . 213 ; 35 S . E . 428 ; Gibbs v . Swift , 12 Cush . 393 .
§ 80 97THE DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY .
to be void if they can reasonably be sustained : ut res
magis valeat quam pereat (that the thing may rather have
effect than be destroyed ) .
$ 80 . Uncertainty caused by lack of starting point of
boundary . Uncertainty , making the description void ,
also frequently occurs where the starting point of a boun
dary line cannot be identified .
A case frequently cited as a leading one on this point
is LaFranc v . Richmond ,18 where the description was
( substantially ) “ from the C - Creek , cutting through
the middle of a small hill , to a point adjoining A B , up
to the range of blue hills.” The starting point was thus
on a creek , but the creek was eight thousand feet long ,
and Justice Field says : “ Any position on it may be in
definitely taken as the starting point , and a line run so as
to meet the conditions of the description . The tract
deeded cannot , therefore , be located with certainty , unless
the starting point is established . The land intended by
the grantor remains incapable of identification , and the
deed is inoperative .” So where the description is of land
“ adjoining lands of the grantor , beginning at a stake on
the east side of the railroad track and on said track , and
runs east, etc ., to a stake ; " here it is evident that there
is no starting point, and the description , standing alone ,
is void for uncertainty .19
$ 81. A general description allowable and not neces
sarily uncertain . — The rules applicable to such cases as
those cited in $ 77 and 80 , however , do not prevent the
use of a general description not ambiguous on its face ,
185 Sawyer 601 .
19 Barker v . Southern Ry. Co ., 1899 , 12
5
N . C . 596 ; 34 S . E . 701 ,
though in this case the plaintiff , who was theoriginal grantor , was held
estopped , as he had surveyed the land and put the grantor o
f
the pres
ent defendant in possession . See also , Pry v . Pry , 109 Ill . 46
6 , 478 , and
Edens v . Miller , 1899 , 147 Ind . 208 ; 46 N . E . 526 .
7 - BREws . Con .
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and in practice it is sometimes necessary to resort to such
a description . Descriptions , therefore , in general terms ,
are not void for uncertainty , because it may be shown by
extrinsic evidence what particular property is embraced
in the general description .
Examples of such descriptions are , “ All my land ” in a
certain town , county or state ;20 or , “ All my lands ,
wherever situated ; ' 21 or, “ All my right, title and interest
in and to my father 's estate at law . " 22
Or a general name may sufficiently describe the prop
erty to be conveyed , as where the property is described as
“ Pelican Beach , near Barren Island , in the town of, etc ., "
there being certain definite land known as Pelican Beach . 23




general description there is no uncertainty appearing on
the face o
f
the description . Each can be applied to its




if more specific , and extrin
sic evidence is admissible to show to what land the de
scription was to be applied .
But a general description may on its face be void , as
any other may , as being too vague and indefinite .
For example , a description consisting only of the words
" a piece o
r parcel o
f
land near Bacon Quarter Branch "
is too uncertain . 24
$ 8
2 . Descriptions usually more specific — What par
ticulars are to b
e regarded . — While , therefore , general
descriptions have often been sustained as sufficient , and
must be used at times as being the best obtainable , ordi
2
0 Frey v . Clifford , 44 Cal . 335 ; Blair v . Bruns , 8 Colo . 397 ; 8 Pac .
569 ; Drew v . Carroll , 1891 , 154 Mass . 181 ; 28 N . E . 148 .
2
1 Pettigrew v . Dobbelaar , 63 Cal . 396 ; Higgins v . Higgins , 1898 , 121
Cal . 487 ; 53 Pac . 1081 .
2
2 Austin v . Dolbee , 1894 , 101 Mich . 292 ; Huron Land Co . v . Robarge ,
1901 , 128 Mich . 686 ; 8 D . L . N . 835 ; 87 N . W , 1032 . See Wadsworth v .
Murray , 1900 , 161 N . Y . 274 , 289 ; 55 N . E . 910 .
2
8 Coleman v . Improvement Co . , 94 N . Y . 229 .
3
4 George v . Bates , 1894 , 90 Va . 839 ; 20 S . E . 828 .
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narily a description should be more specific , and should
contain particular and accurate statements . The partic
ulars which should be mentioned in order that the de
scription may be identified with certainty will , of course ,
vary with the nature of the land and its location ; as , for
example , whether it is a city lot or a farm .
Among the more important particulars which ought to
be considered before drawing a conveyance (though , of
course , not all need bementioned in any one description )
are :
The state , county and town where the land is situated ;
Public or private surveys;
Monuments , either natural or artificial, from which
courses and distances may be laid off ;
Streets and highways , a point on which may form the
starting point and end of the description ;
The boundaries of the land and their measurements,
known as metes and bounds , and
The quantity or area of the land .
In describing a town lot, reference may often well be
made to the street number and the particular side of the
street , as well as a reference to the plat , to former occu
pancy of the land conveyed and to adjoining ownership .
Most careful lawyers , in drawing a description , prepare
a diagram of the land described , drawn to a scale in order
to see that the words used fit the thing described , and in
construing descriptions already drawn the same method
may profitably be employed .
$ 8
3 . Conflicting parts of descriptions . A grantor
thus describing land b
y




lines running to and from objects , or at
certain angles with one another for certain distances , and




feet , is very
likely , in his anxiety for fullness of description ( in add
ing one description to another , o
r mentioning incidents
connected with the history o
f
the title ) , to err in having
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too much of a description . Often in such cases one part
of the description conflicts with another. A line, for in
stance , may be described as starting from one monument
and extending a certain distance to another , whereas in
fact the distance between the points is either greater or
less than that recited ; or, a description may be made by
lines of a tract said to contain a certain quantity of land ,
whereas , when the lines are run and the measurements
taken ,as prescribed in the deed , the real amount included
is shown to be either greater or less than the quantity
stated .
In drawing descriptions a
ll
additions to a sufficient
description should be avoided , unless the draftsman is





4 . Rules for construing descriptions with conflict
ing parts . - In construing descriptions , however , where
such conflicts occur courts o
f
law often apply certain rules
o
f
construction , the purpose o
f
which is to carry out the
meaning and intent of the grant , so far as they can be
ascertained from reading the description and inspecting
the land . 24
a
These rules are based on the principle o
f regarding , in
case o
f conflict , that as o
f
first importance about which
there is the least likelihood o
f




n the principle that what is more certain shall
prevail o
r
control what is ordinarily less so . The chief
general rules o
f
this kind are :
1 . Particular and definite descriptions will control gen
eral descriptions with which they conflict .









These so - called rules are not fixed rules o
f
law , but are guides to





found according to the weight o
f
evidence . Heywood v .
Lumber C
o . , 1899 , 70 N . H . 24 , 31 ; 47 Atl . 294 .
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ments are to be preferred to, or will control , those by
courses and distances with which they conflict .
3 . Among monuments , permanent natural monuments
are preferred to artificial monuments .
4 . Descriptions by courses and distances generally con
trol statements as to quantity :25
The first thing to do in cases where there is a seeming
conflict is to reconcile the conflict , if possible, and give
effect to every part of the description , rather than to as
sume at the outset that the conflict is irreconcilable . This
is illustrated by Judge Cooley 's interpretation of a de
scription by reading the word “ to ” as “ toward , ” in ac
cordance with a meaning sometimes given to it , and with
the result that effect was given to the whole description . 26
When , however , the different parts of a description
cannot be reconciled , as is frequently the case , the fore
going general rules , or some of them , may be used to ad
vantage .
It is important , however , to remember in regard to the
application of these rules to the different kinds of cases
which arise , that they are not inflexible . In the case just
cited ,21 Judge Cooley discusses the rules , and shows that
in some cases the statement of quantity , which is consid
ered generally the least certain part of the description ,
may control ; and he says: “ The only purpose of rules of
construction is to enable us to reach the probable intent
of the parties , in order that we may give it effect , and
unless they are somewhat flexible they would in many
cases defeat the actual intent , even when upon the face of
the instrument it is obvious what the intent was . The
errors in deeds are infinite in variety and form , and any
one case of mistake may present considerations a little
different from any other . ” 28
15 See note , 30 Am . Dec . 734 .
26Moran v . Lezotte , 54 Mich . 83 ; 19 N . W . 757 .
2754 Mich . 83 , 88 .
28 See illustrations of their flexibility , post , $ $ 86 , 87 .
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$ 85 . The maxim “ Falsa demonstratio , etc.” — In
using these rules as means of interpreting descriptions ,
we are obliged to disregard erroneous or false portions of
the description in order to carry out the intent of the
parties. In discussing such descriptions the following
legal maxim is repeatedly referred to : Falsa demon
stratio non nocet , cum de corpore constat ; that is, “ a
false description does not vitiate , when a description of
the essential matter remains .”
This maxim is frequently used in an abbreviated form :
Falsa demonstratio non nocet; but this abbreviation does
not fully express the law , unless the rest of themaxim is
understood or implied .29
The maxim simply means , that where a sufficient and
accurate description is preceded or followed by an errone
ous statement or reference , the erroneous part may be dis
regarded , and the conveyance given effect according to the
remaining description ; or , in other words, “ if there be a
description of the property sufficient to render certain
what is intended , the addition of a wrong name or an er
roneous statement as to quantity , occupancy , locality , or
an erroneous enumeration of particulars , will have no
effect . " 30
In Wiley v . Lovely ,31 an action brought for breach of
covenant of seisin , the description was : “ Lot 77 ” of a
certain village “ as laid out , platted and recorded ." There
were two village plats recorded , one containing lots num
bered from 1 to 29 , and another containing two lots num
bered 78, side by side, but not lot 77. So it appeared
that in neither case did any record of a plat of the village
disclose lot 77 , as described ; and the claim of the plain
tiff was , that the covenant had been broken , because the
property defendant assumed to convey never had any ex
istence . There was , however , another plat, which had not
29 Heller v . Cohen , 1897 , 154 N . Y . 299 , 31
2 ; 48 N . E . 527 .
3




6 Mich . 83 ; 8 N . W . 416 .
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been recorded , which did contain a lot 77, and it was held
that the error in the description did not invalidate the
conveyance , but that the part of the deed which men
tioned the registry or recording of the plat, if found in
correct , might be rejected .32
In the application of this maxim it is a matter of no
consequence in what part of the description the incorrect
statement occurs ; that is , whether it precedes or follows
the description which is correct . The courts will reject
the false wherever found , and give effect to the intention
of the party if the remainder of the description is suffi
cient.33
The principle underlying themaxim , however, cannot be
invoked to reform a deed in an action at law when there is
no ambiguity created in applying the description in the
deed to the subject -matter . For example , in Muldoon v .
Deline,34 which was ejectment to recover a small triangular
piece of land , the parties owned adjoining lands, and both
claimed under the same grantor . The plaintiff took his
deed shortly before the defendant took his , and in the
description in the plaintiff' s deed the gore in dispute was
included . The defendant offered parol evidence to show
that it was not intended to include it in the plaintiff 's
description , and that the first course in the plaintiff 's
deed should not run at right angles , but diagonally , and
sought the application of the maxim as to the rejection of
false particulars . But the court held that here there was
no ambiguity — there was no false description which ,
within the rule , could be disregarded . If the defendant
had a remedy it was by an action to reform the deed .35
82 See Merrick v . Merrick, 37 Ohio St. 126 ; Lanman v . Crooker , 97
Ind . 163 ; 49 Am . R . 437 ; Holston v. Needles , 115 Ill. 461 ; 5 N . E . 530 ;
Vestal v. Garrett , 1902 , 197 Ill . 398 ; 64 N . E . 345 .
5
3 State Savings Bank v . Stewart , 1896 , 93 Va . 447 ; 25 S . E . 543 ;
Cowen v . Truefit , 1899 , 2 Ch . 309 ; 81 L . T . R . 104 .
* 1892 , 135 N . Y . 150 ; 31 N . E . 1091 .
3
5 See Prentice v . Stearns , 113 U . S . 435 , 446 , 448 .
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§ 86 . Illustrations of the rules — Particular descrip
tions control general. — To appreciate the force of the
foregoing general rules , with their exceptions , it will be
necessary to consider their application to the facts in
a few decided cases .
When , as is often the case , a conveyance contains two
descriptions of the same land , one particular and definite
and the other general in its terms, the general rule is that
the particular description controls in a case of conflict , for
the reason that such a particular description is more likely
than the general one to have received the attention of the
parties. For example , where land is described in general
terms , as " the land called the Cross lot , now in posses
sion of B , " and is then particularly described by bounda
ries , the latter description will prevail in case of discrep
ancy , and the boundaries will not be extended to include
land beyond them but in “ possession of B . ” 36
But what Judge Cooley called 37 the flexibility of rules
of construction is seen in cases where there is an error in
a particular or specific description , and in such cases the
general description will control . Therefore , a description












y particular metes and bounds
including only a part o
f
it , will carry the whole lot under
the general description . 38 So where a description b
y
a








scription , the general will not be controlled b
y
the partic
ular description ; 39 and a conveyance describing the land as
the grantor ' s “ homestead farm , ” and then giving a par
ticular description o
f
the parcels composing it , omitting
3
6 Jones v . Smith , 73 N . Y . 205 . (See also , Prentice v . Railway Co . ,
1894 , 15
4
U , S . 163 ; Plummer v .Gould , 1892 , 92 Mich . 1 ; 52 N . W . 146 . )
ante , $ 84 .
3
8 Rutherford v . Tracy , 4
8 Mo . 325 .
3
9 Martin v . Lloyd , 1892 , 94 Cal . 195 ; 29 Pac . 491 .
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several acres, is sufficient to pass the whole farm .40 In
such cases as these latter , it is clear that the general de
scription , or the description of the tract of land as a whole ,
really indicates the property the parties had in view , and
their intention ought not to be defeated by a mistake in
setting out the specific boundaries . In fact, whether the
general or the particular description be preferred in a par
ticular case , the reason is the same, namely , the descrip
tion which conforms to the plain intention of the parties
prevails .
§ 87 . Illustrations — Monuments control courses and
distances. Of very frequent application is the rule that
in case of conflict monuments named control courses and
distances given in a deed ; and to carry out this rule
courses must be deflected and distances named must be
contracted or extended , if necessary . The reason for this
rule is that errors are more apt to occur with respect to
angles and measurements than with respect to objects
which are fixed and visible . Early and late decisions
may be found in every state applying this general rule .
Within the meaning of the rule , the law recognizes a
great variety of monuments ; notmerely those things that
would popularly be called monuments — as stakes , etc . , or
even trees, or hills — but streets and highways , springs ,
ponds , rivers , and small streams, railways , houses , party
walls , or other tracts of land are such within the rule .
For example , a well-known tract of land included in a
grant by a state , and generally known by a special name
( e . g ., " Hart 's Location ” ) , if called for as a boundary
by that name in a subsequent grant, will be regarded as
a monument named in this subsequent grant, and the
rule as to its controlling distances will be applied so as to
prevent the state from later granting land between the
4
0 Andrews v . Pearson , 68 Maine 19 ; Lake Erie & c . R . Co . v .Whitham ,
1895 , 155 Ill . 514 ; 40 N . E . 1014 ; 28 L . R . A . 612 .
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two prior grants ,41 and an adjoining lot designated by
it
s
owner ' s name is a monument . 42 So a creek is a nat





a particular course ) if it is clear that
the parties intended to carry a boundary line to the creek ,
that linemay be extended b
y reading into the description
the words necessary to bring the end o
f
the line to the
creek , though the distance recited in the deed is too
short . 43 So a party wall mentioned as fixing a boundary
line is a monument : if the measurement of the line is too
short it will be extended to it . 44 Hoban v . Cable45 affords
a good illustration of the application of this rule
(although the rule is not mentioned in the opinion ) . A
map is given in the report o
f
the case , from which it will
b
e
seen that the starting point is clear , and certain mon
uments — one a street — are named , but it appears that
if the courses as given are followed no land whatever will
b
e included in the description , hence they are disre
garded , and the lines run so as to reach the street — that
is , the monument .
But this rule a
s
to the controlling effect o
f
monuments
over courses and distances is as flexible as the others , and
if it clearly appears from the description , in the light of
surrounding circumstances , that the courses and dis
tances as given correctly describe the land intended to b
e
conveyed , they will prevail . “ To hold otherwise would
be to give the rule itself more importance than the reason
o
f
the rule ” , 46 and , of course , where the monument re






o . v . Saunders , 103 U . S . 316 .
4
2 Powers v . Bank o
f
Oroville , 1902 , 136 Cal . 486 ; 69 Pac . 151 .
4
3 .Park v . Wilkinson , 1900 , 21 Utah 279 ; 60 Pac . 945 .
4
4 Medara v . Dubois , 1898 , 187 Pa . St . 431 ; 41 Atl . 322 .
4
5
1894 , 102 Mich . 206 .
4
6 Hale v . Cottle , 1892 , 21 Ore . 580 ; 28 Pac . 901 ; White v . Luning , 93
U . S . 514 , 525 ; Higinbotham v . Stoddard , 72 N . Y . 94 .
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oral testimony , effect will be given in fixing the bounda
ries to course and distance .47
§ 88 . The part of the monument taken as the bound
ary . - Ordinarily when a monument having appreciable
width is referred to , the courts will construe the center of
the monument as intended , in the absence of qualifying
expressions or circumstances making such a construction
impossible or unreasonable .
This would especially be the case where the grantor
owns the monument designated as a boundary in his con
veyance , and in such cases the middle line or central
point of the monument , rather than its exterior , will be
taken a
s
the point to which lines should be run .
The rule will not apply where such monuments as
buildings or other tracts of land are referred to : in such
cases the side o
f
the land o
r building will be the limit of
the grant . 48
§ 8
9 . Streets and highways as boundaries — When
grantee takes to the center . - It is upon this principle







the central point o
f
the monument — that the general
rule governing boundaries on streets or highways is based
in some o
f
the most carefully considered decisions . 49






n existing street o





the way , subject to the public use , unless
there is something in the description showing an intent to
the contrary , or unless the circumstances are such that
the rule cannot be applied . 50
* Blackburn v . Nelson , 1893 , 100 Cal . 336 ; 34 Pac . 775 .
1
8 See Boston v . Richardson , 13 Allen 146 , 154 .
1
9 Paine ' s Ex . y . Consumers ' Storage Co . , 1895 , 71 Fed . R .627 ; 37 U .
S . App . 539 .
5
0 Lemay v . Furtado , 1902 , 182 Mass . 28
0 ; 65 N . E . 39
5 ; Gould v . East
tern R . R . , 1896 , 142 Mass . 85 ; 7 N . E .543 ; Henderson v . Hatterman ,
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It will be noticed that in several of these cases it is con
sidered unimportant whether the description of the lot as





plat , or by boundary lines running from the street .
Where the grantor owns the street it is generally held
that a conveyance of a lot bordering on a street will carry
title to his grantee to the middle of the street , unless his





a recorded plat the ownership
o
f
the street is not in the grantor , but has been conveyed
by him to the public , this , of course , will be a circum
stance which would prevent his conveyance o
f
the adjoin
ing lot from being so construed .
The rule b
y





is presumed to mean the center of the way , if it belongs





manifest intention , but is merely a principle o
f in
terpretation , adopted for the purpose o
f finding outthe true
meaning of the words used . 51 It is founded on the pre
sumption that in ordinary cases the grantor has no inten
tion o
f reserving a fee in the street adjoining the land
conveyed , when the street and its use have ceased to be
o
f




1 . 555 ; 34 N . E . 1041 ; Thomas v . Hunt , 1896 , 13
4
Mo . 392 ; 35
S . W . 581 ; 32 L . R . A . 857 ; Brown v . Baraboo , 1898 , 98 Wis . 273 ; 74 N .
W . 223 ; Warbritton v . Demorett , 1891 , 129 Ind . 346 ; 27 N . E . 730 ; 28
N . E .613 ; Olin v . D . & R . G . R . Co . , 1898 , 25 Colo . 177 ; 53 Pac . 454 .
In Firmstone v . Spaeter , 1892 , 150 Pa . St . 616 ; 25 Atl . 41 , there was a
contract for the purchase of a tract of land bounded on two sides by
streets , “ containing forty acres ,more or less , to be surveyed , and to be
paid for by the acre , " and the question arose whether the purchaser
was to pay for nearly two acres contained in half o
f
these streets . In
this action for the purchase price the court held that he must do so , be
cause the acreage must be ascertained in accordance with the boundaries
called for , and the price must be paid for the acreage within those bound
aries . Thedifference in price was $ 2 ,400 .
5
1 Crocker v . Cotting , 1896 , 16
6
Mass . 183 ; 44 N . E . 214 ; 33 L . R . A .
5
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tion should yield to evidence - shown by the deed or by
circumstances — of a different intention .53
§ 90 . Streets and highways as boundaries - Decisions
not in accord as to what expressions exclude the way.
As to what expressions in a description will be sufficient
to prevent the operation of the " center rule” , there is a
lack of harmony in the decisions : some courts having
been more ready than others to find an intention to ex
clude the street from the grant. By some decisions
naming the side of the way , or a monument on its side ,
a
s the place o
f beginning , is not enough to exclude the
way from the grant , while by others such indirect expres
sions o
f
intention will make the margin , rather than the
center , the boundary ; and while generally such expres
sions a
s




” a way ,
will exclude any part of the way , they will not always be
held to d
o
so . 54 Even in the same state the decisions are
not always harmonious .
In Holloway v . Southmayd , 55 the court says there
is great difficulty in reconciling the decisions in New
York upon the question as to when a description in a
deed which bounds the premises on a highway or street
shall be deemed to take in the fe
e
to the center line o
f
the roadbed in front of the premises . There is no doubt
about the rule being settled that there is a legal presump
tion against the grantor ' s intending to reserve to himself
the title to the soil in the highway , and such presumption
is generally only overcome b
y language in the convey
ance clearly indicating such an intention on his part , but
the application o
f
the rule is made uncertain through the
5
3 Huff v . Hastings Ex . Co . , 1902 , 195 Ill . 257 ; 63 N . E . 10
5 ; Graham
v . Stern , 1901 , 168 N . Y . 517 ; 61 N . E . 891 ; Overland Machinery Co . v .
Alpenfels (Colo . 1902 ) , 69 Pac . 574 .
5
4 See cases cited in the preceding section and compare Peck v . Den
niston , 121 Mass . 17 , with Deering v . Reilly , 1901 , 167 N . Y . 184 , 193 ;
6
0
N . E . 447 .
$ 1893 , 139 N . Y . 390 ; 34 N . E . 1047 , 1052 .
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varying opinions of courts as to the inferences which we
shall draw concerning the intention from the words in
which the grant is couched .
$ 91. Streets and highways as boundaries — When
grantee takes the entire street . — This rule has been ex
tended so as to include the whole street which is on the
margin of the platted land — as where one lays out a street
entirely on his own land , and at one side of it, so that the
boundary of his land and the boundary of the street coin
cide . If, then , he conveys land as bounded on that street ,
the grantee takes not merely to the middle of the street ,
but the whole of it.56 When , however , the grantor has an
interest in the half of the street at the extrememargin of
his platted land , or has rights beyond the margin - as, for
example , riparian rights — his conveyance of lots abutting
on the street should not be construed as conveying the
entire street .
For example , in Banks v . Ogden ,57 the question was as
to the ownership of accretions which had formed at the
shore line of Lake Michigan near Chicago , this line being
the outer edge of a street , and the lots adjoining it having
been conveyed by the original proprietor : it was decided
that, in conveying lots on the street, he conveyed only to
the center of the street , and after his conveyance still
owned the part adjoining the lake , and so owned the land
formed by accretions on that part.
$ 92. Description by courses and distances will con
trol quantity named — “ More or less " — When statement
of quantity important . - Courses and distances mentioned
56 Healey v . Babbitt , 14 R . I. 533, where the question was as to the
ownership of land in a street upon the discontinuance of the street
which was on the margin of a former grantor 's plat : it was held that
the grantee of the former owner of the whole body of land was entitled
to the fee of the entire highway . See also , In re Robbins , 34 Minn . 99 ;
24 N. W . 356 ; Taylor y. Armstrong , 24 Ark . 102 ; Haberman v. Baker ,
1891 , 128 N . Y . 253 ; 28 N . E . 370 ; 13 L . R . A . 611.
57 2 Wall. 57 ; see themap .
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generally control the statement of quantity , the latter be
ing considered , generally speaking , as less likely to be
definite . A statement of quantity has little effect where
the rest of the description is definite and accurate .
It is common , in speaking of quantity , to use the ex
pressions " about, ” or “ more or less , ” or similar qualify
ing words , and it is understood that in such cases the
parties assume the risk of a deficiency or an excess within
reasonable limits. Where there has been no fraud in the
sale , and simply an estimate of quantity has been made ,





acres is a mere matter of de
scription , and not of the essence o
f
the contract , the
buyer clearly assumes the risk o
f
the quantity , provided
there is no intermixture of fraud . 58
These words , " more or less , " have been allowed to cover
considerable deficiencies in many cases . For example ,
where an action was brought on a note for the purchase
price o
f
land conveyed , the description o
f
the land was
by metes and bounds , " containing 451 acres , more or
less ; ” the consideration was stated to be $ 20 ,000 . There
was a deficiency o
f
5
4 acres . It was held that it was not
a sale b
y
acre , but in bulk , for a gross sum . 59
In Noble v . Googins , 60 there was a contract for the
sale o
f
a certain lot , measuring “ about 220 feet on C
street ,more or less ” . There were but 170 feet . Never
theless , it was held that unless the deficiency was so great
a
s
to show fraud , the defendant must pay the whole gross
price , the court stating the general principle that the de
scription of land by its boundaries or the insertion of the
words " more o
r
less ” will control a statement as to quan
tity , so that neither party will be entitled to relief .
Even if a sale be by the acre , and the discrepancy is
slight , and the words “ more o
r
less ” are used , equity
5
8 Tyler v . Anderson , 10
6
Ind . 18
5 ; 6 N . E . 600 .
5




9 Mass . 231 .
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will not interfere on behalf of either the vendor or ven
dee ; as , in a sale of 195 acres there was a deficiency of
1 37 acres . This was held to be controlled by the phrase
“ more or less ” , and not such a deficiency as to entitle the
vendee to relief .61
The sale in cases where the quantity is named as " more
or less ,” without any other understanding , is generally
held to indicate a sale in gross and not by the acre , but
where there is a misrepresentation as to the quantity , or
an express sale by the acre , and there proves to be a sub
stantial deficiency, the vendee may recover back an over
payment , or equity will enjoin the collection of the pur
chase price,62 and in such a case the words “ more or less ”
will not prevent the vendee from showing that a certain
number of acres was named as the inducement for his
purchase .63 Of course , also , by an express covenant , or
by other terms in the conveyance , the quantity may be
come the chief element in the description ; as , for exam
ple , where the deed , after describing the land by courses
and distances , provided that " said tract shall contain just
one acre , and the distances shall be so construed ” .64
And , although the statement of quantity is the last part
of the description relied upon , it is often allowed control
ling force where there is uncertainty from the rest of the
description as to the land conveyed , even where the
words “ more or less ” are used .65
$ 93 . Reference in description to maps . It is very
common practice to refer in a conveyance to a map or
61 Frenche v . Chancellor , 1893 , 51 N . J . Eq. 624 ; 27 Atl. 140 .
62 Wilson y. Randall , 67 N . Y . 338 ; Thompson v. Catlett , 24 W . Va .
524 .
68Moore v . Harmon , 1895 , 142 Ind . 555 ; 41 N . E . 599 .
64 Sanders v. Godding , 45 Iowa 463 .
65 Ely' s Administrator v. United States , 1898 , 171 U . S . 220 , 234 ; Hoff
man v . Port Huron , 1894 , 102 Mich . 417 , 435 ; Oakes v. DeLancey , 1892 ,
133 N . Y . 22
7 ; 30 N . E . 974 ; Hostetter v . Railway , 1895 , 108 Cal . 38 ; 41
Pac . 330 ; Wilson v . Hildreth , 118 Mass . 578 .
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plat. Such a reference has the effect of incorporating the
map or plat in the conveyance .67 The reference to a map
or plat is usually to one that is properly recorded , but if
the plat referred to does not conform to statutory require
ments and is hence invalid as a plat and is improperly
recorded , the deed referring to it is not affected : it is a
good conveyance as between the parties and is binding on
them and all who have notice of the plat by the reference
to it in the conveyance ,68 and the reference may be made
with the same effect to a map or plat not recorded or filed
in any public office.69
$ 94 . Grantee 's rights in streets shown on map ,
Where the owner of land has platted it into lots with ad
joining streets and alleys, and sells lots referring in his
conveyances to such streets as bounding the lots, or re
ferring to the plat or map on which they are shown , the
grantees of the lots acquire a right of way in the streets so
referred to , even though they may not be actually opened
— for the grantor is estopped (as against his grantees ) to
deny the existence of the streets , 70 provided the land so
described as streets belongs to the grantor .71 By some de
cisions the grantee in such cases is entitled to the use of
all the streets shown on the plat ; none of them can , as
against any grantee who has bought by the plat , be
67 Masterson v . Munroe, 1895 , 105 Cal. 431 ; 45 Am . St. R . 57 ; 38 Pac.
1106 ; Nichols v . N . E . Furniture Co ., 1894 , 100 Mich . 230 ; Ferguson ' s
Appeal , 117 Pa. 427 ; 11 Atl. 885 ; State Savings Bank v . Stewart , 1896 ,
93 Va . 447 ; 25 S . E . 543 .
68 Nichols v . Furniture Co ., 1894 , 100 Mich . 230 ; Young v . Cosgrove ,
1891 , 83 Iowa 682 ; 49 N . W . 1040 ; Borer v. Lange, 1890 , 44 Minn . 281 ;
46 N . W . 358 .
69Wiley v . Lovely , 46 Mich . 83 ; 8 N . W . 716 ; Collins v . Asheville
Land Co ., 1901 , 128 N . C . 563 ; 39 S . E . 21 ; 83 Am . St . R . 720 ; Deery
v . Cray, 10 Wall . 263 .
70Garstang v . Davenport , 1894 , 90 Iowa 359 ; 57 N . W . 876 ; Cox v .
James , 45 N . Y . 557 ; Wolf v . Brass , 72 Texas 133 ; 12 S . W . 159 .
11Cole v . Hadley , 1895 , 162 Mass . 579 ; 39 N . E . 279 .
8 - BREWS. Con .
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closed , for the general scheme shown by the plat is re
garded as a unity . But, by other decisions , the grantee ,
while entitled to a way over the streets shown on the plat
which are necessary or convenient to the use of his lot, is
not entitled to have every street indicated on the plat left
open . 73
$ 95 . Statutory plats — Maps may aid description
though not expressly referred to . - !n most states there
are statutes authorizing a landowner to survey his land
and lay it off into blocks and lots , with parks, intersect
ing streets, etc., and to file among the public records a
map or plat o
f
the land so laid off , when the map is cer
tified and authenticated in accordance with the statute .
Under such statutes there will generally be a dedication
o
f
the streets , parks , etc . , shown on the plat . Original
subdivisions are often subjected to re -subdivision . Lots
in such subdivisions are generally sold b
y
a brief refer
ence to their number on the recorded plat , often no other
description being given than the lo
t
and block number o
f
the subdivision . These plats are important to be consid
ered in conveyancing and examining titles . It is often
necessary to consult the original plats , and it is well to
become familiar with the system o
f indexing and record
7
2 Wolfe v . Sullivan , 1892 , 133 Ind . 331 ; 32 N . E . 1017 ; Collins v .
Asheville Land Co . , 1901 , 128 N . C . 563 ; 83 Am . S
t
. R . 720 ; 39 S . E . 21 .
7
8 Pearson v . Allen , 1890 , 151 Mass . 79 ; 23 N . E . 731 ; 21 Am . St . R .




f the platted land , with reference to the plat showing the
streets , amounts to a dedication of the streets to the public . Quicksall
v . Philadelphia , 1896 , 177 Pa . 301 ; 35 Atl . 609 ; Meier v . Portland Cable
Co . , 16 Ore . 500 ; 19 Pac . 610 ; Trustees M . E . Church v . Hoboken , 33
N . J . L . 13 ; 97 Am . D . 696 ; Irwin v . Dixion , 9 How . 10 , 31 . But by
some decisions the filing o
f
the plat and making conveyances with
reference to streets not actually opened is not considered a
s
a dedica
tion to the public a
t large , though individual purchasers have rights
o
f way in them . In re Eleventh Ave . , 81 N . Y . 436 ; Sacramento v .
Clunie , 1898 , 12
0
Cal . 29 ; 52 Pac . 44 ; Prescott v . Edwards , 1897 , 117 Cal .
298 ; 4
9 Pac . 178 ; 59 Am . St . R . 186 .
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ing them , as well as with the chief statutory requirements
for platting and subdividing land .
Plats and maps may be used to explain the description ,
though not expressly referred to in the conveyance , where
it is evident the parties had the map or plat in mind .
This must generally be the case where land is described ,
as it often is, as “ lo
t
No . — , o
f
— ' s addition to ,
the city of — " . This method , without further ex
plicit reference to a plat is careless . And the plat should
be consulted b
y
the purchaser . The advantage of con
sulting the original plat may be illustrated b
y
a case
where one granted two lots , each described in the deed as
sixty feet wide , in a certain block owned and laid out b
y
him , a plat of which had been filed , b
y
which plat the
block mentioned contained a larger number o
f
lots , each
only twenty -six feet wide . It was held that the words
describing the width a
s sixty feet must be rejected , and
that , in the absence o
f
competent proof to the contrary ,
the parties must be presumed to have contracted with
reference to the real condition o
f
the property . 74 As these
publicly filed maps may aid the description , though not
expressly referred to , so also private maps , though not
referred to , may be treated as part o
f
thedescription when
evidently intended to be so treated . 75 And a map is some
times indorsed on the deed , and may be looked to in
explanation o
f
the description , though not expressly
referred to in it . 76
$ 9
6 . Incorrect maps controlled b
y
monuments . But
maps and plats are only one method of helping to make a
description ; and where , as is often the case , the map does
not correctly represent the actual portion of land as staked
out or otherwise marked on the earth , and there is a con
7
4 Arambula v . Sullivan , 1891 , 80 Texas 615 ; 18 S . W . 436 . And see ,
Masterson v . Munroe , 1895 , 105 Cal . 431 ; 38 Pac . 1106 ; 45 Am . St . R . 57 . ,
7
5 Prouty v . Tilden , 1896 , 164 Ill . 163 ; 45 N . E . 445 .
7
5 Murray v . Klinzing , 1894 , 64 Conn . 78 ; 29 Atl . 244 .
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flict between the map and the monuments on the land , the
monuments will control the description . These monu
ments on the land are facts . Plats and maps and notes
regarding them are but descriptions which serve to assist
in ascertaining the facts . Parol evidence will therefore be
received to show that the map as drawn does not corre
spond with the survey as made and marked on the
ground .77
§ 97 . Reference may be made to other deeds, etc ., for
description . — A conveyance may refer to another deed or
contract for a more complete description of the land con
veyed , and the description referred to is thus a part of the
later conveyance , and may be used to make certain what
is uncertain in the latter . 78 But the reference in a deed
to an earlier one for the purpose of showing the present
grantor ' s chain of title ( in the ordinary form , as : “ being
the same premises conveyed to me by , etc. ”') is not neces
sarily conclusive that the grantor intended to convey all
the land conveyed to him by the deed referred to .79
$ 98. Lands bounded by waters - General rule . - As
land increases in value with increasing population , the
question as to how far the grantee 's title extends when
land is bounded by waters increases in importance . It
presents itself in various and interesting forms.
Cities have grown up on the margins of rivers and
lakes ; artificial and natural causes have changed phys
ical conditions ; drainage , for agricultural and other
purposes , has caused lakes and ponds to become dry
17Burke v . McCowen , 1896 , 115 Cal. 481, 486 ; 47 Pac. 367 ; Decatur v .
Niedermeyer , 1897 , 168 I11 . 68 ; 48 N . E . 72 ; Thrush v . Graybill , 1900 ,
110 Iowa 585 ; 81 N . W . 798 ; Stetson v . Adams , 1898 , 91 Maine 178 ; 39
Atl . 575 ; Whitehead v . Ragan , 1891 , 106 Mo . 231 ; 17 S . W . 307 ; Olson
v . Seattle (Wash . 1903 ) , 71 Pac , 201 .
7
8 West v . Bretelle , 1893 , 115 Mo . 653 ; 22 S . W . 705 ; Rupert v . Pen
ner , 1892 , 35 Neb . 587 ; 53 N . W . 598 ; 17 L . R . A . 824 ; Newman v .
Tymeson , 13 Wis . 172 ; 8
0 Am . D . 735 .
7
9 Lovejoy v . Lovett , 124 Mass . 270 .
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land , and streams to change their courses ; islands have
sprung up or been swept away ; the erection of wharves ,
docks and bridges ; the building of railroads ; the cutting
of ice ; the location near water -courses and lakes of sum
mer resorts and shooting and fishing clubs — all these
varied conditions bring forward questions regarding both
riparian rights and the titles of marginal landowners to
submerged soil .
While natural differences in the kinds of bodies of
water taken as boundaries produce , not unnaturally , dif
ferent results , the question as to how far sub -aqueous
land is conveyed is further complicated by a lack of har
mony among the authorities as to the law on some points ,
the result being that the grantee 's title will be deemed to
extend further in some jurisdictions than it will in others ,
even when the water boundary is of the same character
in each . And in some jurisdictions such questions ap
pear to be still unsettled .
While much depends on the circumstances of each case
and on local laws, some general rules seem established
which assist one in drawing descriptions of this character
or in construing those drawn by others.
A broad general rule , of perhaps first importance ,may
be stated as follows :
Where water of any kind is made a boundary in the
description of lands granted , the presumption is that the
grantor conveys title to the grantee as far as his own title
extends (even though in some cases this may extend to
land under water ) unless the terms of the conveyance
clearly indicate that the grantor excepts the land at the
water 's edge and beyond .80
50 Ballance v . Peoria , 1899 , 180 II
I
. 29 , 36 ; 54 N . E . 428 ; Goff v . Cougle ,
1898 , 118 Mich . 307 ; 76 N . W . 489 ; 5 D . L . N . 517 ; 42 L . R . A . 161 ; Rail
road C
o . v . Platt , 1895 , 53 Ohio St . 254 , 266 ; 41 N . E . 243 ; Hanlon v .
Hobson , 1897 , 24 Colo . 284 ; 51 Pac . 433 ; 42 L . R . A . 502 ; Williamsburg
Boom C
o . v . Smith , 84 Ky . 372 ; 1 S . W . 765 ; Norcross v .Griffiths , 65
Wis . 599 , 610 , 615 ; 27 N . W . 606 ; 56 Am . R . 642 ; Waverly Imp . Co . v .
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It should not, however , be understood from this gen
eral rule , that when one owns lands on both sides of a
stream , and also owns the bed of the stream , and conveys
land on one side only , he conveys the whole bed ; in such
cases the central point of the monument (i. e., the
stream ) is to be taken as a general rule .81
$ 99 . The basis of the rule – Application to cases
where water is not named as a boundary . — This general
rule , or presumption , is founded partly on public policy ,
for when one conveys land bounded by water , to the land
under which he may have certain rights , he does not as a
fact intend ordinarily to reserve to himself any rights in
or under the water which bounds the dry land , and it
would be contrary to public policy to allow him or his
representatives afterward - and perhaps under very differ
ent conditions — to claim rights which he has not ex
pressly reserved or excepted . As by every conveyance
many things pass without special mention - for example ,
minerals , fences , trees , rights in the air above the land
conveyed and in the waters beneath it — so the soil owned
by the grantor under the water boundary passes as a part
of the adjacent dry land conveyed .82
For the application of this rule it is immaterial whether
White , 1899 , 97 Va . 176 ; 33 S. E . 534 ; 45 L . R . A . 227 . In Paine v .
Woods, 108 Mass. 160 , 169 , it is said : “ The general rule of construc
tablished ; that unless qualified by restrictive words they pass the soil
toward the center of the water as far as the grantor owns . For exam
ple , where , as in this commonwealth , the shore of the sea between high
and low water mark is private property , it is included in a grant of
land bounded by the sea ' or 'harbor ' or 'bay ' or other word descriptive
of tide water . "
81See ante , $ 88 , and Muller v. Landa , 1868 , 31 Texas 265 ; 98 Am .
Dec . 529 .
82 There is no conflict here with the general rule that " land cannot be
appurtenant to land ” - Humphreys v .McKissock , 140 U . S . 304, 314
because , where subaqueous land passes in such cases , it does so , not
as an “ appurtenance of the dry land , but as described in the deed
as part of it by virtue of this presumption .
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the water be named as a boundary of the land granted , or
whether there be a description by courses and distances
bringing the boundary to the body of water .83 So the
rule applies where land bordering on water is platted , and
the water lots are conveyed by their lot numbers without
special mention of the water.84
$ 100 . Application of general rule, how limited by
grantor . - Grantors may , of course , limit their convey
ances and reserve to themselves proprietary rights in
front of the land conveyed , but such limitation and reser
vation will not generally be presumed .
The limitation by way of exception or reservation may
be expressed in the conveyance - and some courts will be
more ready to find such restriction from the words used
than will others. Or, on the principle that maps and
plats referred to become incorporated in the description ,
the same end may also be accomplished by a reference to
a plat : and , if on the face of the plat , so referred to ,
there is indicated an intent on the part of the grantor to
make the case exceptional, and to reserve to himself
rights in front of the water lots marked on the plat, the
general rule will not apply . 85 As to what terms will be
enough to show a grantor 's intention to restrict his grant ,
in the absence of an unqualified exception in the convey
ance , or one by such reference to a plat as has just been
mentioned , somewhat the same difficulties are experienced
as arise in the case of a boundary on a street or highway .86
If a stream is given as a boundary in general terms, or
83 Railway Co . y . Platt , 1895 , 53 Ohio St. 254 , 266 ; 41 N . E . 243 ; Nor.
cross v . Griffiths , 65 Wig . 599 , 610 , 615 ; 27 N . W . 606 ; 56 Am . R . 642 .
64Head v . Chesbrough , 1897 , 13 Ohio Cir. Ct . 354 ; 60 Ohio St. 594 ;
54 N . E . 1102 ; Watson v . Peters , 26 Mich . 508 . See In re White 's Char
ities, 1898 , 1 Ch . 659, 664 ; Trustees v . Haven , 11 Ill . 554 .
8
5 Nichols v . Furniture Co . , 1894 , 100 Mich . 230 ; Gilbert v . Emerson ,
1893 , 55 Minn . 254 , 261 ; 56 N . W . 818 ; Palmer y . Farrell , 129 Pa . St .
162 ; 18 Atl . 761 ; 15 Am . St . R . 708 .
6
6
See above , $ 90 .
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the line is described as “ running along ” the stream , the
general presumption will ordinarily govern , and the
grantee will take as far toward the center of the stream
as the grantor owns. But if the land is described as
bounding on the “ shore ” or “ bank , ” it has often been
held that the grantor intends to reserve whatever title he
may have to the bed of the water , for the special refer
ence to the bank has been considered as excluding the bed .
But, as illustrating how descriptions of this general
character may be differently interpreted by different
courts , one or two cases may be noted . In Starr v .
Child 87 part of the description was : “ thence parallel
with B street to the Genesee river ; thence northeasterly
along the shore of said river to B street . ” The construc
tion of this by Justice Cowen was that the bed of the
stream to the center passed to the grantee ; but this deci
sion was reversed on appeal to the court of errors by a
vote of eleven to ten .88 Whereas a similar description in
Sleeper v . Laconia 89 was construed as not restricting the
grant to the bank or shore , and it was held that the
grantor could not be considered as having retained the
strip of land under the stream .90
§ 101. How far the rule applies to public grants . - It
is often necessary to consider how far the general rule of
construction applies to public grants from a state or the
United States ; for conflicting claims frequently arise as
to the ownership of islands , beds of streams, etc ., from
the fact that public grants are made , attempting to con
vey what appears ( if the rule applies to such grants ) to
have been previously conveyed by the government.
As to boundaries on non -tidal waters, at least, the gen
eral rule has been held to apply to public grants — the
87 1838 , 20 Wend . 149 .
88 Child v. Starr , 1842 , 4 Hill 369 .
8960 N . H . 201 .
so And compare , Murphy v . Copeland , 51 Iowa 515 ; 1 N . W . 691.
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presumption , that is , being against the grantor in such
cases as it would be in the case of private grants .
The rule has been considered , therefore , as applying to
grants from a state ,91 and to grants from the United
States , even to patents for lands on navigable rivers above
tide waters in states where private persons may have title
to the beds of such rivers . And it is said in some cases
that the government forms no exception to the maxim
that grants must be construed most strongly against the
grantors. 92
In spite of such expressions, however , the rule of con
struction as to public grants is properly different from
that which governs private grants , for public grants are
generally to be strictly construed against the grantee .
Therefore, where the grant from the United States is of
lands bordering on tidal waters the same presumption
against the government does not prevail , nor does it
where the lands are bounded by a navigable river in
those states which do not recognize private ownership of
the beds of navigable rivers .94 For “ when land under
navigable water passes to the riparian proprietor , along
with the grant of the shore by the United States , it does
not pass by force of the grant alone, because the United
States does not own it, but it passes by force of the
declaration of the state which does own it that it is
attached to the shore. " 95 Nor does this presumption
prevail in the case of grants by the government of lands
bounded by the waters of one of the “ Great Lakes, ” the
91 Boston v . Richardson , 10
5
Mass . 351 , 355 ; Granger v . Avery , 64
Maine 292 ; Ex parte Jennings , 6 Cow . 518 .
9
2 Butler v . G . R . & I . R . Co . , 1891 , 85 Mich . 246 , 255 ; 48 N . W . 569 ;
2
4 Am . S
t
. R . 84 , affirmed by the supreme court o
f the United States ,
159 U . S . 87 ; Jones v . Soulard , 24 How . 41 ; Middleton v . Pritchard , 3
Scam . ( 4 Ill . ) 510 ; 38 Am . Dec . 112 ; Chandos v . Mack , 77 Wis . 573 ; 20
Am . S
t
. R . 139 ; 10 L . R . A . 207 ; Williamsburg Boom Co . y . Smith , 84
Ky . 372 .
9
3 Shively y . Bowlby , 152 U . S . 1 , 10 , 13 .
9
4 Packer v . Bird , 1890 , 71 Cal . 134 ; 137 U . S . 661 .
9
5 Hardin v . Shedd , 1903 , 190 U . S . 50
8 ; 23 Sup . C
t
. R . 685 .
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beds of which are held in trust fo
r
the public , and are
analogous to tidal waters . 96 The United States supreme
court , in passing on the effect o
f
such grants , will gener
ally apply the law o
f
the state where the granted land is ;
and , as all the states do not hold to the same doctrines as
to the extent o
f private ownership o
f





the supreme court on this matter
will vary with the location o
f
the land . 97
§ 102 . Public grants — The “meander line . ” — In many
o
f
the states the comparatively recent source o
f
title to
most land is the United States .
The general government , after a survey of its public
lands , has conveyed them to settlers , often in localities
which have since become thickly populated
In opinions discussing questions concerning titles to
lands bordering on waters , the “ meander line " is often
referred to in connection with these public grants .
The meander line is the line run in surveying lands
bordering on waters , and follows , in a general way , the
windings or curves o
f
the land at the edge of the stream
o
r
lake surveyed , but is not generally coincident with the
actual margin o
f
the water . 98
9
6 Illinois Steel Co . v . Bilot , 1901 , 109 Wis . 418 ; 85 N . W . 402 ; 83 Am .
S
t . R . 905 ; see post , $ 112 .
9
7 Compare , fo
r
example , Packer v . Bird , 1890 , 71 Cal . 134 ; 137 U . S .
661 , with Grand Rapids & c . R . Co . v . Butler , 1894 , 159 U . S . 87 .
9
8 The “ meander line ” is not expressly created by law , but early
United States statutes , governing the surveys of public lands , provided
for the subdivision o
f
the lands into townships six miles square , sec
tions one mile square , and quarter sections , these subdivisions to be
















f navigable rivers ,may render this
impracticable ” : a plat o
f
the land surveyed was to be made by the dis
trict surveyor -general on the return of the contents of each subdivision ,
The meanderings of a water -course , being the boundarv of a “ frac
tional ” subdivision , would thus be shown by the “meander line . " See
Shively v . Bowlby , 1894 , 152 U . S . 1 , 33 ; U . S . R . S . , $ $ 2395 , 2396 ,
2399 , 2407 .
Particular instructions were issued from the general land office from
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Often there is much dry land between the line as sur
veyed and the water 's edge , and the question arises as to
whether this intermediate land has been conveyed by the
government when it has sold lands according to the sur
vey , or whether it shall be regarded as undisposed of , and
so subject to a future grant by the government .
The meander line is run for the purpose of ascertaining
the quantity of land subject to sale — the number of acres
the purchaser shall pay for - and is not run as a boundary
line .
Consequently , the general rule is that the first grantee
from the government of such lands takes to the water at
least , and not merely to the meander line , even though
the line as surveyed does not nearly coincide with the
water line. Hence the government cannot convey the
land between the meander line and the water -course or
lake, where it has previously conveyed the lands accord
ing to its survey , without restriction or reservation .
This rule is well established by decisions of the United
States supreme court , 99 and has often been applied by the




the rule produces , in
particular cases , somewhat peculiar results ; as , for ex
ample , where a small fractional lot of four and a half acres
was held to include an unsurveyed point , running beyond
the meander line into a lake , and containing twenty - five
time to time : for example , in 1855 , deputy surveyors were instructed as
to the method of meandering navigable streams ; and they were also
instructed to meander " all lakes and deep ponds of the area of twenty
five acres and upward ; also navigable bayous ; shallow ponds , readily
to b
e
drained , or likely to dry u
p
are not to b
e
meandered . ” Lester ' s




9 Railroad v . Schurmeir , 1868 , 7 Wall . 272 ; Hardin v . Jordan , 1891 ,




Albany Bridge Co . v . People , 1902 , 197 II
I . 199 ; 64 N . E . 350 ; Sizor
v . Logansport , 1898 , 151 Ind .626 ; 44 L . R . A . 81
4 ; 50 N . E . 37
7 ; Peuker
v . Canter , 1901 , 62 Kan . 363 ; 63 Pac .617 ; Olson v . Thorndike , 1899 , 76
Minn . 399 ; 79 N . W . 399 ; Knudsen v . Omanson , 1894 , 10 Utah 124 ; 37
Pac . 250 ; Washougal & c . Trans . Co . v . Dalles ' & c . Nav . Co . , 1902 , 27
Wash . 490 .
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acres . But, on thewhole , its application has resulted in
giving , what was evidently contemplated , a water frontage
a
t least . 2 .
§ 103 . When the meander line will be taken as the
boundary . - It is important to notice that while this gen
eral rule , as to meander lines , is thus well recognized , it
will not be applied where it clearly appears to have been
the intention when the survey , maps and patents are
compared , not to convey the government title beyond the
meander line 3 Moreover , the courts in other recent
decisions , while admitting the general rule , hold that
where there has been either fraud or mistake in making
the survey , and the so -called meander line does not in
fact outline or approach a body o
f
water , itmust be taken
a
s the boundary line .
Such mistakes have occurred where the government
surveyors have carelessly assumed that a body o
f
water
was , at the time of the survey , of much greater extent
than it actually was , ' or where they have assumed that
what proves later to have been but a temporary lake was a
·Mitchell v . Smale , 1891 , 140 U . S . 406 .
? In Harrison v . Stipes , 1892 , 34 Neb . 431 ; 51 N . W . 976 ; it is held
that " an entry o
f government land bounded by a meander line does not
include land lying at the time between such meander line and the bank
o
f
the river , " which appears to be an exceptional doctrine a
s thus
stated , contrary to the weight of authority . This and earlier decisions
in Nebraska are explained in the recent case o
fMcBride v . Whittaker ,
1902 , 90 N . W . 966 .
3 Niles v . Cedar Pt . Club , 1898 , 85 Fed . R . 45 ; 54 U . S . App . 668 ; a
i
.





a marsh , called by the surveyor " im
paseable marsh and water ” : over 4 ,000 acres laybetween the "mean
dered line " o
f early patents and the open waters o
f
Lake Erie , and the
club got later patents of this marsh from the United States , its title
being sustained in these decisions . See also , Horne v . Smith , 1895 , 159
U . S . 40 .
4 Whitney v . Detroit Lumber Co . , 1890 , 78 Wis . 240 ; 47 N . W . 425 ;
Live Stock Co . v . Springer , 1899 , 35 Ore . 312 ; 58 Pac . 102 ; same case
o
n appeal U . S . supreme court , 185 U . 8 . 47 ; 22 Sup . Ct . 563 ; Security
Land & c . Co . v . Burns , 1902 , 87 Minn . 97 ; 91 N . W . 304 .
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body of water proper to be “ meandered .”! 5 In such cases
the meander line, not having been fairly and honestly
drawn , after an actual survey, rather than a fictitious one ,
the plat does not represent the contour of the body of
water , nor even approximately the true quantity of up
land between the meander line and the water . These lat
ter cases appear to be instances of gross carelessness on
the part of the government surveyors . The decisions in
general, however, give no definite answer to the question :
how near the actual water line must themeander line ap
proach in order that the general rule , stated in the last
section , shall apply , rather than its exception , as illus
trated by these decisions ?
§ 104 . How far does title extend under water ? — Tidal
waters . — Taking the general rule stated above as a guide
— that is , that the grantor is presumed , in the absence of
words of restriction , to convey his title , to lands bounded
by water , as far as his title extends (not generally be
yond , however , the “ middle thread ” of a stream ) — the
practical question will then be in each case , how far be
yond the actual dry land does the grantor 's title extend ,
under the laws of the place where the land lies ?
The answer to this question will depend somewhat upon
the character of the water named as a boundary ; as , for
example , whether it is tide water , or a river , or a lake ,
etc .
It has been taken for granted by many authorities that ,
in waters affected by the tides , the title to al
l
lands below
high water mark is , b
y
the common law , in the king .
This proposition has , however , not always been accepted
a
s
a correct statement o
f
the common law , and it is doubt
ful whether it is really as well established as it has been
assumed to be . ?
5 Schlosser v . Hemphill , 1902 , 118 Iowa 452 ; 90 N . W . 842 ; Carr v .
Moore , 1903 ( Iowa ) ; 93 N . W . 52 .
* See a valuable discussion o
f
the question in 45 L . R . A . 22
7 , 237 .
6 $ 9
8 .
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It having been thus assumed that the shore of the sea
belongs to the king , u
p




water mark , it is presumed that the title o
f
others to
lands adjoining tide water extends to this line only ; and
while private persons may , b
y grant or , according to
some decisions , by prescription , acquire title below high
water mark , the ordinary presumption is against such
ownership .
S
o it is generally stated , that , b
y
the common law , pri
vate ownership o
f
land bordering on tide waters extends ,
prima facie , to high water mark only . 9 Whatever title ,
however , the king once had of a private , personal na
ture has long since given place in England to a represen
tative title b
y
which he holds for the people . 10 In this
country many o
f
the principles relating to tidal waters
have been applied to our larger inland lakes , and are ,
therefore , of importance to others than dwellers on the
seacoast .
The following brief summary of part of an important
opinion ' 1 is given :
On the settlement of the American colonies the rights
o
f
the king passed to the grantees named in the royal
charters , in trust for the communities to be established ,
and on the American Revolution these rights , charged
with a like trust , were vested in the original states , sub
ject to the rights surrendered by the Constitution to the
United States . On the acquisition of new territory b
y
the
United States , either b
y
cession from a state o
r by treaty ,
8Church v .Meeker , 1867 , 34 Conn . 421 , 429 ; Nichols v . Boston , 1867 ,
9
8 Mass . 39 ; 93 Am . D . 132 ; Oakes v . DeLancey , 1892 , 133 N . Y . 227 ,
231 (obiter ) ; 28 Am . St . R . 628 ; 30 N . E . 974 .
9 Sage v . Mayor , 1897 , 154 N . Y . 61 , 69 ; 61 Am . S
t
. R . 592 ; 38 L . R .
A . 60
6 ; 47 N . E . 1096 ; United States v . Pacheco , 1864 , 2 Wall . 587 ,
Field , J . : " When the sea o
r
a bay is named as a boundary the line o
f
ordinary high water mark is intended where the common law pre
vails . "
1
0Gann v . Free Fishers , 1865 , 11 H . L . Cas . 192 .
1
1 Shively v . Bowlby , 1894 , 152 U . S . 1 ; p
p
. 18 to 26 .
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or by discovery and settlement, the same title and domin
ion passed to the United States for the benefit of the whole
people, and in trust for the several states to be ultimately
formed out of the new territory .
New states admitted into the union , since the adoption
of the Constitution , have the same rights as the original
states in the tide waters and in the lands under them
within their respective jurisdictions.
The title and rights of riparian proprietors in the soil
below high water mark , therefore , are governed by the
laws of the several states , subject to the rights granted to
the United States by the Constitution . The matter of title
to lands under tidal waters , being subject to control by
the several states , we find the common law rule much
modified by usage and statute among the older states
along the Atlantic seaboard , many of the statutes being
early colonial ordinances .
Some of these states have reserved to the state the lands
under tide water , others have, by general laws , or by
grants or usage , given to private persons either title be
low high -water mark or rights in the shore practically
equivalent to it. The decisions of these states must be
read in the light of such statutes and usages : “ Great
caution , therefore, is necessary in applying precedents in
one state to cases arising in another . " 12
f 105 . How far does title extend ? — Rivers - At com
mon law . - As it came to be generally regarded as settled
that the title to the soil under the sea was in the king , so












the tide ebbed and flowed .
Hence the same rule was applied , in determining
whether the king o
r
the private subject had title to lands
under inland streams , as to the seashore .
1
2
152 U . S . , p . 26 .
128 § 106THE LAW OF CONVEYANCING .
The ebb and flow of the tide, as marking the extent of
the sea , seems to have been the test , and wherever the
tide is there no private person (ordinarily , and in the ab
sence of special grant or prescription ) owns below high
water mark at common law . On the other hand , above
the point of tidal flux and reflux , the bed and soil of a
river are vested in the riparian proprietors , those on
either bank possessing it usque ad medium filum aqua ,
and this none the less because it is actually navigable .
For the word " navigable , ” used in a legal sense as ap
plied to a river in which the soil prima facie belongs to
the crown , and , for example , the fishing to the public
generally , imports that the river is one in which the tide
ebbs and flows. 13
As it was generally , though not universally , a fact that,
in England , only those rivers that were affected by the
tides were navigable , and as the rivers so affected were
ordinarily public rivers, and , in the technical sense, thus
navigable , many courts and text-writers have drawn the
conclusion that the test at common law of public owner
ship of the bed of a river was actual navigability and not
the ebbing and flowing of the tide .14 But this appears to
be an error arising naturally from the very general coin




. Rivers in the United States — Private title to
bed in some states . — The courts of many of our states
have followed the English rule a
s
to non -tidal streams ,
regardless o
f
whether the stream is navigable or not , and
in those jurisdictions the title o
f purchasers of lands
bordering on navigable rivers extends to the middle o
f




8 Murphy v . Ryan , 1868 , 2 Ir . C . L . Rep . 143 ; Pearce v . Schotcher , . .
1882 , L . R . 9 Q . B . D . 162 ; Leake , " Law of Uses and Profits o
f
Land , ”
pp . 153 , 156 , 158 , 159 , 162 , 180 , 182 ; 42 L . R . A . 162 , 305 .
1
4 See Illinois Central R . v . Illinois , 1892 , 146 U . S . 387 , 435 , 436 . And






This is the rule in Illinois , Kentucky , Michigan , Ohio
and Wisconsin . 15
Where this doctrine is held , private ownership is sub
ject to the public right o
f navigation ; and the adjoining





a qualified , rather than an absolute ,
title . 16
In Scranton y . Wheeler17 it was held that the title to
submerged lands along navigable rivers , and the right of
access thereto , are subject to the paramount right o
f
the
United States to use the land in such manner as it shall
determine to be necessary in aid o
f navigation , as b
y
building piers , etc . ; and in affirming this decision , the
supreme court o
f
the United States 18 holds that the gov
ernment need make no compensation for the injury to the
riparian owner ' s right of access to navigable waters , as
this is not taking property for public use : three justices
dissent , Shiras , J . , stating for them that the question of title
to submerged land is not involved ,and basing the dissent
o
n the ground that access to navigable water is private
property , and cannot be taken for public purposes with
out compensation . In states , therefore , where this
" middle thread ” rule prevails as to navigable rivers ,
while the adjoining landowner has title to the submerged
lands , he has simply the “ bare , technical title . ” : 19
1
5 Bellefontaine Imp . Co . v . Neidringhaus , 1899 , 181 Ill . 426 ; 55 N . E .
184 ; 72 Am . S
t
. R . 269 ; Kentucky Lumber Co . v . Green , 1888 , 87 Ky .
257 ; 8 S . W . 439 ; Hall v . Alford , 1897 , 114 Mich . 165 ; 72 N . W . 137 ; 38
L . R . A . 205 ; Lake Shore R . v . Platt , 1895 , 53 Ohio St . 254 ; 41 N . E . 243 ;
2
9
L . R . A . 52 ; Chandos v . Mack , 1890 , 77 Wis . 573 ; 46 N . W . 803 ; 20
Am . St . R . 139 ; 10 L . R . A . 207 .
1
6 Willow River Club v . Wade , 1898 , 100 Wis . 86 ; 76 N . W . 273 ; 42
L . R . A . 305 .
1
7 1897 , 113 Mich .565 ; 71 N . W . 1091 ; 67 Am . St . R . 484 .
1
8 Scranton y . Wheeler . 1900 , 179 U . S . 141 .
1
9 Scranton v . Wheeler , 1897 , 57 Fed . R . 803 , 811 . See Slingerland v .
Int . Con . Co . , 1901 , 169 N . Y . 60 ; 61 N . E . 995 ; 56 L . R . A . 494 .
9 - BREWS . Con .
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§ 107. Owner 's rights incident to this title Islands
Ice - Shooting and fishing . - Even this limited title is not
without value , however, as the person having it is the
owner of islands which have formed on his side of
the channel :20 he has the exclusive right to the ice over
his portion of the river bed ; 21 as well as the exclusive right
to shoot game on the waters over it,22 though , perhaps ,
only on those waters on his side , that are not generally
navigable .23
At common law the riparian owner on non - tidal, though
navigable , rivers had the exclusive right to fish in the
waters over his part of the stream 's bed ,24 for the public
right of navigation does not carry with it the right of
fishing . 25 In the United States fishing is to a great extent
regulated by statute , and it has been held that the legis
lature may give the public in general the right to fish in
such waters .26 In the absence ,however , of such a statute
it seems that as a rule the riparian owner on a navigable
non -tidal stream may control the fishing there in those
states where his title to the bed of such stream is recog
nized . 27
§ 108 . Rivers — No private title to bed . — The courts of
other states , however , have considered that the ebbing
20 Bellefontaine Imp. Co . v . Neidringhaus , 1899, 181 Ill . 426 ; 55 N .
E . 184 ; 72 Am . S
t
. R . 269 ; Butler v . G . R . & I . R . Co . , 1891 , 85
Mich . 246 ; 48 N . W . 569 ; 24 Am . St . R . 84 ( af
f
’ d , 159 U . S . 87 ) .
2
1 Washington Ice Co . y . Shortall , 1881 , 101 Ill . 46 ; 40 Am . R . 196 ;
Oliver v . Olmstead , 1897 , 112 Mich . 483 ; 70 N . W . 1036 ; Reysen v .
Roate , 1896 , 92 Wis . 543 ; 66 N . W . 599 .
2
2 State v . Shannon , 1881 , 36 Ohio S
t
. 423 ; 38 Am . R . 599 .
2
8 Hall v . Alford , 1897 , 114 Mich . 165 ; 72 N . W . 137 ; 38 L . R . A . 205 .
2
4 Murphy y . Ryan , 1868 , 2 Ir . C . L . 143 ; Smith v . Andrews ( 1891 ) , 2
C
h . 678 .
2
5 Pearce v . Scotcher , 1882 , L . R . 9 Q . B . D . 162 .
2
6 Willow River Club v . Wade , 1898 , 100 Wis . 86 ; 76 N . W . 273 ; 42 L .
R . A . 305 .
2
7 See Sterling v . Jackson , 1888 , 69 Mich . 488 ; 37 N . W . 845 ; 13 Am . S
t
.
R . 405 ; Albright v . Cortright , 1900 , 64 N . J . L . 330 ; 45 Atl . 634 ; 81 Am .
S
t . R . 504 ; 48 L . R . A . 616 ; Beckman v . Kreamer , 1867 , 43 Ill . 447 ; 92
Am . D . 146 .
§ 108 131THE DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY .
and flowing of the tide was , at common law , simply evi
dence o
f navigability , and that it was really navigability
that determined the character of the river as being a
" royal river . ”
Or , if not taking this view precisely , they hold that the
proper test to apply under the physical conditions exist
ing in this country , in deciding whether the title to the
beds o
f
our rivers shall b
e public o
r private , is navigabil
ity .
In these states the bed o
f
a river navigable in fact isnot
subject to private ownership , hence a boundary on such a
river carries the grantee ' s title to the water ' s edge : in




" low water . " 28
It has been observed that this test of navigability is
wanting in that accuracy and certainty at which the law
aims , fo
r




some arbitrary rule , such as depth of water , quantity of
tonnage , et
c
. ; while the tidal test , as a rule b
y
which per





the public , and what are within
the domain o
f private ownership , has the merit of uni
formity and certainty , and is easy o
f application . 29 Nev
ertheless , this latter rule prevails in perhaps the greater
number of states , among others in Alabama , Arkansas ,
California , Iowa , Kansas , Minnesota , Missouri , Montana ,
North Carolina , Pennsylvania and Virginia . 30
2
3 See next section .
2






two recent decisions involving the
question o
f
" navigability ” of two rivers that appear from the cases to
be o
f
about the same size : Willow River Club v . Wade , 100 Wis . 86 ;
7
6
N . W . 273 ; 42 L . R . A . 305 ; Griffith v . Holman , 1900 , 63 Pac . 239 ;
2
3 Wash . 347 ; 83 Am . S
t
. R . 821 . In the Wisconsin case the river was
held to be navigable in fact , while in the Washington case it was held
non -navigable .
* Webb v . Demopolis , 1891 , 95 Ala . 116 ; 21 L . R . A . 62 ; 13 So . 289 ;
S
t . Louis & c . Ry . Co . v . Ramsey , 1890 , 53 Ark . 314 ; 8 L . R . A . 559 ; 22
Am . S
t
. R . 195 ; Packer v . Bird , 1890 , 137 U . S . 661 ; 7
1 Cal . 134 ; Mc
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§ 109 . Navigable rivers — Practically three rules in
United States . - Navigable rivers above the ebb and flow
of the tide are subject to fluctuations not the effect of
tides , and these fluctuations have been considered by
some courts , the result being that three different rules are
in force in the United States as to the extent of private
ownership of lands adjacent to such rivers :
1 . Private ownership extends to the middle thread of
the stream .31
2 . Private ownership extends to high water mark , title
to all below that being in the state .32
3 . Private ownership extends to lo
w
water mark . 33
It would seem that if all navigable rivers are to be re
garded a
s
tidal waters were regarded a
t
common law ,
then , in so far as they have a high water mark , as dis
tinguished from a low water mark , it should be taken as
the limit of private ownership , as it was at common law
o
n tidal rivers . 34
$ 110 . Non -tidal , non -navigable rivers . — On streams
and rivers not affected by the tide and not actually navi
gable , the rule in the United States seems to be universal
that the riparian owner of one side has title to themiddle
Manus v . Carmichael , 1856 , 3 Iowa 1 ( a leading case ' ' ) ; Barney v . Ke
okuk , 1876 , 94 U . S . 324 ; Wood v . Fowler , 1882 , 26 Kan .682 ; 40 Am . R .
330 ; S
t
. Paul & c . R . Co . v . S
t
. Paul & Pac . R . Co . , 1879 , 26 Minn . 31 ; 49
N . W . 303 ; Moore v . Farmer , 1900 , 156 Mo . 33 ; 79 Am . St . R . 504 ; 56 S .
W . 493 ; Gibson v . Kelly , 1895 , 15 Mon . 417 ; 39 Pac . 517 ; State v .
Eason , 1894 , 114 N . C . 787 ; 41 Am . St . R . 811 ; 19 S . E . 88 ; 23 L . R . A .
520 ; Palmer v . Farrell , 1889 , 129 Pa . St . 162 ; 15 Am . St . R . 708 ; 18
Atl . 761 ; Goodwin v . Thompson , 1885 , 15 Lea 209 , 83 Tenn . 209 ; 54
A
m . R . 410 ; Norfolk v . Cooke , 1876 , 27 Gratt . 430 .
3
1 Supra , § 106 .
5
2 McManus v . Carmichael , 1856 , 3 Iowa 1 ; St . L . & c . Ry . Co . v . Ram
sey , 1890 , 53 Ark . 314 ; 8 L . R . A . 559 ; 22 Am . S
t . R . 195 ; 13 S . W . 931 .
3
3 Williams v . Glover , 1880 , 66 Ala . 189 ; Fulmer v . Williams , 122 Pa .
S
t
. 191 ; 9 Am . S
t
. R . 88 ; 1 L . R . A . 603 ; 15 Atl . 726 ; Goodwin v .
Thompson , 1885 , 15 Lea 209 , 83 Tenn . 209 ; 54 Am . R . 410 .
3
4 Barney v . Keokuk , 1876 , 94 U . S . 324 , 338 , 339 .
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thread of the stream , and his conveyance ordinarily
passes title to this extent.35
Exact definitions , however , of “ navigability " and
" non -navigability ,” universally applicable , seem impos
sible to frame.
Rivers are “ navigable in fact when they are used or
are susceptible of being used , in their ordinary conditions
as highways of commerce , over which trade and travel
are or may be conducted in the customary modes of trade
and travel on water . * * * The capability of use
by the public for purposes of transportation and com
merce affords the true criterion of the navigability of a
river rather than the extent and manner of that use . " 36
Adaptability to navigation for pleasure renders a stream
navigable according to some courts ,37 though the expres
sions used in most cases where the question is discussed
would seem to limit navigability to such streams as are ,
or may be, used for commercial purposes .38
§ 111 . Boundaries on lakes - Public and private owner
ship . - In view of recent decisions concerning boundaries
on lakes and ponds the subject is worthy of especial
attention . Statements as to the matter in some text
books are misleading , for example , it is sometimes stated
as the law that : “ If the pond or lake is a natural object ,
the boundary line is along the edge at low water mark .
35 See Ross v . Faust , 1876, 54 Ind . 471, 474 ; 23 Am . R . 655 ; Welles v .
Bailey , 1887 , 55 Conn . 292 ; 3 Am . St. R . 48 ; 10 Atl . 565 ; Fulmer v . .
Williams, 1888 , 122 Pa . St. 191 ; 9 Am . St. R . 88 ; 1 L . R . A . 603 ; 15
Atl. 726 .
36 The Montello , 1874 , 20 Wall . 430 , 439 .
37See Atty . Gen . v. Woods , 1871 , 108 Mass . 43
6 ; 11 Am . R . 380 .
See Lamprey v . State , 1893 , 52 Minn . 181 ; 38 Am . S
t . R .541 ; 53 N . W .
1139 ; 18 L . R . A . 670 ; Grand Rapids v . Powers , 1891 , 89 Mich . 94 ; 28
Am . St . R . 276 ; 14 L . R . A . 498 .
3
8 See for recent discussions o
f
the subject , Griffith v . Holman , 1900 ,
2
3 Wash . 34
7 ; 63 Pac . 239 ; 83 Am . St . R . 821 ; Willow River Club v .
Wade , 1898 , 100 Wis . 86 : 76 N . W . 273 ; 42 L . R . A . 305 .
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If the pond is artificial the boundary is through its
center . ” 39
It will be seen40 that the distinction between natural
lakes and artificial ponds is not recognized in several
states and that the foregoing is not an entirely correct
statement o
f
the law universally applicable . There is , in
fact , no fixed and uniform rule as to public and private
ownership of the beds of smaller inland lakes , nor as to
the extent of private ownership where this is allowed .
Some courts and text -writers have followed Massachu
setts decisions , which have generally limited private
ownership on lakes to the water ' s edge , without noticing
that they are based on early ordinances ,making lakes and
ponds , of more than ten acres in area , public , 41 while
others have followed what they consider the common law
rule that private persons may have title to the beds of
such lakes .
§ 112 . The “ Great Lakes . ” — Concerning what are
known as the Great Lakes , it appears to be now uniformly
held that the title to the beds o
f
these lakes is prima facie
in the public — that is , in the adjoining state for the use o
f
the public ; and the same rule has been applied to other
lakes o
f great size , like Lake Champlain . 42
3
9 Tiedeman , Real Property , $ 836 , citing Massachusetts and Maine
decisions , and following Washburn , Real Property , 5th ed . , III , p . 634 .
Substantially the same rule is given in Angell on Water -courses , $ 41 .
4
0
$ $ 115 , 116 .
4
1
“ The law relating to great ponds is peculiar to this commonwealth
and to Maine , which was formerly a part o
f
this commonwealth . ”
Slater v . Gunn , 1898 , 170 Mass . 509 , 512 ; 49 N . E . 1017 ; 4
1
L . R . A . 268 .
“ Under the ordinance [of 1641 - 7 ] the state owns the great ponds as
public property , held in trust for public uses . It has not only the
ownership o
f
the soil , but also the right to control and regulate the
public uses to which the ponds shall be applied . ” Watuppa Reservoir
C
o . v . Fall River , 1888 , 147 Mass . 548 , 557 ; 18 N . E . 465 ; 1 L . R . A . 466 .
4
2 Austin v . Rutland R . Co . , 1873 , 45 Vt . 215 . By some courts this
rule is applied to all meandered lakes , whether navigable or non -navi
gable . Hammond v . Shepard , 1900 , 186 Il
l
. 235 , 241 ; 57 N . E . 867 ; 78
A
m . St . R . 274 ; see post , $ $ 114 , 11
7 ; and ifmeandered , a lake is to be
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On these lakes , therefore , the private shore owner 's
title does not , prima facie , embrace the bed of the lake,
consequently he cannot generally convey title beyond the
line at which the water stands when free from disturbing
causes .43 And , as the state holds the beds of these lakes
in trust for the whole public , it has been considered that
it is not within its power to grant them in fee to any pri
vate person . 4 Nor , it has been held , may title to them
be acquired as against the state by adverse possession
continued merely for the period which would ordinarily
give title . 45 Nor may the shore owner , without authority
from the state , build wharves or piers which intrude upon
the submerged lands o
f
the state . 46
However , the supreme court of the United States con
siders this matter o
f
title to submerged public lands a
question o
f
local law ; and should a state court hold that
the state legislature had power to grant , and had granted
to private persons either the title to such lands , or special
privileges in them , it appears that the supreme court
would not hold the grant invalid unless the state ' s action
interfered with commerce . 47
There have been instances o
f private ownership , arising
regarded a
s navigable in some states , and therefore to be held in trust
for the whole people , hence exclusive privileges as to cutting ice there
o
n cannot be granted by the state . Rossmiller v . State , 1902 , 114 Wis .
169 ; 89 N . W . 839 ; 58 L . R . A . 9
3 .
4
3 Sloan v . Biemiller , 1878 , 34 Ohio S
t
. 492 ; People v . Silberwood ,
1896 , 110 Mich . 103 ; 67 N . W . 1087 ; 32 L . R . A . 694 ; Sherwood v . .
Com ' r Land Office , 1897 , 113 Mich . 227 ; 71 N . W . 532 .
4
4 Ill . Cent . R . Co . v . Chicago , 1898 , 173 Ill . 471 ; 50 N . E . 1104 ;
affirmed b
y
United States supreme court , 1899 , 176 U . S . 646 ; Ill . Cent .
R . v . Illinois , 1892 , 146 U . S . 387 , 452 .
4
5 Ill . Steel Co . v . Bilot , 1901 , 109 Wis . 418 ; 85 N . W . 402 ; 83 Am . S
t
.
R . 905 . And see the minority opinion of Hooker , J . , in State v . Fish
ing and Shooting Club , 1901 , 127 Mich . 580 ; 8
7
N . W . 117 .
4
6 Revell v . People , 1899 , 177 Il
l
. 468 ; 52 N . E . 1052 ; 69 Am . S
t . R . 257 :
4
3
L . R . A . 790 . See Ill . Cent . R . v . Illinois , 1892 , 146 U . S . 387 .
1
7 See Illinois Cent . R . v . Chicago , 1899 , 176 U . S . 646 , 659 , 660 ;
Lowndes v . Huntington , 1893 , 153 U . S . 1 ; Shively v . Bowlby , 1894 ,
152 U . S . 1 , 13 ; dissent in Illinois Cent . R . v . Illinois , 1892 , 146 U . S . 387 .
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from public grants , of lands under the navigable waters
of bays on the Great Lakes ,48 and it has also been held that
those parts of these lakes may be privately owned which ,




water , are practically
marshes . 49
§ 113 . Smaller lakes and ponds . — When smaller lakes




fapplying any one rule to lakes
o
f varying shapes and sizes , and partly because of the
different views which the courts entertain a
s
to what , if
any , were the rules of the common law on the subject .
The common law apparently provided n
o
rule as to the
matter , except that the public title — that is , the title o
f
the king in trust for the public — did not extend beyond
tide -water , and so did not extend to inland lakes . It did





a lake among the owners o
f
the land adjoin
ing the lake . The English decisions are few . One o
f
the few is Bristow v . Cormican , 50 and on this case is





the United States , to be noticed presently . 51




ery in one o
f
the largest lakes of Great Britain , from
fourteen to sixteen miles long and from six to eight miles
broad and containing about 100 ,000 acres , was involved .
The plaintiff claimed his exclusive fishery and title to the
lake under a grant from Charles II , without showing how
4
8 Hogg v . Beerman , 1884 , 41 Ohio St . 81 ; 52 Am . R . 71 .
4
9 Toledo Shooting Co . v . Erie Shooting Club , 1898 , 90 Fed . R . 680 ;
Brown v . Parker , 1901 , 127 Mich . 390 ; 86 N . W . 989 ; Baldwin v . Erie
Shooting Club , 1901 , 127 Mich . 659 ; 87 N . W . 59 . And see as to grants
to private persons in tidal waters : Mullen v . Penobscot Co . , 1897 , 90
Maine 55 ; 38 Atl . 557 ; Oakland v . Oakland Co . , 1897 , 118 Cal . 160 ; 50
Pac . 268 ; United States v . Mission Rock Co . , 1903 , 189 U . S . 391 ; 2
3
Sup . Ct . R . 606 , and 42 L . R . A . 163 , note .
5
0
1878 , L . R . 3 App . Cas .641 .
5
1 Hardin v . Jordan , 1891 , 140 U . S . 371 .
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the king got his title . It was held that the crown has of
common right no prima facie title to the soil of a lake .
And the court says : “ Whether the rule that each ad
joining proprietor , where there are several , is entitled to
the middle thread of the water should apply to a lake is a
different question . It does not seem convenient that each
proprietor of a few acres fronting on the lake should have
a piece of the soil of the lake many miles in length
tacked on to his frontage . But no question arises in this
case as to the rights of the riparian proprietors among
themselves , for no title is made by either party through
any one as riparian owner. ” It is thus seen that the
court did not decide that adjoining proprietors should be
regarded as owning to the center of the lake ; though it
has been said of this case that the holding that the crown
has not prima facie title to the soil under the waters of an
inland lake , leads to the conclusion that such soil belongs
to the riparian proprietor .52 Exactly what their rights
would be when the land on the shore belongs to several
different owners appears not to have been decided in
England .
$ 114 . Conflicting views as to smaller lakes in the
United States. The peculiar condition of American law
on this question is forcibly illustrated by decisions relat
ing to a lake , called Wolf lake , about twelve miles from
Chicago , partly in Illinois and partly in Indiana . The
lake is two or three miles in extent and “ unnavigable , "
and the question is whether the title of the owner of a
fractional section of land bordering on the lake extends
to the center or stops at the water 's edge .
In Hardin v . Jordan53 and Fuller v . Shedd54 this ques
tion is considered , some of the same parties being in
volved in each case , and the samemap being used in each
52 Lincoln v . Davis , 1884, 53 Mich . 37
5 ; 51 Am . R . 116 ; 19 N . W . 103 .
5
8
1891 , 140 U . S . 371 .
5
4
1896 , 161 III . 462 ; 44 N . E . 286 ; 52 Am . St . R . 38
0 ; 33 L . R . A . 146 .
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case to illustrate the decision . The United States supreme
court is unanimous in holding that the question must be
decided according to local law , but is divided as to what
the law of Illinois is ; and as the members of the court
are not agreed as to what the law of Illinois is, so they
are not agreed as to what the common law is . The ma
jority hold the common law is the law of Illinois , and that
by that la
w , under a grant of lands bounded on a non
tidal and non -navigable lake , the grantee takes to the
center , citing as “ directly in point ” the case o
f
Bristow
v . Cormican , referred to in the last section . So the su
preme court o
f
the United States decided that the riparian
owner on Wolf lake owned to the center . The minority ,







the majority ,maintained that at any rate Illinois
law made a distinction between running waters and lakes ,
and that in grants on lakes the grantee took to the water ' s
edge only . Theminority ' s view is the law of Illinois . 55
The supreme court o
f
the state says : “ The determi
nation o
f boundary lines to the center o
f
a river is
not attended with any seriousdifficulty . * * * This ,
a
s well as the injustice of holding that the purchaser of a
small rim o
f
the lake , consisting o
f
but a few acres , would
a
t
once become the owner of thousands o
f
acres of a non
navigable lake , has caused many courts to hold that the
riparian proprietor takes only to the water ' s edge . ' ? 56
Whether o
r
not the lake has been surveyed b
y
the general
government and marked by meander lines is considered
as important by the supreme court o
f Illinois , for if the
lake was not sufficiently large or important to have been
5
5 Fuller v , Shedd , 1896 , 161 III . 462 ; 44 N . E . 286 ; 52 Am . St . R . 380 :
3
3
L . R . A . 146 ; Hardin v . Shedd , 1898 , 177 Ill . 123 ; 52 N . E . 380 ; Ham
mond v . Shepard , 1900 , 186 Ill . 235 ; 57 N . E . 867 ; 78 Am . St . R . 274 .
5
6 Fuller v . Shedd , 161 Ill . p . 483 - in this case purchasers of 153 acres
would acquire title to 1 , 100 acres if the central rule prevailed . And see
Mitchell v . Smale , 14
0
U . S . 406 .
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Following the Illinois decisions , the supreme court o
f
the United States has recently held that a patentee o
f
the
United States , of land bounded on a non -navigable lake in
Illinois , takes no title to the adjacent submerged lands . 58
§ 115 . The sectional line rule . — This same Wolf lake
is in Indiana , and the method o
f settling the question





bordering on the lake takes
so much o
f
the lake bed a
s
is necessary to fill out the sec
tion o
r quarter section o
f
which he owns the fraction ;
that is , while he is not restricted to the water ' s edge ,
neither does he own to the lake ' s center , unless the lines
o
f
his fractional lot extend so far . 59 The supreme court of
the United States says 60 that such cases are departures
from the common la
w , though this method of disposing
o
f
the subject might be convenient if sanctioned b
y
law . 61
§ 116 . Beds of inland natural lakes (though of large
area ) may b
e subject to private ownership in several
other states . — This sectional line rule just mentioned is





Clute v . Fisher , 62 but it is not the Michigan rule , fo
r
it
is there held in one case that the relative rights of shore
owners on such lakes are to be determined without refer
5
7 Fuller v . Shedd , 1896 , 161 Ill . 462 , 489 ; 44 N . E . 286 ; 52 Am . St . R .
380 ; 33 L . R . A . 146 ; Hammond v . Shepard , 1900 , 186 Ill . 235 , 241 ; 57
N . E . 867 ; 78 Am . S
t
. R . 274 .
5
8 Hardin v . Shedd , 1903 , 190 U . S . 508 ; 23 Sup . C
t
. Rep . 685 , affirm
ing s . c . 177 II1 . 123 ; 52 N . E . 380 .
5
9 Stoner v . Rice , 1889 , 121 Ind . 51 ; 22 N . E . 968 ; 6 L . R . A . 387 ;
Brophy v . Richeson , 1894 , 137 Ind . 114 ; 36 N . E . 424 .
6
0 Hardin v . Jordan , 1891 , 140 U . S . 371 , 399 .
6
1 See further as to Indiana lakes , Kean v . Calumet Canal & c . Co . ,
1903 , 190 U . S . 452 ; 23 Sup . C
t
. Rep . 651 affirming 150 Ind . 699 ; Kean
v . Roby , 1896 , 145 Ind . 221 ; 42 N . E . 1011 .
6
2 1887 , 65 Mich . 48 ; 31 N . W . 614 .
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ence to the extension of sectional lines , but by the prin
ciples governing the rights of riparian proprietors , de
pending upon their frontage , and the form of the lake ;63
and in another it is conceded that a meandered lake , a
mile in length by about one -third of a mile in width , may
be privately owned , but it is said by the court that “ no
fixed rule ever has been or ever can be laid down for the
division of the territory covered by these inland lakes ,
with their irregular shores . ” 64 And in earlier decisions
it had been held that the beds of small inland lakes , nav
igable or unnavigable , belong to the shore owners , sub
ject to the public right of navigation where the lake is
actually navigable , and that the shore owners ' title ex
tends to the middle line of the lake , unless the irregular
shape of the lake makes such a division impracticable .65
In Ohio a lake covering about 400 acres and “ non -nav
igable ” was considered subject to private ownership , and
it was held that where a lake of this character is men
tioned as a boundary (and not its margin ) the presump
tion is that the grantor reserves no title to land under
water and the grantee ' s title extends to the center . 66
In New York it is also held that the title to the land
under the waters of small inland lakes is presumed to be
in the proprietors o
f
the adjoining uplands , and that de
scribing one boundary in a conveyance as along a certain
pond will carry title to the center . 67
In Olson v . Huntamer the lake was meandered , but
6
8Grand Rapids Ice & c . Co . v . Ice Co . , 1894 , 102 Mich . 227 ; 60 N . W .
681 ; 25 L . R . A . 815 ; 47 Am . S
t . R . 516 .
6
4 Pittsburgh & c . Iron Co . v . Lake Superior Iron Co . , 1898 , 11
8
Mich .
109 ; 76 N . W . 395 .
6
5 Webber v . Pere Marquette Boom Co . , 1886 , 62 Mich . 626 ; 30 N . W .
469 , and cases cited .
6
6 Lembeck v . Nye , 1890 , 47 Ohio St . 336 ; 21 Am . St . R . 828 ; 24 N . E .
686 ; 8 L . R . A . 578 . See Railway Co , v . Platt , 1895 , 53 Ohio St . 254 ,
268 ; 41 N . E . 243 ; 29 L . R . A . 52 .
6
7 Gouverneur v . National Ice Co . , 1892 , 134 N . Y . 355 ; 31 N . E . 865 ;
1
8
L . R . A . 697 ; 30 Am . St . R . 669 .
6
8
1894 , 6 S . D . 364 ; 61 N . W . 479 .
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" non -navigable , ” and it was held that the grantee took to
the center of it ; the result being , in this instance, thatby
the drying up of the lake the adjoining owner acquired
thirty -eight acres , his original dry land on its margin
being but twenty -three acres .
In Minnesota , owing to the fact that many o
f
the lakes
have been gradually drying u
p , the questions as to the
ownership o
f
lake beds and the method o
f dividing them ,
have been discussed in several cases . The smaller un
navigable lakes - for example , one of about five hundred
acres in area , not meandered by the government and not
navigable fo
r
other purposes than 'hunting - may be owned
absolutely by a private person , and he may exclude the
public therefrom . 69
Riparian owners have title to the lake bed in severalty
and not in common , and their title extends to the center
o
f
the lake , the boundaries being fixed b
y
extending con
verging lines from the meander line to the center . 70
In Lamprey v . State , 11 the plaintiffs claimed a large
part o
f
300 acres , worth $ 250 ,000 , the bed o
f
a former
lake , which had been surveyed and meandered b
y
the
government and the shore conveyed to plaintiffs . The






The court held that " where a meandered lake is non
navigable in fact , the patentee o
f
land bordering on it
takes to the middle of the lake ; but where the lake is
navigable in fact , its waters and bed belong to the state ;
* * * ” that “ so long as these lakes are capable of use
for boating , even for pleasure , they are navigable ; * * * "
but “ where the waters of any of them have so dried up as
to be no longer capable o
fany beneficial use by the public ,
they are n
o longer public waters , and their former beds




9 Lamprey v . Danz , 1902 , 86 Minn . 317 ; 90 N . W . 578 .
7
0 Shell v . Matteson , 1900 , 81 Minn . 38 ; 83 N . W . 491 ; Hanson v .
Rice , 1903 , 88 Minn . 273 ; 92 N . W . 982 ; Scheifert v . Briegel (Minn . ) ,
1903 , 96 N . W . 44 .
7
1
1893 , 52 Minn . 181 ; 53 N . W . 1139 ; 18 L . R . A . 670 ; 38 Am . St . 541 .
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e
rs . ” Hence the plaintiffs took the bed of the former
lake .
In Tennessee it has recently been held that the bed o
f
a lake fifteen to twenty miles long and two to seven miles
wide , non -navigable in the “ strict legal sense , ” but navi
gable in the common acceptation o
f
the term , may be the
subject o
f private ownership , though the grants may limit
title to low water mark , as it was held they had done in
this case . 72
§ 117 . States holding to the rule that private title ex
tends to water ' s edge only . In the New England states
there has been a tendency to follow the policy o
f
theMas
sachusetts colonial ordinance , and to consider natural
lakes of over ten acres in area as public , and the water ' s
edge a
s
the boundary , 13 though when land is bounded b
y
a
n artificial pond the center of the pond would ordinarily
b
e
the boundary line . 74







the western states . 75
In Iowa the title to al
l
lake beds , especially those of
navigable lakes , is in the state , 76 nor have shore owners
prima facie title to the beds o
f unnavigable , meandered ,
lakes unless b
y
the conveyances to them a purpose to
include the bed o
f
the lake is indicated ; therefore , a
shore owner on a lake five miles long , 100 rods wide
and from three to seven feet deep , is not entitled to its
bed when the lake becomes dry land b
y drainage , which
7
2 Webster v . Harris ( Tenn . 1902 ) , 69 S . W . 782 .
7
3 Concord Mfg . C
o . v . Robertson , 1889 , 66 N . H . 1 ; 25 Atl . 718 ; 18 L .
R . A . 679 ; Brastow v . Rockport Ice Co . , 1885 , 77 Maine 100 , and see
$ 111 .
7
4 Mansur v . Blake , 1873 , 62 Maine 38 ; Mill River Mfg . Co . v . Smith ,
1867 , 34 Conn . 462 .
7
5 As to Illinois , see § 114 .
7
6 Rood v . Wallace , 1899 , 109 Iowa 5 ; 79 N . W . 449 .
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perceptively , and not gradually and insensibly , causes its
waters to disappear . ? ?
The supreme court adheres to the rule , which it says is
" generally recognized , ” that the title of riparian owners
o
n
a natural lake or pond does not extend beyond the
natural shore . 78 Nevertheless the riparian owner may
have his land extended into the lake b
y gradual and im
perceptible additions to it , o
r by similar recession of the
waters from it . 79 The fact , however , that a body o
f
water
















In Wisconsin , while unmeandered ponds may be pri
vately owned , 81 meandered or navigable lakes are held by
the state , as trustee , for the use of the public generally , but
not as proprietor , with power to dispose of their beds or
waters for the purpose o
f adding to the public revenues . 82
Therefore the riparian proprietor on navigable lakes and
ponds takes only to the water ' s edge , but as such pro
prietor he has the exclusive right of access to the lake ;
hence the state cannot drain a lake and cut off riparian
rights , and grant to private parties the strip which is left
between the new line and the old , fo
r , as the waters are
thus made to recede , the shore owner ' s rights extend to
the water , and the uncovered land is his . 83
On the other hand , if the waters are artificially raised ,
the public rights extend inland ; and if the artificial con
dition is continued fo
r
a sufficient timeand under such
7





. R . 571 .
7
8 Noyes v . Board , 1897 , 104 Iowa 174 ; 73 N . W . 480 .
7
9 Carr v . Moore (Iowa , 1903 ) , 93 N . W . 52 .
8
0 Ib . ; Rood v . Wallace , 1899 , 109 Iowa 5 ; 79 N . W . 449 .
8
1 Abbott v . Cremer (Wis . , 1903 ) , 95 N . W . 387 .
8
2 Rossmiller v . State , 1902 , 114 Wis . 169 ; 89 N . W . 839 ; 58 L . R . A . 93 .
Priewe v . Wisconsin State Land and Imp . Co . , 1896 , 93 Wis . 534 ,
546 ; 67 N . W . 918 ; 33 L . R . A . 645 .
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circumstances as to change the title to the land sub
merged , this artificial condition is considered as the nat
ural condition with all the incidents of the latter : the
state , and private owners of lands affected by the artificial
condition , may enforce the maintenance of that condi
tion .84
§ 118 . Appartenances . - Deeds in general use , where
the longer forms of conveyances still prevail , contain
usually " general words” following the description , the
chief of which is " appurtenances .” In some forms of
deeds this term appears first in the habendum . Whatever
is an appurtenance , however, will pass with the land con
veyed without the use of such words , fo
r
the incident fol
lows the principal , 85 and a thing is appurtenant to some




incident to a principal . 86
Easements87 o
f
various sorts are themost important a
p
purtenances , and , properly , the term applies only to
things of an incorporeal character . The term is flexible
and is to b
e
construed with reference to the character o
f
the principal thing granted So , fo
r
example , the con
veyance by a gas company o
f all it
s property , “ with the
8
4 Smith v . Youmans , 1897 , 96 Wis . 103 ; 70 N . W . 1115 ; 37 L . R . A .
285 ; 65 Am . St . R . 30 ; Pewaukee v . Savoy , 1899 , 103 Wis . 271 ; 79 N .
W . 436 ; 74 Am . S
t
. R . 859 ; 50 L . R . A . 836 . In Boardman v . Scott ,





boundaries on lakes and ponds : the con
clusion being reached that when one owning the land adjacent to , and
covered b
y
a pond , bounds land " by the pond , ” he does not convey be
yond the edge o
f
the pond . This conclusion is contrary to the general
rule stated above ( $ 98 ) and is criticised by the annotator in 51 L . R .
A . 17
8
: “ There is no doubt but the title to the bed of the pond is in the
private owner , and not in the state , so that the principal reason for lim
iting grants on natural lakes to the water ' s edge , as was done in the
cases cited b
y
the court ( in this Georgia case ) does not exist . "
8
5 Shep . Touch . , 89 .
8
6 Humphreys v . McKissock , 1891 , 140 U . S . 304 , 313 ; Book v . West ,








easements , post , $ $ 119 , 125 .
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rights, privileges and appurtenances thereunto belong
ing , ” carries a franchise which the company has to use
the streets for its pipes and mains ;88 and if mill property
is conveyed , a right of flowing land of the grantor , neces
sary to the proper enjoyment of the property granted ,
passes to the grantee as an appurtenance ,89 and , generally ,
one conveying part of his land impliedly conveys with it
an apparent and visible right of way , or other easement ,





the part conveyed ; 90 but in order to
so pass by implication the easement must belong to the
estate conveyed . 91
Though apparently other things than those of an in
corporeal nature sometimes pass a
s appurtenances , 92 they
actually pass as part of the thing described and granted ;
for , as a rule , " land cannot be appurtenant to land , ” and
pass under the term “ appurtenance , ” 93 nor can personal
property which is not in a legal sense part of the real
property conveyed . 94
$ 8 Lawrence v . Hennessy , 1901 , 165 Mo . 659 ; 65 S . W . 719 .
8
9 Jarvis v . Seele Milling Co . , 1898 , 173 II
I
.192 ; 50 N . E . 1044 ; 64 Am .
S
t . R . 107 .
9
0 Irvine v .McCreary , 1900 , 108 Ky . 495 ; 56 S . W . 966 ; 49 L . R . A . 417 ;
Richardson y . International Pottery Co . , 1899 , 63 N . J . L . 248 ; 43 Atl .
692 .
9
1 Bumstead v . Cook , 1897 , 169 Mass . 410 ; 48 N . E . 767 ; 61 Am . St .
R . 293 .
9
2 See , supra , $ $ 99 , note 8
2 .
9
3 New Orleans Pac . Ry . Co . v . Parker , 1891 , 143 U . S . 42 , 55 ; Oliver
v . Dickinson , 100 Mass . 114 .
9
6 Lansing Iron & Engine Works v . Walker , 1892 , 91 Mich . 409 ; 51 N .
W . 1061 ; Ottumwa Woolen Mill Co . v . Hawley , 44 Iowa 57 ; 24 Am .
R .719 .
1
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EXCEPTIONS _ RESERVATIONS .





. Difference in effect .
121 . Expressions causing doubt .
122 . Place for such clauses .
123 . Effect of certain words .
124 . Particular cases — Timber -
Minerals .
$ 125 . Reservation of easements
appurtenant to grantor ' s
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127 . Reservation to a stranger .
§ 119 . Exceptions and reservations in general . - Often
it is the understanding o
f
the parties to a conveyance that
the grantor shall not convey the land described without
retaining some part o
f
it or having some rights in it .
These ends are accomplished b
y inserting in the deed
the proper clauses o
f exception or reservation .
If he is to retain some existing part of the thing granted ,
which would otherwise pass to the grantee b
y
the grant ,
he makes an exception o
f
that part , and title to it simply
remains in him . The result is , obviously , that his inter
est o
r
estate in the thing excepted is the same as it was
before , and if he had an estate in fee in it he still has the




needed to produce this effect .
An exception relates to something in existence at the
time of the conveyance as a part o
f
the thing granted . '
By a reservation there is created some new interest for
the grantor in the thing granted , and a reservation , there
fore , relates to something not in existence at the time the
grant is made .
' Co . Litt . 47a ; Shep . Touchstone , pp . 78 - 80 .
(146 )
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Technically and strictly the term reservation is applica
ble only to rents and services and whatever things are
stipulated to be rendered for the tenure of the land .
But the application of the term has been extended , and
easements are now said to be reserved . An easement re
served , being a new right created for the grantor in prop
erty which he conveys , is often regarded as created by a
regrant , or a counter-grant, made by the grantee to the
grantor .3
This counter - grant, however, is a fiction (generally , at
least , as the grantee does not execute the deed ) ; it exists
only in the imagination , or, at least , the only part of it
in existence is the reservation clause in the actual deed .
Hence , if the new right thus created is to last beyond the
life of the grantee in the imaginary deed (who is the
grantor in the actual deed ) , it must be so stated in that
part of the imaginary deed which is in existence , and this
is the reservation clause in the actual deed ; in this clause ,
therefore , it should appear whether the regrant is to the
grantor alone and for life , or to the grantor and his heirs ,
that is , in fe
e
. This would be necessary , at least , where
the reservation is regarded as a regrant and where a
t
the
same time the common law rule has not been modified by
a statute making words of inheritance unnecessary to the
creation o
f
a fee . Where the technical word “ heirs ” is
no longer necessary to create a fee in an ordinary grant ,
it may not be necessary for this purpose in a reservation , 6
but its use , if a reservation in fee be intended , can do no
harm and would clearly indicate the intention .
· Hence it is said , " a reservation operates b
y
way o
f implied grant . ' ”
Whitney v . Fitchburg R . , 1900 , 178 Mass . 559 , 563 ; 60 N . E . 384 .
* Kister v . Reeser , 98 Pa . St . 1 ; Simpson v . B . & M . R . , 1900 , 176
Mass . 359 ; 57 N . E . 674 .
See post , $ 136 .
6 See Karmuller v . Krotz , 18 Iowa 35
2
.
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$ 120 . Difference in effect . — A simple illustration will
perhaps bring out the difference in effect between an ex
ception and a reservation .
I, the owner in fee of “ Lot A ,” convey Lot A to M and
his heirs , “ excepting therefrom a strip twenty feet wide,
running easterly and westerly , off the north side thereof."
The result is that I own in fee the strip kept out, and .
everything below it and above it. No one can use it, or
build upon it, or over it, or dig under it, without my con
sent. I may convey it, or part of it. I may sell separ
ately the trees on it , or the minerals beneath it. And if
I die , not having conveyed it, or a part of it, all these
incidents descend to my heirs .
If, on the other hand , I convey said lot A , " reserving
therefrom for a roadway , easterly and westerly, twenty
feet off the northerly side thereof,” I have reserved , ac
cording to the usual American view , an easement — a right
of way . The fee in the twenty feet has passed together
with the rest of lot A , subject, however , to my easement .
Another person may build over the space, provided my
right of way is not interfered with ; I do not own the
trees on the strip of land , nor the minerals beneath it ;
and , unless I have reserved the exclusive use , my grantee
(of lo
t
A ) may use the way also ; furthermore , unless the
duration o
f
this easement is defined or limited to extend
to my heirs , its use as an easement ceases with my life .
§ 121 . Expressions causing doubt . - A slight variation
in the phraseology makes it less clear whether the inten
tion is to create a reservation or an exception . As , I grant
lot A , " reserving a road twenty feet wide for my own
use . ” Is this a reservation of a right of way — an ease
ment - merely , and for life , or is it an exception of a strip
twenty feet wide which I may use as a right of way and
for other purposes , also ? It is at least doubtful , from read
ing the clause , which I have intended .
If , in this last case , a reservation of the easement , sim
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ply , is made, the fee passes subject to the easement , and
the grantee has all the rights in the strip of an owner in
fee subject to the easement reserved .? And the reserva
tion of “ a road ” would ordinarily be construed by many
courts as retaining an easement , merely , in the grantor .8
But if the road already existed when the deed was exe
cuted such a clause might be held an exception , at least to
the extent of not requiring words of inheritance to make
it
s
use perpetual , even in those states where such words
would b
e generally required fo
r
a reservation in fe
e
. And
it might be held an exception to the further extent o
f
re
serving not only a perpetual use (without words of inher





over which the road extended . 10 In multitudes o
f
cases
litigation has been necessary to settle the doubts as to
meaning , but it seems clear , from an examination of the
authorities , that , in nearly every case , confusion might




care when the con
veyance was drawn , and the intention of the parties so
plainly expressed as to leave no doubt about it .
Just what expressions should be used it would be im
possible to state for all cases , as exceptions and reserva
tions are almost numberless in variety , but it can not be
difficult to clearly express in words whether the intention
is to retain an incorporeal right fo
r
life , or whether it is
to retain a definite part o
f
the thing granted .
It is generally o
f greater importance to the grantor and
his successors than to the grantee that the intention be
clearly expressed , fo
r
if it is left in doubt the grantee will
generally get the benefit o
f
the doubt , but if it is clearly
expressed there is n
o
need o
f applying this rule . 11
? Moffitt v . Lytle , 1895 , 165 Pa . 173 ; 30 Atl . 922 .
& Wellman v . Churchill , 1898 , 92 Maine 193 ; 42 Atl . 352 ; Bolio v .
Marvin , 1902 , 130 Mich . 82 ; 89 N . W . 563 ; 8 D . L . N . 160 .
9 White v . New York & c . R . , 1992 , 156 Mass . 181 ; 30 N . E . 612 .
1
0 Munn v . Worrall , 53 N . Y . 44 ; 13 Am . R . 470 .
1
1 Richardson v . Clements , 89 Pa . St . 503 .
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$ 122 . Place for such clauses . — Attention to certain
matters in drawing these clauses will often prevent ob
scurity , and consideration of the same principles will
sometimes assist in the proper interpretation of them as
drawn by others .
The appropriate place fo
r
a
n exception is just after the
description of the property conveyed ; the place for a res
ervation o
f
rent is in the reddendum , as is now commonly





it is usually placed now after the description , it being
quite generally regarded , as before stated , as a regrant







f placing a clause
in its proper place may be taken the case of Knapp v .
Woolverton ; 12 in this case the deed was in the usual form ,
with covenants ; following the covenants , in the blank
space left in the printed form , were inserted the words ,
“ except all the wheat on the ground or land as above de
scribed . " The result was that instead of conveying the
property " except the wheat , ” it was a conveyance o
f all
the property , with covenants , except that the wheat was
taken out from the operation of the covenants ; and the
dispute in this case having arisen as to whether the
grantor could recover from the grantee damages for in
jury to the wheat b
y
the grantee ' s cattle , it was held that
h
e
could not , because the grantee , and not the grantor ,
owned the wheat , which was simply excepted from the
warranty .
If the exception had been in its proper place there
could have been no such question .
§ 123 . Effect of certain words . — The appropriate word
o
r words for the creation of an exception are : " saving
and excepting " o
r
" excepting , ” alone ; for a reservation ,
" reserving . ”
1
3 4
7 Mich . 292 ; 11 N . W . 164 .
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But these words are , as deeds are drawn , often used
interchangeably , so very little assistance in construing





the one or the other does not control in fixing the
character o
f
the clause as an exception or a reservation .
Illustrations : An exception may be created b
y
words
more appropriate to a reservation , as : “ Saving and resery
ing for his own use the coal contained in said parcel of
land , together with free ingress and egress b
y
wagon road to
haul the coal therefrom aswanted ” — this clause was held
to except the coal - something already existing as a part
o
f
the thing granted — and not to reserve merely the right
to use coal fo
r
the grantor ' s life , as was contended . 13
Sometimes the words are used together ; as where the
clause was : “ excepting and reserving , however , the full
right of keeping and maintaining booms on the flats
between high and low water mark o
f
said river along the




sell to other persons ” — and it was construed not to be




where the same two words were used — " reserving
and excepting " a strip of land , it was held that a reserva
tion , rather than an exception , was created . 15
From such cases , and there are many , the conclusion is
sometimes hastily drawn that there is no advantage to be
gained from considering the distinction between an ex
ception and a reservation - if , indeed , the distinction
exists .
But the truth is , that while there is often difficulty in
determining whether a particular clause is one or the
other , and while , also , in particular cases , there is much
room for difference o
f
opinion , yet when once the char
acter o
f
the provision has been settled , the legal incidents
1
3 Whitaker v . Brown , 46 Pa . St . 197 .
1
4 Engel v . Ayer , 1893 , 85 Maine 448 ; 27 Atl . 352 .
1
5 Biles v . Railroad , 1893 , 5 Wash . 509 ; 32 Pac . 211 .
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belonging to it as of that particular character attach to it,
and so in most cases the distinction cannot be disre
garded .
§ 124 . Particular cases — Timber — Minerals . - It is not
unusual for the grantor to retain in one form or another
an interest in a portion of the growing timber on land
conveyed by him .
He may except it, in which case the actual ownership
of the timber is in him , together with an implied power
to enter on the land to cut the timber and remove it, as
also the right to have it left unhurt by the removal of the
soil ; subsequent purchasers must take notice of his rights,
and if no time is named within which he is to remove the
timber , it seems that he is not required to remove it with
in a limited time.16 And even if a time has been limited
within which the grantor must remove timber cut by him
under an exception which leaves the title in him , his title
to the excepted timber will not be forfeited to the grantee
by his failure to remove what he has cut within the time
limited .17
On the other hand ,hemay reserve simply the right to cut
the timber and to do it within a limited time, in which case
the title to the timber does not remain in him , and should
he neglect to cut it within the time limited it would become
the property of the grantee .18
Exceptions of minerals of one kind or another are not
uncommon , but here , also , the distinction must be borne
in mind between keeping back a specified thing , and
reserving a right to enter the lands and remove it.
For example , where a deed reserved to the grantor
16Wait v. Baldwin , 60 Mich . 622 ; 27 N . W . 697 ; 1 Am . St. R . 551 ;
Howard v. Lincoln , 13 Maine 122 ; Sears v. Ackerman , 1903, 138 Cal.
583 ; 72 Pac . 171 . Though see, Huron Land Co . v. Davison (Mich . 1902 ) ,
90 N . W . 1034 ; 9 D . L . N . 239 ; holding that the grantor must remove
the timber within a reasonable time after notice from the grantee .
17 Irons v . Webb , 41 N . J . L . 203 ; 32 Am . R . 193 .
18Martin v. Gilson , 37 Wis . 360 .
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“ the right ofmining on the above granted premises " a
certain amount of ore annually , “ at a duty of thirty
seven and one-half cents per ton , including all the facili
ties needful fo
r
doing the same , ” it was held that the
property in themines themselves and in the ore they con
tained passed to the grantee , and that there was reserved
to the grantor a license to enter on the granted premises
and exercise certain rights for the purpose of extracting
from the mines a limited quantity o
f
the ore ,and revesting
in the grantor the property in that which was thus sepa




n exclusive right it might be held to retain in the
grantor the property in the mines , being practically an
exception ; but , as it was not exclusive , there was noth
ing to prevent the grantee from working the mines at the
same time . 19
And a deed containing a clause b
y
which a grantor
“ reserves for himself ,his heirs and assigns , a free tolera
tion o
f getting coal for their own use without hindrance
o
r
denial , ” conveys the land with its minerals to the
grantee subject only to the privilege kept by the grantor ,
which is not an exclusive right to the coal . 20 Whereas ,
o
n the other hand , b
y
a clause in the deed reading , " ex
cept the right to all valuable minerals in said land , which
we hereby reserve , together with the right to mine the
same , " the grantor retains the exclusive right to and
ownership in the minerals . 21
§ 125 . Reservation of easements appurtenant to grant
o
r ' s other land . - It often happens that the grantor re
serves a right of way or other easement for the benefit of
other land o
f his in the vicinity , and the question has
arisen in such cases a
s




9 Stockbridge Iron C
o . v . Hudson Iron Co . , 107 Mass . 290 , 321 , 322 .
2
0 Algonquin Coal Co . v . Northern & c . Co . , 1894 , 162 Pa . 114 ; 29 Atl .
2
1 Snoddy v . Bolen , 1894 , 122 Mo . 479 ; 24 S . W . 142 ; 25 S . W . 932 .
402 .
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While the general rule is recognized that a reservation ,
in order to continue in fee , should be limited to the
grantor and his heirs, as if it were actually a regrant ,
such cases as those now referred to are considered as jus
tifying a disregard of this technical rule , and the ease
ment in such cases is held to be one in fee ( though
words of inheritance are wanting ) , and capable of passing
to subsequent grantees as appurtenant to the land re
tained by the grantor.22 And in such cases, besides look
ing at the reservation in this way , the courts sometimes
regard it as an exception , considering the grantor 's estate
at the time the conveyance is made as a collection of
rights in esse , from which collection the one reserved is
excepted , with the same incidents attached to it as if it
were a technical exception , among which incidents is the
non -requirement of words of inheritance to create a fee ,
provided the owner 's estate was formerly a fee .23
While such doctrines have undoubtedly resulted in sub
stantial justice in particular cases , they are not adopted
by al
l
courts , 24 and there are consequently , in the law as
to reservations o
f
easements in this country , uncertainty
and confusion which are annoying . 25
§ 126 . Exception and reservations repugnant to grant
- Effect o
f
. — Exceptions and reservations will be held
void if repugnant to the estate granted , because the grant
in such case would b
e inoperative were the repugnant ex
ception o
r
reservation to stand .
Having , therefore , granted a specific and definite num
2
2 Lathropy . Elsner , 1892 , 93 Mich . 599 ; 53 N . W . 791 ; Walz v .
Walz , 1894 , 101 Mich . 167 ; 59 N . W . 431 ; Chicago & c . R . v . Ward , 12
8
Ill . 349 ; 18 N . E . 828 ; 21 N . E . 562 ; Wells y . Tolman , 156 N . Y . 636 ;
51 N . E . 271 .
2
3 Chappel v . Railroad , 1892 , 62 Conn . 195 ; 24 Atl . 997 ; 17 L . R . A .
420 ; Smith v . Furbish , 1894 , 68 N . H . 123 , 14
5
; 44 Atl . 398 ; 47 L . R . A
226 . See Knowlton y . Railroad , 1899 , 72 Conn . 188 ; 44 Atl . 8 .
2
4 See , fo
r
example , Simpson v . Railroad , 1900 , 17
6
Mass . 359 ; 57 N .
E . 674 .
2
5 There is a useful note on this subject in 20 L . R . A . 631 .
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ber of acres , the grantor cannot except part of the num
ber granted ; or having granted an estate in fee he cannot
by exception or reservation retain absolute control in fee
of the estate granted .
But exceptions may be very broad without being held
repugnant ; as an exception of all minerals , valuable
earths , substances , coals , ores, all manner of composi
tions , et
c
. , was held to leave something for the grantee in
the water , timber and ordinary soil . 26
And , the grant being in general terms , an exception of
a part is valid ; as , if the grant be of the “ S . W . quarter ,
etc . , " an exception may bemade of five acres in the south
west corner , etc . ; or , even if the boundaries be definitely
given , but the grant does not name a specific number of
acres as conveyed , the woodland or marsh may be ex
cepted . 27
S
o there is no repugnancy , if , having granted a fee , the
grantor reserves a life estate , or an estate for years ; and
express reservations o
f
such interests are not unusual . 28
§ 127 . Reservation to a stranger . — It is a general
principle that a reservation to a stranger not a party to
the conveyance is void , and the stranger can take noth
ing by virtue o
f
the reservation . 29 In order , however , to
carry out the intention o
f
the parties , such a reservation
has sometimes been construed a
s
a
n exception , practically
giving the stranger the benefit of the reservation , and as
giving notice o
f
his rights . 30 And in Wall v . Wall , 31
where a reservation clause was : “ reserving to herself
2
6 Foster v . Runk , 109 Pa . 291 .
2
7 Painter v . Water Co . , 1891 , 91 Cal . 74 ; 27 Pac . 539 .
2
8 McDougal v . Musgrave , 1899 , 46 W . Va . 509 ; 33 S . E . 281 ; Fisk v .
Brayman , 1899 , 21 R . I . 195 ; 42 Atl . 878 .
7
9 Edwards Hall Co . v . Dresser , 1896 , 168 Mass . 13
6 ; 46 N . E . 420 ;
Littlefield v . Mott , 14 R . I . 288 .
3
0 Martin v . Cook , 1894 , 102 Mich . 267 ; 60 N . W . 679 ; Beinlein v .
Johns , 1898 , 102 Ky . 570 ; 44 S . W . 128 .
3
1
1900 , 126 N . C . 405 ; 35 S . E . 811 .
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(grantor ), the possession , use , enjoyment and control of
the tract of land for her natural life , and reserving , also ,
the care and support of her daughter for and during the
life of the said daughter , ” it was held that the reserva
tion for the support of the daughter was a lien on the
land , enforceable by the daughter against the land in the
hands of a subsequent grantee , who took it with notice of
this clause .32
32See also , Blakeley V. Adams (Ky., 1902 ), 68 S . W . 393 .
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$ 128 . The habendum , its function . — " The office of the
habendum is to limit the estate . ” 1
The word “ limit ” is here used not in its sense o
f
“ to
restrict , ” but as meaning to mark out , or to define .
The premises having properly designated the parties
and the thing granted , the habendum then declares o
r
* Buckler ' s Case , 2 Rep . (Coke ) 55 .
( 157 )
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defines the estate of the grantee in the thing granted
whether it is for life , in fee , etc .
It will have been noticed that in most of the statutory
short forms of deeds there is no habendum ; and , irre
spective of such statutes, it is not an essential part of a
deed , if the estate is otherwise limited or defined . Yet ,
as most of the deeds in actual use have the habendum ,
the general principles applicable to it require notice .
§ 129 . Effect of contradictions between premises and
habendum . — Where each part of the deed is so drawn as
to perform it
s
office , there can almost no question arise
a
s





But it is not unusual to find discrepancies between
different parts of the deed , especially between the premises
and the habendum .
Among the most common discrepancies may be men
tioned the following :




one kind having been limited in the
premises , a different estate is limited in the habendum .
( b ) Different persons are named a
s grantees in the
premises and in the habendum .
It is not necessary that the premises should con
tain any mention o
f
the estate to be granted ; and there
is , indeed , authority for the view that it is not only un
necessary but improper for the estate to be there men
tioned . Nevertheless it is very common for the estate
granted to be named after the designation o
f
the grantee
in the premises . And an instance o
f
the first kind o
f
discrepancy would be where the lands conveyed are stated
in the premises to be granted “ to A and his heirs , ” while





his natural life . ” In such a case , applying
technical rules o
f
construction , the habendum is void , as
it is irreconcilable with the premises b
y
which an estate
* Shep . Touch . 75 .
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has been already vested . It is, therefore , a general rule.
that where the estate is expressly set forth in the prem
ises it cannot be defeated by repugnant words in the ha
bendum . The habendum is void , and the estate as given
in the premises stands. But to have this effect the repug
nancy must be clear , fo
r
if it is not so , effect may be given
to the habendum , as will appear from cases cited in the
three following sections .
$ 130 . Where habendum is not repugnant , it may ex
plain and qualify the premises . — Where the habendum is
not repugnant to the premises in respect to the estate
granted it may serve to lessen , enlarge , explain or qual
ify the estate which would otherwise be granted b
y
the
premises standing alone . For example , a fe
e simple and
a fee tail are both estates o
f
inheritance , and if a grant be
made “ to A and his heirs , to have and to hold to the
said A and the heirs of his body , " the grantee would
take a fee tail . 4
These estates being both estates of inheritance - though
not identical - there is no such incompatibility between
the premises and the habendum as to make them irrecon
cilably repugnant — as there is in the case o
f
a fee granted
in the premises , with a life estate in the habendum ;
hence the habendum may modify and to some extent
lessen the estate as named in the premises .
S
o if the estate given in the premises is a fee b
y impli
cation , and is not expressly stated to be such , the haben




For example , were the conveyance substantially : “ A
conveys and warrants to B ( certain described real estate ) ,
to have and to hold the same for life ” - here , there being
no express grant in fee in the premises , though , standing
3 See Smith v . Smith , 71 Mich . 633 , 640 ; 40 N . W . 21 ; Pynchon v . .
Stearns , 11 Met . (Mass . ) 312 , 316 .
* Tyler v . Moore , 42 Pa . St . 374 , 386 .
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alone, “ convey and warrant ” would amount to it in
many states, the habendum may properly be given effect
" controlling , ” as is sometimes said , the premises .6
And , where by virtue of statutes , which exist in most
of the states , dispensing with the word “ heirs ” to create
an estate in fee , a fee would be created by the premises
alone which merely described the property and thegrantee ,
the same result, as noted in these last cases , would follow
from the use of an habendum expressly modifying the
estate arising by legal implication from the premises . ?
Such cases are sometimes spoken of as instances of re
pugnancy between the premises and the habendum , and
the habendum is said to “ control ” the premises ; but it
is evident , when the deed is read as a whole , that there
is no contradiction or repugnancy , fo
r
the habendum
simply expresses what is unexpressed in the premises ,
and does away with the necessity for resorting to legal
implication to learn the intention o
f
the parties . There
is , in fact , no estate in the premises to be “ controlled "
by the habendum , but the habendum for the first time
mentions and defines the estate intended to be granted .
§ 131 . Effect of habendum in enlarging the premises .
It is very generally stated that the habendum may
" enlarge ” or extend the estate granted , and Coke is cited
a
s authority for the proposition that if land be granted to
one for life , “ to have and to hold to him and his heirs , ”
the grantee will take an estate in fe
e
. Where the grant
ing clause is in general terms , and from the whole deed
read in the light of surrounding circumstances , it appears
that it did not express the grantor ' s intention , the practi
6 By virtue o
f
statutes , see ante , $ 30 .
6 Doren v . Gillum , 1893 , 136 Ind . 134 ; 35 N . E . 1101 ; Welch v . Welch ,
1899 , 183 II
I
. 237 ; 55 N . E . 694 .
? Riggin v . Love , 72 Ill . 553 ; Rupert v . Penner , 1892 , 35 Neb . 587 ;
5
3
N . W . 598 ; Montgomery v . Sturdivant , 41 Cal . 290 .
& Co . Litt . , 299a .
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cal effect of the habendum may be to enlarge the premises :
as, if the granting clause is to a woman “ and her children
and assigns, " " To have and to hold to her and her heirs
and assigns,” it would convey to her a fee , the ha
bendum explaining and enlarging the estate granted in
the premises .9 But while this may be truewhen the state
ment in the premises is in general terms, the habendum
can not be allowed to enlarge the estate named in the
premises when the premises specifically and expressly
define and limit it. For example, one conveyed land to
his daughter and her husband , “ their heirs and assigns ,”
and after the description of the land , there followed in
the premises : “ It is expressly understood by al
l
parties




their two bodies begotten and born ,
then the land herein conveyed shall vest in the said
husband and wife and their heirs forever . But should







them , shall have and enjoy a
life estate in the said land ” - and it was provided that if
no issue were born the land should be sold and the pro
ceeds divided among certain persons . The habendum
clause followed : “ To have and to hold the said lands
. . . . unto the said parties of the second part , their
heirs and assigns , to and fo
r





the second part , their heirs and assigns ,
forever . ” The wife having died before her husband ,
never having had a child , it was held that the husband
took but a life estate in the land — because the interest
granted was “ so fully , circumstantially , and precisely
defined and limited ” in the premises . 10
§ 132 . The conveyance to be read and construed as a
whole . — In construing conveyances where there is a seem
9 Rines v . Mansfield , 96 Mo . 394 ; 9 S . W . 798 .
1
0 Karchner v . Hoy , 1892 , 151 Pa . 383 ; 25 Atl . 20 .
1
1 - Brews . Cox .
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ing repugnancy , the entire conveyance should be read , in
order to get at the intention from the language of the
whole instrument .
" In the exposition of deeds, the construction must be
upon the view and comparison of the whole instrument ,
and with an endeavor to give every part of it meaning
and effect. ” 11
Practically , the court will reconcile , if possible , the
contradictory clauses , without special regard to what par
ticular parts of the instrument they occur in ; and effect is
given in many cases to the habendum , if it appears clearly
to have been the grantor 's intention that the terms used
therein should control ; for example , in Martin v . Jones 12
there was a grant “ to A J and his children after him ,
* * * to have and to hold said premises to said A J
and his heirs forever .” After A J 's death , when his
administrator desired to sell the land for the purpose of
paying A J 's debts , his children claimed he had but a
life estate with remainder to them , and that therefore the
administrator could not sell ; but the court held that the
premises and the habendum are not irreconcilably repug
nant, and that A J took an estate in fee .
So a grant expressed in the premises to be to one , “ her
heirs and assigns, " with an habendum , “ to have and to
hold for and during the natural life ,only , of [the grantee ) ,
with the remainder in fe
e simple ” to others , was held to
grant a life estate only , to the grantee , and not a fee , be
cause such was clearly the grantor ' s intention when the
whole conveyance was read . 13 O
f
course , no lawyer
would draw conveyances containing such contradictory
statements a
s






1 Ch . J . Kent in Jackson v .Myers , 3 Johns . 388 , 395 .
1
2 1900 , 62 Ohio S
t
. 519 ; 57 N . E . 238 .
1
3 Wilson v . Terry , 1902 , 130 Mich . 73 ; 89 N . W . 566 ; 8 Det . Leg .
News 1151 . And see , Bedford Lodge v . Lentz , 1900 , 194 Pa . S
t . 399 ; 45
Atl . 378 ; Barnett v . Barnett , 1894 , 104 Cal . 300 ; 37 Pac . 1049 .
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going cases contain ,when it is so simple a matter , with a
little care , to avoid doing so .
§ 133 . Naming the grantee in habendum - Effect of
naming other or different persons. — Where the haben
dum is used the grantee should be named or clearly des
ignated there , as well as in the premises . If the persons
named in the two parts are different , confusion and un
certainty result .
If no grantee be named in the premises , but one is
named in the habendum , he will take the estate ,14 for
there is no repugnancy in such a case : the habendum
simply supplies what should have been in the premises .
If, however , different persons are named in the prem
ises and in the habendum as grantees , there is such a re
pugnancy as to make the habendum ineffective , and the
person named in the premises is the grantee .
If one is named as grantee in the premises and also in
the habendum with other persons , these others cannot ,
according to the general rule , take an immediate estate ,15
though one not named in the premises may take an estate
in remainder , by being named for the first time in the
habendum . 16
§ 134 . Trusts may be declared in the habendum . - In
conveyances creating a trust , and in assignments for the
benefit of creditors , etc., the habendum may appropriately
14 Irwin v . Longworth , 20 Ohio 581, 603 ; Lawe v . Hyde , 39 Wis . 345 .
15 Samme 's Case, 13 Coke 54 .
16Downing v . Birney , 1897 , 112 Mich . 474 ; 70 N . W . 1006 ; 4 Det . Leg .
News 21 ; McCullock v . Holmes , 1892 , 111 Mo.445 ; 19 S. W . 1096 ; Blair
v . Osborne, 84 N . C . 417 . But in McLeod v . Tarrant , 1892 , 39 S. C . 271 ;
17 S. E . 773 ; 20 L . R . A . 846 , husband and wife — the latter being first
mentioned in the habendum - were held to have taken the estate ,
though the grant in the premises was to the husband alone : and the
wife having survived her husband took the whole , “ tenancy by entire
ties ” being recognized in South Carolina .
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declare the trusts on which the property is to be held .17
For example :
" This indenture, made the — day , etc ., between ,
of, etc . , and — , of , etc . , as trustee , Witnesseth , That
the said party of the first part ( granting clause , descrip
tion , etc . , as in an ordinary deed ) , To have and to hold
the above granted premises , et
c
. , unto the said party of
the second part , as trustee , his successors and assigns for
ever , upon the trusts , and to and for the uses , interests
and purposes , hereinafter limited , described and declared
— that is to say , upon trust to receive the issues , rents and
profits of the said premises , and apply the same to the use
of X Y during the term of his natural life , and after the
death o
f
the said X Y , to convey the same by deed to C
D in fee .
“ In witness whereof , etc . ”
$ 135 . Use of the word " heirs ” at common law in lim
iting an estate in fee . - At common law it was necessary
in a limitation to a natural person in fee simple to use the
word “ heirs ” in connection with the name or other desig
nation o
f
the grantee . The general rule was that no
other words in a deed , though clearly indicating an intent
to create a fe
e , could do so if the technical word “ heirs "
were omitted . So that in England , before 1882 , a limita
tion to a natural person " in fee simple , ” to him “ and his
seed , ” to him and his issue generally , ” to him “ and his
successors ' ' - gave him in each case an estate for his own
life only . 18
In this country , while it has sometimes been consid
ered , irrespective of a statute on the subject , that the
strict rule of the common law should not be applied be
cause it was based on principles o
f
feudal policy not
adapted to our institutions , and often defeated the plain
1
7Nightingale v . Hidden , 7 R . I . 11





. Com . 107 ; Shep . Touchstone 106 . By the Conveyancing Act ,
1881 , 44 - 45 Vict . , ch . 41 , s . 51 , an estate in fee simple may now be cre
ated b
y
the words " in fe
e
simple . ”
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intent of the parties ,19 it has nevertheless been generally
enforced unless modified by statute .
Consequently , conveyances , for example, to one " and
his generation , to endure as long as the waters of the
Delaware should run ; " 20 to one “ his executors , adminis
trators and assigns; ' : 21 to several " and their representa
tives ;' 22 to them and “ assigns forever ; " 23 have been
held to convey life estates only to the respective grantees .24
$ 136 . Effect of statutes on the rule requiring the
word " heirs " in limiting an estate in fee . — Statutes ex
pressly providing short forms for deeds 25 usually make
one of the effects of the operative words prescribed by the
statute to be the passing of an estate in fee , and where
such a conveyance is permissible and is used , of course
the common law rule as to the use of the word “ heirs ” is
inapplicable .
Moreover , in most of the states statutes either expressly
enact that the word “ heirs ” need not be used in a deed to
create an estate in fee , or in effect dispense with it by





the grantor unless a contrary intent is expressed in the
conveyance o




9 See the discussion in Cole v . The Lake Co . , 1874 , 54 N . H . 242 ,
279 .
2
0 Foster v . Joice , 3 Wash . C . C . 498 .
2
1 Hofsass v . Mann , 1891 , 74 Md . 400 ; 22 Atl . 65 .
2




3 McMichael v . McMichael , 1897 , 51 S . C . 555 ; 29 S . E . 403 .
2
4 See , as to the necessity o
f
" heirs " to make a reservation in fee ,




5 See ante , $ 30 .
2
6 The states which seem to have provided neither short forms o
f
deeds having the effect noticed above , nor general statutes , directly or
indirectly dispensing in deeds with the word " heirs ” for the creation
o
f
a fee , ar
e
: Connecticut , Delaware , Florida , Maine , Massachusetts ,
New Jersey , Ohio , Pennsylvania , South Carolina , and Vermont ; in
Rhode Island there may b
e
used either “ heirs ” o
r
the words “ in fee
simple , ” without " heirs ” : Gen . L . 1896 , p . 661 .
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But as these statutes , altering the common law rule ,
are in many instances recent, and as they do not affect
conveyances taking effect before their enactment, the rule
cannot be ignored in investigating titles , even in states
where such statutes exist .27
§ 137 . When the word heirs is not essential to create
a fee, irrespective of statute . - The word " heirs " is not
necessary in the following cases :





the trust that the trustee shall
have the legal estate in fee , a fee simple will be held to
pass , though words o
f
inheritance are lacking . 28
( b ) In conveyances to corporations aggregate the word
" heirs ” is inappropriate and unnecessary , nor need the
word " successors , ” though usual and proper , be used , as
the corporation being deemed to have perpetual exist
ence , a grant to it for life is a grant in fe
e
. 29





land enforceable in equity a
s
a




( d ) Words in a will showing an intention to devise an
estate in fee simple are enough for this purpose , though
words of inheritance are lacking . 31
$ 138 . Use of the word “ assigns ” in limiting estates .
The word " assigns , " so commonly associated with “ heirs ”
in the premises and habendum , is unnecessary . It was
8
7 Allen v . Baskerville , 1898 , 123 N . C . 12
6 ; 31 S . E . 383 ; Hofsass v .
Mann , 1891 , 74 MD . 400 ; 22 Atl . 65 .
2
8 Angell v . Rosenbury , 12 Mich . 241 ; West v . Fitz , 109 Ill . 425 ; Ew
ing v . Shannahan , 1892 , 113 Mo . 188 ; 20 S . W . 1065 .
2
9Wilkes - Barre v . Wyoming Hist . Soc . , 1890 , 134 Pa . S
t
. 616 ; 19 Atl .
809 ; Congregational Soc . v . Stark , 34 V
t
. 243 ; Delhi School District v .
Everett , 52 Mich . 314 ; 17 N . W . 926 . “ Successors " is necessary in a
grant to a corporation sole : 2 B
l
. Comm . 109 .
8





. Comm . 108 ; Lincoln v . Lincoln , 107 Mass . 590 .
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once considered necessary in order to give the quality of
alienability to lands,82 but any such necessity for its use
- if it ever really existed - has long since ceased to exist . 33
§ 139 . The fee simple and the fe
e simple conditional
- If , therefore , at common law " heirs ” were not named ,
the taker had no interest beyond his own life , 34 and he
power o
f alienation depended on the terms of the grant to
him .
If , however , “ heirs ” were named , the interest con
ferred o
n the grantee ( o
r
donee ) was the greatest interest
that a subject was deemed capable o
f having in lands
the " estate in fee simple . ” And it came to be the law
finally that he could alienate this estate whenever he
chose , and , speaking generally , either entirely o
r par




If , however , instead of naming the donee ' s " heirs ”
( i . e . in general ) terms were used in the grant restricting
the generality o
f
this expression to heirs of a certain kind
- as , for example , " to A and the heirs o
f
his body ” or
" the heirs male of his body ' ' — the donee could not alien
ate until some one of the specially designated class was in
existence capable o
f succeeding him . The donee ' s inter
est in such a case was not a complete or absolute fee sim
ple until the condition was fulfilled , and an heir of the
named class came into existence . His estate was there
3
7 Poll . & Mait . Hist . Eng . L . II , 14 ; Williams R . P . , 17th ed . 77 .
1
3 Grant v . Carpenter , 8 R . I . 36 ; Brasington v . Hanson , 1892 , 149 Pa .
289 ; 24 Atl .344 . As to the necessity , or desirability , of the use of “ as
signs ” in other parts o
f
a deed , as , for example , in connection with
covenants , see post , $ $ 197 , 224 .
3
4
See , supra , § 135 .
8
6 This power o
f
alienation came gradually , it was not created b
y any
one statute ; it , was , however , confirmed b
y
statute in 1290 , the statute
o
f
“ Quia Emptores , ” 18 Edward I , c . 1 . See Digby Hist . Law Real
Prop . ( 5t
h
. ed . ) , p
p
. 157 – 161 , 234 – 23
9
.
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fore called a " fee simple conditional . ” When the condi
tion was fulfilled the particular course of descent ap
pointed by the form of the grant was not affected so long
as the donee (or tenant ) held the land .
But it was claimed that in such cases the donee might ,
immediately on the coming into existence of an heir of
the kind named in the grant, that is on the fulfillment of
the condition , treat his estate as an absolute fee simple ,
and alienate it as he might have done had it been made a
fee simple absolute by the terms of the grant ; and this
claim was made even though in the grant there was an
express condition that if the donee should die without
heirs of the kind named the land should revert to the
donor or his heirs .
These broad rights claimed on behalf of donees of such
" fees simple conditional ” being admitted , the result was
that the donee , after having issue of the class named in
the grant , actually alienated his estate to another person
in fee simple in whose hands it would be an ordinary es
tate in fe
e simple descending , if not alienated b
y
him ,









Thus the estate was no longer confined to the particular
course o
f
succession originally designated , nor could the
landowner who had created the “ fee simple conditional ”
claim the estate b
y
escheat on the failure o
f
the specially
named heirs of the original donee .
§ 140 . The statute D
e
donis conditionalibus — Estates
tail . This liberal construction placed upon grants limited
in their terms was unpopular with the great landowners
whose chances of reversions were thus lessened . There
fore , in 1285 they procured the passing of the celebrated
statute , De donis conditionalibus , the object o
f
which was
to protect inheritances and to lessen the danger o
f
the
lord ' s right of escheat being defeated or indefinitely post
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poned by the alienation of the tenant, and which , in
effect , provided that the donee of such an estate could not
alienate it as against either his issue or the donor ; but that,
on his decease his issue , and upon failure of these the
donor or the donor 's heir , should take the land per formam
doni, in spite of any attempted alienation by the donee .
Thereafter the tenant who would have had , before the
statute De donis , a fee simple conditional , had only a lim
ited and inalienable estate ; which as being cut down from
the freedom of alienation incident to a fee simple , was
regarded as a new kind of estate — a “ fee tail ” (feodum
talliatum , taillé ) .
So that if , after the statute De donis , land was granted ,
for example , " to A , and the heirs of his body, " while A
had the rights of a tenant in fe
e simple a
s
to the use o
f
the land , he could not grant it away fo
r
any time beyond
his own life ; and his lineal heirs succceding under the
grant were in the same position . He and they were “ ten
ants in tail ” - tenants in fee with limited powers .
For some time the restriction placed b
y
the statute De
donis upon the alienation o
f
estates tail seems to have
been effectual , but before two centuries had elapsed it was
wholly evaded . Judges and lawyers administering the
law reflected the popular dislike for inalienable estates ,
and the form o
f proceeding known as the Common Recov
e
ry




r destroying an entail , and converting the estate tail into
a
n
estate in fee simple , and the “ fine ” was afterward
used fo
r
the same purpose .
B
y
various later acts o
f parliament restrictions on
alienation have been removed , and the English tenant in
tail has , generally speaking , complete powers o
f dealing
with the land .
§ 141 . Kinds of estates tail - What terms are neces
sary to create . - The kinds o
f
estates tail are chiefly four ,
namely :
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( a ) The estate in tail general, which arises where the
limitation is to one and the heirs of his body ; the estate




the donee , but not to col
lateral heirs .
( b ) The estate in tail male ( or female ) general : the
limitation being in the same form as the last , with the
added qualification of sex - fo
r
example , " to A and the
heirs male of his body ' ' : the estate being descendible to
all the issue of the donee , being of the specified sex , ac
cording to the canons o
f
descent .
( c ) The estate in tail special , which arises where the
limitation is to one and the heirs of his body by a certain
wife , or to one and the heirs of her body b
y
a certain hus
band ; it may arise by a gift to two persons married and
the heirs o
f
their bodies , or b
y
a gift to two persons o
f
different sexes and capable o
f
lawful marriage , and the
heirs of their bodies . Only the issue of the two persons
named can inherit .
( d ) The estate in tail male ( o
r
female ) special , being
like the last named except that the inheritance is re
stricted to the issue o
f
a specified sex ; fo
r
example , a lim
itation to “ A and the heirs male , of his body , b
y
his
wife M . "
And in al
l
these cases , as the word " heirs ” was neces
sary at common law to create a fee simple in a deed , so it
is necessary to create a fee tail ; 36 but the particular for
mula “ o
f
his body , ” though themost appropriate expres
sion , is not indispensable where there are other words of
procreation which restrict the meaning o
f
“ heirs ” to the
lineal descendants o
f
the grantee . 37
§ 142 . Estates tail in the United States . — In this coun
try estates tail were early recognized in most o
f
the origi
nal states as part of the common law taken from England ,
3
6 Adams v . Ross , 30 N . J . L . 505 .
8
7 Reed v . Lane , 1894 , 122 Mo . 311 ; 26 S . W . 957 ; Atherton v . Roche ,
1901 , 192 Ill . 252 ; 61 N . E . 357 ; Challis Real Prop . , p . 236 .
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and in some, at least, the common recovery was the
means of barring them .38 But by statutes (some of them
early ) in many states estates tail have been abolished , or
have been changed into estates of another character .
The modification of the law , as it stood at the time of
the settlement of this country , has not, however , been
uniform , so that now expressions in a deed or will cre
ating what would have been ( after the statute De donis )
an estate tail , create in one state , by virtue of its statute ,
an estate in fee simple , while in another they create a life
estate only for the donee in tail — the first tenant in tail
with estates in fee simple fo
r
his issue in some states , or ,




f the common law .
Moreover , in several states , while no statutes exist di
rectly bearing on the matter , it has been held that the
statute De donis (the effect o
f
which was to change the
" fee simple conditional ” into the “ fe
e




the common law o
f
those states .
$ 143 . Estates tail in the United States — The states
classified . - Grouping the states , therefore , we find : ( 1 )
States having statutes which provide in effect that every
estate which would be (but for such statute ) considered
a fe
e
tail is an estate in fe
e simple .
Among such states are , Alabama , California , Florida ,
Georgia , Indiana , Kentucky , Michigan , Minnesota , Mis
sissippi , Montana , New York , North Carolina , North Da
kota , Pennsylvania , South Dakota , Tennessee , Virginia ,
West Virginia , Wisconsin . 39
8
8 Hawley v . Northampton , 8 Mass . 3 ; 5 Am . Dec . 66 ; Croxall v .
Shererd , 5 Wall . 268 , 283 ; Lyle v . Richards , 9 Serg . & R . 322 .
3
9 Ala . Civ . Co . , 1896 , § 1021 ; Cal . Civ . Co . , 1901 , $ 763 ; Fla . R . S . ,
1892 , $ 1818 ; Ga . Co . , 1895 , $ 3085 ; Ind . Burns ' R . S . 1901 , $ 3378 ; Ky .
S
t . , 1899 , $ 2343 ; Mich . C . L . , 1897 , § 8785 ; Minn . G . S . , 1894 , § 4364 ;
Miss . Ann . Co . , 1892 , $ 2436 ; Mon . Civ . Co . , 1895 , $ 1212 ; N . Y . R . S .
(1903 , Birdseye ) , p . 3017 , $ 22 ; N . C . Co . , $ 1325 ; N . D . Civ . Co . , 1899 ,
$ 3327 ; Pa . , Bright . Purd . Dig . , 1894 , p . 810 , $ 8 , act o
f April 27 , 1855 ;
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The statutory provisions are not identical in the fore
going states , but the general effect of them is to give the
grantee in tail full power to alienate the estate , as if it
were an estate in fee in him .
In California , Indiana , Michigan , New York , North
and South Dakota there may be a remainder taking effect
upon the death of the first grantee without issue, the stat
utes providing that an estate in fee tail is an estate in fee
simple, and “ if no valid remainder be limited thereon it
is a fee simple absolute ; and while these statutes in terms
declare that “ estates tail are abolished , ” the estate tail is
only abolished by being changed into an estate in fee
simple , which , if no valid remainder is limited thereon ,40
is a fe
e simple absolute ; so that a grant to one " and to
the heirs o
f
her body , ” without more , vests in the grantee
a
n absolute fee . 41
( 2 ) A smaller number of states in which b
y
statute
what would have been an estate tail before the statute is
declared to be an estate in fee simple , not , however , as
in the states just mentioned , a fee in the first taker .
( a ) In several states of this class a life estate only is
expressly given to the first taker , but a fee simple abso
lute is given to the person to whom the estate would first






S . D . Ann . St . , 1901 , $ 3648 ; Tenn . Co . ( Shannon ) , 1896 , § 3673 ; Va .
C





these states , e . g . , California , Indiana , North
and South Dakota , provide that every estate “ which would be a
t
com
mon law adjudged a fe
e tail , is a fee simple ” : such statutes refer to the
effect o
f
the statute De donis , for at common law , strictly speaking , there
was no estate tail .
4
9 Harriot v . Harriot , 1898 , 25 App . Div . ( N . Y . ) 245 , 248 . See McIl
hinny v . McIlhinny , 1894 , 137 Ind . 411 ; 37 N . E . 147 ; 45 Am . S
t
. R .
186 ; 24 L . R . A . 489 .
1
1 Lane y . Utz , 1891 , 130 Ind . 235 ; 29 N . E . 772 .
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Such states are Arkansas , Colorado , Illinois ,Missouri
and Vermont .42
(b ) In other states of this class a fee simple estate is
given to the "'issue of the first taker , though the nature
of the first taker 's estate is not expressly defined as a life
estate : Connecticut and Ohio have statutes of this charac
te
r
. 43 In al
l
these states the estate o
f
the donee in tail
the first taker - is such that he cannot convey a valid title
in fee to the land acquired b
y
him under a deed o
r
will
attempting to make him and his specified heirs tenants
in tail . 44
( 3 ) In several states statutes in effect provide simply
that a tenant in tail may convey the land , of which he is
seised in that capacity , b
y
a
n ordinary deed , as if he were
seised in fee simple ; the statutes not in terms converting
the estate tail into an estate in fee simple , but authorizing
the grantee to do so b
y





mon recovery . Maine , Maryland and Massachusetts
have statutes of this kind , 45 and in them , therefore , any
deed which will convey the land will bar the entail . 46
( 4 ) A number of states appear to have no statutes on
the subject o
f
estates tail , namely : Iowa , Kansas , Ne
braska , New Hampshire , Oregon , South Carolina , Texas ,
Utah and Washington ; but in some o
f
these the statute
" Ark . Sand & H . Dig . , $ 700 ; Colo . Mills Stat . , $ 432 ; Ill . R . S . , ch .
3
0 , $ 6 ; Mo . R . S . 1899 , $ 4592 ; Vt . Stat . 1894 , $ 2201 .
Conn . Gen . St . (Rev . 1902 ) , § 4027 ; Ohio R . S . , $ 4200 .
Wilmans v . Robinson , 1900 , 67 Ark . 517 ; 55 S . W . 950 ; Lehndorf
v . Cope , 1887 , 122 III . 317 ; 13 N . E . 505 ; Atherton v . Roche , 1901 , 192
II
I
. 252 ; 61 N . E . 357 ; 55 L . R . A . 591 ; Rozier v .Graham , 1898 , 146 Mo .
352 ; 48 S . W . 470 ; Horton v . Upham , 1899 , 72 Conn . 29 ; 43 Atl . 492 ;
Chesebro v . Palmer , 1896 , 68 Conn . 207 ; 36 Atl . 42 ; Pollock v . Speidel ,
2
7 Ohio St . 86 ; Thompson v . Carl , 51 Vt . 408 .
* Maine R . S . 1883 , ch . 73 , § 4 ; Md . Pub . G . L . 1888 , ar
t
. 21 , $ 24 ;
Mass . R . L . 1902 , ch . 127 , $ 24 .
4
6 Richardson v . Richardson , 1888 , 80 Maine 585 ; 16 Atl . 250 ; Colla
more v . Collamore , 1893 , 158 Mass . 74 ; 32 N . E . 1034 .
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De donis has been held to be not in force , irrespective of
express statute . 47
§ 144. Reversions — Remainders . — The writer ' s inten
tion is to confine himself, as fa
r
a





estates in fee in possession ,
with the incidents o
f
such transfer . It is not , therefore ,
within the scope o
f
this work to discuss estates in general ,
nor to treat o
f
those “ incorporeal hereditaments ” known
a
t common law as reversions and remainders — future in
terests ,which , though not now conferring possession ,will
d
o
so in the future , and which are thus estates in futuro . 48
Owing , however , to the effect still often given to an an
cient rule o
f




s the rule in Shelley ' s Case , the general characteristics
o
f
these estates should be noted .
A “ reyersion " arises b
y operation o
f
law when one in
whom an estate is vested conveys out o
f
it a “ particu
lar ” — a smaller - estate in the same land which carries
seisin . 49 There remains in the grantor of this particular
estate , and his heirs , an estate which will confer posses
sion upon the determination o
f
the particular estate , and
this estate is the reversion .
But a remainder arises by act o
f
the parties , as when a
particular estate is limited , and b
y
the same instrument
another estate is limited to come into possession after the
determination o
f
the particular estate . For example , if
A , tenant in fee simple , conveys to B for life and from
and after the determination o
f
B ' s estate to C and the
heirs o
f
his body , " C is said to have an estate tail in re
mainder , expectant on the death of B .
4
7 Pierson v . Lane , 60 Iowa 60 ; 14 N . W . 90 ; Jewell v . Warner , 35 N .
H . 176 ; Rowland v . Warren , 10 Ore . 129 ; Burnett v . Burnett , 17 S . C .
545 .
4
8Williams Real Prop . , 17th ed . , part II , ch . 1 ; Leake Dig . Law
Prop . in Land , p . 312 .
1
9 Co . Litt . , 22 b .
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When a remainder is so created that from its com
mencement to it
s
close the seisin could vest instantly in
the remainder -man in case the particular estate be deter
mined , it is a vested remainder . Thus , a limitation “ to
A fo
r
life , remainder to B and his heirs , " confers a vested
remainder on B , because his interest will come into pos
session the moment A ' s estate determines : should A sur
vive B , B ' s interest will pass to his heir , devisee or .
alienee , without losing its characteristics .
When , however , a remainder is so created that the par
ticular estate can be determined before the seisin of the
remainder is able to vest in the remainder -man , it is a
contingent remainder : this is the case when the re
mainder is limited to a person not in being , or to one not
a
t present capable o
f taking the estate , or when it is made
dependent on a future and uncertain event . Thus , in a
limitation “ to A fo
r
life , and after his decease to the eld
est son o
f
B , living a
t
A ' s decease , and his heirs , ” the
remainder is contingent : it may not come into possession ,
for B may not have sons , or , if he have sons , they may
die in A ' s life , or none of them may be born till after A ' s
death .
$ 145 . The rule in Shelley ' s Case . — Limitations in the
form o
f
remainders to the heirs or to the heirs o
f
the
body , which taken alone would create a contingent re
mainder in the persons designated , are affected by the
rule o
f
law known as the rule in Shelley ' s Case . 50





Where an estate o
f
freehold is limited to a person , and
by the same instrument an estate is limited in the form
o
f
a remainder , whether immediately expectant on the
former estate or after other estates interposed , to his
5
0
1 Rep . (Coke ) 93 ( 1581 ) . It is sometimes said that the rule is erro
neously named because it was not applicable to Shelley ' s Case ; but that
the case was a decision in favor o
f
the rule , see Challis Real Prop . ,
pp . 125 - 132
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“ heirs ” in fee or tail, the word “ heirs ” is a word of
limitation of an estate of inheritance in the ancestor , and
is not a word of purchase .51 That is, in such a case the
limitation to the “ heirs ” entitles the ancestor to the
whole estate , and the heir must take his interest (if he
should take any ) by descent from his ancestor , for he is
notmade , by the words of the instrument , a “ purchaser ":
of any separate estate for himself .
§ 146 . Not a rule of construction but one of law
When does not apply . — While the rule is sometimes said
to be a rule of construction , 52 and that therefore it should
give way to an intention disclosed by the instrument that
it should not operate , especially when the instrument is a
will,53 it has generally been considered a fixed rule of law
to be given effect regardless of the intention of the donor.54
But the word “ heirs ” may be used in a context or with
a further description , rendering it incapable of being re
garded as a word of limitation , and it must then be taken
as a word of purchase , giving a remainder to the person
so designated - as, fo
r
example , if the expression were the
“ heir now living ; ' and the chief difficulty in regard to
the application o
f
the rule , in particular cases , consists in




1 See Williams Real Prop . , 17th ed . , p . 40
4 ; Leake Dig . L . Prop . in
Land , p . 342 . The rule is well discussed in “ The Modern Law of Real
Property ” by Herbert T . Tiffany , and is there stated , page 308 , in the
following terms : “ If , after a limitation to a person of an estate of free
hold , there be limited , b
y
the same instrument , an estate in the form
o
f
a remainder to his heirs , or the heirs of his body , he will , at common
law , take an estate in remainder in fee or in tail , according to the class
o
f
heirs specified , and the freehold estate previously limited to him
will merge therein , unless there be another estate interposed which
will prevent merger . ”
5
2 See Wilmans v . Robinson , 1900 , 67 Ark . 517 ; 55 S . W . 950 .
6
3 De Vaughn v . Hutchinson , 1897 , 165 U . S . 566 ; Wescott v . Binford ,
1898 , 104 Iowa 645 ; 74 N . W . 18 ; 65 Am . St . R . 530 .
5
4 Davis v . Sturgeon , 1902 , 19
8
Ill . 520 ; 64 N . E . 1016 ; Shapley v .
Diehl , 1902 , 203 Pa . S
t
. 566 ; 53 Atl . 374 ; Trumbull v . Trumbull , 1889 ,
149 Mass . 200 ; 21 N . E . 366 .
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person to whom the first estate is given , or is to his " chil
dren ” or certain other persons, in which cases the ' rule ”
would not apply . In deciding this question , which is one
of construction, the principle that the rule in Shelley 's
case is one of law does not preclude a construction of the
words used which will accomplish the donor 's intention .55
§ 147. The rule in the United States . — While it is
probable that the origin of the rule — as to which there
has been much speculation — " is to be found in the policy
of feudalism ,' 156 it survived the passing of feudalism be
cause it facilitated alienation b
y
" vesting the inheritance
in the ancestor and making it alienable a generation
sooner than it otherwise would be ; ' ' 57 and it has there
fore been justified a
s
a rule o
f property in harmony with
the genius o
f
our institutions , and “ with the liberal and
commercial spirit o
f
the age . ” 58
It is still preserved as a rule of law applicable to both
deeds and wills in several states — unless , that is , very
recent statutes have altered the policy o
f
these states .
Such states are : Arkansas , Illinois , Indiana , North Caro
lina , Pennsylvania , and perhaps others . 59
But in states where it is thus recognized it is affected
by statutes , if any exist in them , regarding estates tail .




5 Simonton y . White , 1899 , 93 Texas 50 ; 53 S . W . 339 ; 77 Am . S
t
. R .
824 ; Granger v .Granger , 1897 , 147 Ind , 95 ; 44 N . E . 189 ; 46 N . E . 80 ;
Daniel v . Whartenby , 17 Wall . 639 ; McCann v . McCann , 1901 , 197 Pa .
S
t
. 452 ; 47 Atl . 743 ; 80 Am . S
t . R . 846 .
5
6 Challis Real Prop . , p . 135 .
5
7 Hileman v . Boüs 'aügh , 13 Pa . St . 344 ; 53 Am . Dec . 474 .
5
8 See last case cited and Polk v . Faris , 9 Yerg . ( Tenn . ) 209 ; 30 Am .
Dec . 400 — it is now abolished in Tennessee .
6
9 See , in addition to cases cited above from these states , Leathers v .
Gray , 1888 , 101 N . C . 162 ; 7 S . E . 657 ; 9 Am . St . R . 30 ; Edgerton v .
Aycock , 1898 , 123 N . C . 134 ; 31 S E . 382 ; McIlhinny v . McIlhinny , 1894 ,
137 Ind . 411 ; 24 L . R . A . 489 ; 45 Am . St . R . 186 ; Carpenter v . Van - '
Olinder , 1889 , 127 Ill . 42 ; 19 N . E . 868 ; 11 Am . St . R . 92 .
1
2
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tail is made a life estate only in the first taker , the rule
in Shelley 's Case , in so far as it would apply to estates
tail, is abolished ;60 while in Pennsylvania and North
Carolina , where estates tail aremade estates in fee simple ,
a remainder in tail creates a fee simple in the first taker
and not an estate tail .61
In most of the states, however , statutes have in effect
abolished the rule by reversing it and providing that the
“ heirs " or " heirs of the body of the life tenant shall
take as purchasers by virtue of the remainder limited to
them .62
But such statutes are inapplicable to wills and con
veyances taking effect before their enactment,63 and , as
many of these statutes are of recent date , the rule may
still affect titles even in these states where it has been
abolished .
In a few states — Kansas , New Hampshire , Ohio , Ore
gon — it is abolished by statute only so far as devises are
concerned .64
60Griswold v . Hicks , 1890 , 132 Ill . 49
4 , 501 ; 24 N . E . 63 ; Butler v .
Huestis , 68 Ill . 594 .
6
1 Sheeley v . Neidhammer , 1897 , 182 Pa . St . 163 ; 37 Atl . 939 ; Cham
blee v . Broughton , 1897 , 120 N . C . 170 ; 27 S . E . 111 .
6
2 Ala . Co . , 1896 , $ 1025 ; Cal . Civ . Co . , 1901 , $ 779 ; Conn . G . 8 . , 1902 ,
§ 4028 ; Ga . Co . , 1895 , $ $ 3083 , 3084 , 3085 ; Idaho R . S . , 1887 , § 2855 ;
Ky . St . , 1899 , $ 2345 ; Maine R . S . , 1883 , ch . 73 , $ 6 ; Mass . R . L . , 1902 ,
ch . 134 , § 4 ; Mich . C . L . , 1897 , § 8810 ; Minn . G . S . , 1894 , § 4389 ; Miss .
Ann . Co . , 1892 , § 2446 ; Mo . R . S . , 1899 , § 4594 ; Mont . Civ . Co . , 1895 ,
§ 1228 ; New Mexico C . L . , 1897 , $ 2045 ; N . Y . R . S . (Birdseye , 1901 ) ,
p . 3021 , § 44 ; N . D . R . Co . , 1899 , § 3343 ; Okl . St . , 1893 , § 3716 ; R . I .
G . L . , 1896 , ch . 201 , $ 6 ; S . D . Ann . S
t
. 1901 , § 3664 ; Tenn . Co . (Shan
non ) , 1896 , § 3674 ; Va . Co . , 1887 , § 2423 ; W . Va . Co . , 1899 , ch . 71 ,
$ 1
1 ; Wis . S
t
. , 1898 , $ 2052 .
6
3 Wilson v . Alston , 1898 , 122 Ala . 630 ; 25 So . 225 ; Harris v .McCann ,
1898 , 75 Miss . 805 ; 23 So . 631 ; Hurst v . Wilson , 1890 , 89 Tenn , 270 ; 14
S . W . 778 ; Spader v . Powers , 56 Hun ( N . Y . ) 153 .
6
4 Kan . Gen . Stat . 1901 , $ 7990 ; Ohio R . S . , $ 5968 ; N . H . Pub . Stat .
1901 , ch . 186 , § 8 ; Ore . Ann . St . 1892 , $ 3093 .
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§ 148 . Concurrent ownership in general . - Two or more
persons may have concurrent interests in the same land .
These concurrent interests may arise from an express lim
itation of the estate , o
r
several persons may take the
estate concurrently by descent . Not all persons interested
in the same land are , however , co -owners ; for one o
f
them may be a tenant for years , another may have a re
(179 )
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mainder in fee or for life , another may have an easement
in the land ; or one may have an estate of one sort or an
other in the surface merely , while another may own the
minerals beneath the surface . In such cases the right of
each is several and distinct and may be connected with
different portions of the land.1
Where co -ownership exists ,however , each owner has no
several right as to any distinct part of the land , but is in
terested in every part of the whole . While this quality is
common to the several kinds of concurrent ownership
each has peculiarities of its own .
Though there is now in this country practically abso
lute ownership o
f lands rather than a holding of and
from some superior , the chief kinds o
f
concurrent owner
ship are still known b
y
their common - law names a
s ten
ancies . The kinds of concurrent ownership are not of
equal practical importance and some o
f
them are known
to the law o
f
but few states . The several kinds are :
1 . Joint tenancy ;
2 . Tenancy in common ;
3 . Coparcenary ;
4 . Tenancy by entireties ;
5 . Community ownership .
$ 149 . Joint tenancy - Its characteristics . - Joint ten
ancy can arise b
y
“ purchase ” only , and not b
y
descent .
It may exist for any estate except an estate tail general .
S
o if lands be given to two persons without further
limitation they will , at common law , become joint ten .
ants for life ; after the death of either the survivor will
b
e entitled to the whole during his life . If lands be
given to them and the heirs o
f
their bodies there will be
created an estate tail special , if they are capable of mar
rying ; but where they are not capable of marrying they
· Virginia Coal Co . v . Kelly , 1896 , 93 Va , 332 ; 24 S . E . 1020 ; Ames
v . Ames , 1896 , 160 Ill . 599 ; 43 N . E . 592 ; Powell v . Lantzy , 1896 , 173
Pa . 543 ; 34 Atl . 450 .
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are joint tenants for life, and on the death of one the
survivor takes the whole , but on his death the inheri
tance is divided between the heir of the body of the for
merly deceased grantee and the heir of the body of the
survivor , who become tenants in common . But a joint




in tail . And , generally , at common law a grant to two
o
r
more persons (not being husband and wife ) and their
heirs , without further words , creates a joint tenancy in
fee . The distinguishing feature of joint tenancy is the
right by survivorship ; on the death of one of several
joint tenants the survivors hold the whole estate . For so
far as tenure and survivorship are concerned the joint
tenants together are regarded a
s
one person .
Joint tenants are , by reason of their identity o
f
interest
and title , said to have four unities , namely : time , title ,
interest and possession . 3
There must be “ unity of title , ” that is , the estate o
f
the joint tenants must arise under the same limitation ;
there is " unity of interest ” because there is but one es
tate created , which can only last as long as the estates o
f
all the joint tenants ; there is “ unity of possession ” if the
estate is in possession , but there may be a limitation o
f
a







uses the former necessity that the titles of all
the joint tenants should begin at thesame time is avoided ,
for joint tenants under this statute may take their shares
a
t
different times , that is , if the use is declared jointly to
several persons , some of whom are not yet in being , they
will be joint tenants when they come into being . 4
$ 150 . Alienation b
y
a joint tenant . — Though all the
joint tenants are for some purposes regarded as composing
one owner , each nevertheless has such a share that he
2 Williams Real Prop . , 17th ed . , p . 164 .
3 See 2 BI . Comm . 180 .
* Challis Real Prop . 295 ; 4 Kent Comm . 358 .
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may alienate it inter vivos . As, however , at the instant
of the death of one joint tenant the right of survivorship
attaches , alienation by will is prevented . A conveyance
by one joint tenant of his entire interest to a stranger
“ severs " the joint tenancy and turns it to a tenancy in
common , so fa
r
a
s his grantee is concerned . The interest
o
f
one joint tenant is also subject to levy and sale upon
a
n
execution against him . In conveying to a stranger a
joint tenant conveys in the ordinary manner and with




a fee where necessary ,
but in conveying to a co -tenant he conveys b
y
release , in
which case no words o
f
inheritance are required to pass a
fee even where they are required in ordinary convey
ances . ?
§ 151 . Joint tenancy not now favored — American
statutes concerning it . - While b
y
the earlier common
law joint tenancy was , when contrasted with other forms
o
f
co -ownership , favored as being in accord with feudal
principles in preventing the division o
f
tenures , the
reason for this preference ceased with the practical aboli
tion o
f
tenures , and the doctrine of survivorship came to
b
e regarded as inequitable in making no provision fo
r
posterity . 9 In this country , irrespective of legislation on
the subject , some courts early held that joint tenancy as
a
t
common law did not exist . 10 In most states , however ,
5 Wilkins v . Young , 1895 , 144 Ind . 1 ; 41 N . E . 68 ; 55 Am . S
t
. R . 162 .
&Midgley v . Walker , 1894 , 101 Mich . 583 ; 60 N . W . 296 .
? C
o . Litt . 273b .
8 Martin v . Smith , 5 Binn . ( Pa . ) 16 ; 6 Am . Dec . 395 .
9 Hawes v . Hawes , 1747 , 1 Wils . 165 ; 3 Atk . 524 ; though in Cray v .
Willis , 1729 , 2 P . Wms . 529 , the Master of the Rolls says there is
nothing unreasonable in the law of joint tenancy , each tenant having
an equal chance to survive , and as each is able to sever the joint tenancy
if he wishes to do so , survivorship can be no hardship where it may be
at pleasure prevented .
1
0 Sergeant v . Steinberger , 2 Ohio 30
5 ; 15 Am . Dec . 553 ; Miles v .
Fisher , 10 Ohio 1 ; in Connecticut the right of survivorship as a neces
sary incident o
f joint tenancy was never recognized . Whittlesey y .
Fuller , 11 Conn . 337 , 340 .
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statutes have been enacted materially changing the com
mon law and lessening the practical importance of joint
tenancy . American statutes on the subject are of three
classes :
( a ) Those reversing the common law rule that an es .
tate granted or devised to two or more persons is pre
sumed to create a joint tenancy rather than a tenancy in
common ;
( b ) Those destroying survivorship ;
( c ) Those expressly abolishing joint tenancy .
But hardly any two statutes on the subject , even of the
same class , are identical in all respects .
§ 152 . Statutes reversing the common -law presumption
- The estate still created by apt words . - As examples of
those of the first class may be noted , the short statute of
Iowa and the longer one of Massachusetts : “ Convey
ances to two or more in their own right create a tenancy
in common , unless a contrary intent is expressed .” 11
" A conveyance or devise of land to two ormore persons
or to husband and wife , except a mortgage , or a devise or
conveyance in trust , shall create an estate in cominon and
not in joint tenancy , unless it is expressed in such con
veyance or devise that the grantees or devisees shall take
jointly , or as joint tenants , or in joint tenancy , or to them
and the survivor of them , or unless it manifestly appears
from the tenor of the instrument that it was intended to
create an estate in joint tenancy ."'12
Statutes having the general effect of these exist in the
majority of states where legislation has been had on the
subject.13
11 Iowa Ann . Co ., 1897 , § 2923 .
12Massachusetts , R . L . 1902, ch . 13
4 , $ 6 .
1
3 Arkansas , Dig . Stat . 1894 , $ 704 ; California , Civ . Co . $ $ 683 , 686 ;
Colorado , Stats . 1891 , $ 429 ; Idaho , Civ . Co . 1901 , $ 2398 ; Illinois , R .
S . , ch . 30 , $ 5 ; Indiana , Burns ' R . S . 1901 , $ 3341 ; Iowa , Ann . Co . 1897 ,
$ 2923 ; Maine , R . S . 1883 , ch . 73 , $ 7 ; Maryland , G . L . 1888 , art . 5
0 ,
$ 1
3 ; Massachusetts , R . L . 1902 , ch . 134 , $ 6 ; Michigan , C . L . 1897 ,
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Where statutes of this character are in force , estates in
joint tenancy may still be created , though the termsmost
apt to create them will vary somewhat in the different
states. The general rule , however, is that the precise
terms of the statute need not be followed in order to cre
ate a joint tenancy rather than a tenancy in common ;
thus , under a statute providing that no estate in joint
tenancy shall be held under a grant unless it shall “ ex
pressly be declared to pass not in tenancy in common ,
but in joint tenancy ,” a conveyance to two persons " and
the survivor of them , in his or her own right, " and recit
ing that it “ is made in joint tenancy ” creates an estate in
joint tenancy , although it is not expressly declared that
an estate in common is not granted ; 14 and where the
statute provides that a conveyance to two or more shall
be construed to create an estate in common , " unless it
shall be expressed therein that the grantees * * *
shall hold the same in joint tenancy and to the survivor
of them , or it shall manifestly appear , from the tenor of
the instrument , that it was intended to create an estate
in joint tenancy, ” by the use of the word " jointly ” after
the names of the grantees an estate in joint tenancy is
created .15
§ 153 . Exceptions to the modern rule favoring estates
in common - Trustees - Mortgagees . - It will be noticed
that many of the statutes make important exceptions, in
$ $ 8826 , 8827 ; Minnesota , G . S . 1894 , § 4405 ; Missouri, R . S . 1899 ,
$ 4600 ; Montana , Ci
v
. Co . 1895 , 1105 ; New Hampshire , Pub . St .1901 , ch .
137 , $ 14 ; New York , R . S . & G . L . 1901 , Birdseye , p . 3023 , $ 56 ; North
Dakota , R . Co . 1899 , $ $ 3283 , 3286 ; Rhode Island , G . L . 1896 , ch . 201 ,
$ 1 ; South Dakota , Ann . S
t
. 1901 , $ $ 3604 , 3606 ; Utah , R . S . 1898 ,
$ 1973 ; Vermont , R . S . 1894 , $ 2202 ; Wisconsin , St . 1898 , S8 2068 , 2069 .
1
4 Slater v . Granger , 1897 , 165 IN . 329 ; 46 N . E . 235 .
1
5 Case v . Owen , 1894 , 139 Ind . 22 ; 38 N . E . 395 ; 47 Am . St . R . 253 ,
though not ( in Indiana ) if they are husband and wife ; Simons y . Bol
linger , 1900 , 154 Ind . 83 ; 56 N . E . 23 ; 48 L . R . A . 234 . And see Morris v .
McCarty , 1893 , 158 Mass . 11 ; 32 N . E . 938 ; Purdy v . Hayt , 92 N . Y .
446 , 453 .
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dicating that the policy of the law is not opposed to the
doctrine of survivorship in all cases . A very general
exception is that made concerning estates granted or de
vised in trust . Joint tenancy is a convenient form of
ownership in such cases as it is not desirable that the
representatives of a deceased trustee should interfere with
themanagement of the property ; therefore , even where
the statute makes no express exception , it seems that
" slighter indications will suffice in a trust deed than in
other deeds to amount to a 'manifest showing ,' because
the courts are inclined to hold that trustees are joint ten
ants ; ’’ 16 and where , in a statute changing joint tenancies
to tenancies in common , or in one abolishing survivor
ship , an express exception is made of trust estates, if it is
intended in a particular case that the rule of survivorship
should not apply , this intent should appear in the instru
ment creating the trust estate.17
In several states, for example , Indiana , Maine, Massa
chusetts, Michigan and Wisconsin , the statutes except
mortgages ; but this does not prevent the making of a
mortgage with covenants several as to each mortgagee so
that there shall be no survivorship between the mort
gagees. 18
§ 154 . Statutes abolishing survivorship — They do not
destroy joint tenancy . – Of the statutes abolishing survi
vorship , that of Alabama may be taken as an illustration :
“ When one joint tenant dies before the severance , his in
terest does not survive to the other joint tenants , but de
scends and vests as if his interest had been severed and
ascertained . ” 19 Statutes of this character are found in
16Franklin Institution v. Savings Bank , 14 R . I.632 ; Parsons v. Boyd ,
20 Ala . 112 .
17Norris v. Hall , 1900 , 124 Mich . 170 ; 82 N . W . 832 ; 7 Det . Leg .
News 155 ; Boyer v . Sims, 1900 ,61 Kan . 593 ; 60 Pac . 309 .
is Cooley v . Kinney, 1896 , 109 Mich . 34 ; 66 N . W . 674 .
19 Ala . Code 1896 , § 1033 . 34
66 . Pa
c . 309 . 7 D
e
t . Lege
186 § 155THE LAW OF CONVEYANCING .
some states that also have those of the kind discussed
above ; this is so in Colorado and Illinois .20 Other
states having similar statutes are : Kansas , North Caro
lina , Pennsylvania , South Carolina , Tennessee , Virginia ,
Washington and West Virginia .21
But these acts abolishing survivorship as an incident
to joint tenancy do notgenerally prohibit a grant or devise
of an estate with survivorship . They do not , therefore ,
actually abolish joint tenancy . So, though the Pennsyl
vania statute provides that " if partition be not made be
tween joint tenants * * * the parts of those who die
first shall not accrue to the survivors , but shall de
scend or pass by devise * * * and be considered to
every other intent and purpose in the same manner as if
such deceased joint tenants had been tenants in com
mon , ” a grant to four " as joint tenants , and not as ten
ants in common ,” preserves the right of survivorship , as
it shows an intent on the grantor ' s part not to follow the
statute , but to convey an estate subject to survivorship
the distinguishing incident of joint tenancy .22 And where ,
as in Connecticut , the right of survivorship as an incident
to joint tenancy has long been disregarded without legisla
tion of this kind , it may , nevertheless , be expressly con :
ferred by a grantor or testator .23
§ 155 . Joint tenancy expressly abolished . — Statutes
expressly abolishing joint tenancy exist apparently in
but two states , Georgia and Oregon .24 Under the Georgia
20 Colo . Stats . 1891, $ 2526 ; III . R . S . , ch . 71 , § 1 . See ante , $ 8 152 , 153 .
8
1 Kan . G . S . 1901 , $ 2534 ; K
y
. G . S . 1899 , $ 2348 ; N . C . Co . 1883 ,
$ 1326 ; Pa . Bright . Purd . Dig . 1894 , p . 1089 ; S . C . R . S . 1893 , § 1985 ;
Tenn . Shannon Co . 1896 , § 3677 ; Va . Co . 1887 , § 2430 ; Wash . Ball . Co .
1897 , § 4623 ; W . Va . Co . 1899 , ch . 71 , $ 18 .
2
3 Redemptorist Fathers v . Lawler , 1903 , 205 Pa . St . - ; 54 Atl . 487 .
And see Lockhart v . Vandyke , 1899 , 97 Va . 356 ; 33 S . E .613 ; Rowland
v . Rowland , 1885 , 93 N . C . 214 ; Bank of Greenbrier v . Effingham , 1902 ,
51 W . Va . 267 ; 41 S . E . 143 .
2






4Ga . Co . 1895 , $ $ 3142 , 3143 ; Ore . Hill ' s Ann . L . 1892 , $ 2991 .
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provision that " Joint tenancy does not exist in this state ,
and a
ll
such estates , under the English law , will be held
to b
e tenancies in common under this code , ” it seems
that an estate in " joint tenancy ” may not be created b
y
express terms in a deed or will as it may be in most states ,
but that , nevertheless , survivorship may still be provided
for . 25 In states where b
y





( as in Ohio ) , joint tenancy does not exist , a grant to two
o
r
more jointly , their heirs , etc . , and to the survivor o
f
the grantees , his heirs , etc . , might be construed , in order
to carry out the intention o
f
the parties without , perhaps ,
violating the law abolishing joint tenancies , as a joint es
tate for life with remainder to the survivor in fee . 26
$ 156 . Tenancy in common - It
s
characteristics — How
created . — Tenants in common hold severally , but b
y unity
o
f possession , because none of them knows his own sev
eralty . Unity o
f
possession is the only unity required in





different times , their titles may be diverse , and
they may own different estates in the land , but so long as
there is unity o
f possession there will be a tenancy in com
mon . 27 Without , however , this unity of possession - or
a
n equal right to the possession o
f
every part of the subject
matter o
f
the tenancy - several persons having interests in
the same realty are not tenants in common . Where one
has the exclusive right o
f
possession in one part and
others have such exclusive rights in other parts , this
tenancy does not exist . 28 Nor are tenants for life and re






life is exclusive of possession b
y
the re
mainder -men . 29 The right o
f survivorship is not a legal
characteristic of tenancy in common .
2
5 Harrison v . Harrison , 1898 , 105 Ga . 517 , 521 ; 31 S . E . 455 .
2
6 Lewis v . Baldwin , 11 Ohio 352 .
2




8 See ante , $ 148 .
1
9 Chamberlain v . Gleason , 1900 , 163 N . Y . 214 , 218 ; 57 N . E . 487 .
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At common law a tenancy in common originated only






the same person were coparceners . In the United States
the estate may arise b
y




vise . At common law , as joint tenancies were favored ,
to create a tenancy in common there must have been a
limitation to two or more expressly as tenants in common
o
r
in such a way as to imply a severance o
f
interests , but




a will are of less importance
than they were in former times , owing to the general rule
that a conveyance or devise to two or more is presumed
to create a tenancy in common . A tenancy in common
will also be created b
y






Where one conveys an undivided interest in a tract of
land in which h
e holds al
l
interests not thus conveyed ,
he and his grantee become tenants in common ; and the
creation o
f
this tenancy as between grantor and grantee ,
in many cases where a grantor conveys an undefined part
o
f
a larger tract , has been mentioned in the chapter on
Description . 30
§ 157 . Alienation b
y




specific part . - In consequence of the
character o
f
a tenancy in common , one tenant in com
mon may convey his own undivided interest , and his
grantee will become a tenant in common with the re
maining tenants , 31 or he may mortgage his undivided
interest and if the mortgage be foreclosed the purchaser
a
t
the foreclosure sale becomes tenant in common with
the former co -tenant of the mortgagor . 32 But as one ten
ant in common cannot without his co -tenant ' s consent
8
0 Ante , $ 79 .
3
1 Fleming v . Katahdin Pulp & c . Co . , 1899 , 93 Me . 110 ; 44 Atl . 378 ;
Banzer v . Banzer , 1898 , 156 N . Y . 429 ; 51 N . E . 291 ; Tindell v . Tindell ,
1896 , 37 S . W . 1105 .
3
2 Moreland v . Strong , 1897 , 11
5
Mich . 211 ; 73 N . W . 14
0 ; 4 Det . Leg .
News 837 .
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appropriate to himself any exclusive rights in a specific
portion of the land held in common , so he cannot by
grants or conveyances give to others any such rights ; for
example , he cannot grant an easement , so as to confer
rights which can be enforced against his co-tenants . 33
Nor may he grant the right to cut and remove timber
from the land owned in common . 34 The vendee of the
timber in such a case does not become a tenant in com
mon of the timber with his vendor ' s co -tenants .35
The conveyance by one co - tenant of a portion of the
common property by metes and bounds, though said to be
" void " in some of the earlier decisions , will generally be
held to be valid as against the grantor , though his
grantee takes subject to the risk of loss if , on partition ,
the land should not be so divided as to give him the por
tion conveyed ; for such a conveyance cannot be allowed
to prejudice the rights of the co -tenants to a partition of
the land as if it had not been made , and the grantee has
no absolute right on partition to have the part attempted
to be conveyed allotted to him . 36
That such a conveyance is not “ void ” is indicated by
the fact that the other co- tenants may confirm it if they
choose to do so ;37 and , according to many decisions, in
making partition a court of equity will so far recognize
83 Palmer v . Palmer , 1896 , 150 N . Y . 139 , 149 ; 44 N . E . 966 .
34 Sullivan v. Sherry , 1901 , 111 Wis . 476 ; 87 N . W . 471 ; Nevels v.
Kentucky Lumber Co ., 1900 , 108 Ky . 550 ; 56 S . W . 969 ; 49 L . R . A .
416 .
35 Benedict v . Torrent, 1890 , 83 Mich . 181 ; 47 N . W . 129 ; 11 L . R . A .
278 ; 21 Am . St. R . 589 , though it was afterward held that, while the
vendee of the timber was not entitled to partition of the timber , he
might enforce a partition of the land and the timber as a whole , even
though all the tenants in common had conveyed the land to a third
person without reservation of the timber . Mee v. Benedict , 1893 , 98
Mich . 260 ; 57 N . W . 17
5
; 22 L . R . A . 641 ; 39 Am . St . R . 543 . .
3
6Gates v . Salmon , 35 Cal . 576 ; 95 Am . Dec . 139 ; Markoe v . Wake
man , 107 Ill . 251 ; Warthen v . Siefert , 1894 , 139 Ind . 233 ; 38 N . E . 464 .
3
1Gordon v . City of San Diego , 1894 , 101 Cal .522 : 36 Pac . 18 ; 40 Am .
S
t . R . 73 ; Goodwin v . Keney , 49 Conn . 563 .
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the conveyance as to allot to the grantee the portion so
attempted to be conveyed , if such allotment may be made
without injuriously affecting the rights of the other co
tenants. 38
$ 158 . Conveyance of the entire property by tenant in
common - Ouster . — If one tenant in common attempts a
conveyance by deed of thewhole property , and his grantee
enters and claims the whole title under his conveyance ,
this will generally be considered an " ouster ” of the other
tenants. The grantee 's possession thus becomes adverse
as to the co -tenants of his grantor , and his title may ulti
mately become good by this adverse possession .39 But to
amount to “ ouster , ” so that title by adverse possession
may be acquired , the facts must have come to the notice,
actually or constructively , of the co -tenant who is out of
possession .40 Nor will possession by the grantee of one
co -tenant amount to ouster if it is in recognition of the
other co -tenants ' rights and not adverse to them .41
$ 159 . Coparcenary. - An estate in coparcenary , or
parcenary , arises by descent and not by purchase , thus
differing from both joint tenancy and tenancy in com
mon . It comes about when , either by virtue of the com
mon law or special custom , an estate in fee or tail
descends upon two or more as co -heirs of a deceased per
son . All the coparceners together form but one heir and
38Maverick v. Burney , 1895 , 88 Texas 560 ; 32 S . W . 512 ; Young v .
Edwards , 1890 , 33 S. C . 404 ; 11 S . E . 1066 ; 26 Am . St . R . 689 ; Worth
ington v . Staunton , 16 W . Va . 209 ; Mee v. Benedict , 1893 , 98 Mich .
260 ; 57 N . W . 175 ; 22 L . R . A . 641 ; 39 Am . St. R . 543 .
39 Sweetland v. Buell , 1900 , 164 N . Y . 541 ; 58 N . E . 663 ; Bennett v .
Pierce, 1901, 50 W . Va. 604 ; 40 S . E . 395 ; Murray v . Quigley , 1902, --
Iowa — ; 92 N . W . 869 ; Frost v. Courtis, 1899 , 172 Mass . 401 ; 52 N . E .
515 ; Johnston v . Virginia Coal & c. Co., 1898 , 96 Va . 158 ; 31 S . E . 85 .
40Roberts v. Morgan , 30 Vt. 319 ; Warfield v . Lindell , 38 Mo. 581 ; 90
Am . Dec . 443 .
41 Van Ormer v. Harley , 1897 , 102 Iowa 150 ; 71 N . W . 241 ; Price v .
Hall , 1895 , 140 Ind . 314 ; 39 N . E . 941.
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have but a single freehold ,42 and yet there is no right of
survivorship among them .
In lands which descend by virtue of common law rules
coparcenary among males is impossible , so that at com .
mon law the estate arose among females only , but in gavel
kind lands coparceners may be males or females .13 As
long as the descent is uninterrupted the parcenary con
tinues , but one parcener may convey his share to another
parcener or to a third person or may devise it. 44
If one parcener alien his or her entire estate in lands
to a stranger this is a severance and the alienee is tenant
in common with the other parcener or parceners .46
In this country parcenary is of little practical impor
tance as distinguished from tenancy in common ; for co
heirs take generally as tenants in common , either under
express statutory provisions which exist in some states ,46
or without such statutes .
In a few states , however , statutes provide for descent
“ in parcenary ” to the kindred of the intestate in the or
der designated in the statutes .47
$ 160 . Partition - By deed . - Partition is a division of
the interests of co -owners into severalty .
There are two general methods of accomplishing this :
( a ) Voluntary partition , by the act of the parties ; ( b )
compulsory partition , by judicial proceedings.48
62 Co . Litt. 164a .
48 Digby Hist. L . R . Prop ., pp . 280 , 281.
* Challis Real Prop ., 301 .
45 Co . Litt . 167b .
46 For example , Ala . Co . 1896 , § 1461 ; N . H . Pub. St. 1901, ch . 137 ,
$ 15 : " Joint heirs shall be deemed tenants in common ;' N . Y . Real
Prop . L ., $ 293 , Birdseye 1901, p . 3081 .
47For example , Colo . Ann . St. 1891, $ 1524 ; Ky . Stats . 1899 , $ 1393 ;
Mo. R . S. 1899, $ 2908 ; Ohio R. S. , $ 4158 ; Va . Co. 1887 , $ 2548 . Ameri .
can decisions discussing coparcenary are infrequent. See Stevenson v.
Cofferin , 20 N . H . 150 ; Ward v . Ward , 1895 , 40 W . Va .611 ; 21 S . E .
746 ; 52 Am . St. R . 911 .
48By the common law only parceners were entitled to insist on par
tition , but by statutes in 1539 - 40 joint tenants and tenants in com .
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Joint tenants , tenants in common and coparceners
may , by mutual agreement, make partition among them
selves , by conveying or releasing to one another so that
each co - tenant receives from the others a certain part,
designated specifically by metes and bounds, of the entire
property .
The partition may be effected by one deed , executed by
all the co -tenants , under which a share of the property in
severalty is assigned to each ,19 or by mutual deeds under
which each co -tenant has transferred or released to him
the interest of all the other co -tenants in the part assigned
to him . Such deeds create no new title to the portions
set off to the parties to be held in severalty , but merely
designate each share by metes and bounds.50
§ 161 . Parol partition. - In many states a partition by
mutual agreement may be by parol , followed by posses
sion by the several tenants respectively of the portions
assigned to them ,51 though the effect of such parol parti
tion is not always to give the legal title to the tenant tak
ing possession of his part under it, butmerely an equita
ble title and the right to exclusive possession ;52 and in
all cases the parol partition must be established by clear
evidence that exclusive possession was taken of the part
assigned .53
In other states, however , it is held that a parol partition
mon were given this right . In this country the matter of partition by
judicial proceedings is regulated by statute . The subject is not within
the scope of this volume.
19 Townsend y. Qutten , 1898 , 95 Va .536 ; 28 S. E . 958 . See Center v .
Davis , 1896 , 113 Cal. 307 ; 45 Pac. 468 ; 54 Am , St . R . 352 .
50 Whitsett v . Wamack , 1900 , 159 Mo. 14 ; 59 S . W , 961 ; 81 Am . St .
R . 339 ; Carter v . Day, 1898 , 59 Ohio St. 96 ; 51 N . E . 967 ; 69 Am . St .
R . 757.
51Byers v . Byers , 1898 , 183 Pa . 509 ; 38 Atl. 1027 ; 39 L . R . A . 537 ;
63 Am . St. R . 765 ; Wood v. Fleet, 36 N . Y . 499 ; 93 Am . Dec . 528 .
52 Kash v. Coleman , 1898 , 145 Mo. 645 ; 47 S. W . 503 ; Bruce v. Og.
good , 113 Ind . 360 ; 14 N . E . 563 .
53 Justice v. Lawson , 1899 , 46 W . Va . 163 ; 33 S. E . 102 ; Sanger v .
Merritt , 1892 , 13 N . Y . 614 ; 30 N . E . 100 .
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is invalid , as the statute of frauds requires an agreement
for such a division of lands to be in writing ,54 though
where this view is held , possession taken under a parol
partition , if continued long enough ,will give a legal title
by virtue of the statute of limitations .56
§ 162. Tenancy by entireties . - At common law , " ten
ancy by entireties '' - or “ by the entirety ' - occurs when
a gift or conveyance , which , if made to two strangers ,
would create a joint tenancy , is made to a husband and
wife during the coverture . The peculiarities of this
estate arise out of the identity which the common law ap
pears generally to have assumed to exist between husband
and wife. At common law a husband and wife are ten
ants by entirety , unless the conveyance to them indicates
an intention to create a different estate . “ It constitutes
the most intimate union of ownership known to the
law ." 56 The most important characteristic of the estate
by the entirety is the right of survivorship by which the
survivor, whether husband or wife , becomes seized of the
entirety . In this it resembles joint tenancy , but it differs
from the latter in that this right of survivorship cannot
be defeated by either spouse by a conveyance to a stran
ger.57
$ 163 . Has been generally recognized as common law
in the United States — Exceptions . This estate seems to









4 Woodhull v . Longstreet , 18 N . J . L . 405 ; Berry v . Seawall , 1895 , 65
Fed . 742 .
5
5 Slone v . Grider ( 1898 Ky . ) , 44 S . W . 384 .
5
6 Challis Real Prop . , 304 .
5
7 On divorce the estate is destroyed and husband and wife become
tenants in common , as a general rule . Russell v . Russell , 1894 , 122 Mo .
235 ; 26 S . W . 677 ; 43 Am . S
t
. R . 581 ; Stelz v . Shreck , 1891 , 128 N . Y .
263 ; 28 N . E . 510 ; 26 Am . St . R . 475 ; contra , Appeal of Lewis , 1891 , 85
Mich . 340 ; 48 N . W . 580 ; 24 Am . St . R . 94 .
1
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recent statutes . But in two states — Connecticut and Ohio
- irrespective of such statutes , it seems never to have
existed ,58 and in Nebraska , without reference to any spe
cial legislation , it is declared to be inapplicable to modern
conditions and not the common law of that state,59 nor
has it obtained in Oklahoma,60 nor, generally , in those
states where the " community system ” prevails .61
§ 164. In what states now recognized - Effect of
statutes as to joint tenancy and married women . - Ten
ancy by entireties seems still recognized with many of its
common law attributes in about one -third of the states ,
among these being , Arkansas , Indiana , Michigan , Mis
souri , New York , North Carolina , Oregon , Pennsylvania ,
South Carolina , Tennessee and Vermont . 67
In several o
f
these states the acts changing estates in
joint tenancy to estates in common , or abolishing joint
tenancy d
o not apply to estates b
y
the entirety , because
husband and wife are expressly excepted from their oper
ation ; 63 and in the others they have been held inappli




also the married women ' s property acts have been
5
8 Whittlesey v . Fuller , 11 Conn . 337 ; Farmers ' & c . Bank v . Wallace ,
4
5 Ohio St . 152 , 165 ; 12 N . E . 439 .
5
9 Kerner v . McDonald , 1900 , 60 Neb . 663 ; 84 N . W . 92 ; 83 Am . St . R .
550 .
6
0 Helvie v . Hoover , 1902 , 12 Okl . — ; 69 Pac . 958 .
6
1 Though see the commissioners ' amendments to Cal . Civ . Co . 1901 ,
$ $ 161 , 682 , 686 .
6
2 Roulston v . Hall , 1899 , 66 Ark . 305 ; 50 S . W . 690 ; 74 Am . S
t
. R . 97 ;
Simons v . Bollinger , 1900 , 154 Ind . 83 ; 56 N . E . 23 ; 48 L . R . A . 234 ;
Doane v . Feather ' s Est . , 1899 , 119 Mich . 691 ; 78 N . W . 884 ; 6 Det . Leg .
News 25 ; Hume v . Hopkins , 1897 , 140 Mo . 65 ; 41 S . W . 784 ; Hiles y .
Fisher , 1895 , 144 N . Y . 306 ; 39 N . E . 337 ; 30 L . R . A . 305 ; 43 Am . St . R .
762 ; Ray v . Long , 1903 , 132 N . C . 891 ; 44 S . E . 652 ; Noblitt v . Beebe ,
2
3 Ore . 4 ; Bramberry ' s Est . , 1893 , 15
6
Pa . St . 628 ; 36 Am . St . R . 64 ; 22
L . R . A . 594 ; McLeod v . Tarrant , 1893 , 39 S . C . 271 ; 17 S . E . 773 ; 20
L . R . A . 846 .
6
3 For example , Indiana , Michigan , Missouri and Vermont .
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held in many states not to have had the effect of abolish
ing tenancy by the entireties .64
§ 165 . In what states not recognized because of stat
utes . — On the other hand , statutes like that of Iowa ,6 re
lating to joint tenancy , have been considered to apply to
the estate by entireties ,66 and in some states modern
statutes enlarging the property rights of married women
have been held to have had the effect of abolishing this
estate by removing whatever reason there had once been
for it at common law in the supposed identity of husband
and wife .67
In addition to such statutes are those like that of Mas
sachusetts quoted above , which expressly name estates
granted to husband and wife as being estates in com
mon ; and statutes which , in abolishing survivorship
in joint tenancy , expressly name estates in entirety ,68 or
expressly apply the rule abolishing survivorship to es
tates granted to husband and wife .69
As a general result of these different statutes, directly
and indirectly affecting tenancy by entireties , it appears
that in the majority of states the estate does not exist at
present except in cases where it was created before such
statutes took effect . But in jurisdictions where it has
been recognized , but is not now , it is to be noted that it
s
former recognition may still affect titles , and that , there
fore , the doctrines regarding it cannot be ignored .
6
4 See the cases cited above , in note 62 , from Arkansas , Michigan ,
New York and Pennsylvania .
6
5 Ante , $ 152 .
6
6 Bader v . Dyer , 1898 , 10
6
Iowa 71
5 ; 77 N . W . 469 ; 68 Am . St . R .
332 ; Wilson v . Wilson , 1890 , 43 Minn . 398 ; 45 N . W . 710 .
6
7 Mittel v . Karl , 1890 , 133 Ill . 65 ; 24 N . E . 553 ; 8 L . R . A . 655 ; Rob
inson , Appellant , 1895 , 88 Me . 17 ; 33 Atl . 652 ; 51 Am . S
t
. R . 367 ; 30 L .
R . A . 331 ; Donegan v . Donegan , 1893 , 103 Ala . 488 ; 15 So . 823 ; 49 Am .
S
t
. R . 53 ; Citizens ' Loan & c . Co . y . Witte , 1902 , 116 Wis . 60 .
6
8 Stewart v . Thomas , 1902 , 64 Kan . 511 ; 68 Pac . 70 .
6
9 McNeeley v . South Pa . Oil Co . , 1903 , 52 W . Va . 616 ; 44 S . E . 508 .
See ante , $ 154 . .
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For example , in a recent action for flowing the plain
tiff's land in a state where tenancy by entireties is not
now created by a grant to husband and wife, 70 the defend
ant claimed , under the husband 's conveyance made while
the title to the land stood in the names of husband and
wife , but after conveyances to husband and wife had been
declared by statute to create estates in common , and the
plaintiff claimed title by a subsequent conveyance made
by the surviving wife : it was held that , as the convey
ance to the husband and wife was made before the statute
changing the law took effect , the wife 's right by survivor




§ 166 . Conveyance of estates by entireties . - A hus
band and wife may convey lands held in entirety b
y
their
joint conveyance , though in such a case the wife should
not join in the conveyance " to release her dower , " et
c
. ,
but should be named in the granting part of the deed . 71
Neither tenant , however , can alone make a conveyance




the husband ' s general marital rights at common
law being the right to control and dispose of his wife ' s
lands during their joint lives , he was entitled to the
rents and profits o
f
land held under this tenancy and could
convey the land for his life , 72 or incumber it subject to his
wife ' s right of survivorship . 73 This power of control by
the husband o
f
his wife ' s share is generally regarded as
taken from him b
y
the laws extending the property rights
o
f
married women . 74 He may , however , in some states
convey his own interest subject to his wife ' s right of sur
7
0 Pease v . Inhabitants of Whitman , 1903 , 182 Mass . 363 ; 65 N . E . 795 .
7
1 Wales v . Coffin , 13 Allen 213 .
7
2 Pray v . Stebbins , 141 Mass . 219 ; 4 N . E . 824 ; 55 Am . R . 462 .
7
8 Washburn v . Burns , 34 N . J . L . 18 .
7
4 Hiles v . Fisher , 1895 , 14
4
N . Y . 30
6 ; 39 N . E . 337 ; 43 Am . St . R .
762 ; 30 L . R . A . 305 .
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vivorship ,75 and the effect of statutes permitting the wife
to convey either “ as a feme sole ,” or “ in the sameman
ner as her husband, ” has been held to give her convey
ance an equal force .76 On the other hand , in a few
states (notably Indiana and Michigan ) a conveyance ,
while both are living , by either spouse alone to a third
person has n
o
force , even though the one that conveyed
survives the other . 77 But in these states a husband may
convey his interest in the tenancy b
y
entireties directly
to his wife , 78 and in Michigan she may convey her interest
in such an estate directly to him . 79
§ 167 . The " community system . ” — The " community
system " exists at present in Arizona , California , Idaho ,
Louisiana , Nevada , New Mexico , Texas and Washington ,
though it formerly prevailed in Missouri also . 80
This system originated in the civil law , and was adopted




Its general characteristic is that it reserves to the hus
band and the wife separately all property acquired by
either before marriage , and what is acquired b
y gift , de
vise , o
r
inheritance from others during marriage , but , in
general , all other property acquired b
y
either during the
marriage is held a
s
" community property . " 81 There is ,
1
5 Hiles y . Fisher , 1895 , 144 N . Y . 306 ; 39 N . E . 337 ; 43 Am . St . R .
762 ; 30 L . R . A . 305 ; Atkison v . Henry , 80 Mo . 151 ; Berrigan v .
Fleming , 70 Tenn . 271 .
7
6 Howell v . Folsom , 1900 , 38 Ore . 184 ; 63 Pac . 116 ; 84 Am . St . R .





7 Naylor v .Minock , 1893 , 96 Mich . 182 ; 55 N . W . 664 ; 35 Am . S
t
. R .
595 ; Dyer v . Eldridge , 1893 , 13
6
Ind . 654 , 662 ; 36 N . E . 522 .
7
8 Enyeart v . Kepler , 118 Ind . 34 ; 20 N . E . 539 ; 10 Am . St . R . 94 .
7
9 Wilkinson v . Kneeland , 1900 , 125 Mich . 261 ; 84 N . W . 142 ; 7 Det .
Leg . News 499 .
5
0 Moreau v . Detchemendy , 18 Mo . 522 .
1 Meyer v . Kinzer , 12 Cal . 24
7 ; 73 Am . D . 538 ; De Blanc v . Lynch ,
2
3 Texas 25 .
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in general, a presumption that property acquired after
marriage by either husband or wife is community prop
erty until it is shown to be separate property .82
But the system does not prevent either one of themar
ried persons from having separate property which is dis
tinct from the community property ; though when the
title is apparently in the community the evidence to estab
lish it
s separate character must be such as to counterbal
ance the presumption that it is community property . 83
A husband may convey community property to his
wife , and when he does so the presumption is that its *
character is changed to her separate property . 84
The wife , however , has such a slight interest in the
community property that she alone can convey no title to
it , unless she is abandoned b
y
her husband . 86 On the
other hand , the general rule is that the husband has the
management o
f





cannot convey it without consideration ,
unless with his wife ' s consent , nor can he convey it with
intent to defraud her . 86 Where this system prevails ,
courtesy and dower have either been abolished or have
never existed ; the rights of the survivor in the common
property take the place o
f
the one and the other . 87
8
2 Morris v . Hastings , 70 Texas 26 ; 8 Am . St . R . 570 ; Hanna v .
Reeves , 1900 , 22 Wash . 6 ; 60 Pac . 62 ; Svetinich y . Sheean , 1899 , 124
Cal . 216 ; 56 Pac , 1028 ; 71 Am . St . R . 50 . But see Cal . Civ . Co . , $ 164 ,
a
s amended , 1901 .
8
3Mattson v . Mattson , 1902 , 29 Wash . 417 ; 69 Pac , 1087 .
8
4Main v . Main (Ariz . 1900 ) , 60 Pac . 888 ; Hamilton v . Hubbard , 1901 ,
134 Cal . 603 , 606 ; 65 Pac . 321 .
8
6 Zimpelman v . Robb , 53 Texas 274 .
8
6 Spreckels v .Spreckels , 1897 , 116 Cal . 339 ; 48 Pac . 228 ; 58 Am . St . R .
170 ; Wilson v . Wilson , 1899 , 6 Idaho 597 ; 57 Pac . 708 . In Washing
ton , however , he cannot convey it o
r
encumber it unless she joins with
him in the deed , etc . Wash . Ball . Co . 1897 , $ 4491 .
8
7 Local statutes and decisions have so far divergently modified the sys
tem a
s
to make a further discussion o
f
its doctrines impracticable . The
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land conveys it b
y
deed to another and his
heirs , or devises it by will , he does not always merely
grant or devise it absolutely , but he often provides that
something must happen or be done before the grantee ' s
interest can begin o
r
become complete , or he subjects the
land to some restriction , o
r attempts to confine its enjoy
ment to some particular use , or he provides that the
grantee ' s or devisee ' s estate shall come to an end on the
happening o
f
some contingency before the time a
t
which
it would otherwise terminate .
(199 )
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A clause or recital in the instrument disposing of the
estate by which such ends are sought to be accomplished
may have the character of a condition imposed by the
grantor, or of a covenant in the nature of a promise by
the grantee , or of a stipulation amounting to a prohibi
tion on the use of the land , or of a special limitation .
Such clauses in some particulars resemble one another
in form , but their effects are quite different , according as
they are really one or the other .
§ 169 . Implied conditions . — Conditions which qualify
the existence of estates are primarily of two sorts : ( 1 )
implied conditions , or conditions in law , — such as the
law itself annexes to estates ; and ( 2 ) express conditions ,
o
r
conditions in deed , — such as are expressly stated in




n implied condition a
t





tenure , was that a tenant











conveyances , by which seisin was divested , worked a for
feiture . Implied conditions , of comparatively much less
importance now than formerly , will not be discussed .
§ 170 . Express conditions — Conditions precedent . - Ex
press conditions may be either conditions precedent o
r
conditions subsequent .
A condition precedent is one which must be fulfilled
before the estate dependent upon it can come into exist
ence : prior to the fulfilment o
f
the condition no estate
passes from the grantor to the grantee ,while after its ful
1 B
1 . Comm . II , 152 - 154 .
? This doctrine did not apply to conveyances under the Statute o
f
Uses , which conveyed only such an estate as the grantor had ; nor does
it apply at this time in this country . Quimby v . Dill , 40 Maine 528 ;
McCorry v . King ' s Heirs , 3 Humph . ( Tenn . ) 267 ; 39 Am . Dec . 165 .
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filment the grantee has an absolute and unconditional
estate .
For example, a conveyance to a city of land for a park ,
provided that the city obtains authority from the legisla
ture to remove bodies from the cemetery on the land con
veyed within a certain time, is a grant on condition pre
cedent, and the failure of the city to obtain this authority
prevents its taking title . 3 Or , a devise to one on condition
that he , within a named time , shall come under the
guardianship of a relative o
f
the testator is a devise on





the devisee takes no estate . “
If a condition precedent be impossible or unlawful , the
grantee can take nothing , as the condition cannot be ful
filled . 5
$ 171 . Express conditions — Conditions subsequent .
A condition subsequent is one which affects an estate a
l
ready vested , rendering it liable to be defeated . The
characteristic o
f
the condition subsequent is that it pre
scribes terms upon which the land granted shall revert to
the grantor . If such a condition is impossible or unlaw
ful , the estate already vested cannot be defeated . This is
sometimes called a “ condition o
f
re - entry , ” or , at com
mon law , a " condition ” simply . It operates by reserv
ing a right of re -entry to the grantor o
r
his heirs : in a
certain event named the estate may be defeated b
y
this
entry , but until entry ( or some act equivalent to it ) the
estate continues . .
8 Stockton v . Weber , 1893 , 98 Cal . 433 ; 33 Pac . 332 .
* Johnson v . Warren , 1889 , 74 Mich , 491 ; 42 N . W . 74 ; Pearl v . Lock
wood , 123 Mich . 142 ; 81 N . W . 1087 ; 6 Detroit Leg . News 990 .
5If , however , the condition becomes impossible through the act of
him who has imposed it , it would seem to be no longer binding , but to
b
e discharged . Jones v . C . & 0 . R . R . Co . , 14 W . Va .514 , 523 . Thougb
see , contra , II Bl . Comm . 156 ; Co . Litt . 218a .
6 As to whether the right of re - entry should be expressed , see post ,
$ 179 .
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The grantor , having conveyed subject to a condition
subsequent , thereafter holds no estate in the land con
veyed . His interest , after such a conveyance and before
the breach of the condition by the grantee , is a mere pos
sibility of acquiring an estate in the land conveyed at
some future time, and this possibility , not being an es
tate , was inalienable at common law ; and after breach of
the condition by the grantee the grantor 's interest is a
right of entry not assignable at common law .
Therefore , it is still the general rule , except where a
statute has modified the doctrine , that advantage can be
taken of a condition subsequent only by the grantor or
his heirs .?
The condition may be of a positive or affirmative char
acter , that is , that the grantee , after taking the estate in
the land conveyed , shall do some specified thing — as that
he shall within a certain time build on the land a factory
of a certain capacity ; 8 or it may be of a negative charac
te
r , that is , that the grantee shall not do some specified
thing — as that he shall not make and sell intoxicating
liquors on the land ; 9 or it may be not dependent on the
act of the grantee , but on that of the grantor , as , in the
case o
f
the common - law mortgage , if land be conveyed
upon the condition that if the grantor pay the grantee
certain money at a certain day , then the grantor may re
enter — the fulfilment o
f
the condition gives the grantor
the right of re -entry . 10
§ 172 . Conditions precedent and subsequent compared .
- While there is a marked difference in effect between a
Upington v . Corrigan , 1896 , 151 N . Y . 143 ; 45 N . E . 35
9 ; 37 L . R . A .
794 ; Ruch v . Rock Island , 97 U . S . 693 ; Bangor v . Warren , 34 Maine
324 ; 56 Am . D . 657 . For statutes making such rights assignable see
Cal . Civ . Co . , $ 1046 ; Idaho Civ . Co . 1901 , $ 2391 ; Connecticut Gen .
Stat . 1902 , § 4051 .
* Langley v . Chapin , 134 Mass . 82 .
9 Cowell v . Colorado Springs Co . , 100 U . S . 55 .
1
0 Litt . , $ 332 .
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condition precedent and a condition subsequent, it is not
always easy to determine whether a particular clause be
longs to the one class or the other , for there are no tech
nical words by which to distinguish between them .11 It
is a matter of intention of the party imposing the condi
tion to be gathered from the whole instrument and not
merely from the terms of a part of it.
If it thus appears that the act on which the estate de
pends must be performed before the estate can vest , there
is a condition precedent ; if, however, the act does not
necessarily precede the vesting of the estate , but may ac
company or follow it, there is a condition subsequent.12
As the law favors the present vesting of estates — even
though they may be subsequently divested — the courts
are apt to construe a clause of doubtful import as a con
dition subsequent rather than a condition precedent , 13
though where the clause imposes clearly a condition pre
cedent there is no room for construction , as the manifest
intention of the grantor or testator must be regarded . 14
§ 173 . Determinable or special limitations. — An es
tate upon condition subsequent is to be distinguished
from an estate upon “ determinable limitation ,” or , as it
is also called , upon " special limitation , ” or “ collateral
limitation ." 15
An estate on condition subsequent and one on deter
minable or special limitation resemble one another in that
either may possibly end upon the happening of a contin
gency , before the timeatwhich it would end had no such
contingency been named .
11 Nicoll v . N . Y . & E . R . R . Co., 12 N . Y . 121 .
12 Finlay v. King' s Lessee , 3 Pet . 346 , 374 ; Donnelly v . Eastes , 1896 ,
94 Wis . 390 ; 69 N . W . 157 ; Burdis v . Burdis , 1898 , 96 Va . 81 ; 30 S. E .
462; 70 Am . St . R . 825 .
13 Donnelly v. Eastes , 1896 , 94 Wis . 390 ; 69 N . W . 157 .
14 Johnson v.Warren , 1889, 74 Mich . 491 ; 42 N . W . 74 ; Tilley v. King ,
1891 , 109 N . C . 461 ; 13 S . E . 936 .
15 See post, $ 17
5 , note 22 .
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But the contingency in a condition is a proviso cutting
off the estate granted before what would otherwise be it
s
natural termination by virtue o
f
its original limitation ,
while the contingency in a determinable o
r special limita
tion defines or limits the quantum o
f
the estate as part of
it
s original limitation . For example , if land is granted
to a woman “ during widowhood , ” the words “ during
widowhood " define the time during which it is the inten
tion o
f
the grantor that the estate shall endure , and at the
end o
f
which time the estate shall end : they are words of
limitation . The estate at the end of the period named
terminates by virtue of its original limitation . No entry
b
y
any one nor act o
f any other person is necessary to
divest the grantee o
f any interest , because her estate
ceases a
t
once upon the happening o
f
the event by which
it is limited .
If , however , the land is granted to a widow for and
during her life , but in the event of her marriage her
estate to cease and the land to revert to the grantor , the
effect is different ; for in this case an estate of a certain
character is given ,but by a separate provision , not a part
o
f
the original limitation , the estate is liable to be for
feited b
y
the grantee ' s performance of an act which , but
fo
r
this separate provision , might have been performed
without affecting the duration of the estate as limited .
This , therefore , is a condition , and the happening o
f
the
contingency named does not o
f
itself terminate the




§ 174 . Determinable fees . — When an estate in fe
e
sim




. Such an estate is an es
tate limited to the grantee and his heirs until the happen
ing of some future event , which must be of such a kind
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that it may by possibility never happen at all ; 16 it is an
estate whose continuance as a fee simple is made to de
pend upon the happening or not happening of some fu
ture event , but where the terms used in its creation are
words of limitation , as distinguished from words of con
dition .
Old examples of determinable fees are limitations to
one and his heirs “ as long as the Church of St . Paul shall
stand , ” or “ until the grantee go to Rome” ; 17 the most
appropriate words to create a determinable fee being:
during , so long as , till, until, whilst , etc . — such words
fitly prefacing a limitation .
The difference between the interest of the grantor after
the grant of a determinable fee and his interest after the
grant of an estate upon condition is chiefly in this , that
in the latter case a breach of the condition gives the
grantor a right of entry , while in the former case , upon
the happening of the event named as limiting the estate ,
the estate of the grantee terminates without entry and the
right of possession reverts to the grantor .
It has been argued that as the grantor 's " possibility of
reverter ” presupposed a tenure between grantor and
grantee , which cannot exist since the statute Quia Emp
tores , 18 and that the whole fee having been granted there
is no reversionary interest left in the grantor by virtue of
which he may claim possession , therefore no valid deter
minable fee can be created.19 But, nevertheless , deter
minable fees are expressly recognized by many decisions
in this country .
For example , where the grant was to a religious society :
" To have and to hold to the said ( society ) and their as
16 Challis Real Prop ., p . 197 .
17 Plowd . 557 ; 1 P . Wms. 75 ; Shep . Touchstone 125 .
18 1290 , 18 Edw . I, c . 1.
19See Gray Rule Against Perpetuities, $ $ 31 -42 ; Pollock Land
Laws, App ., p . 221 ; papers by Prof. Gray and Mr. Challis in Law
Quarterly Rev ., Vol. 3, pp . 399 , 403 ( 1887 ) .
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signs , so long as said real estate shall by said society or
it




the Christian religion , " set forth in a
certain formulary , it was held to create a determinable
fee , terminating without entry and reverting to the
grantor when the use specified ceased . 20
§ 175 . Conditional limitations . - An estate upon condi
tional limitation partakes of the character of both an es
tate upon condition and one upon special limitation , but
is identical with neither .
Where there is an estate upon condition with a limita







non - fulfilment , there is a condi
tional limitation .
The limitation to the third party must be made at the
time of the original grant , for if the grant be strictly upon
condition subsequent the grantor has no estate which he
can afterward alienate . 21
Thus , if a grant bemade to a widow for life , but in the
event o
f
her marriage her estate to cease and title to vest
in a third person , the grant is not one upon condition
merely , for the grantor has reserved (expressly o
r by im
plication ) no entry ; nor is the estate one upon special






this dual character is a grant upon condi
tional limitation . It resembles a condition subsequent
but operates quite differently , for upon the breach of the
condition involved in a conditional limitation no act of
any one is necessary to terminate the estate , as it ceases ,
2
0 First Universalist Soc ' y v . Boland , 1892 , 155 Mass . 171 ; 29 N . E .
524 ; 15 L . R . A . 231 . See also Delhi School District v . Everett ,52 Mich .
314 ; 17 N W . 926 ; Friedman y . Steiner , 107 Ill . 125 ; Slegel v . Lauer ,
1892 , 148 Pa . S
t
. 236 ; 23 Atl . 996 ; Hall v . Turner , 1892 , 110 N . C . 292 ;
1
4
S . E . 791 ; Congregational Soc ' y v . Stark , 34 Vt . 243 .
2
1 See supra , 171 .
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ipso facto , and the limitation over to the third person ,
vests at once without entry .22
§ 176 . Causes of difficulties in construing . - It appears
that the subject of conditional estates has always been con
sidered one of some difficulty . On this matter it is said ,
in Preston 's edition of Shepard 's Touchstone , page 121 ,
“ Conditions annexed to estates are sometimes so placed
and confounded amongst covenants ; sometimes so ambigu
ously drawn , and at al
l
times have in their drawing
(when deeds , etc . , are prepared b
y
unskilful persons ) so
much affinity with limitations , that it is hard to discern
and distinguish them . ” Time has not much lessened the
difficulties mentioned in the Touchstone . 2 Indeed , they
seem to have somewhat increased during the two hundred
and fifty years since the clause quoted from the Touch
stone was written , and this is due to several causes . In
creased and more varied business enterprises have led to
a greater variety o
f
uses to which land may be put , and
a
t
the same time to the imposition o
f
a greater variety o
f
2
2 Proprietors Brattle Square Church v . Grant , 3 Gray 142 ; 63 Am .
Dec . 725 ; Outland v . Bowen , 115 Ind . 150 ; 17 N . E . 281 ; 7 Am . S
t
. R .
420 . Some confusion has been caused by the use o
f
the phrase " condi
tional limitation ” to describe a special o
r
collateral limitation . Challis
(Real Prop . , pp . 199 , 200 ) styles the " special limitation " a " determina
ble limitation , " and says that to describe it as a " conditional limita
tion " is only to invite obscurity and confusion . ” The term conditional
limitation is more properly used to describe a proviso cutting short an
estate previously created and substituting another in it
s
stead ” : Gray




t . R . Co . v . Jackson , 1899 , 108 Ga . 634 ; 34 S . E . 184 , illustrates how
differences o
f opinion may be entertained concerning conditional
clauses : plaintiffs regarded the clause as a covenant and brought an
action for damages , defendant contended that it was a condition subse
quent , but the court , agreeing with neither party , refers to it as creat
ing a “ defeasible fee , " and calls it also a " conditional limitation ” and
a " limitation . "
2
3
See , for example , Clapp v . Wilder , 1900 , 17
6
Mass . 332 ; 57 N . E .
692 ; 50 L . R . A . 120 , in which case the court was about equally divided
in opinion as to whether a clause in a deed was a conditional clause o
r
a restriction merely .
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restraints on its free use . Besides , modern rules of con
struction have somewhat changed the effect o
f
technical
words ; and while in construing conveyances the aim o
f
the courts is to get at the intention o
f
the parties from the
whole instrument , read with regard to the circumstances
in which it was made , they very often disregard forms o
f
expression which once had more nearly a fixed meaning .
Moreover , the doctrine o
f
conditional estates is not





land . When all lands were regarded as granted out by
somesuperior lord and held on condition from him , re
versionary interests and forfeitures , in certain cases ,were
natural legal incidents of estates . But the fundamental
principles o
f allodial ownership are really inconsistent
with the doctrine of reversionary rights still remaining
with one who has parted with his title . Some American
courts , therefore , incline further than do others toward







a condition . Others have been more influenced b
y
the
older rules . The result is that there is some conflict
among the decisions , and in practice the questions raised
are often perplexing
The chief difficulty that seems to have arisen in connec
tion with the subject has been that of ascertaining
whether certain provisions annexed to grants o
f
real prop
erty constitute conditions of such a character that a breach





whether such provisions are covenants , restrictions ,
limitations , or trusts impressed on the property _ affecting
the estate in ways quite different from that in which a true
condition affects it .
In view o
f
the number and character o
f
the decisions it
is worth while to examine them in some detail with the
view o
f distinguishing the condition subsequent from
these other provisions .
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§ 177 . Words used in creating conditions . — When an
estate is granted on condition subsequent, a present estate
passes , subject , however, to be defeated by the breach of
the condition . The estate continues in the grantee until
avoided . As, therefore , conditions subsequent tend to work
a forfeiture of an estate already vested , it is well settled
that they are strictly construed against the grantor , and if
it is intended to create a condition subsequent itmust be
generally so expressed as to leave no room for construing
it as something else .
No particular form of words is considered absolutely es
sential to create a condition ; but it is essential that the
intention to create it shall be clearly shown by some
words. If the grantor, in attempting to create a condition
subsequent , has so expressed himself that it is doubtful
whether the clause is a covenant or a condition , it will be
construed a covenant; or , if it is doubtful whether there
is a condition or simply a trust, not resulting in a forfei
ture on it
s
breach , it will be construed as the latter . 24
“ Where , however , the terms are distinctly and plainly
terms o
f
condition , where the whole provision precisely
satisfies the requirements o
f
the definition , and where the
transaction has nothing in it
s
nature to create an incon
gruity , there is no room for refinement , and no ground for
refusing to assign to the subject it
s predetermined legal
character . In such a case the law attaches to the act , and
* * * the parties cannot b
e
heard to say that although
they deliberately made a condition , and nothing but a
condition , they yet meant that it should be exactly as a
covenant . " 25
2
4
See post , $ 180 .
2
5 Blanchard v . Railroad , 31 Mich . 43 , 51 . In this case a conveyance
was made upon the express condition that a railroad company should
build and maintain a depot , and run trains , etc . The grantor seeks to
specifically enforce this as a covenant ; not , as is generally the case , to
forfeit the estate as for the breach o
f
a condition . But the court holds
that equity will not enforce it as a covenant , for two reasons : first , be
1
4
— BREWS . Con .
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While technical words are not essential to create a con
dition , and while they will not,when used , always be held
to create one , it is well recognized that certain terms are
more apt to create a condition than are others . The
most appropriate words used for this purpose are such
phrases as “ on condition ,” “ provided always ,” or similar
expressions which indicate that in a certain event pre
scribed the estate becomes defeasible by entry of the
grantor or his heirs ( or an equivalent act ), but that until
entry the estate is to continue .
§ 178 . The place for the condition . The appropriate
place for the use of these words is just after the habendum ,
or as a part of it. In this place they qualify the grant,
controlling , butnot contradicting , the more general words
used in the premises. If the words of condition are found
in any other part of the deed , as , for example , among the
covenants , or, as is often the case , in the premises , as a
part of the statement of consideration , their unusual and
inappropriate position may have an influence on the in
terpretation of the deed .
For example , where the words claimed to be a condition
subsequent were placed after the usual covenants , and
were to the effect that the grantees should not use the
premises for any noxious or offensive business , nor use
the said premises for any other purpose than as an orna
mental park , the court decided that the clause was a
promissory covenant , not for the benefit of the grantor
and his heirs , but for the benefit of those to whom ease
ments had previously been granted ; and mentions the
fact that the provision in question is not placed where
conditions are usually found in deeds , but follows the
covenants for title , saying : “ While this is by no means
cause it is a condition subsequent , and , second , because equity cannot
supervise the construction and maintenance of the depot and the oper
ation of the railroad . See Ritchie v . Railroad , 1895 , 55 Kan . 36 ; 39
Pac. 718 ; Mills v . Railroad , 1895 , 10 Wash . 520 ; 39 Pac. 246 .
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controlling, it has a significance not to be overlooked , as
the instrument was evidently drawn by a skilful convey
ancer , who was well acquainted with both forms and
technical terms in common use by experienced draughts
men of deeds. The absence of technical language appro
priate , although not essential to create a condition , is also
significant . ” 26
Where the short form statutory deed is used , in which
there is no habendum clause , about the only place in the
usual printed form for the insertion of a condition is just
after the description , and this appears to be the place
where the condition is inserted when this form of deed is
used .27
§ 179 . The re -entry clause. — To make the condition
clearer and more unmistakable , a clause providing for a
re-entry by the grantor or his heirs , or for forfeiture of
the estate on breach of the condition , should be added .
The presence or absence of a clause of this kind has an
important bearing upon the question whether the recital
constitutes a condition or a covenant.
For example , in Post v . Weil, 28 one having agreed to
purchase land refused to complete the purchase and ac
cept a deed , on the ground that by the provision of a for
mer deed , through which the present vendor derived title ,
the property was subject to the operation of a condition
subsequent . This action was brought to compel the spe
cific performance of his contract to purchase the land.
The clause in question was in the habendum clause, as
follows: “ Provided always, and these presents are upon
this express condition , that the said premises shall not ,
nor shall any part thereof , or any building or buildings
thereon erected or to be erected , be hereafter used or occu
pied as a tavern or public house of any kind .” The court,
26Graves v . Deterling , 1890 , 120 N . Y . 447 ; 24 N . E . 655 .
37 Preston v . Bosworth , 1899 , 153 Ind . 458 ; 55 N . E . 224 .
28 1889 , 11
5
N . Y . 361 ; 22 N . E . 145 ; 12 Am . St . R . 809 ; 5 L . R . A . 422 .
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in deciding that this was not a condition subsequent, no
tices that there is no clause in the deed giving the right
to re -enter fo
r
condition broken , and says ( p . 371 ) :
“ While the presence o
f
such a clause is not essential to
the creation of a condition subsequent , b
y
which an estate








grantor , or his heirs , to re -enter , yet its absence to that
extent frees still more the case from the difficulty of giv
ing a more benignant construction to the proviso clause .
The presence o
f
a re -entry clause might make certain that
which , in its absence , is left open to construction . ” 29







re -entry or fo
r
for
feiture has been considered important in determining
whether the clause is o
r
is not a true condition . 30 But
while such an express provision will generally be held to
clearly make that a condition which might otherwise be
regarded as a covenant , a condition may be created with
out such a provision ; thus the following clause in the
habendum is held a condition subsequent : “ Subject ,
nevertheless , to the condition that no spirituous or other
intoxicating drinks shall be sold on the premises . ' > 31
2




the supreme court o
f Massachu
setts this case shows “ considerable astuteness in the direction o
f modi .




conditions , ” but the minority
opinion cites it with approval . Clapp v . Wilder , 1900 , 17
6
Mass . 332 ,
335 , 345 ; 57 N . E . 692 ; 50 L . R . A . 120 .
3
0 Elyton Land Co . v . Railroad , 1893 , 100 Ala . 39
6 , 406 ; 14 So . 207 ;
Scovill v . McMahon , 1892 , 62 Conn . 378 ; 26 Atl . 479 ; 36 Am . S
t . R .
350 ; Brewery C
o . y . Primas , 1896 , 163 I1
1
. 652 ,658 ; 45 N . E . 145 ;McAnaw
v . Tiffin , 1897 , 143 Mo . 667 , 677 ; 45 S . W . 656 ; Bragdon v . Blaisdell ,
1898 , 91 Me . 326 , 328 ; 39 Atl . 1036 ; Greene v . O 'Connor , 1892 , 18 R . I .
5
6 , 59 ; 25 Atl . 692 ; 19 L . R . A . 262 ; Palmer v . Ryan , 1891 , 63 Vt . 227 ;
2
2 Atl . 574 ; Mahoning Co . v . Young , 1893 , 16 U . S . App . 253 , 269 ;
Hartung v . Witte , 59 Wis . 285 , 293 ; 18 N . W . 275 ; King v . N . & W . Ry ,
Co . , 1901 , 99 Va . 625 ; 39 S . E . 701 .
3
1 Lehigh Coal Co . v . Early , 1894 , 162 Pa . S
t
. 338 ; 29 Atl . 736 , and see
Papst v . Hamilton , 1901 , 133 Cal . 631 ; 66 Pac . 10 ; Langley v . Chapin ,
134 Mass . 82 ; Clapp v . Wilder , 1900 , 176 Mass . 332 ; 57 N . E . 692 ; 50
L . R . A . 120 .
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§ 180 . Particular classes of cases — Conveyances for
specified purposes . In conveyances there is frequently a
clause reciting the use that is to be made by the grantee
of the land conveyed , and the question has been often
raised whether such conveyances create estates upon con
dition , conferring upon the grantor or his heirs a right of
entry upon the grantee 's ceasing to use the property for
the purpose specified .
The grant may be without technical words importing a
condition , as , for example, to a city of land — " To have
and to hold to the city and its successors as and for a
street and to be kept as a public highway , ' 32 or the terms
of the grant may more clearly import a condition , as
where land was conveyed to a city , “ On condition that it
shall be forever kept open and used as a public highway ,
and for no other purpose, ” 33 and yetbe held — as it was
held in each of these cases — not to create a condition sub
sequent working a forfeiture in case the use named is not
maintained .
Technical words , therefore , do not absolutely control in
such cases , and yet , as the aim of the courts is to give ef
fect to the intention of the parties , and as one of the
means of discovering this intention is the language used ,
there may be instances in this class of cases — as in others
— where the intention is so clearly expressed that there is
no doubt as to the creation of a condition subsequent and
no need for applying rules of construction .
For example , the following language after the descrip
tion in a conveyance to a city creates a condition subse
quent : " Said land is to be used by said city for the pur
pose of building a city hall thereon , and this conveyance
is inade upon the express condition that in case the said
plot of ground above described shall ever cease to be used
32 Kilpatrick v . Baltimore , 1895 , 81 Md. 179 ; 31 Atl . 80
5 ; 48 Am . St .
R . 509 .
3
3 Greene v . O 'Connor , 1892 , 18 R . I . 56 ; 25 Atl . 692 ; 19 L . R . A . 262 .
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by said city for a city hall, or other similar city build
ings, then and in that case the said plot of land shall re
vert back to the parties hereto of the first part as if this
conveyance had not been made ." 34
In this class of cases ,while the intention of the grantor
may generally be clearly seen to be that the property
should be used for the designated purpose only , neverthe
less , unless he also clearly indicates his intention that the
whole estate shall be forfeited and revert to him when
such use ceases , the seeming condition will be likely to be
construed rather as showing his intention to impose a
trust in the grantee than as indicating his intention to
create a condition .35
§ 181. Effect in such cases of consideration and nature
of purpose . — Yet the language alone in such cases will not
always control, for this language must be read in connec
tion with the circumstances of each case .
Among the circumstances very generally considered as
of importance in the decision of cases of this character
are the nature of the purpose or use named , and the fact
whether the conveyance was made for a full and substan
tial consideration paid to the grantor, or was made for a
nominal consideration , or none .
If one should purchase land , paying for it its full value ,
and the conveyance to him should recite that he was to
use it fo
r
residence purposes , this alone would not indicate
an intention that he should forfeit his estate by ceasing to
use the land for the purposes recited . If , however , one




Union College v . New York , 1903 , 173 N . Y . 38 ; 65 N .
E . 853 .
8
5 Rawson v . School Dist . , 7 Allen 129 ; 83 Am . D . 670 ; Village o
f
Ashland v . Greiner , 1898 , 58 Ohio S
t
. 67 ; 50 N . E . 99 ; Carroll Co .
Academy v .Gallatin Academy Co . , 1898 , 104 Ky . 621 ; 47 S . W . 617 ;
Mahoning County v . Young , 1893 , 16 U . S . App . 253 , 26
8 , 269 . .
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it without consideration to a railroad company for depot
purposes , in the belief that the erection and maintenance
of a depot would increase the value of his remaining
land , it would be contrary to the intention of the grantor ,
as well as inequitable , if the grantee should dispose of the
land or neglect to put it to the use specified ; and , even if
the language used in the conveyance did not technically
express a condition subsequent , these circumstances might
properly be considered in giving effect to it as such .36
Therefore , the presence or absence of a consideration is
often regarded in determining the effect of such clauses ,
and if the grantor has received a substantial consideration
for his land this fact will be taken into account in con
struing the alleged conditional clause , when he seeks to
recover the land , and the clause will be more strictly con
strued against him than if the conveyance had been
merely voluntary or on a nominal consideration .37
But the presence or absence of the consideration is , at
the most, simply one of the facts to be regarded in arrivo
ing at the intention of the parties , and other facts may
make this fact of little importance in particular cases .





the purpose specified in the conveyance . If this
purpose is in its nature general and public , and not such
a
s will enure specially to the benefit of the grantor , the
absence o
f
a consideration seems o
f little importance in
itself as indicating an intention to create a condition
subsequent . 38
8
6 Horner v . C . M . & St . P . R
y
. Co . , 38 Wis . 165 ; Indianapolis P . & c .
Ry . Co . v . Hood , 66 Ind . 580 . But see Gray v . C . M . & St . P . Ry .
Co . , 1901 , 189 Ill . 400 ; 59 N . E . 950 , holding that the consideration for
such a conveyance may not be inquired into in an ejectment suit
brought by the grantor .
5
7 Ecroyd v . Coggeshall , 1898 , 21 R . I . 1 ; 41 Atl . 260 ; 79 Am . St . R .
741 ; Faith v . Bowles , 1897 , 86 Md . 13 , 16 ; 37 Atl . 711 ; 63 Am . St . R .
489 ; Village o
f
Ashland v .Greiner , 1898 , 58 Ohio St . 67 ; 50 N . E . 99 ;
Neely v . Hoskins , 1892 , 84 Maine 386 , 394 ; 24 Atl . 882 .
3
8 Rawson v . School District , 7 Allen 129 ; 83 Am . D . 670 ; Farnham
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§ 182 . Particular classes – Building restrictions — Re
strictions as to use. - Stipulations regarding buildings to
be erected may be expressed in the form of conditions and
will have the effect of conditions ; thus this clause : “ Said
party of second part hereby covenants with said party of
the first part under penalty of forfeiture of the estate here
by conveyed , that previous to [ date ] he shall erect on said
lot a substantial dwelling house , ” was held a condition
subsequent. 39 But such stipulations and “ building re
strictions ” in general, are more often regarded as cove
nants , especially when they are drawn , as most of them
seem to be , without provision for forfeiture and re-entry .
So stipulations restricting to some extent the use of the
land , or prohibiting its use fo
r
certain purposes , may , as
many of the foregoing cases show , be drawn and con
strued as conditions ; 40 but these also are , it seems , more
frequently covenants , 41 and , with building restrictions ,
will be referred to later . 42
§ 183 . Particular classes - Conditions and stipulations
for support . — There is an important class o
f
cases in
v . Thompson , 34 Minn . 330 ; 26 N . W . 9 ; 5
7 Am . R . 59 ; Olcott v .
Gabert , 1893 , 86 Texas 121 ; 23 S . W . 985 ; Newpoint Lodge v . Newpoint ,
1894 , 138 Ind . 141 ; 37 N . E . 650 . But in Papst v . Hamilton , 1901 , 133
Cal . 631 ; 66 Pac . 10 , where the purpose " erecting and maintaining a
collegiate school , ” etc . - seems not to have been for the grantor ' s
special advantage , but rather public and general , importance appears
to have been attached , in holding that there was a condition , to the




O 'Brien v . Wagner , 94 Mo . 93 ; 7 S . W . 19 ; 4 Am . St . R . 362 . And
see Langley v . Chapin , 134 Mass . 82 ; Clapp v . Wilder , 1900 , 176 Mass .
332 ; 57 N . E . 692 ; 50 L . R . A . 120 ; Quatman v . McCray , 1900 , 128 Cal .
285 ; 60 Pac . 855 .
4
0 See the recent case o
f
Wakefield v . Van Tassell , 1903 , 202 Ill . 41 ;
6
6
N . E . 830 , in which a condition against using the granted premises
for handling grain in elevators is sustained .
4
1 Brewery Co . v . Primas , 1896 , 163 Ill . 652 ; 45 N . E . 145 .
1
2 See post , ch . 14 .
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volving the consideration of conveyances made with the
expectation on the grantor 's part that the grantee will
support and maintain him for life or for a definite time.
Where land is conveyed subject to a provision for sup
port, the provision may be a condition subsequent , or it
may be a covenant on the grantee 's part, or it may create
a lien on the land enforceable by the grantor ; and
whether it be one or the other will depend on the inten
tion to be gathered from the language and the circum
stances in which the conveyance is made.
In clear cases such a provision must be held a condi
tion , as where a deed is made on the express condition
that the grantee shall maintain and support the grantor ,
with a proper clause that the premises shall revert in case
of failure .43
While in doubtful cases of this character the courts will
usually follow the general rule and construe the clause as
something else rather than a condition , still it is to be re
membered that the circumstances surrounding convey
ances of this kind are often such as to warrant a construc
tion which will give the grantor a right of re-entry in
case of the grantee ' s non -compliance with the terms of the
conveyance .
The grantor in such cases is usually aged , the grantee
is usually a relative , and often the anticipated support is
the only consideration for the transfer ; the kind of care
and support necessary renders pecuniary damages inade
quate , and the continuing nature of the contract would
lead to continuous litigation if the grantee persisted in
his neglect. The most practical and equitable redress in
such cases is one that will place the parties in their orig
inal positions. Therefore , the general rule of construction
- adverse to conditions — will not always be applied as
strictly in these cases as in others .44
43 Delong v . Delong , 56 Wis . 514 ; 14 N . W . 591 ; Berryman v . Schu
maker , 67 Texas 312 ; 3 S . W . 46 .
* Glocke v . Glocke , 1902 , 113 Wis . 303 ; 89 N . W . 118 ; Goldsmith v ..
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$ 184 . Conditions not created in such cases by infer
ence - Remedy in equity . - However , an intent to create a
condition subsequent will not always be inferred merely
from the circumstances under which such conveyances
are made , in the absence of language susceptible of con
struction as a condition . So if a deed is made merely in
consideration of support , or of the payment of certain
sums by the grantee periodically , while the grantor may
have other remedies , it will generally be held that there
is not a condition subsequent.45
Such cases are recognized as forming a class by them
selves and , though there may be strictly no condition
subsequent, if there has been failure of consideration
slight evidence of fraud and imposition should , it would
seem , induce a court of equity to cancel the conveyance ,46
and the death of the grantee has been held to afford
ground fo
r
setting it aside ; 47 or where the deed will not be
canceled , the court may decree a lien on the land for the
value of such support . 48
Goldsmith , 1899 , 46 W . Va . 42
6 ; 33 S . E . 26
6 ; Hershman v . Hershman ,
63 Ind . 451 .
4
5 Anderson v .Gaines , 1900 , 156 Mo .664 , 670 ; 57 S . W . 726 ; Lowman
v . Crawford , 1901 , 99 Va . 688 ; 40 S . E . 17 ; Doescher v . Spratt , 1895 , 61
Minn . 326 ; 63 N . W . 736 .
4
6 McClelland v . McClelland , 1898 , 176 Ill . 83 ; 51 N . E . 559 ; Patter .
son v . Patterson , 1891 , 81 Iowa 626 ; 47 N . W . 768 .
4
7 Payette v . Ferrier , 1899 , 20 Wash . 479 ; 55 Pac . 629 .
4
8 Doescher v . Spratt , 1895 , 61 Minn . 326 ; 63 N . W . 736 ; Childs v .
Rue , 1901 , 84 Minn . 323 ; 87 N . W . 918 ; Patton v . Nixon , 1898 , 33 Ore .
159 ; 52 Pac . 1048 . In Knutson v . Bostrak , 1898 , 99 Wis . 469 ; 75 N . W .
156 , such a deed is said to be one on condition subsequent which
equity will enforce b
y declaring a forfeiture ( p . 483 ) — though in the later
case o
f Glocke v . Glocke , 1902 , 113 Wis . 303 ; 89 N . W . 118 , it is ex
plained that this is not strictly accurate , and that a court of equity in
such cases “ does not lend its jurisdiction to effect a forfeiture , " but




the grantor , o
r
its equivalent , a court o
f equity will aid him in quieting his title . For
equity will not generally enforce forfeitures : Pomeroy , E
q
. Jur . I . ,
$ $ 459 , 460 .
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§ 185 . Void conditions — Requiring illegal acts — Re
straining marriage. - A condition which requires the per
formance of an act contrary to law or good morals is void .
Hence a condition calling for the separation of husband
and wife is invalid , 49 as is one calling for the commission
of a crime .




fmarriage are invalid , there is much conflict .
A condition subsequent in absolute restraint of mar
riage will , by what seems to be the general rule , be held
void ; as will one thatunreasonably restrains themarriage
o
f
the grantee , as , for instance , by prohibiting marriage
before an extreme age , o
r







the grantee ; but a reasonable restraint - as
where marriage with a particular person is prohibited , o
r
where the consent of a parent is required , or the marriage
is forbidden before the attainment of a suitable age — is
valid . 50
Conditions in restraint of second marriages are not con
sidered a
s within the same reason , and are therefore gen
erally held valid . 51
§ 186 . Void conditions — Repugnant to estate granted
o
r capricious . - Conditions imposing restraints on the use
o
f
the land conveyed have been sometimes claimed in ar
gument to be void a
s repugnant to the estate granted , 52
but decisions are numerous , as the foregoing citations
* Conrad v . Long , 33 Mich . 78 ; Hawke v . Euyart , 1890 , 30 Nob . 149 ;
4
6
N . W . 422 .
5
0 See Coppage v . Alexander ' s Heirs , 2 B . Mon . 31
3 ; 38 Am . Dec .
153 , note ; Randall v . Marble , 69 Me . 310 ; 31 Am . R . 281 . But a con
dition precedent restraining marriage may prevent the vesting o
f
the
estate . Phillips v . Ferguson , 85 Va . 509 ; 8 S . E . 241 ; 17 Am . S
t
. R . 78 .
5
1 Herd v . Catron , 1896 , 97 Tenn . 662 ; 37 S . W . 551 ; Knight v . Ma
honey , 1890 , 152 Mass . 523 ; 25 N . E . 971 .
5
2 See e . g . Cowell v . Colorado Springs Co . , 100 U . S . 55 .
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show , sustaining conditions reasonably restricting the use
of property .




n attempt by condition to impose a general restraint
o
n alienation , such a condition is void as repugnant to
the estate limited . 53
S
o
also are conditions which unreasonably restrict the
use and enjoyment o
f
the property , as , for instance , in the
conveyance “ o
f
a house that there shall be no windows
in it , o
r
no passage in and out . ” 54 Conditions imposing
restrictions which are o






s contrary to public policy and wholly
unreasonable ; 55 and this principle has been made statu
tory in a few states 56 b
y
enactments providing that when
any conditions annexed to a grant are merely nominal
and evince no intention of actual and substantial benefit
to the party in whose favor they are to be performed , they
may be disregarded , and a failure to perform the same
shall not operate as a forfeiture o
f
the lands conveyed sub
ject thereto .
Where such statutes exist proof will often be necessary
to establish the fact whether the expressed condition was
o
r was not beneficial . 57
§ 187 . General suggestions for drawing and constru
ing conditions . It appears , therefore , from the authori
ties that it is not difficult to draw a deed so that it will be
a conveyance upon condition subsequent , so fa
r , at least ,
5
3 Jones v . Port Huron Engine Co . , 1898 , 17
1
Ill . 502 ; 49 N . E . 700 ;
Kaufman v . Burgert , 1900 , 195 Pa . St . 274 ; 45 Atl . 725 ; 78 Am . St . R .
813 ; Mandlebaum v . McDonnell , 29 Mich . 78 .
5
4Gray v . Blanchard , 8 Pick , 284 , 290 .
5
5 Mitchell v . Leavitt , 30 Conn . 587 .
5
6 Michigan , C . L . , 1897 , § 8828 ; Minnesota , Gen . Stat . , 1894 , § 4407 ;
Wisconsin , Stat . , 1898 , $ 2070 .
5
7 Sioux City & c . Ry . v . Singer , 1892 , 49 Minn . 301 ; 51 N . W . 905 ;
Smith y . Barrie , 56 Mich . 314 ; 22 N . W . 816 .
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as form is concerned . The chief points to be observed
are :
First . The recital should be in the general form of a
condition .
Second . It should be in its appropriate place in the
deed .








n act contrary to law or good morals , should not
be impossible , and should not be repugnant to the estate
granted .
The first thing to d
o
in construing such clauses , either
for the purpose o
f ascertaining the remedy for an alleged
breach , or in looking into the title to land , is to have be
fore one either the original paper or an exact copy of it .
An abstract of a conveyance containing conditional or re
strictive clauses should quote these clauses fully , and
should not merely state them according to what seems to
the abstracter to b
e
their legal effect .
And as the construction to be placed on the clause may
depend on other parts o
f
the instrument , a copy of the
entire document should in such cases be examined .
Further , as we have seen , the use o
f
certain words will
not alone control the interpretation , but the attendant cir
cumstances must b
e regarded , as , fo
r
instance , the state
o
f
the property , the situation of the parties , and the other
provisions o
f
the same instrument .
And , moreover , in estimating the force and effect of
such conditional clauses , acts and events occurring since
the making of the deed containing the clause may be
considered , though not directly connected with the orig
inal transaction . For it may appear from these facts that
the condition , though in proper legal form , is of no effect
o
n
the title , having been inserted in the deed for a dishon
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est purpose and to obtain a monopoly , 58 or it may so ap
pear that the condition , though valid once , has been
waived . 59
58 Chippewa Lumber Co . v . Tremper , 75 Mich . 36 ; 42 N . W . 532 ;
Jenks v. Pawlowski , 1893 , 98 Mich . 110 ; 56 N . W . 1105 .
59Lehigh Coal Co. v . Early , 1894 , 162 Pa . St. 338 ; 29 Atl. 736 ; Sco
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I . Covenants for Title .





covenants for title . — A deed of conveyance
is , of course , perfectly valid , and may convey title , with
out covenants of any kind , if otherwise conforming to
law . The word “ covenant ” means , strictly , an agree
ment under seal for the performance or non -performance
o
f
certain acts , or that a given state of things does or shall
exist , o
r
does not or shall not exist . In it
s origin a cove
nant has no necessary connection with a conveyance .
While a deed of conveyance , therefore , need contain no
covenants , it may , on the other hand , contain covenants
o
f
various kinds , some intended to bind the grantor and
some the grantee .
The covenants most often used in conveyances are some
o
r
all of the “ covenants for title . ”
The general rule is well settled that a purchaser ' s right
§ 188 225OVENANTS .
to relief against his vendor , in case he should suffer loss
through a defective title when land has been conveyed to
him , depends upon the covenants contained in the con
veyance . If he has not taken the precaution to have
covenants for title inserted in the conveyance , he cannot
(generally speaking ) either recover back the purchase
money paid or keep back that which remains unpaid ,
should the title fail ; neither in law nor equity can he
have relief , unless the vendor was guilty of fraud , or the
contract was founded in mistake as to some fact upon
which the title depends . The grantee in such cases
assumes the risk of the soundness of the title ; he cannot
show a parol agreement which will convert a deed with
out covenants into one with them ; and his condition as
to the recovery of the purchase -money on failure of title
is similar to that of one who has voluntarily given away
money . If, however, a purchaser who is entitled to a
deed with covenants has accepted one without covenants ,
supposing that it contains them , the vendor may be com .
pelled to execute a deed containing covenants . 3
Whether a conveyance shall or shall not contain cove
nants fo
r
title is , therefore , a question of importance to
the parties contracting for the sale and purchase of real
estate , and the possibility that the title may be defective
o
r
incumbered generally has an effect on the purchase
price : a purchaser assuming the risk may generally prop
erly expect a reduction in price as an equivalent . A
grantor who gives a deed with covenants for title may
later prove pecuniarily irresponsible , so that some of the
advantages o
f
the covenants may be lost to the grantee ,
but the possibility of a recovery of damages for their
" Peters v . Bowman , 98 U . S . 56 ; Whittemore v . Farrington , 76 N . Y .
452 ; Thorkildsen v . Carpenter , 1899 , 120 Mich . 419 ; 79 N . W . 636 ; 6
Detroit Leg . News 196 ; Gibson v . Richart , 83 Ind . 313 ; Porter v . Cook ,
1902 , 114 Wis . 60 ; 89 N . W . 823 .
2Gates v . Winslow , 1 Mass . 65 .
* Point Street Iron Works v . Simmons , 11 R . I . 496 .
1
5 - BREWS . Con .
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breach is not the only thing that makes covenants for
title valuable to the purchaser . A conveyance containing
a covenant of warranty will have the effect of transferring
a title subsequently acquired by the grantor ; though he
may not have had the title when hemade the conveyance
— and sometimes the same effect is given to other cove
nants . Whereas , when the conveyance merely purports
to convey such an estate , title or interest as the grantor
has, it cannot have this effect , and in some jurisdictions
where , in a chain of title , there is a series of deeds
with general covenants fo
r
title , the title is regarded as
more sure than where the conveyances are " quit claim ”
deeds , or deeds with limited or special covenants only ,
the presence of which has been said to afford some ground
for suspicion that there is some defect in the title . 6
§ 189 . Covenants for title in mortgages . It is not only
in deeds intended to convey the legal title in fee that
covenants fo
r
title may be important to the grantee , for
they may b
e
used in mortgages with practically the same
effects ; fo
r
example , a warranty o
f
title contained in a





the mortgage he had title , and if he sub
sequently acquires the paramount title , it will enure to the
benefit o
f
the mortgagee and his legal representatives ,
*Morris v . Jansen , 1894 , 99 Mich . 436 ; 58 N . W . 365 ; Walton v . Fol




6 Thompson v . Becker , 1902 , 194 Ill . 119 , 123 ; 62 N . E . 558 ; People v .
Miller , 79 Mich . 93 ; 44 N . W . 172 .
6 Oliver v . Piatt , 3 How . 333 , 410 ; Peters v . Cartier , 1890 , 80 Mich .
124 , 129 ; 45 N . W . 73 ; 20 Am . St . R . 508 ; Johnson v . Williams , 37
Kan . 17
9 ; 14 Pac . 537 ; 1 Am . St . R . 243 . Though , that there is nothing
especially significant o
r suspicious in the use o
f quit claim deeds , see ,
Wilhelm v . Wilken , 1896 , 149 N . Y . 447 , 452 ; 44 N . E . 82 .
7 Tefft v . Munson , 57 N . Y . 97 ; Thalls v . Smith , 1894 , 139 Ind . 496 ;
3
9
N . E . 154 ; Caple v . Switzer , 1900 , 122 Mich . 636 ; 81 N . W . 560 ; 6
Det . Leg . News 892 .
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and the " covenant against incumbrances ” in a mortgage
binds themortgagor .8
§ 190 . The usual covenants for title. — The usual cove
nants for title are six , namely : 1, for seisin ; 2 , of good
right to convey ; 3 , against incumbrances ; 4 , for quiet
enjoyment ; 5 , for further assurance ; 6 , of warranty ;
though some of these are more usual and important than
others .
The covenants of seisin , against incumbrances and of
warranty , are considered the most important , while the
covenant fo
r
further assurance is , in the United States ,





A contract for the sale of land stipulating for a deed
with " full covenants , ” would generally not be considered
a
s complied with unless the deed contained all the six
covenants , either expressed or implied . 9 Where , however ,
the contract provides fo
r
a deed with the “ usual cove
nants , ” it will not be construed with the same effect in
all the states , for in some it is not usual to insert any
other covenant than that o
f general warranty , 10 while in
others a
t
least the three named above as the most import
ant are customary .
S
o
a contract stipulating for a " warranty deed ” will
bind the vendor in some states to execute a deed with a
general warranty only , while in others such a contract
requires a deed with full covenants . 11
If the contract be silent as to the kinds of covenants for
title which the grantor should give , the parties will gen
erally b
e presumed to have contracted with reference to
the known custom o
f
the place where the land is situated ,
. 8 Security Bank v . Holmes , 1896 , 65 Minn . 531 ; 68 N . W . 113 ; 60 Am .
S
t
. R . 495 ; Bissell v . Hively , 1900 , 123 Mich . 106 ; 8
1
N . W . 925 ; 6 Det .
Leg . News 920 ; Butler v . Seward , 10 Allen 466 ; Lloyd v . Quimby , 5
Ohio S
t . 262 .
9 Murphy v . Lockwood , 21 Il
l
. 611 , 618 .
1
0Green v . Irving , 54 Miss . 454 .
1
1 Bethell v . Bethell , 92 Ind . 318 .
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for , as the sufficiency of a deed is determined by the lex
rei sitæ , the contract fo
r
a deed seems to b
e governed b
y
the same principle , and the purchaser is entitled to such
a deed a
s
is usual by the custom o
f
the place where the
land is . 12
In making land contracts it is best to specify the cove
nants intended to b
e
inserted in the conveyance , to save
all question .
The covenants for title may be unlimited o
r general ,
that is , covenants against the acts o
f
all persons claiming
title ; or they may be limited or special , that is , covenants
against the acts of the covenanter or some other specially
designated person o
r persons . Where they are thus lim
ited they are not broken b
y
the acts o
f any others than
those designated .
§ 191 . The form of covenants for title . — No precise
terms o
r particular forms o
f
words are essential to create a
covenant of any kind : all that is necessary is that it shall
appear that the intent of the parties was to bind them
selves . Therefore the words “ covenant , ” “ promise , ”
etc . , are not necessary ; and a clause which at first sight
appears to be a " condition subsequent ” may be construed
to be a covenant . 13
What is true in this respect of covenants generally is
true o
f
covenants for title . In Johnson v . Hollensworth , 14
Cooley , J . , says : “ There is no fixed and essential form
for any covenant . . . Each covenant may consti





single sentence as well , and a single promise may embody
the substance o
f
several covenants , and thus constitute an
undertaking to protect against existing claims or defects ,
and also to give assurance for the future . "
The forms in use vary somewhat in the different states ;
1
2 Gault v . Van Zile , 37 Mich . 22 .
1




8 Mich . 140 ; 11 N . W . 843 .
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and even in the same state there are generally several dif
ferent printed blank forms used , expressing the covenants
for title in varied terms.
In the following form 15 the words in parentheses , if
used , will make the covenants special , and their omission
will make the covenants general - A B being grantor , and
X Y grantee :
The said A B doth hereby covenant fo
r
himself his
heirs , executors , and administrators that (notwithstanding
any act matter or thing b
y
him done ) he the said A B is
now lawfully seised o
f
the said premises and hath good
right to convey the same that the same are free from all
incumbrances (done , suffered , or committed b
y
him ) . And
that the said X Y his heirs and assigns shall and may at
all times hereafter freely peaceably and quietly enjoy the
same without molestation or eviction of him the said AB
o
r any person or persons whomsoever ( lawfully claiming
o
r
to claim the sameby , from , o
r




them ) . And that he the said A B shall at ll times here
after a
t
the request and expense of the said X Y his heirs
and assigns make and execute such other assurances for
the more effectual conveyance o
f
the said premises as shall
b
e by him reasonably required . And that he the said A B
and his heirs all and singular the messuages and tene




e with the appurtenances unto the said X Y his heirs
and assigns against him the said A B and his heirs and
against all and every other person or persons lawfully
claiming o
r
to claim the same o
r any part thereof (by ,
from , o
r
under him , them o
r any of them ) shall and will
by these presents warrant and forever defend .




the deed , just before the testimonium clause ,
though where they are expressed in a mortgage they often
follow the habendum and immediately precede the con
dition .
1
5 Substantially that given b
y
Rawle Cov . Tit . , p . 29 .
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§ 192 . The designation of the parties to be bound
The covenantor himself. — The covenantor in this form
covenants for “ himself . ”
At this point in the ordinary printed blank form there
is always a space left for the insertion of the words ,
" himself , his , " " themselves , their ,” or “ herself , her , ”
as the circumstances of the casemay require .
If, in the filling up of the blank form , the grantor is
made to covenant “ for his heirs, ” etc . (not for himself ) ,
the effect is, according to some decisions, that - unless the
deed is reformed - no one is bound by the covenants dur
ing his lifetime , for the contract is plainly intended to
make a charge on the covenantor 's estate in the hands of
his legal representative after his death .16 But in Hilmert
v . Christian , 17 the court , in a case where the covenant of
seisin was expressed as " fo
r
his heirs , executors and ad
ministrators , ” say that they see no “ force in the objec
tion that the grantor did not covenant for himself but
only fo
r
his heirs , etc . It is plain enough upon the face
o
f
the instrument that the defendant bound himself b
y
the covenants . ” And in Smith v . Lloyd , 18 it was consid




least as the covenant of
seisin and that against incumbrances are concerned ,
which “ are broken , if ever broken at all , at the moment
when made , ” that the grantor must be bound unless he




his heirs , etc . ,
which could not be pretended . 19
1
6 Traynor v . Palmer , 86 II
I
.477 ; Bowne v . Wolcott , 1891 , 1 N . D . 497 ;
4
8








9 Mich . 382 , 385 .
1
9 See also , Judd v . Randall , 36 Minn . 12 ; 29 N . W . 589 . While it is
true that all contracts should receive a fair , and perhaps even a liberal
construction , it is also true that where contracts are clearly expressed
in writing , in unambiguous terms , there is no room for " construction , "
and it is the duty o
f
courts not to make contracts , but to enforce them
according to the intent o
f
the parties as shown b
y
the language used .
It therefore seems that , especially as to those covenants which relate
to the future , the Illinois and North Dakota decisions are to be preferred .
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$ 193 . The covenantor 's heirs , executors , etc. — The
grantor usually covenants “ for himself, his heirs , execu
tors and administrators . "
It was necessary at common law , in order to make an
heir liable on the covenants of his ancestor : ( 1 ) that he
be named in the covenant , and ( 2 ) that he should have
assets by descent sufficient to meet the obligation .
At the present time the liability of the heir on his
ancestor 's covenants depends largely upon the statutes of
the different states . These generally provide that the
real estate of a deceased person shall be liable for the pay
ment of his debts . Heirs, therefore , generally in the
United States , take the land descended to them subject to
all debts of their ancestors, but beyond assets received
they are not personally liable ,20 and naming them in
the covenant will not make them liable to any greater
extent. 21
In most states it is probably not necessary for the cove
nantor to name his heirs , for they will be bound , to the
extent to which they have received assets , whether or not
they are named .22
Executors and administrators are bound as such , in
general , without being named in the covenant .
“ The executor doth more actually represent the person
of the testator than the heir doth the person of the ances
tor , fo
r
if a man bindeth himself his executors are bound
though they b
e
not named ; but so it is not of the heir . " 23
The covenantor , by binding himself , binds his estate so
far a
s
it is represented by his executors and administra
2
0 Cutright v . Stanford , 81 Ill . 240 , 244 ; Massie v . Hiatt , 82 Ky . 314 ,
320 ; Bacon v . Thornton , 1897 , 16 Utah 138 ; 51 Pac . 153 .
3
1
See , Rinard v . West , 92 Ind . 359 .
» Rohrbaugh v . Hamblin , 1896 , 57 Kan . 39
3 , 39
6 ; 46 Pac . 705 . But in
McDonald v . McElroy , 60 Cal . 484 , 496 , it was held that they were not




warranty unless the deceased
covenantor covenanted that they should be bound .
u C
o Litt . 209a .
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tors , even though they be not named .24 If, however , the
covenant is one which is to be personally performed by
the covenantor , his executors and administrators are not
bound . For example , if an author covenants to compose
a work and dies before its completion his executors are
not liable , for the covenant is personal in its nature , and
by his death has become impossible of performance .25
Unless in such cases there has been a breach of the cove
nant before his death , his estate , represented by his ex
ecutors , etc ., is not bound . Covenants for title are not
of this particularly personal character , and there is no
distinction as to them between the liability of the execu
tor upon such covenants broken after the testator 's death
and those broken before his death .26
§ 194 . Grantor ' s wife joining in her husband's deed
Husband in wife 's deed . - Where a wife joins in a convey
ance of her husband ' s lands she is not ordinarily bound
by the covenants in the deed even though she is named in
them , as she generally is in practice .27 This is the gen
eral rule in the absence of a statute affecting her liability ,
Such statutes , however , exist in several states , most
of them being comparatively recent , and by virtue of
them a wife , if named in the covenants in her husband ' s
deed will be bound , though she need not have been
named ( in the covenants ) to make the conveyance valid .28
And in some states she will be bound , when named in
24 McClure v . Gamble , 27 Pa . St. 288 .
25Marvel v . Phillips, 1894 , 162 Mass . 401 ; 38 N . E . 1117 .
26Hovey v . Newton , 11 Pick . 421.
37Kitchell v. Mudgett , 37 Mich . 81 ; Webb v. Holt , 1897 , 113 Mich .
338 , 341 ; 71 N . W . 637 ; 4 Detroit Leg . News 309 ; Sanford v . Kane ,
1890 , 133 Il
l
. 199 ; 24 N . E . 414 ; 23 Am . S
t
. R . 602 ; Miller v . Miller ,
1894 , 14
0
Ind . 174 , 178 ; 39 N . E . 547 ; Curry v . Mortgage Co . , 1894 , 107
Ala . 429 ; 18 So . 328 ; 54 Am . St . R . 10
5 ; Bennett v . Pierce , 1898 , 45 W .
Va . 654 , 657 ; 31 S . E . 972 .
2
8 Security Bank v . Holmes , 1897 , 68 Minn . 538 ; 71 N . W . 699 ; Fisher
v . Clark , 1898 , 8 Kan . App . 483 ; 54 Pac . 511 .
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the covenants , if it is also expressly stated that she is to
be bound .29
Where a husband joins in his wife 's conveyance of her
lands, simply to release his “ dower ,” it has been held
that he is not liable upon the covenants contained in the
conveyance ,30 but, as he is fully capable of contracting ,
he should , when he joins ( in general terms and not
merely to release his curtesy or “ dower '') in the cove
nants in his wife 's deed , be liable to her immediate gran
tee , although he may not be so liable to a remote grantee ,
unless he has some title or interest to convey .31
§ 195 . Married woman 's covenants in conveyance of
her separate property . - Whether a married woman is
bound by her covenants in a deed of her separate prop
erty is a matter so much controlled by statutes , which are
constantly subject to change , that it is impracticable to
attempt to state what the general rule of la
w
is .
In the absence o
f
a statute she is not liable in an action
for damages at law for a breach of covenants for title .
And statutes simply authorizing her to convey do not
necessarily make her covenants binding on her .
But though she may not be liable in damages , she has
been held in some cases estopped b
y
her covenants from
setting up a claim to an after -acquired title . 32 Under the
so called “ married women ' s acts , ” of a general nature ,
which exist in many states , she is undoubtedly bound b
y
her covenants or other contracts relating to her separate
3
9 Moore v . Graves , 1896 , 97 Iowa 4 , 8 ; 65 N . W . 1008 . In Arthur v .
Caverly , 1893 , 98 Mich . 82 ; 56 N . W . 1102 , a wife joining in the cove
nants was held liable jointly with her husband , because she had re
ceived the whole consideration , and must therefore b
e considered a
s
having contracted with respect to her own separate estate . On a simi
lar state of facts in Dean v . Shelly , 57 Pa . St . 426 ; 98 Am . D . 235 , she
was , however , held not liable .
3
0 Center v . Elgin Banking Co . , 1900 , 185 Il
l
. 534 ; 57 N . E . 439 .
9
1 See Mygatt v . Coe , 1897 , 152 N . Y . 457 , 460 , 466 ; 46 N . E . 949 .
3
2 Hill y . West , 8 Ohio 222 , 226 ; Beal v . Beal , 79 Ind . 28
0
. See ,
Knight v . Thayer , 125 Mass . 25 .
234 $ 196THE LAW OF CONVEYANCING .
property , and in some states statutes less general, and not
relating to all contracts , provide that she shall be liable
on her covenants for title . 33
§ 196 . Designation of parties — The covenantee , his
heirs , etc . - It is customary for the covenants for title to
be expressed as made by the covenantor ( the grantor ) ,
to and with the covenantee (the grantee ) , " his heirs and
assigns, ” and in some forms as with " his heirs , execu
tors , administrators and assigns , ” that is , the covenantor
is made to bind himself (his heirs , etc .) not only to the
grantee , but to the successors of the grantee . The ques .
tion naturally occurs as to how far it is necessary to
name these successors and what effect , if any , is had
on their rights under the covenants if they are not
named . There is a difference in the nature and purposes
of the different covenants for title, and whether others
than the original grantee , with whom the covenant was
first made, may have the benefit of the covenant , will de
pend rather more upon its nature34 and certain other cir
cumstances than upon it
s precise form , yet as certain
words are almost invariably used a
s parts o
f
the form , we
should consider the reasons for their use , and to what
extent they are necessary .
It appears to be unnecessary to name the covenantee ' s
“ executors and administrators ” in the covenants for
title . If the covenant is broken and the loss occurs dur
ing the covenantee ' s lifetime he should have his remedy
against the covenantor , and if he has not had his remedy
when the breach occurs , and dies without obtaining it ,
his executor or administrator may recover for the breach
o
f
covenant as for any debt due the deceased , 36 and for
this purpose the executor or administrator need not have
been named in the covenant .
3
3 See , e . g . , Miller v . Miller , 1894 , 140 Ind . 17
4 , 17
8 ; 39 N . E . 547 ,
3
4 See post , $ 214 .
8
5 Wilson v . Peelle , 78 Ind . 384 .
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If the covenant is not broken during the life of the
covenantee , and is such as passes with the land to his
heir on his death , his executor or administrator has no







§ 197 . The covenantee 's “ heirs and assigns.” — The
naming of the grantee 's “ heirs and assigns ” in the
covenants fo
r
title seems not necessary in order that





transmission or assignment - o
r , in




“ run with the land . ”





them ( especially in some covenants
other than those for title ) has been considered important
for some purposes , it is worth while to note why they
have been and still are named .
The practice o
f naming the grantee ' s “ heirs and as
signs ” arose from the necessity which existed under the
early law (when deeds first came into use ) o
f naming
them , if they were to have the benefit of the ancient
warranty .
This “ warranty ” was not a covenant in the sense
in which the term is now used ; it was an incident
o
f
feudal tenure . The lord , having enfeoffed his tenant ,
must protect the title , o
r give the tenant other lands o
f
equal value (not , generally , damages ) . And this war
ranty , thus arising from the ancient feudal relation of
feoffor and feoffee , existed before deeds were used .
When deeds came to b
e
used the warranty was either
inserted expressly a
s
a special clause (still distinct , how





feoffment , “ dedi , " " I have
given . ”
When thus implied , the warranty was implied for the
benefit o
f
the feoffee and his heirs only ; that is , the im
plication did not include the feoffee ' s assigns .
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Express clauses of warranty became common in deeds
as early as the thirteenth century , and when the transfer
of land was so evidenced by a deed containing an express
warranty , the feoffee ' s “ heirs and assigns ” could not
avail themselves of the warranty (and call on the lord to
defend the title or give other land ) , unless they were
named in the deed of feoffment.
The warranty afterward disappeared and gave way to
covenants for title . The old actions for land were re
placed by actions for damages , but the principles on
which the grantee 's successors could have the benefit of
these covenants fo
r
title were derived from those which
had governed warranty . And in the covenants for title
there continued to be used , often , the words “ heirs " and
" assigns , " as the covenants were modeled after the war
ranty ; and it seems to have been a
t
first necessary to
mention , at least , “ assigns ” in the covenants , as it had
been in the clause o
f
warranty .
Without , however , giving any clear reason fo
r
it , the
“ covenant is in many cases extended further than the
warranty , ” 36 and it was held that the benefit of the cove
nants fo
r
title passed with the land to the grantee ' s heirs
and assigns , though they were not named . 37
§ 198 . The covenants fo
r
seisin , and good right to
convey . - Seisin signifies possession , and was at one time
applied to the possession o
f
chattels , aswell as the posses
sion o
f
land . 38 Later it referred only to the possession of





o . Litt . , 384b .
3
7 See , Poll . & Mait . Hist . Eng . L . , I , p . 287 ; II , pp . 94 , 224 ; Digby
Hist . L . Real P . , 5th ed . , pp . 165 , 171 ; Holmes The Common Law , pp .











aid in determining when covenants " run with the land , " will be









8 Poll . & Mait . Hist . Eng . L . , II , pp . 29 , 32 .
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or having a freehold estate therein , either by himself or
another on his behalf . Still later the word acquired a
more extended meaning in England , and seems to have
been regarded as synonymous with title.39 In this
country a covenant that one is “ lawfully seised ” is
given somewhat different effects in different states .
In several states a covenant that the grantor is “ law
fully seised ” is satisfied by an actual seisin , and he need
not have an indefeasible estate in order that the covenant
may be fulfilled . A seisin in fact under a claim of title ,
though tortious ( that is , gained by disseisin ), is sufficient
to prevent the covenant from being broken . The grantor
is regarded as covenanting that he is in possession of the
land claiming such title as his deed purports to convey ,
and the covenant is not considered as broken if , as a fact,
he has not the title he claims, though it is broken if an .
other is in adverse possession of the land .40 But in other
states the “ covenant of seisin ” is construed as a covenant
for title; that is , a covenant by the grantor that he has
the estate that he undertakes to convey , and in these
states a covenant of " lawful seisin ” in a conveyance of an
estate in fee is satisfied only by the grantor 's having an
indefeasible estate in fee.41 Therefore , a grantor making
this covenant is liable in an action on it if, by reason of a
defect in an attempted conveyance to his grantor , the legal
title is not conveyed , but is outstanding in some former
owner,42 and such a grantor is liable on this covenant if ,
before he attempts to convey , part of the land has been
sold for taxes . 43
These latter were cases where the grantor covenanted
39Rawle Cov . Tit ., $ 40 .
40 See Marston v . Hobbs , 2 Mass . 433 , 439 ; 3 Am . Dec . 61 ; Wilson v.
Widenham , 51 Maine 567 ; Watts v . Parker , 27 Ill. 228 ; Wetzell v . Rich
creek , 53 Ohio St. 62, 70 ; 40 N . E . 1004 .
" Mercantile Trust Co. v . South Park Co., 1893, 94 Ky. 271 ; 22 S . W .
314.
43 Allen v . Allen , 1892 , 48 Minn . 462 ; 51 N . W . 473 .
43 Zent v . Picken , 54 Iowa 535 ; 6 N . W . 750 .
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in what appears to be the usual form ; that is, " that he is
lawfully seised of the said premises ,” but in the states
where the doctrine of the former class of cases is followed
this form of expression would not fully protect the grantee ,
and hence the covenant is often expressed more fully , as ,
“ that he (grantor ) is seised of an absolute perfect and
indefeasible estate in fee simple .” And in some states it
is certainly prudent , if not necessary , for the grantee to
require the latter form if he wishes to have the protection
of the covenant .
The general object of inserting the covenant of seisin is
to give the grantee relief where there has been a failure of
title , but where there has been no assertion of title by any
one else and no eviction of the grantee .
When the fuller form of the covenant is used (" is
seised of an indefeasible estate, etc . " ) there can be no
doubt as to what is intended , as this form is universally
construed as meaning simply what is stated in it .44 The
covenant for seisin is not generally considered as broken
by the existence of liens or incumbrances on the land ,
nor by the fact that a third person may have a right of
profit in it - for , while these may cause a breach of the
covenant “ against incumbrances , " they do not affect the
covenant for seisin .45
The covenant of good right to convey is sometimes said
to amount to the same thing as the covenant for seisin ,46
but while it is generally true that if one be seised in fee
he has a good right to convey , it does not necessarily fol
low that because he may have the right to convey he is
also seised in fe
e
. 47
* Frazer v . Supervisors , 74 Ill . 282 ; Adkins v . Tomlinson , 1894 , 121
Mo . 487 ; 26 S . W . 573 ; Abbott v . Allen , 14 Johns . 248 , 252 .
4
5 Douglass y . Thomas , 103 Ind . 187 ; 2 N . E . 562 ; Blondeau v . Sheri
dan , 81 Mo . 545 ; Fitzhugh v . Croghan , 2 J . J . Mar . 429 ; 19 Am . D .
139 .
4
6 Raymond v . Raymond , 10 Cush . 140 .
* ?Devoe v . Sunderland , 17 Ohio 52 .
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One conveying under a power may have a right to con
vey without being seised in fee , and executors or adminis
trators often covenant that they are executors or adminis
trators and have a right to convey , under the order of a
court or otherwise , without covenanting that they are
seised .
$ 199. The covenant against incumbrances - Form .
The form of the covenant against incumbrances is usually
“ that the same are free from all incumbrances . ” But it
was formerly expressed in connection with the covenant
for quiet enjoyment, and as supplementary to that cove
nant ; that is, that the vendee “ shall peaceably and





. ” 48 The latter form is occasionally seen still ,
and when used may properly have a different effect from
the former , for the covenant for quiet enjoyment is clearly
prospective in character , a covenant in futuro , and if the
covenant against incumbrances is connected with it ( as
in the latter form given ) , it may properly be regarded as
also prospective in character , or a covenant in futuro ;
that is , that the quiet enjoyment shall be free from in
cumbrances , whereas in the first form , that the premises
are free from incumbrances , there is more reason for say
ing that it is a covenant in præsenti ,merely .





varied so as to make it a covenant looking to
the future , without being thus supplemental to the cove
nant for quiet enjoyment . For example , in Post v . Cam
pau , 49 the covenant was substantially that the party o
f
the
first part covenants that “ he has not heretofore done , com
mitted , etc . , any act , matter or thing whereby the prem





otherwise , ” and it was held that this
covenant looked to the future , and promised indemnity
Hall v . Dean , 13 Johnson 105 .
1
9 4
2 Mich . 90 , 99 ; 3 N . W . 272 .
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for damages that might at any time in the future result
from its breach , and that it was immaterial whether the
ordinary covenant against incumbrances was or was not







As there is some conflict upon the question as to whether
the covenant against incumbrances is one o
f
those cove
nants that run with the land , 50 affording a remedy for a
breach to subsequent holders , or whether it is simply a
covenant in the present , broken , if at all , as soon as made ,
it will been seen that the form of the covenant may have
some bearing upon this question in particular instances .
$ 200 . What are incumbrances ? - As this covenant is
practically one o
f
the most important , and as there is no
technical definition o
f
incumbrances that will fit all
cases , it is well to note some o
f
those things that may be
incumbrances .
An incumbrance , within this covenant , is generally
defined a
s : every right to , or interest in , the land which





the land , but consistent with the passing of the
fee in it b
y
deed . 51
The diminution of value which is one of the essentials
o
f
the above definition should not b
e
understood as con




some interest in a third person , o
f
less pecuniary value ,
but must be considered a
s extending to cases where the
grantee , by reason o
f
such interest in some other person ,
does not acquire b
y
the grant the complete dominion over










f importance for those buying and selling land to
5
0 Post , $ $ 215 , 218 .
5
1 Prescott v . Trueman , 4 Mass . 627 ; 3 Am . Dec . 246 ; Batley v . Foer
derer , 1894 , 162 Pa . S
t
. 460 , 466 ; 29 Atl . 868 ; Huyck v . Andrews , 113
N . Y . 81 ; 20 N . E . 581 ; 10 Am . St . R . 452 ; 3 L . R . A . 789 .
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consider what incumbrances exist on the property , and if
it is understood that the purchaser is to take the land sub
ject to incumbrances it should be so stated in the deed ,
or the incumbrance should be expressly excepted . The
fact that the grantee knew of the incumbrance , it is gen
erally held , will not relieve the grantor from liability for
a breach of this covenant.52
§ 201 . Mortgages , building restrictions , etc. - Incum
brances . — Many interests which third persons have in
the land are so clearly of such a nature as to diminish its
value , and are so plainly incumbrances , that there is
little occasion for difference of opinion about them . Of
this sort are mortgages , money charges , or liens , private
rights of way , a right to cut trees , or to mine ; and it is
generally considered that a right of dower , inchoate or
consummate , is an incumbrance .53 And the same rule
has been applied to the statutory substitute for dower .54
Building restrictions , which impair the free enjoyment
of the land by the owner , are incumbrances , whether
they are in the form of covenants or conditions . For ex
ample , where one bought land from another who owned
on both sides of the street , and the grantor provided in
the deed that only buildings of a certain class should be
built on the lot sold (which was opposite the grantor ' s
residence ) with a " reversion to the grantor , his heirs , ”
etc ., in case of a breach of the condition , and this grantee
then conveyed by a deed with covenants against incum
52Demars v. Koehler , 1898 , 62 N . J . L . 203 : 41 Atl . 720 ; 72 Am . St.
R . 642 ; Weiss v . Binnian , 178 Ill. 241 ; 52 N . E . 969 ; Edwards v.
Clark , 1890 , 83 Mich . 24




8McCord v . Massie , 1895 , 155 Ill . 123 ; 39 N . E . 592 ; Runnells y .
Webber , 59 Maine 488 . Though it was said by Judge Story that a
possibility o
f
dower is not an incumbrance , within the sense of this
covenant , for that means a settled , fixed incumbrance . Powell v .Mon
son , 3 Mason 355 ; Bostwick v . Williams , 36 Ill . 65 .
5
4 Crowley v . Lumber Co . , '1896 , 66 Minn . 40
0 , 408 ; 69 N . W . 321 .
1
6 - BREws . Con .
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brances and of general warranty , and without reference
to these restrictions in the deed to him , and his grantee
then conveyed to another by a similar deed ; the last
grantee could hold his grantor liable in an action for
breach of the covenantagainst incumbrances , because the
provision in the first deed mentioned , whether regarded
as a condition or a restriction , created an incumbrance on
the last grantee 's land .55
In Wetmore v . Bruce 56 the defendant refused to com
plete a purchase of land , because the plaintiff had agreed
to convey him a house and lot free of all incumbrances .
Certain former owners of the land including the premises
in question had , by mutual agreement , imposed restric
tions upon the lands belonging to each of the owners of
the block , for the purpose of securing uniformity in the
position of the buildings , and imposing restrictions in
perpetuity ; it was held that these restrictions were in
cumbrances , and that the defendant was justified in de
clining to complete his purchase . In such cases , as has
been said ,57 “ the restriction may not interfere with the
use of the land for many purposes , but it is an absolute
prohibition of its use for others for which the owner
might otherwise lawfully use it . "
§ 202 . Leasehold interests as incumbrances . Some
other interests in third persons are not , however , so clearly
incumbrances . For example , a leasehold interest out
standing in a third person may be actually a benefit ,
rather than a detriment , to one buying the property
leased . This would be the fact where the purchaser buys
the land for the purpose o
f making an income producing
investment , and the longer the term o
f
the lease and the
higher the rent , the greater the benefit would be to such
a purchaser .
6
5 Locke v . Hale , 1895 , 165 Mass . 20 ; 42 N . E . 331 .
5
6
1890 , 118 N . Y . 319 ; 23 N . E . 303 .
6
7 Foster v . Foster , 62 N . H . 46 , 56 .
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Nevertheless , on the ground that the purchaser does
not obtain the full dominion and use of the property
thus subject to a lease , the lease is held in many decisions
to be an incumbrance within the covenant against incum
brances . The grantor , therefore , who conveys leased
land by a deed containing this covenant may be held
liable for it
s
breach , unless he excepts the lease from its
operation , and the grantee ' s knowledge of the lease will
not affect his right to recover for the breach . 58 Gener
ally , in practice , when a conveyance is made of leased
land the lease is not excepted from the covenant , because
the tenancy is taken into account between the parties and
the rent passes to the grantee , being allowed for or appor
tioned a
t the time the deed takes effect . And when the
grantee recognizes the tenancy and receives rent from the
tenant , though there may be technically a breach o
f
the
covenant , the amount of rent received b
y
the grantee
from the tenant should be deducted from the damages
awarded the grantee for the breach o
f
the covenant ; but
the mere fact that the conveyance o
f
the leased premises
gives the grantee a right to the rent will not relieve the
grantor from his liability for a breach o
f
the covenant
against incumbrances . 59 It has , however , been held in a
few cases that , if the grantee of leased land knows of the
tenancy , and there is a statute which has the effect of
transferring possession without attornment by the tenant
( i . e . , without the tenant ' s express recognition of the
grantee a
s his landlord ) , the existence o
f
the lease can
not be a breach of the covenant . 60
§ 203 . Distinction between incumbrances visibly af
fecting the physical condition and others . - A distinction
5
8 Demars v . Koehler , 1898 , 62 N . J . L . 203 ; 41 Atl . 720 ; 72 Am . St .
R . 642 ; Clark v . Fisher , 1894 , 54 Kan . 403 ; 38 Pac . 493 ; Fritz v . Pusey ,
3
1 Minn . 368 ; 18 N . W . 94 ; Porter v . Bradley , 7 R . I . 538 ; Cross v .
Noble , 67 Pa . St . 74 , 77 .
5
9 Edwards v . Clark , 1890 , 83 Mich . 246 ; 47 N . W . 112 .
6
0 See Kellum v . Berkshire L . Ins . Co . , 101 Ind . 455 .
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is sometimes made between the effect of such incum
brances as mortgages, or money charges , and such in
cumbrances as easements , especially where the latter are
openly exercised and are visible to the grantee . And in
this connection there is often quoted from Memmert v .
McKeen 61 this statement : " Incumbrances are of two
kinds : first, such as affect the title ; second , those which
affect only the physical condition of the property . A
mortgage or other lien is a fair illustration of the former;
a public road, or a right of way , of the latter . Where
incumbrances of the former class exist , it is of no im
portance that the grantee had notice of them . . . .
Where , however , there is a servitude imposed upon the
land which is visible to the eye , and which affects not the
title but the physical condition of the property , a differ
ent rule prevails . ”
The argument is, that in cases where there is a physical
burden of this sort , which is visible , there is a fair and
reasonable presumption , in the absence of express agree
ment, that both parties act with reference to this plain ,
existing burden , and that the vendor on the one hand de
mands , and the vendee on the other hand pays , only the
fair value of the land as visibly incumbered . Therefore ,
it is said , such burdens , by way of open and notorious
easements , are not really incumbrances , within the mean
ing of this covenant, because the real subject -matter of
the dealings between the grantor and grantee is the land ,
subject to the visible easements .62
This view appears to be approved by Rawle , in his
work on covenants for title.63
ean .
61 112 Pa . St. 31
5 , 32
0 ; 4 Atl . 542 .
6
9 Kutz v . McCune , 22 Wis . 628 ; 99 Am . D . 85 ; Judge Cooley ' s re
mark in Haldane v . Sweet , 55 Mich . 196 , 200 ; 20 N . W . 902 : " The a
l
leys were open to observation at the time , and he must have known a
ll
about them , and bought with them in mind , " is also quoted in this con
nection .
6
3 See $ 85 .
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But it is criticised in Huyck v . Andrews , 64 where the
court (in speaking of the authorities that hold that
where there is a visible burden imposed upon the land
which affects the physical condition of the property , it is
presumed that the grantee took the property in contem
plation of such condition ) , says : “ We do not yield as
sent to those authorities . They have no sanction in the
cases decided in this state , and have no adequate founda
tion in principle or reason . They open to litigation upon
parol evidence in every action for the breach of the cove
nant against incumbrances , caused by the existence of an
easement , the question whether the grantee knew of its




e absolutely taken away b
y
disputed oral evi
dence . . . . If open , visible and notorious ease
ments are to b
e excepted from the operation o
f
the cove
nants , it should be the duty o
f
the grantor to except
them . . . . The distinction which is attempted to
bemade between incumbrances which affect the title and
those which affect merely the physical condition o
f
the
land conveyed , is quite illusory and unsatisfactory .
Easements not only affect the physical condition o
f
the
land , but they affect and impair the title . "
In many o
f
the states , therefore , any right o
f way , pub
lic or private , is considered an incumbrance , without ref
erence to the knowledge of the grantee as to it
s
existence .
This appears to be the law in the New England states ,
and in some others . 66 Hence a right o
f
way for a railroad
is a
n incumbrance , though well known to both parties
when the deed containing the covenant was delivered . 67
°
While this is so , a public highway existing on the land
6
4
1889 , 113 N . Y . 81 , 90 ; 20 N . E . 581 ; 10 Am . St . R . 432 ; 3 L . R . A .
789 .
* Hubbard v . Norton , 10 Conn . 42
3 ; Copeland v .McAdory , 1892 , 10
0
Ala . 553 ; 13 So . 545 .
6
7 Burk v . Hill , 48 Ind . 52 ; 17 Am . R . 731 ; Kellogg v . Malin , 50 Mo .
496 ; 11 Am . R . 426 ; Beach v . Miller , 51 Ill . 206 ; 2 Am . R . 290 .
246 $ 204THE LAW OF CONVEYANCING .
has been regarded by some courts as not an incumbrance
within this covenant, and this view has been taken in
states which do not admit the same rule as applicable to
open and visible private ways. The reason often given
for this distinction in such states is that a public highway ·
is not depreciative of the grantee 's interest - is no burden
— but rather is advantageous to him and enhances the
value and utility of the land, and therefore cannot be an
incumbrance .68
$ 204. If an incumbrance is to be excepted from the
covenant , it should be so expressed . — The grantee ' s
knowledge of an outstanding right or interest in a third
person may , therefore , according to some authorities , be
of importance in determining whether this right or inter
est is an incumbrance .
But when a third person 's right or interest is really an
incumbrance , the grantee ' s knowledge of it furnishes no
defense to the grantor in an action against him on the
covenant.
Therefore , for his own protection , the grantor should ,
when it is understood that the grantee is to take the land
subject to the incumbrance , expressly except it from the
covenant or otherwise make the conveyance subject to it .
For , generally speaking, parol evidence will not be re
ceived in a court of law (when an action is brought on
the covenant ) , to show that an incumbrance not excepted
from the covenant was intended to be excepted .69 The
68 Harrison v . Des Moines & c. Ry . Co ., 1894 , 91 Iowa 114 ; 58 N . W .
1081 ; Huyck v . Andrews , 113 N . Y . 81 ; 20 N . E . 581 ; 10 Am . St . R .
452 ; 3 L . R . A . 789 . ( See Ill. R . S ., ch . 30 , $ 10, which provides that
no covenants of warranty shall be considered as broken by the exist
ence of a highway upon the land conveyed , unless otherwise particu
larly specified in the deed . Under this statute a private right of way
is not a highway , and the covenant is broken by its existence . Schmis
seur v . Penn , 1892 , 47 Ill. App . 278 .)
69 Edwards v . Clark , 1890 , 83 Mich . 246 ; 47 N . W . 112 ; Flynn v .
Bourneuf , 143 Mass . 277 ; 9 N . E . 650 ; 58 Am . R . 135 ; Long v.Moler ,
5 Ohio St. 271 ; Van Wagner v. Van Nostrand , 19 Iowa 422 .
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admission of such evidence would violate the rule that
parol evidence is not admissible to vary the terms of a
written contract ; and so far as the grantee ' s mere knowl
edge of the incumbrance bears on the question , it may
have been his chief reason for desiring the covenant that
heknew of the incumbrance and wished to protect him
self from it .
When , however, the grantee not only knows of the
incumbrance but, where it is a money charge, agrees to
discharge it himself , although this agreement does not
appear in the conveyance , and although there is no excep
tion made in expressing the covenant against incum
brances, parol evidence has been held admissible by some
decisions to show this agreement, especially where in fix
ing the amount of the consideration allowance has been
made for the incumbrance . In such cases the incum
brance, as between the parties to the deed containing the
covenants , is regarded as paid , and the grantee cannot
hold the grantor liable on the covenant. While such
decisions are justified by the courts rendering them on the
ground, chiefly , that the true consideration may be
shown , the practical effect of the admission of parol evi
dence in such cases is to contradict and vary the writing
of the grantor ; and there would seem to be no hardship
in requiring him , if it has been agreed that an incum
brance is to be excepted from the covenant, to insert the
exception in his conveyance , or , if he does not do so , to
suffer the consequences of his lack of caution .71
70Wachendorf v . Lancaster , 66 Iowa 458 ; 23 N . W . 922 ; Johnston v .
Markle Paper Co., 1893 , 153 Pa . 189 , 195 ; 25 Atl. 560 ; Johnson v.
Elmen , 1900 , 94 Texas 168 ; 59 S . W . 253 ; 86 Am . St. R . 845 ; Hays v .
Peck , 107 Ind . 389 ; 8 N . E . 274 .
11 In a few states statutes require that a grantor shall inform the gran
tee of incumbrances existing on the land conveyed : see , for example ,
R . L . Mass . 1902 , ch . 134 , § 19 ; Minn . Stat . 1894 , $ $ 4194 , 4195 . And
his neglect to inform the grantee of the incumbrance is a penal offense
in Massachusetts . R . L . Mass . 1902 , ch . 208 , $ 66 .
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§ 205 . The covenant for further assurance . — The cov
enant fo
r
further assurance , though less extensively used
in this country than the other covenants , is one of impor
tance to the purchaser . His remedy on the covenant is
not restricted to an action for damages , but the perform
ance o
f the covenant may be sought in equity to compel
the vendor to execute the further assurance . The execu
tion o
f
the further assurance will operate to convey any
interest which the grantor may have acquired since the
execution o
f
the original conveyance . “ A vendor who
has sold a bad title , will , under a covenant for further
assurance , be compelled to convey any title which hemay
have acquired since the conveyance . ” 72
The case just cited indicates that this covenant may be
advantageous to the vendor as well as to the vendee , for
he may cure a bad title b
y
a voluntary tender , under the
covenant , of a further assurance , and thus bar the relief
the vendee might otherwise have for a defective title .
The effect o
f this covenant will depend on the nature o
f
the estate conveyed , and the other covenants in the deed ;
if these covenants are general and without limitation o
r
restriction the vendee has a right , under the covenant for
further assurance , to require the conveyance o
f
a para
mount title or the removal of an outstanding incum
brance , but if the covenants are limited he cannot require
the conveyance to himself o
f
a greater estate than he is
entitled to b
y





the vendor . 73 This covenant is not broken
until the vendor refuses to execute such further convey
ance as may b
e
devised and tendered b
y
the vendee , and
such as h
e may reasonably require , or to do some act
necessary to perfect the title which may be reasonably in
sisted on b
y




2 Cochran v . Pascault , 54 Md . 1 , 16 .
7
8 Armstrong v . Darby , 26 Mo . 517 .
7
4 Miller v . Parsons , 9 Johns . 336 ; Colby v . Osgood , 29 Barb . 349 .
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surance is prospective , and passes with the land to subse
quent grantees , that is , it runs with the land . ” 75
$ 206 . The covenants for quiet enjoyment and of war .
ranty . - In a lease , the covenant fo
r
quiet enjoyment ,
whether express or implied , is practically the one impor
tant covenant . It is a covenant that the lessee shall not
b
e rightfully disturbed in his possession and enjoyment
during the term .
In deeds purporting to convey an estate in fee , the
covenant fo
r
quiet enjoyment is generally considered as
practically identical with the covenant o
f warranty . 76
In some forms used these two covenants are combined ,
viz . , “ will forever warrant and defend the premises in
the quiet and peaceable possession , ” etc .
In general the same circumstances are necessary to con
stitute a breach o
f either ; they both run with the land ,
and the rules as to the measure o
f damages are the same
in regard to both , and , though both are often used , they
are for the most part so nearly the same that they are
generally discussed in the cases together , or , rather , the
covenant of warranty is discussed as including them both .
The modern covenant o
f warranty has taken the place
o
f
the ancient warranty . But the two are not the same .





tenure . The remedy upon it was b
y
a particular writ , b
y
which the feoffor was called on to make good his war
ranty b
y giving his evicted feoffee other lands , and , only
in rare cases , damages . The remedy on the covenant o
f
7
5 Clarke v . Priest , 1897 , 21 App . Div . ( N . Y . ) 174 ; Bennett v . Wal
ler , 23 Ill . 97 .
7
6 Scott v . Kirkendall , 88 Ill . 465 ; 30 Am . Rep . 562 ; Fowler v . Pol
ing , 2 Barb . 300 . (Distinctions have sometimes been made between
these covenants , as , for example , that a covenant o
f warranty is more
“ than one for quiet enjoyment . It is a covenant to defend not the pos .
session merely , but the land and the estate in it . " Williams y . Weth
erbee , 1 Aik . (Vt . ) 233 . And in technical pleading there may be a dif
ference . Peck v . Houghtaling , 35 Mich . 127 , 131 . )
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warranty , on the other hand , is by a personal action
sounding in damages .??
The word " warrant ” (or rather it
s
Latin equivalent )
was indispensable to the ancient warranty when expressed
in a deed o
f
feoffment . 78 But the same strictness does not
now prevail . A covenant to “ defend ” the title against
the claims o
f all , etc . , has been held enough to make a
covenant of warranty . 79 It is not advisable , however , to
depart from the usual form , for while in one cases the
following words in the habendum clause o
f
a deed , “ free
and clear from me ,my heirs , etc . , and from all other per
sons , ” were considered to make a covenant fo
r
quiet en
joyment , in another81 the words “ to have and to hold the
said premises unto said grantee , his heirs and assigns , for
ever , as a good and indefeasible estate in fee simple , "
were held not to constitute a covenant of warranty .
In some states the covenant o






decisions , made to include the other cov
enants for title . 82 But generally it is considered only as
a covenant against eviction b
y
one claiming under a bet
ter title . It is not a warranty that the title is good . In
Tallmadge v . Wallis , 83 the court says : “ It is a well known
fact that land is frequently conveyed with general war
ranty , which is warranty against eviction only , when
both parties to the sale perfectly understand that the title
is doubtful o
r
that there is some outstanding interest
which may , perhaps , a
t
a future period be the means o
f
evicting the purchaser ; and to protect the purchaser and
7
1 Other differences between the ancient warranty and the modera
covenant are noted b
y
Rawle , Cov . Tit . , $ $ 112 - 114 .
7
8 See the form in Appendix , B
l
. Comm . , Book II .
7
9 Kirkendall v . Mitchell , 3 McLean ( U . S . ) 144 .
8
0 Midgett v . Brooks , 12 Ired . Law 145 ; 55 Am . Dec . 405 .
8
1 Wheeler v . Wayne County , 1890 , 132 Ill . 599 ; 24 N . E . 625 .
8
2 Van Wagner y . Van Nostrand , 19 Iowa 422 ; Smith v . Jones , 97




5 Wend . 107 , 115 .
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enable him to recover against the vendor in case of evic
tion , the covenant of warranty is inserted in the deed .”
Hence , as the covenant of warranty is intended as
much for the protection of the vendee against known de
fects as against those which are unknown , the grantor
cannot successfully defend an action on the covenant by
showing that the vendee knew there was an adverse claim
to the land .
§ 207 . The covenant of warranty attaches only to the
estate conveyed . - An important principle affecting in
some cases the form of the conveyance is that the cove
nantof warranty attaches only to the estate purported to
be granted , and does not enlarge that estate , even though
the covenant be expressed in the most general terms. For
example , if the conveyance is of a life estate , the covenant
warrants nothing more . The object of the covenant is to
defend the estate passed , not to enlarge or narrow it.84
And this is so when the covenants are implied from the
statutory words with the same effect as if they had been
expressed .85
Very often a conveyance purports to grant “ the right ,
title and interest ” of the grantor in certain premises , and
such a granting clause is often followed by a covenant of
warranty in general terms. On the principle just stated ,
the covenant applies to the estate granted , and not to the
land described in the conveyance .86 Though the cove
nant of warranty be in such a case expressed in general
and unrestricted terms, the deed practically amounts to
no more than a quit- claim deed .87








6 Sweet v . Brown , 12 Met . 175 ; 45 Am . Dec . 243 ; Hull v . Hull , 1891 ,
3
5
W . Va . 155 ; 13 S . E . 49 ; 29 Am . S
t
. Rep . 800 ; White v . Brocaw , 14
Ohio St . 339 , 343 .
8
7 Reynolds v . Shaver , 1894 , 59 Ark . 299 ; 27 S . W . 78 ; 43 Am . St . 36 .
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§ 208 . Effect of describing land as subject to an in
cumbrance . - The same principle is applied in cases where
immediately following the description are words indicat
ing that the land granted is subject to a mortgage de
scribed , or certain other incumbrances . The effect of
such a statement is to qualify the covenants which follow ,
and they relate to the estate thus qualified ; that is , the
land conveyed , but subject to the incumbrance mentioned .
For example , a deed , after the description of the property ,
contained the clause “ subject to the following incum
brances ,” describing them , after which followed the coy
enant of freedom from incumbrances, containing no ex
ceptions, and full covenants of warranty . It was held
that the covenants applied only to the estate conveyed ,
which was not the land described , absolutely , but subject
to incumbrances ; and that the real covenant was that,
otherwise than subject to the incumbrances named , the
land was free from incumbrances , and that the grantor
would warrant and defend the title .88
Generally , however , qualifying expressions apply to all
the covenants only when they are part of the description
of the property granted (as in these last instances ), and
therefore, a special exception or restriction annexed to
one covenant alone will not have the effect of qualifying
the other covenants .
As, for example , where there is a covenant against in
cumbrances , from which is excepted a certain mortgage ,
followed by a general warranty , without qualification or
exception - the effect is not to except the mortgage from
the covenant of warranty .89 There is, it is considered , no
:8 Drury v . Holden , 121 Ill . 13
0 , 137 ; 13 N . E . 547 . And see Craw
ford v . Nimmons , 1899 , 180 Il
l
. 143 , 149 ; 54 N . E , 209 ; Johnson v .
Nichols , 1898 , 105 Iowa 122 ; 74 N . W . 750 ; Brown v . Bank , 148 Mass .
300 ; 19 N . E . 382 ; Freeman y . Foster , 55 Maine 508 ; Koch v . Hustis ,
1902 , 113 Wis . 604 ; 89 N . W . 838 .
8
9 Welbon v . Welbon , 1896 , 109 Mich . 35
6 ; 67 N . W . 33
8 ; 3 Detroit
Leg . News 112 ; Ayer v . Brick Co . , 1892 , 157 Mass . 5
7 ; 31 N . E . 717 ;
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inconsistency in the grantor 's mentioning the incum
brance as an exception to the covenant against incum
brances , and at the same timewarranting that there shall
be no eviction by reason of the incumbrance .90 So it is
often stated as a general rule that a restricted covenant
does not affect the operation of a covenant following it,
when the latter covenant is not connected with the former
nor of the same import .91
§ 209 . Eviction necessary to a breach of covenant of
warranty . — The covenant of warranty is a covenant
against eviction : it is not a covenant that the estate is in
defeasible . In some states , as before stated , this covenant
includes , or is in effect given the force of , a covenant of
seisin as well as a covenant of warranty , but except in
such states , a general warranty does not imply a covenant
of seisin , and the covenant is therefore not broken by the
existence of a better title in a third person . Nor does it
include the covenant against incumbrances . Hence , the
existence of a mortgage on the land when the grantee
purchases is not a breach of the covenant of warranty , 92
but an eviction of the grantee under a foreclosure and
sale on the mortgage is a breach .93 While the existence
of an incumbrance on the land conveyed will not always
amount to a breach of the covenant of warranty , there
may be outstanding rights in third persons which , though
incumbrances , will also cause the covenant of warranty
to be broken . Such are rights in third persons to an
Sumner v . Williams, 8 Mass . 162 , 202 , 214 ; 5 Am . Dec . 83 ; King v .
Kilbride , 58 Conn . 109 ; 19 Atl . 519 .
90 Sandwich Mfg . Co . v . Zellmer , 48 Minn . 408 ; 51 N . W . 379 .
91 But the rule as applied in the foregoing recent cases is not accepted
universally , and as opposed to them is the case of Bricker v . Bricker ,
11 Ohio St. 240 , which holds that the exclusion of an incumbrance from
the covenant against incumbrances ,must be held to except it as well
from the covenant of warranty , and all other covenants in the deed .
92 Clark v. Lineberger , 44 Ind . 223 .
93McLean y. Webster , 1891, 45 Kan . 644 ; 26 Pac. 10.
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easement in the land conveyed , interfering with the free
use and possession of part of it and materially impairing
it
s value : it is considered in such cases that there is an
eviction . 94
§ 210 . What is eviction — Constructive eviction . — Pre
cisely what amounts to an eviction it is not always easy
to say . But it appears that the rule stated in Kramer v .
Carter95 is , in general , accepted : “ That any adverse as
sertion o
f
a paramount right b
y





the granted premises , or any
part o
f
them , or to which he yields , as b
y giving an
equivalent for the paramount estate , will be such an evic
tion as will constitute a breach of the covenant of war
ranty . ”
The eviction which will constitute a breach of the cov
enant o
f warranty may be either an actual expulsion o
f
the grantee by one who has a superior title — the expul
sion being either a result of the peaceable entry b
y
him




ings ; or it may be a constructive eviction , as where the
premises when granted are in the adverse possession of
one holding under a better title , o
r
where the grantee
buys in a better title to avoid expulsion . % Where the
grantee surrenders possession to one claiming to have a
better title , in order to avoid an expulsion , o
r
where he
buys in such a title , the burden is on him , if he after
wards sues his grantor on the covenant , of showing that
the title to which he yielded was superior , and that he
would have been evicted had he not yielded . 97 Neither
Smith , 100 N . Y . 471 , 477 ; 3 N . E . 675 ; 53 Am . R . 224 ; Copeland v .
McAdory , 1892 , 100 Ala . 553 , 559 ; 13 So . 545 ; Ensign v . Colt , 1902 , 52
Atl . 829 .
9
5
136 Mass . 504 , 509 .
9
6 Shattuck v . Lamb , 65 N . Y . 499 ; 22 Am . R . 65
6 ; Heyn v . Obman ,
1894 , 42 Neb . 693 ; 60 N . W . 952 .
9
7 McGrew v . Harmon , 1894 , 164 Pa . 115 ; 30 Atl . 265 , 268 ; Robinson
v . Bierce , 1899 , 102 Tenn . 428 ; 52 S . W . 992 ; 47 L . R . A . 275 .
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the covenant of warranty nor that for quiet enjoyment is
broken by a wrongful disturbance or eviction , by a third
person other than the covenantor .98 But a tortious evic
tion or disturbance by the covenantor under a claim of
title is a breach of the covenants .99
§ 211. Covenants implied — Common law - Statutory
deeds. - The short form statutory deeds have been referred
to 10
0
and the fact mentioned that certain covenants are in
many o
f
the states implied by the use of certain words .
An ancient form o
f implied warranty is that arising from
the use o
f
the word “ dedi . " i There were important cov
enants implied a
t
common law ( as in exchange , partition ,








t the present time . The covenants thus implied were
called covenants in law . Among those thus implied
which are of importance now are those implied in the
case o
f
a lease . These are , that the lessor has power to




Statutes exist in several o
f
the states : providing sub
stantially " that no covenants shall be implied in a con
veyance o
f
real estate , whether the same contains express
covenants or not , ” but these statutes have been consid
9
8 Andrus v . St . Louis Smelting Co . , 130 U . S . 643 , 647 ; Barry v .
Guild , 12
6
Ill . 439 , 44
6 ; 18 N . E . 759 ; Poley v . Lacert , 1899 , 35 Ore .
166 ; 58 Pac . 37 .
9
9 Akerly v . Vilas , 23 Wis . 207 ; 99 Am . Dec . 165 ; Sedgwick v . Hol .




See Ante , $ 30 .
* See Ante , $ 197 .
? “ A covenant in law , properly speaking , is an agreement which the
law infers or implies from the use o
f
certain words having a known
legal operation in the creation of an estate ; so that after they have had
their primary operation in creating the estate , the law gives them a
secondary force , by implying an agreement on the part o
f
the grantor
to protect and preserve the estate so b
y
those words already created . "
Tindal , C . J . , in Williams v . Burrell , 1 C . B . 402 , 429 .
* E . g . , New York , Michigan , Minnesota , Wisconsin and Oregon .
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ered as not applying to leases , because they are not con
veyances of real estate within the meaning of the statute .“
Such statutes as those last mentioned must also be read
in connection with other statutes which expressly allow
covenants to be imported into conveyances by the use of
certain words . The form given above,5 in which the
chief words are “ convey and warrant ," is substantially
like those in several other states , as there indicated .
There is another set of words, namely : " grant , bargain
and sell, " from the use of which in certain states cove
nants will be implied . These words, which are those
used , for instance , in Alabama , Illinois , Pennsylvania
and Missouri , were imported into this country by Penn
sylvania from the English act.6
In some states both sets of words are to be found , as,
fo
r
example , in Illinois , where the words " convey and
warrant ” may be used and will imply certain covenants ,
and the words “ grant , bargain and sell ” certain others . ?
And in some states , as in California and states influ
enced b
y
its statutes , from the word " grant ” alone cer
tain covenants will be implied ; such statutes appear to
have been derived from the same Statute o
f
Anne .
The point noticed before , that some o
f
these words im
ply special covenants and some general , should not be
overlooked , because , o
f





Anne ( 6 Anne , c . 35 ) the
words “ grant , bargain and sell ” were to be considered as
covenants that the bargainor , notwithstanding any act
done b
y




the execution of such
deed seized , et
c
. , of an estate in fee simple , free from all
incumbrances , and for quiet enjoyment thereof against
* See Boreel v . Lawton , 90 N . Y . 293 ; Mayor & c . v .Mabie , 13 N . Y .
151 ; Shaft v . Carey , 1900 , 107 Wis . 273 , 277 ; 83 N . W . 288 .
5 See ante , $ 30 .
6
6 Anne , c . 35 . See Douglass v . Lewis , 131 U . S . 75 , 82 ; Wheeler
v . Wayne Co . , 1890 , 132 I11 . 599 , 605 ; 24 N . E . 625 .
? Illinois R S . , ch . 30 , $ $ 8 , 9 .
8 See ante , $ 30 .
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the bargainor and all claiming under him ; thus restrict
ing the covenants to the acts of the grantor and those
claiming under him , and the general features of this stat
ute are preserved in the American statutes modeled upon
it .
And the word “ grant” in several of the states , where
used , has the effect of importing limited or special, rather
than general , covenants into the deed .10
§ 212. Effect of such statutes. — When the statutory
words are used , the effect is to import the covenants as
effectively into the deed as if they were expressed at
length . 11
But in order that this may be the effect , the statutory
words must be used ; as, for example , where the statute
gives this effect to the words “ grant, bargain and sell,”
the same effect will not be given to one of the words
merely , “ grant."'12 The same general principles apply
where statutory words may be used to imply covenants in
mortgages . Such covenants work the same effect as if
written at length in the mortgage .13
It appears that if the grantor , instead of using the stat
utory words alone, should insert an express covenant , this
might have the effect of restricting the full force which
would otherwise be given to the statutory words . For
9 For example , see the statutes of Missouri , Illinois , Pennsylvania
and Alabama ; but note the changes in some cases in copying the act,
as indicated in Douglass v . Lewis , 131 Ų . S. 75, 83 - 86 .
10 See , for example , Cal. Civ . Co ., § 1113 ; Mon . Civ. Co ., $ $ 1501,
1519 ; N . Dak . Rev . Co. 1899, $ 3539 ; S. Dak . Ann . Stat. 1901, $$ 4435 ,
4437 .
11Van Wagner v . Van Nostrand , 19 Iowa 422 ; Meservey v . Snell ,
1895 , 94 Iowa 223 , 224 ; 62 N . W . 767 ; Foote v. Clark , 1890 , 102 Mo.
394 ; 14 S . W . 981 ; Lehndorf v . Cope , 122 Ill . 317 ; 13 N . E . 505 ; Beas
ley v . Phillips , 1899 , 20 Ind . App . 185 ; 50 N . E . 488 .
1
2 Wheeler v . Wayne Co . , 1890 , 13
2
Ill . 599 ; 24 N . E . 625 .
1
3 Lagger v . Loan Ass ' n , 1893 , 146 Ill . 283 , 300 ; 33 N . E . 946 ; Boyd
v . Haseltine , 1892 , 11
0
Mo . 203 ; 19 S . W . 822 .
1
7
— BREWS . Con .
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example , " convey and warrant ” in Washington imply a
covenant against incumbrances : but where the grantor
inserted an express covenant of warranty , it was held
that the conveyance could not be considered as including
the covenant against incumbrances .14 Where certain
covenants only are implied and others are desired it seems
better to express fully all the covenants desired than to
attempt to combine the implied and expressed .
§ 213 . Whether le
x
situs or lex loci contractus con
trols . — As the words from which covenants are implied
vary , therefore , in the different states , and as conveyances
are not infrequently drawn in another state than that
where the land lies , and are sometimes drawn according
to the form o
f
one state and sometimes according to the
form o
f
the other , it will be found not always easy to de
termine just what force shall be given to the lex situs .
These statutory conveyances have the dual capacity o
f
transferring the title to the land , and importing cove
nants into the deed , some o
f
which are clearly o
f
a per




states . Hence , if an action is brought on the
covenants imported into the deed b
y
the operative words
in them , and the action is brought in another state than
that where the land conveyed is situated , the words may
not be given the effect that they would have been given
in the courts of the state where the land conveyed lies .
For example , in Bethell v . Bethell , 15 both parties to the
action lived in Indiana . The defendant by deed conveyed
to the plaintiff land in Missouri . The words of the deed
were , “ grant , bargain , sell and convey , ” but there were
no express covenants . The defendant had never been in
possession o
f
the land and had no title to it , and it was
held that if there was a covenant for seisin it was broken
1
4 Leddy v . Enos , 1893 , 6 Wash . 247 ; 33 Pac . 508 ; 34 Pac . 665 ;




4 Ind . 428 ; 8 . c . 92 Ind . 319 .
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as soon as made , and being therefore personal the action
was governed by the le
x
loci contractus ; but , moreover , as
under that law (Indiana ) no such covenant would be im
plied from the words used , the plaintiff had no cause of
action .
While it is recognized by the court that the law of Mis
souri alone can be looked to in order to determine whether
the deed in question was sufficient to pass title , “ it does
not , therefore , necessarily follow that the lex rei sitä so
far governs conveyances made elsewhere as to change
their character as mere conveyances and invest them with
the character o
f personal covenants not necessary to the
transmission of the property . ”
In Jackson v . Green , 16 the deed was one also executed
in Indiana and conveyed land in Missouri , but was of
the short form prescribed b
y
the Indiana statute , the op
erative words being “ convey and warrant . ” The breach
alleged was that the grantors never had title to any part
o
f
the land , and could convey none , and that neither
plaintiff nor defendant had ever been in possession . The
court held that the laws o
f
Indiana determined the ques







the statute of Indiana “ convey and
warrant ” di
d comprehend all the covenants as fully as if
written a
t length : therefore the complaint in this case
was good .
Where , however , the action is brought on covenants
which run with the land , it seems that the law o
f
the
place where the land is situated should govern and not
that o
f
the place where the deed is executed . 17
$ 214 . The running o
f
covenants for title with the
land . - Although in thecovenants for title the covenantor
1
6
112 Ind . 342 ; 14 N . E . 89 .
1
7 Succession o
f Cassidy , 1888 , 40 La . Ann . 827 ; 5 So . 292 ; Fisher v .
Parry , 68 Ind . 465 ; Riley v . Burroughs , 1894 , 41 Neb . 296 ; 59 N . W .
929 .
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in form covenants generally with the grantee , his “ heirs
and assigns,” the right of the successors of the original
covenantee to recover against the original covenantor is
not wholly fixed by the use of these words designating the
grantee 's successors . The use of the words “ heirs and
assigns ” cannot cause the benefit of a covenant to pass
with a transfer of the land to successive owners of it, if






these covenants may be taken advan
tage o
f , not merely b
y
the actual covenantee , but by sub
sequent holders o
f
the interest comprised in the convey
ance in which they are found , they form an exception to




contract , namely : that
contracts can only be enforced by and against the original
parties to them and their personal representatives .
When the right o
f
a
n heir or assign of a covenantee to
recover against a remote grantor on a particular one o
f
the
usual covenants for title is being considered , it is gener
ally said that the question is : does the particular cove
nant run with the land ? 19
$ 215 . Conflicting views as to the running o
f
some
covenants . — Whether a grantee , heir or devisee o
f
the




covenants for title — which covenants were not made with
1
8Mygatt v . Coe , 1895 , 147 N . Y . 456 , 467 ; 42 N . E . 17 .
1
9 It seems likely that the application o
f
this phrase , “ running with
the land , " indiscriminately to both covenants for title and other cove
nants — those , for example , relating to the use of land - has helped to
cause some confusion and to increase the difficulties connected with the
subject o
f
the “ running o
f
covenants " other than those for title “ with
the land . " For the principles controlling , in this respect , other cove
nants than those for title are not identical with those controlling cove
nants for title . Covenants for title are more especially matters o
f
con
tract , and when they pass to successors of the covenantee they do so
because they “ run with the estate , " whereas rights arising from cove
nants concerning the use o
f
the land becomeattached to the land - they
“ run with the land . ” See Norcross v . James , 14
0
Mass . 18
8 ; 2 N . E .
946 ; Holmes The Common Law , Ch . XI .
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him — will depend , then , on the nature of the covenant,or,
rather , on the view taken by the particular court having
the question before it as to its nature . And the fact that





the covenants for title to run with the
land has caused one of the conflicts in the American law
o
f real property .
Covenants for title may be said to run with the land
when , being either implied in a conveyance or expressed
a
t length in it , they are of such a nature that they become
incidents to the estate granted and pass with it through
other transfers so that the owner for the timebeing is en
titled to claim the benefit o
f
them from the original cov
enantor ; that is , generally , to recover damages for their
breach .
O
r , “ A covenant may be said to run with the land
when its purpose is to give future protection to the title
which the deed containing the covenant undertook to
convey , and it does not run with the land when its whole
force is spent in giving assurance against something
which immediately affects the title and causes present
damage . ” 20
Succeeding as they did the ancient warranty21 it was
probably never expected that the covenants for title would
not each and all run with the land for the benefit of a
subsequent owner o
f
it . The terms in which they were
originally expressed , and are still generally expressed ,
indicate that , taken as a whole , they make an engagement
o
n the part o
f





them . That is , they together
make a promise to save harmless against loss o
r damage
which may happen in the future to the grantee , his heirs
o
r assigns . The feoffee ' s heirs and assigns could take
advantage o
f
the old warranty under certain circum .
2




1 Supra , $ 19
7
.
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stances , and the substitution of covenants for title in the
place of warranty seems to have been originally made ,
not for the purpose of lessening the security of titles , but
rather for the purpose of getting rid of certain cumber
some features of the actions connected with warranty ,
and of affording surer and simpler remedies .
In theory all the covenants for title run with the land
until they are broken .22
In England and in some of our states they all do, in
fact , run with the land . But in many ( it seems most )
of the United States only the covenants for quiet enjoy .
ment and warranty , and further assurance , practically do
so , the others (for seisin and good right to convey , and
often the covenant against incumbrances ),being regarded
as covenants in præsenti, that is, covenants for the present
existence of certain facts , are considered broken as soon
as made if these facts do not exist , and being thus broken
instantaneously , they lose all capacity for running with
the land . They have become at once choses in action ,
not assignable at common law , although the real substan
tial loss may not then occur, but may occur later when
the land is owned by another than the original cove
nantee . 23
§ 216 . The " English rule” as to the covenant of seisin
running : - What is known as the English rule is sub
stantially followed in many states . This rule was estab
lished in two cases ,24 which are almost always cited in
later discussions , and which may be briefly stated as fol
lows :
22 Rawle Cov . Tit., p. 292 .
23 It has been suggested that the real question in such cases is , “ At
what time the right of substantial recovery accrues , whether at the mo
ment of the delivery of the deed , or is it postponed under any circum
stances until the actual damage is sustained ? ” Dickson v. Desire 's
Admr., 23 Mo. 151 , 163 ; 66 Am . D . 661 .
24 Kingdon v . Nottle , 1 Maule & Selwyn 355 ; Kingdon v . Nottle , 4
Maule & Selwyn 53.
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In the first case , the plaintiff declared as executrix on
a breach of covenant for seisin , entered into with her
testator . But as itwas shown that the only breach accru
ing in the lifetime of the testator was the mere non -exist
ence of seisin in the covenantor , from which the estate
had sustained no real injury before the testator 's death ,
judgment was rendered for the defendant .
In the second case the plaintiff declared as devisee of
the covenantee , and proved a substantial injury to the
estate , caused by defect of title since the death of the
covenantee . It was objected to this that there had been
an instantaneous breach , and so a personal right of action
in the covenantee , in his lifetime , which could not be
assigned . But it was held that though according to the
letter there was a breach in the testator ' s lifetime, yet
according to the spirit the substantial breach " is in the
time of the devisee . So long as the defendant has not
good title there is a continuing breach as of a covenant
to do a thing toties quoties (as often as ] the exigencies of
the case may require . "
The view of the American courts holding substantially
this doctrine is stated in Mecklem y . Blake ,25 as follows :
“ These courts hold that where the covenantor is in
possession , claiming title , and delivers the possession to
the covenantee , the covenant of seisin is not a mere pres
ent engagement ,made for the sole benefit of a covenantee ,
but that it is a covenant of indemnity entered into in re
spect of the land conveyed , intended for the security of
all subsequent grantees until the covenant is finally and
completely broken ; and they consequently hold that no
such right of action accrues to the covenantee on themere
nominal breach , which always happens the moment the
covenant is executed , as is sufficient to merge or arrest
the covenant in the hands of the covenantee , or to de






2 Wis . 495 , 99 Amer . Dec . 68 .
264 § 217THE LAW OF CONVEYANCING .
benefit of the person holding under the deed when an
eviction takes place , or other real injury is actually sus
tained . '' 26
§ 217 . The “ American Rule .” — On the other hand , a
different view was early taken by some of the courts of
this country , and this view has been so generally fol
lowed in the United States as to warrant it
s being called ,
a
s it often is , the American rule on the subject . The
rule is , that these covenants ( for seisin and good right to
convey , and , according to some courts , that against in
cumbrances ) are strictly in præsenti ; if they are broken ,
they are broken at once when the deed is executed and
delivered , and cannot pass to the assigns o
f
the cove
nantee . The chief reason for the establishment o
f
this
rule appears to have been the non -assignability of choses
in action . But additional grounds are stated in some o
f
the decisions which affirm the rule , among them , that if
the covenantor is not seised , or has no right to convey ,
nothing passes as an estate in which the covenants may
rest and be transmitted to later owners ; that by the terms
o
f
the covenants they are in præsenti , and do not purport
to b
e security against future injury ; that the non
existence o
f
the facts covenanted for is a breach for
which there can b
e but a single right of action , and that
the first o
r
immediate covenantee has that right , and
hence a
n assign cannot have it .
This rule was established in New York in what is con
2
6 Other leading cases taking this view are Backus v . McCoy , 3 Ohio
211 ; 17 Am . Dec . 585 . See Betz v . Bryan , 39 Ohio S
t
. 320 ; Schofield v .
Homestead C
o . , 32 Iowa 317 , 7 Am . Rep . 197 . See also Boon v . Mc
Henry , 55 Iowa 202 ; 7 N . W . 503 . But if covenantor have no title , and
transfers to the grantee no possession , the covenant is broken when
the deed is delivered . Zent v . Picken , 54 Iowa 535 ; 6 N . W . 750 . And
as in such a case the right of action accrues then , the statute of limita
tions begins then to run . Mitchell v . Kepler , 75 Iowa 207 ; 39 N . W .
241 ; Martin y . Baker , 5 Blackf . (Ind . ) 232 ; Wright v . Nipple , 92 Ind .
310 , 313 ; Wysong v . Nealis , 1895 , 13 Ind . App . 165 , 174 ; 41 N . E . 388 .
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sidered the leading case of Greenby v . Wilcocks ,27 and
having been adopted also in early decisions in many other
states , has since been followed , often without much dis
cussion . 28
$ 218 . The role as to the covenant against incum
brances . — The so -called American doctrine has not been
applied as universally to the covenant against incum
brances as it has been to the covenants for seisin and good
right to convey . This is perhaps partly due to the fact
that at first it was intimately connected with the covenant
for quiet enjoyment,29 or otherwise made a covenant in
futuro . This difference in form has been noticed in sev
eral cases other than those cited above. 30
And in addition to such cases , where the covenant has
been expressly associated with the covenant fo
r
quiet en
joyment , have been others where the covenant against in
cumbrances , implied b
y
statute from the use o
f
the words
“ convey and warrant , ” is regarded as embracing a guar
anty for future a
s well as present enjoyment . 31
But aside from the question of form , the propriety o
f
having the benefit o
f
this covenant belong to the owner of
the land for the time being has worked against the rule
2
7
2 Johns . 1 , 3 Am . Dec . 379 , before the decisions in the English cases
o
f Kingdon v . Nottle , cited supra , $ 216 .
2
8 Butler v . Barnes , 1891 , 60 Conn . 170 , 192 ; 21 Atl . 419 ; King v .
Gilson , 32 Ill . 348 ; 83 Am . Dec . 269 ; Jones v . Warner , 81 Ill . 343 ;
Smith v . Richards , 1891 , 155 Mass . 79 ; 28 N . E . 1132 ; Matteson v .
Vaughn , 38 Mich . 373 ; Sherwood v . Landon , 57 Mich . 219 ; 23 N . W .
778 ; Mygatt v . .Coe , 1891 , 124 N . V . 212 ; 26 N . E . 611 . (The doctrine
that the covenant for seisin does not run with the land was based on
reasons o
f
a technical character , and the rule established does not
appear to bring about as just results as would the rule which gives to
the actual sufferer the benefit o
f
the covenant . See 4 Kent ' s Comm .
472 ; Rawle Cov . T . , $ 211 ) .
2
9 See ante , $ 199 .
3
0Andrews v . Appel , 22 Hun 429 ; Nyce v . Obertz , 17 Ohio 71 , 75 ;
Carter v . Denman , 23 N . J . L . 260 , 273 .
3
1 Worley v .Hineman , 1892 , 6 Ind . App . 240 , 245 ; 33 N . E . 260 ; De
hority v . Wright , 101 Ind . 382 .
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which restricted the usefulness of the covenant fo
r
seisin ;
and especially in later cases , which have recognized
the injustice o
f
now allowing the old reason as to non
assignability o
f
choses in action to control , this covenant
is allowed to be taken advantage o
f by remote grantees ;
for example , in the recent case o
f
Geiszler v . De Graaf , 32 the
court held that the reason for holding that this covenant
does not run , no longer exists , and that the covenant “ at
taches to and runs with the land and passes to a remote
grantee through the line o
f conveyances , whether there is
a nominal breach or not when the deed is delivered . ”
And this has been the tendency even in some states where
the covenant fo
r
seisin is regarded a
s
not running with
the land . 33
Nevertheless , it appears that in the greater number o
f






run with the land . 34
§ 219 . Covenants fo
r
quiet enjoyment and warranty
run with the land . — The covenants fo
r
“ quiet enjoyment ”
and “ warranty " are , with substantial unanimity , held to
be covenants in futuro , running with the land , for the
protection o
f
the owner in whose time the breach happens .





a later owner o
f
the land claim .
3
2 1901 , 166 N . Y . 339 ; 59 N . E . 993 ; 82 Am . St . 659 .
8
3 Richard v . Bent , 59 Ill . 38 ; 14 Am . R . 1 ; Security Bank v . Holmes ,
1896 , 65 Minn . 531 ; 68 N . W . 113 ; 60 Am . St . R . 495 . In Post v .
Campau , 42 Mich . 90 , 95 ; 3 N . W . 272 , Judge Cooley suggested that the
covenant could have reasonable effect only when the fact that in
cumbrances are o
f
different kinds is recognized : some are permanent
in their nature , and it is reasonable to hold that the covenant against
them is broken at once and finally , but as to those that are money
charges , which cause no loss a
t
once to the covenantee , but may later ,
a different rule should apply .
8
4 Guerin v . Smith , 62 Mich . 369 ; 28 N . W . 906 ; Ladd v . Noyes , 137
Mass . 151 ; McPike v . Heaton , 1900 , 131 Cal . 109 ; 63 Pac . 179 ; 82 Am .
S
t
. 335 ; Sears v . Broady , 1902 (Neb . ) ; 92 N . W . 214 . See Notes , 47
Am . Dec . 569 ; 82 Am . S
t . 664 .
$ 220 267OVENANTS .
ing under the covenantee , whether this owner is grantee ,
devisee or heir.35 But when once broken these covenants
cease to run with the land . There is then a right of
action that should be enforced by the person entitled to
take advantage of the covenant at the time of its breach ,
o
r , if he be dead , b
y
his personal representative . The
subsequent grantee is not entitled to damages for the
breach o
f
the covenant occurring before his time . 36
§ 220 . Subsequent grantees b
y
quit claim deeds have
the benefit o
f
such covenants as run with the land . - The
benefits o
f
such covenants for title as run with the land
will pass to a subsequent grantee b
y
any conveyance that
will transfer the title to the land to him ; the immediate
deed through which he claims need not be a deed with
covenants ; a quit -claim deed will have the same effect . 37
§ 221 . “ Personal ” and “ real ” as used with reference
to covenants for title . — In decisions and discussions re
garding covenants for title , the words “ real ” and “ per
sonal ” are used in such a way as to cause some confusion
unless certain distinctions are borne in mind . All the cov
enants for title are sometimes called personal , 38 and ,
again , some or all of them are referred to as “ real . ” ' 39
The explanation is that where they are spoken o
f
in dis
tinction from the ancient warranty which was “ real , ” in
3
5 Suydam v . Jones , 10 Wend . 180 ; 25 Am . D . 552 ; Baker v . Bradt ,
1897 , 168 Mass . 58 ; 46 N . E . 409 ; Tillotson v . Prichard , 60 Vt . 94 ; 14
Atl . 302 ; 6 Am . St . R . 95 .
3
6 Ladd v . Noyes , 137 Mass . 151 ; Provident L . & T . Co . y . Fiss , 1892 ,
147 P




7 Jenks v . Quinn , 1893 , 137 N . Y . 223 ; 33 N . E . 376 ; Thomas v .
Bland , 1890 , 91 Ky . 1 ; 14 S . W . 955 ; Johnson v . Johnson , 1902 , 170
Mo . 34 ; 70 S . W . 241 ; Troxell v . Stevens , 1899 , 57 Neb . 329 , 337 ; 77
N . W . 781 ; Brady v . Spurck , 27 Ill . 478 ; Hunt v . Middlesworth , 44
Mich . 448 ; 7 N . W . 57 .
$ For example , in 4 Kent Comm . 470 , 471 .
$ 9Martin v . Baker , 5 Blackf . (Ind . ) 232 ; Kingdon v . Nottle , 1 Maule
& Selwyn 355 .
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the sense that it bound the warrantor to yield (generally )
lands rather than damages as compensation , they may be
called personal, because of the remedy they afford ; that
is , an action for damages .40
On the other hand , a covenant which has for its object
something annexed to , or connected with , or inherent in ,
real property is often defined as a “ real covenant ” ; it
generally runs with the land , and is the only kind that
can d
o
so . Hence when those covenants for title that are
considered to run with the land are spoken o
f
in contrast
with any covenants that do not so run , they are often
called “ real , ” as distinguished from the others which are
( as not running with the land ) called “ personal . " ' 41
II . Covenants , Other than Covenants for Title .
§ 222 . General features of these covenants . - In con
veyances there are often covenants other than covenants
for title , and , as they may have for their subject -matter
almost anything relating to land , they are o
f
almost in
finite variety . Among the more usual kinds of covenants
not covenants for title are those providing for the erec
tion and maintenance of fences , dams , et
c
. ; those con
cerning the kind and cost o




buildings ; those relating to the uses o
f
land , for example ,
that it shall notbe used for business purposes , or for some
particular business ; those regarding the construction and
use o




“ There is a diversity between a warranty which is a covenant real ,
which bindeth the party to yield lands in recompense , and a covenant
annexed to the land which is to yield damages . ” Co . Litt . , 384b .
1
1 In the foregoing sketch o
f
the covenants for title only the chief
matters concerning them which relate directly to the form and effect of
conveyances have been touched upon : many important topics con
nected with them , e . g . , matters o
f pleading and proof , the measure o
f
damages , etc . , must necessarily be omitted .
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One of the features of these covenants , in which they
differ from covenants for title, is that while the grantee of
land has no occasion fo
r
making a covenant for title ,
either the grantor or the grantee may make one o
f
these
other covenants , and may in many cases bind himself
and those who own his land after him to do something




the other party , or to refrain
from doing something regarded as depreciative o
f
that
land . Thus the grantee may become the covenantor , and
the grantor the covenantee .





a conveyance from one to the other ,
and some kinds of covenants ( o
r agreements not under
seal , and so not strictly covenants ) , are often so made , for
example , agreements concerning party walls , but , fo
r
the
most part , questions concerning covenants arise in con
nection with conveyances o
f
some interest in land — either






the more important features connected







Questions in controversies between the original parties
to such covenants usually present n
o special difficulties ;
but when the land of one or both of the parties has been
transferred it is not in all cases easy to determine against
whom and in favor of whom , as subsequent owners o
f
the land , these covenants may be enforced , and , if en
forceable , in what manner they may be enforced .
§ 223 . Form - No technical words essential . — Cases
often arise where there will be a difference o
f opinion as
to whether a clause is or is not a covenant , and what is
claimed b
y
one interested party to b
e
a " condition ” may
be held to be a covenant , for as no express technical
words are essential to create a covenant , words appropri
ate to a condition may make a covenant when such is the
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intent . And as technical words of covenant or agree
ment are not essential to make a covenant, so words ex
pressive of a covenant have sometimes been held to be a
grant of an easement rather than a covenant.
For example , the plaintiff sues in tort for an interfer
ence by the defendant with an easement claimed by plain
tiff by virtue of the following clause in a conveyance to
plaintiff , inserted just after the description : “ And said
grantors agree that no building shall be erected on said
lot next east of said granted premises nearer to the west
line of said lot than four feet , being the east line of the
premises hereby conveyed .” The plaintiff 's grantors in
this deed owned the adjoining lo
t
referred to in this
clause , and after making the conveyance to the plaintiff
containing the clause , conveyed this adjoining lot to the
present defendant ; it was held that the word “ agree " in
the clause must be read asmeaning “ grant , ” and that
therefore there was attached a
n
easement in fee to the
plaintiff ' s land - it was not merely a personal undertak
ing of the grantors — and that the burden of the easement
granted by the grantors in their own land remained on
the land when it passed to the defendant . ?
§ 224 . Form — Effect o
f
" heirs and assigns ” or simi
lar words in covenant , - As the words “ heirs and
assigns " were necessary a
t
one time to indicate that
certain benefits were to extend beyond the first beneficiary
to his successors in title , so now , in cases where a cove
nant is o
f
such a character that it may or may not “ run
with the land , ” the presence or absence o
f
the words “ heirs
and assigns ” may have an important influence , among
other circumstances , on the determination of the question
1 Electric City Land & c . Co . v . West Ridge Coal Co . , 1898 , 187 Pa .
500 , 511 ; 41 Atl . 458 . And see ante , $ $ 176 , 177 , 182 , 183 .
? Hogan v . Barry , 143 Mass . 538 ; 10 N . E . 253 . See also Wetmore v .
Bruce , 1890 , 118 N . Y . 319 ; 23 N . E . 303 ; Shannon v . Timm , 22 Colo .
167 ; 43 Pac . 1021 ; Brew v . Van Deman , 6 Heisk . ( 53 Tenn . ) 433 , 439 .
s See ante , $ 197 .
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as to whether or not it does " run . ” For example , where
the covenant related to the maintenance of a dam the
court says : “ We think that these covenants run with
the land because they were in terms between the parties
and their respective heirs and assigns , were connected
with the subject of the grant , etc . ” 4 And again ,
where the covenant concerned the building of a fence ,
it is said : “ The failure to include the word 'assigns ' in
the deed is not controlling , if it can reasonably be
inferred from the language o
f
the instrument that the
parties intended that the covenant should run with the
land ; but the absence o
f
such a word , or other words o
f
like import , may be considered in connection with the





parties in this respect . ” ' 5
But this effect is given to such words only when the
covenant is such that it may run with the land , and it is
doubtful whether in the particular case it does so run .
This principle is stated in Mygatt v . Coe , 6 as follows :
“ We do not think the fact that the covenant in question
ran to the grantee , her 'heirs and assigns ' is material .
Whatever confusion may exist in the cases with reference
to the use o
f
these words * * * it hasnever been held
that a covenant which , in its nature or otherwise , is per
sonal is made to run with the land by the mere employ
ment of these words . ” .
And as to the effect to be given to " words of like im
port ” ? substantially the same thing may be said ; that is ,
* Nye v . Hoyle , 1890 , 120 N . Y . 195 , 203 ; 24 N . E . 1 ; see Hart v . .
Lyon , 90 N . Y . 663 .
5 Brown v . So . Pac . R . R . Co . , 1899 , 36 Ore . 128 , 135 ; 47 L . R . A .
409 ; 58 Pac . 1104 . And so in the recent case o
f
Los Angeles & c . Land
C
o . v . So . Pac . R . Co . , 1902 , 136 Cal . 36 , 42 – 44 ; 68 Pac . 308 , in de
ciding that a covenant restricting the use o
f
land was not a covenant
running with the land , the court attaches importance to the absence of
" assigns ” or similar words .
6 1895 , 147 N . Y . 456 , 467 ; 42 N . E . 17 .
736 Ore . 135 .
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if a covenant is of such a character that it cannot run
with the land it cannot be made to so run by any state
ment or agreement of the parties that it shall do so — as ,
for example , that it shall run with the land. ” 8 So ,where
a quarry company granted a railway company a right of
way over it
s lands and covenanted that all products o
f
the quarry should be transported over this railway , and
by an express clause in the indenture , executed and ac
knowledged b
y
both parties , it was agreed that “ All and
singular the grants and provisions herein set forth shall
be binding and obligatory upon the respective parties
hereto , their respective successors , lessees and assigns ' '
it was nevertheless held that the successors in title to the
quarry were not bound b
y
this “ traffic agreement , ” which
was a personal covenant between the original parties .
§ 225 . The form o
f








covenants . - - Technically , to bind the grantee the deed
should b
e
in the form o
f
a




s well as b
y
the grantor . But as between the
original parties the grantee himself may be bound b
y
ac
cepting a deed poll containing an agreement , for instance ,
to fence . And he will be considered so bound even though
in the same jurisdiction it may be held that his successors
in title to the land would not be bound . 10 In many de
cisions nothing is said as to whether the deed is an in .
denture or a deed poll , it being held , in general terms ,
that not only the original grantee but his successor in
title is bound b
y
covenants - for example , in Kelly v .
Nypano R . R . Co . , 11 the defendant railroad company was
8Glenn v . Canby , 24 Md . 127 ; Wilmurt v . McGrane , 1897 , 16 App .
Div . ( N . Y . ) 412 , 417 ; Masury y . Southworth , 9 Ohio S
t
. 340 , 347 , 348 .
9 Kettle River Ry . Co . v . Eastern Ry . Co . , 41 Minn . 461 ; 43 N . W .
469 ; 6 L . R . A . 111 .
1






1 1901 , 200 Pa . St . 229 ; 49 Atl . 779 ; 86 Am . St . R . 715 .
§ 225 273COVENANTS .
held liable on a covenant to “ fence and keep such road
fenced , ” which was contained in a conveyance of a right
of way by the plaintiff to another railroad company whose
property the present defendant had acquired by foreclos
ure proceedings ; the original conveyance may have been
an indenture (which form is largely used in Pennsyl
vania ) or a deed poll, but this point is not mentioned or
discussed as it is in the Massachusetts cases .
But in many cases it has been expressly held that the
assigns of the grantee in a deed poll not signed by him ,
may be bound by the stipulations in the deed , for by the
grantee ' s acceptance of the deed the obligation becomes
binding upon him as owner of the land , and may pass to
his successors in title . For example , in a deed to a rail
road company of a right of way , a provision like that in
the last case , though merely in a deed poll accepted by
the grantee company, but not signed by it, has been held
binding upon the successor of a railroad company , which
obtains title through foreclosureof a mortgage of the rail
road property . " The acceptance of the deed imposed a
burden upon the land which was not only binding upon
the original grantee , but runs with the title and is equally
binding upon all who claim through the original
grantee .” 12
And in Hickey v . L . S . & c . R . Co .13 the deed contained
what was called a condition and agreement “ that the
grantee , his heirs and assigns, shall make and maintain
fences * * * which condition and obligation shall be per
petually binding on the owners of the land .” The grantee
afterward sold portions of the land . The fences not being
maintained , the grantor constructed them , and in this ac
tion sought to recover from the original grantee the expense
12Lake Erie , etc ., R . Co ., v. Priest , 131 Ind . 413; 31 N . E . 77 ; Post
v . Railroad Co ., 50 Hun 301 .
18 1894 , 51 Ohio St. 40 ; 36 N . E . 672 ; 23 L . R . A . 39
6 ; 46 Am . St . R .
1
8
% BREWS . Con .
545 .
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of such construction . The court held that the action was
improperly brought against the first grantee , because the
covenant was so connected with the estate as to run with the
land and make the original grantee ' sassigns liable . “ Nor, "
the court says : “ is this principle to be restricted in it
s
application to leases or deeds inter partes executed b
y
both
lessor and lessee , o
r grantor and grantee . Where a
grantee accepts a deed and goes into possession of the
premises under it he is bound as effectually as if he
had signed and sealed the instrument . Although not
executing the instrument , he should be deemed to have
entered into an express undertaking to do what the deed
says he is to do , and such undertaking or obligation im
posed upon the grantee , if not technically a covenant
running with the land , is nevertheless an agreement o
f
the grantee , evidenced by his acceptance of the deed ,
which might bind him and his personal representatives ,
and , by express words , his heirs and assigns . " And as






the land , ” this provision is held to bind the
original grantee to maintain the fences only during the
time he is the owner of the land . 14
§ 226 , Distinction sometimes made between benefits






relate to the land will pass
to subsequent owners who derive title from the cove
nantee . 15 But the burdens imposed b
y
a covenant will
not as generally be held to pass with the land to the
transferee o
f
the covenantor , for some courts , following
what seems to be the English doctrine ,making a distinc
tion between benefits and burdens , 16 appear to be of opin
1
4 The remark as to the liability in this case of the original grantee ' s
assigns is “ dictum . ”
1
5 National Bank v . Segar , 39 N . J . L . 173 , 184 et seq . ; Graves v .
Deterling , 1890 , 120 N . Y . 447 ; 24 N . E . 655 .
1
6 Keppel v . Bailey , 2 Myl . & K . 517 ; Austerberry v . Oldham , 29 Ch .
D . 750 .
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ion that the latter will not be enforceable against the sub
sequent owner of the covenantor's land .17 There are,
however, many decisions in this country holding that
the burdens imposed by covenants (as well as benefits
given ) will pass with the land . 18
§ 227. Restrictive covenants and conditions , as to use
of land , buildings, etc . - In order to secure and maintain
uniformity and harmony in the character of buildings
erected in a particular locality , and to maintain the suit
ableness of the neighborhood fo
r
buildings and uses of a
special character , or in order sometimes to secure to a
landowner some special advantage in trade , agreements
o
r
conditions of one form or another are often inserted in
conveyances . These provisions are generally restrictive
in character . They appear sometimes in the form of con
ditions providing for a forfeiture on their breach , 19 and





created without an express mention in the deed o
f
conveyance where a reference is made in it to a plat on
which is designated , for example , a " building line " be
yond which it is intended no building shall extend . 20
And even an understanding not evidenced b
y
any writ
ing , but arising from the exhibition o
f
a plan showing
restrictions upon building , has been held to create ease
ments as to the building line . 21 Such restrictions appear ,
however , to be more usually drawn in the form of cove
nants , and are generally declared to be intended to run
with the land . The effect o
f
such provisions in creating
1
7 See Tardy v . Creasy , 81 Va . 553 ; 59 Am . R . 676 ; Costigan v . Penn .
R . R . Co . , 1892 , 54 N . J . L . 233 , 242 ; 23 Atl . 810 .
1
8 See cases cited above in last section ; Gilmer v . Mobile & c . Ry . Co . ,
7
9 Ala . 569 ; Hottell v . Farmers ' Association , 1898 , 25 Colo . 67 ; 53 Pac .
327 ; 71 Am . S
t
. R . 109 ; Bean v . Stoneman , 1894 , 104 Cal . 49 , 37 Pac .
777 ; 38 Pac . 39 ; Fitch y . Johnson , 104 Ill . 111 .
1
9 See instances above , $ 182 .
2
0 Simpson v . Mikkelsen , 1902 , 196 Ill . 575 ; 63 N . E . 1036 .
2
1Maxwell v . East River Bank , 3 Bosw . ( N . Y . ) 124 ; Tallmadge v .
East River Bank , 26 N . Y . 105 .
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incumbrances within the meaning of the covenant against
incumbrances has been noticed .22
The remedy usually applied for the practical enforce
ment of these restrictive provisions is an injunction re
straining their violation . And if not unreasonable or
contrary to public policy (as , for instance, in unduly re
straining trade ), 23 they will be enforced not only between
the original parties , but often between their successors .
$ 228 . Building restrictions in pursuance of a “ gen
eral plan .” - One of the most frequent uses of restrictive
clauses in conveyances is where the owner of a tract of
land divides it into lots , and conveys the lots to separate
purchasers, subject to conditions or stipulations of a char
acter to operate as inducements to the purchaser . In such
cases where there is a general plan regarding building or
use , etc., adopted by the owner , in consideration of which
general scheme each purchaser has bought — the restrict
ive covenants being inserted in each deed , being intended
for all the lands — each purchaser has the benefit of the
restrictions , and — as owner of one of the lots — is subject
to them .
He has attached to his own lot a right held to be , in
many cases , in the nature of an easement in the lots of the
other purchasers ; and each purchaser may enforce this
right against any other purchaser in a court of equity .
Therefore , a purchaser of lots may beheld at the suit of
the grantee of another lot, to conform to a restriction as
to a building line 24 And it is not necessary in order to
hold a purchaser to this line that the restriction should
be mentioned in the immediate conveyance to him , if by
plat and recorded deeds in his chain of title the line is
designated .25 So restrictive provisions as to the use of
22 See supra , $ 201 .
23 See post , $ 230 .
** Hamlen v . Werner , 144 Mass . 396 ; 11 N . E . 684 .
25Ewertsen v .Gerstenberg , 1900 , 186 Ill . 344 ; 57 N . E . 1051 ; 51 L . R .
A . 31
0 ; Townsend ' s Appeal , 1896 , 68 Conn . 358 ; 36 Atl . 815 .
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the premises for residence purposes only , et
c
. ,may simi
larly be enforced b
y
one grantee against another . 26 Great
weight is attached in many courts to the fact that there is
a general plan ; and the right o
f
purchasers to enforce
such restrictions against other purchasers is sometimes
said to b
e dependent on the fact o
f






a larger tract . 27
The fact that there is a general plan with regard to
which each purchaser has bought , is considered as indi
cating that the restrictions were not merely personal to
the grantor and fo
r




f all the lands and each purchaser ; and as each buys
with knowledge o
f
the general plan , he is regarded as as





f any other lot without regard to which of
the lots was first sold . 28 And as such restrictions are not
for the benefit of the original grantor alone , while hemay
waive his own right to enforce them , he cannot release or
waive the rights o
f
his grantees to do so . 29 But restrict
ive clauses are often thus enforced without being part o
f
a general plan , if it appears in some other way that they
are not merely personal to the grantor . They are en
forced because it would be inequitable as against the
owners of adjoining estates not to enforce them , and be
. cause it would be unjust to permit one taking an estate ,
with notice o
f
a valid agreement respecting it
s
use , to
have his estate freed from its obligations . 30
2
6 Hills v . Metzenroth , 1899 , 173 Mass . 423 ; 53 N . E . 890 ; Hopkins v .
Smith , 1894 , 162 Mass . 444 ; 38 N . E . 1122 . See Frink v . Hughes , 1903
(Mich . ) ; 94 N . W . 601 ; 10 Detroit Leg . News 106 .
8
7 Summers v . Beeler , 1899 , 90 MD . 474 ; 45 Atl . 19 ; 78 Am . St . R . 446 .
2
8 De Gray v . Monmouth Beach Co . , 50 N . J . Eq . 329 ; 24 Atl . 388 ;




0 Ivarson v . Mulvey , 1901 , 179 Mass . 141 ; 6
0
N . E . 477 .
8
0 Whitney v . Union Ry . , 11 Gray 35
9 ; 71 Am . Dec . 715 ; Frink v .
Hughes , 1903 (Mich . ) ; 94 N . W . 601 ; 10 Detroit Leg . News 10
6
; Muz
zarelli v . Hulshizer , 1894 , 163 Pa . St . 643 ; 30 Atl . 291 ; Post v . Weil ,
115 N . Y . 361 ; 22 N . E . 145 ; 12 Am . S
t
. 809 ; 5 L . R . A . 422 - at
end o
f opinion .
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Though they will not be enforced in equity in favor of
an adjoining owner unless it appears from the deed , read
in the light of the circumstances under which it was
made, that the restrictions were inserted for the benefit of
this adjoining owner.31
It will be noticed that in many cases where restrictive
clauses are enforced between successors of the original
parties they are referred to as covenants “ running with
the land , ” but it appears that they will be enforced in
equity , generally ,against those having actual or construct
ive notice of them , without regard to this particular qual
ity , and even where there is no legal remedy concern
ing them as covenants running with the land at law , or
where there is no legal privity of estate or contract be
tween the person who seeks to enforce the restriction in
equity and the person against whom he seeks to enforce it.
Indeed , the remedy by injunction , if sought in time, is
so complete and satisfactory , that actions at law for dam
ages fo
r
the breach of such restrictive covenants seem sel
dom to arise .
$ 229 . The duration of such restrictions - Effect of
laches , waiver , changes in neighborhood . A question in
regard to such restrictions is : How long may they encum
ber the land and restrain it
s
free use ? Though in form
unlimited a
s
to time , will the courts perpetually compel
their observance ?
It appears that such restrictive covenants may lawfully
endure perpetually , that is , they are not void because
they are expressed to be unlimited as to time .
But circumstances may arise which would render their
enforcement inequitable , so , practically , while in form




The right to the benefit o
f
them may be lost b
y
laches
si Hays v . St . Paul Church , 1902 , 19
6
II
I .633 ; 63 N . E . 1040 .
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or may be waived , and if the party entitled to enforce
them neglects to do so with reasonable promptness, when
a violation occurs , his acquiescence in the violation and
his delay in seeking a remedy , will prevent relief in a
court of equity , not only for him but fo
r
his grantees . 32
S
o if the character of a neighborhood has changed
since the covenant was entered into , a court of equity will
often decline to enforce it , because it would be inequi
table to do so and would impose unjust burdens on the
owner o
f
the land , as the reason for the original making
o
f
the restrictive covenant has ceased to exist .
Especially will a court of equity decline to enforce
such a restriction when the party seeking its enforcement
and his predecessors in title have contributed to , o
r
been
responsible for , the change in the character of the neigh
borhood , 33 for in such a case the person entitled to the
benefit of the restrictive covenant may b
y
his conduct
have put himself in such an altered relation to the
person bound by it as to make it manifestly unjust fo
r
him to ask a court to enforce the restriction by injunc
tion . 34 While a lot owner who has thus violated a gen
eral scheme of improvement cannot restrain another
from doing what h
e himself has done , relief will never
theless b
e given him if his own violation of the restric
tions was not substantial and material . 35
Where there has been a complete change in the neigh
borhood , as , for example , from residential to a business
character , so as to defeat the purposes of the covenant as
originally made , equity will not in all cases enforce the
covenant , although the person seeking its enforcement is
not responsible for the changed conditions .
1
2 Trout v . Lucas , 1896 , 54 N . J . Eq . 361 ; 35 Atl . 153 .
8
3 Bedford v . British Museum , 2 Myl . & K . 552 .
8
4 Jenks v . Pawlowski , 1893 , 98 Mich . 110 ; 56 N . W . 1105 ; 39 Am . S
t
.
R . 522 ; Sayers v . Collyer , 28 Ch . D . 103 , 108 .
3
5 Bacon v . Sandberg , 1901 , 179 Mass . 396 , 400 ; 60 N . E . 936 ; McGuire
v . Caskey , 1900 , 62 Ohio St . 419 ; 57 N . E . 53 .
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In such cases, though the defendant is violating the re
striction , yet equity will not enforce it against him if the
burden placed on him by so doing would be clearly dis
proportionate to the benefit conferred on the plaintiff ,
especially where damages will compensate the plaintiff ,
and the injunction , if granted against the defendant ,
could not, in any event , change the character of the
neighborhood . 36
The granting or refusing of relief in such cases rests in
the discretion of the court and must depend on the cir
cumstances of each case .
Even if, for example , there has been a change in the
character of the neighborhood , or in the uses of adjacent





right to restrain in equity the violation o
f
a restrictive
covenantmade under former conditions , when it is still o
f
substantial value and real benefit to him , especially if he
is not responsible for the changed conditions . 37
$ 230 . Provisions in effect restraining competition in
trade . — The grantor ' s design may be to obtain an advan
tage b
y
restricting competition , and stipulations having
this effect have been sometimes upheld a
s not being un
lawful restraints on trade , but as reasonable provisions
for the benefit of the grantor as owner o
f
the land retained
by him . For example , in Star Brewery Co . v . Primas , 37
4
the restrictive clause was : “ The premises hereby con






so long as the grantor owns ” a certain house in the
* * Jackson v . Stevenson , 1892 , 156 Mass . 496 ; 31 N . E . 691 ; 32 Am . St .
R . 476 ; Amerman v . Deane , 1892 , 132 N . Y . 355 ; 30 N . E . 741 ; 28 Am .
S
t . R . 584 .
3
7 Rowland v . Miller , 1893 , 139 N . Y . 93 ; 34 N . E . 765 ; 22 L . R . A .
182 ; Star Brewery Co . v . Primas , 1896 , 163 Ill . 652 ; 45 N . E . 145 ; Lan
dell v . Hamilton , 1896 , 175 Pa . S
t
. 327 ; 34 Atl . 663 ; 177 Pa . S
t
. 23 ; 35
Atl . 242 ; 34 L . R . A . 227 ; Reilly v . Otto , 1896 , 108 Mich . 330 ; 66 N . W .
228 ; 2 Detroit Leg . News 873 .
876 1896 , 163 Ill . 652 ; 45 N . E . 145 .
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neighborhood which was intended to be used for saloon
purposes by the grantor ; and the restriction was intro




tition in the same business in the neighborhood . The
court called this clause a “ negative covenant , ” and at
the suit o
f
the grantor enjoined a subsequent grantee who
had taken the premises with notice o
f
the restriction from
using them for the prohibited purpose . And a similar
provision inserted in a deed for apparently a similar pur
pose , that is , to prevent competition , was enforced against
a subsequent grantee in Sutton v . Head , 38 and in Hodge
v . Sloan , 39 where the grantee agreed not to sell sand from
the purchased lot in competition with the grantor ' s busi
ness , conducted on an adjoining lot , the agreement was
enforced in equity on behalf of the grantor and against
the grantee ' s vendee , though two judges dissented on the
ground that the covenant was of a personal nature
between the original grantor and grantee . 40
On the other hand , what seems to be the correct doc
trine is held b
y
some courts , that it is not enough to
warrant a court of equity in enforcing such an agreement ,
against a subsequent owner o
f
the land , that it indirectly
benefits the land o
f
the original covenantee b
y
preventing
competition in trade . To be so enforced the covenant
must more directly relate to or concern the land . 41
§ 231 . Covenants in conveyances relating to party
walls . — For the purpose of reducing the expense o
f
erect
ing buildings , agreements are frequently inserted in deeds .
conveying lands , o
r
are entered into between adjoining




6 Ky . 156 ; 5 S . W . 410 ; 9 Am . St . R . 274 ; on the ground , it seems ,
in this case that the covenant ran with the land .
3
9
107 N . Y . 244 ; 17 N . E . 335 ; 1 Am . St . R . 816 .
4
0 And see Robbins v . Webb , 68 Ala . 393 .
* Kettle River C
o . v . Eastern & c . Co . , 41 Minn , 461 ; 43 N . W . 469 ;
6 L . R . A . 111 ; Norcross v . James , 140 Mass . 188 ; 2 N . E . 946 ; West
Va . Trans . Co . v . Pipe Line Co . , 22 W . Va . 600 , 635 .
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walls. Such agreements occur , generally , when the land
is in a city or town where it is desirable to make the most
of each lot. The party wall is generally a wall standing
partly on the land of each adjoining owner , being a di
vision wall between their buildings and used by both for
the purposes of an exterior wall . Where there is no stat
ute regulating the matter , the right to use the wall and




use arise usually from con
tract .
The right and obligation may originate in a covenant
contained in a deed from an owner of several adjoining
lots who conveys them to different grantees . For ex .
ample , in Richardson v . Tobey , 42 the owner o
f
several
adjoining lots conveyed one of them by a deed , which
was recorded , containing this provision : “ It is under
stood and agreed that the partition wall of any building
hereafter erected o
n
the granted premises , or the adjacent
lot on either side ,may be placed one -half on the granted
premises and one -half on the adjacent lot , and the owner
o
f
the lot adjacent to such building so erected shall ,
whenever he uses such wall , pay one -half the cost o
f
the same , or so much thereof as he may use . ” The
grantee erected a wall one -half on the land conveyed to
him and one -half on one o
f
the adjoining lots ; this ad
joining lot was then conveyed b
y
the grantor of the first
lot to another b
y
a warranty deed , who conveyed it to
still another , who built on the lo
t , using the wall erected
b
y
the first grantee ; and it was held that this last grantee
was liable for the use o
f
the wall to the first grantee , who
had built it . The court considered that this covenant
could b
e regarded either as a covenant running with the
land , creating mutual rights and obligations on the own
ers for the time being , or as giving the first grantee a
right of property in the wall which had been built under
the grant in the first deed ; and the last grantee of the
1
9
121 Mass . 457 ; 23 Am . R . 283 .
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adjacent lot having used the wall , should pay fo
r
its use
under either view .
But the fact that a stipulation regarding theuse of and
payment for a party wall is contained in a conveyance o
f
land will not make the stipulation binding on subsequent
grantees where it is a personal stipulation between gran
to
r
and grantee . As if one has already built a party wall
between his two adjoining lots and , having conveyed one
lo
t , afterward conveys the other ( on which part of the
wall stands ) by a deed containing a clause providing that
the grantee , b
y
accepting this deed , agrees “ for himself
and his heirs and assigns ” to pay the grantor the value ,
a
t
the time of use , “ o
f
so much of said party wall stand





r they may use ; " the promise
is personal to the grantor , and will not be binding on a
grantee o
f
the grantee . 43
§ 232 . Agreements as to party walls without a convey
ance . - Agreements concerning party walls appear to be




land . Two adjoining owners generally agree , by an
instrument executed with the formalities o
f
a deed , pur
porting to bind themselves , their heirs and assigns , that





them , half on each lot , and that the other shall
pay half the cost of the wall when he makes use o
f
it . 44
Under the recording laws o
f many states these instru
ments may be recorded ( if properly acknowledged , etc . ) ,
and in such cases their record will afford constructive
notice of their provisions to subsequent purchasers o
f
either lot ; and where they are not merely personal cov
enants between the immediate parties they may affect sub
sequent owners o
f
the adjoining lots . The questions
4
3 Lincoln v . Burrage , 177 Mass . 378 ; 59 N . E . 67 .
See forms o
f
such agreements : Burr v . Lamaster , 1890 , 30 Neb .
688 ; 46 N . W . 1015 ; 27 Am . St . R . 428 ; King v . Wight , 1892 , 155 Mass .
444 ; 2
9
N . E . 644 .
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between the immediate parties relate generally simply to
the construction to be put on the contract , the amount to
be paid , etc .
Generally the most difficult questions connected with
such agreements are those that arise as to the rights and
liabilities of the assigns of the parties ; that is , for exam
ple, whether the assignee of the builder of the wall can
recover on such a covenant for contribution , and whether
the assign of the party who covenanted with the builder
is liable on the covenant.
The decisions on these questions are not in harmony ;
and in the same court different conclusions are reached in
cases where the facts vary but little in one case the
covenant being held to be personal, and in the other real.
· If it appears that the intention of the parties in making
the agreement was to charge upon the land rather than
upon the person the burden and expense of the party wall ,
and also to confer on the owner of each of the lots the right
to construct the wall ,on condition that any owner of the ad
joining lands using the wall should pay for what he uses ,
and that the agreement relates notmerely to the present,
but to the future — the agreement may be regarded as a
covenant real, running with the land ; but if the agree
ment is a present one , and the person who is to build on
the one hand and the person who is to pay on the other ,
are clearly designated , and the land is not charged with
the obligation , the covenant is personal and does notaffect
the assigns of the parties .45
In Adams v . Noble46 the agreement is set out at length ,
and the court, recognizing the conflict among the author
ities , divides them into two classes , “ one class holding
that the covenant for payment is personal and does not
45Compare Mott v . Oppenheimer , 1892 , 135 N . Y . 312 ; 31 N . E . 1097 ;
17 L . R . A . 409 ; with Sebald v. Mulholland , 1898 , 155 N . Y . 455 ; 50
N . E . 260 ,where the material parts of the agreements are given , and
the former case “ distinguished ” in the latter.
46 1899, 12
0
Mich . 545 ; 79 N . W . 810 ; 6 Detroit Leg . News 279 .
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run with the land , when it is apparent from the contract
that the payment should be made to the party building
the wall , and there are no words indicating that the right
to receive payment shall pass to his assigns ; the second
class holding that the covenant runs with the land , and
passes to the purchaser or assignee when the contract
evinces such intention , and where the language used is
between the parties and their assigns, and the contract
declares the covenant shall be perpetual . ”
In many cases these agreements have been generally
considered as not of the nature of covenants running with
the land , and that therefore the grantees of the original
parties cannot , because of their ownership of the adjacent
lots, take advantage of the benefits of such covenants or
be subjected to the burdens of paying for the wall, but
that the right of recovery is personal to the builder , and
the obligation of paying is on the original covenantor
only .47
There seems, however , to be no good reason why party
wall agreements should not run with the land if in partic
ular cases they are evidently intended to do so .48
" Gibson v. Holden , 11
5




8 See Kimm v . Griffin , 1896 , 67 Minn . 25 ; 69 N . W . 634 ; Burr v .
Lamaster , 1890 , 30 Neb . 688 ; 46 N . W . 1015 ; 27 Am . S
t
. 428 ; Conduitt
v . Ross , 102 Ind . 16
6 ; 26 N . E . 198 ; King v . Wight , 1892 , 15
5
Mass .
444 ; 29 N . E . 644 .
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§ 233 . Signing not essential at common law . The






f signing , sealing , attestation ,
acknowledgment and delivery ; and in a few states al
l
these are necessary to constitute the execution .
Sealing and delivery were the important elements in the
execution of a deed a
t
common law after the Norman
Conquest , and signing was not required for its validity . !
It is often stated , as if it were a matter as to which no
doubt has existed , that the statute of frauds required
deeds to b
e signed , but the true view seems to be that
the statute did not apply to instruments under seal , and
that it is not because of that statute that deeds are signed
in addition to the other formalities o
f
execution .
Shep . Touch . , p . 56 .
2 See 29 Car . II , c . 3 ( 1677 ) .
3 See , for example , 2 B1 . Comm . 306 .
* Aveline v . Whisson , 4 M . & G . 801 ; 43 Eng . C . L . 414 ; Taunton v .
Pepler , 6 Madd . 16
6
; Challis R . Prop . 327 ; Shep . Touch . 56 , note 24 ;
Parks v . Hazlerigg , 7 Blackf . ( Ind . ) 536 , 585 ; 43 Am . Dec . 106 .
(286 )
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§ 234. Now generally necessary in the United States.
- However this may be , the laws of most of the states
require expressly that all deeds conveying real estate
shall be signed by the party making them , or by his
agent duly constituted .
While there may still be some states in which sealing
and delivery will be considered a sufficient execution
without signing , it could not be generally so held ; and
under most of our statutes it would undoubtedly be held
that an unsigned instrument , though delivered , is a
nullity . For example : A mortgage attested , acknowl
edged , delivered and recorded , but not signed , is not
merely defective but void , where the statute requires all
conveyances to be “ in writing , sealed by the grantor , and
subscribed with his own hand * * * or by his attor
ney , ” and a subsequent grantee of the premises, though
he has assumed and agreed to pay the mortgage , is not
estopped from claiming that the incumbrance has no
existence in fact. And the naming of one as grantor in
a deed will not make it his deed unless it is signed by
him ( and sealed where necessary ) . ?
§ 235 . Place of signature . - While it is customary , and
is the better practice, to sign the deed at its end , it seems
that it is not essential (under statutes which provide
simply for “ signing ' ' ) that the signature should be
placed there if it appears in the body o
f
the instrument ,
especially if the deed was written b
y
the grantor himself
who has inserted his name in it , or even if the deed was
written b
y
another , with the name so inserted at the
5 Sicard v . Davis , 6 Pet . 124 .
Goodman v . Randall , 44 Conn . 321 . And see , Jones v . Gurlie , 61






. 395 . But see , contra , Martin v . Nixon , 92 Mo . 26 ; 4 S . W . 503 .
? Adams v . Medsker , 25 W . Va . 127 ; Thomas v . Caldwell , 50 I11 . 138 .
8 Saunders v . Hackney , 10 Lea ( 78 Tenn . ) 194 ; Smith y . Howell , 11
N . J . E
q
. 349 , 354 .
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grantor 's direction , and acknowledged by him and
delivered as his deed .9
The statutes of many states , however , require the in
strument to be “ subscribed , " 10 and under such a provi
sion the deed should be signed at its end or bottom , for ,
though the question has not often arisen a
s
to deeds , it
has been often held in cases where the question has been
raised a
s
to other instruments that there is a difference
between “ signing " and " subscribing . " 11
§ 236 . Form of signature - Signing b
y
mark . - By
" signing ' is generally understood the writing of one ' s
name b
y
himself , but there may be a valid signing with




The primary meaning o
f
the word sign is mark (sig
num ) , and the statutory requirement as to signing is
made for the purpose o
f securing some visible manifesta
tion o
f the intention of the grantor to be bound .
The best way to signify this intention is that usually
adopted b
y
the grantor in himself writing his name in
full , but he may adopt any “ mark " as his signature , 12
and ( in the absence o
f
a statute , providing otherwise )
whether he can write his name or not . 13
It is customary where a mark is used , to write near the




the grantor , the words “ his
mark , ” but this is not necessary , 14 nor is it necessary
that a signing b
y
mark should be specially attested b
y
Newton v . Emerson , 66 Texas 142 ; 18 S . W . 348 .
1
0 And a few that it shall be signed at its foot : Winston v . Hodges ,
1893 , 102 Ala . 304 ; 15 So . 528 .
1
1 Stone v . Marvel , 45 N . H . 481 ; Davis v . Shields , 26 Wend . 341 ;
James v . Patten , 6 N . Y . 9 . But see Cal . Canneries Co . v . Scatena ,
1897 , 117 Cal . 447 ; 49 Pac . 462 .
1 * Devereux v . McMahon , 1891 , 10
8
N . C . 134 ; 12 8 . E . 902 ; 12 L . R .
A . 205 ; Truman v . Lore , 14 Ohio St . 144 .
1
8 Mackay v . Easton , 19 Wall . 619 , 631 .
1
4 Sellers v . Sellers , 98 N . C . 13 ; 3 S . E . 917 .
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witnesses — unless witnesses to deeds otherwise signed are
required .15
Witnesses are required by the statutes of some states
where the signing is by mark . Under such a statute it
has been held that the signature by mark is not invalid ,
because not witnessed , but that it is not prima facie a
signature unless witnessed , though it may be shown to
be such .16
When not required by statute witnesses may be desira
ble where the signing is by an ordinary cross , which is
not as easily identified as is the usual signature by name
- the signature by mark may then be proved by the wit
ness , and in practice it is usual to have witnesses fo
r
this
reason , especially if the instrument is not acknowledged .
Where , however , an instrument is properly acknowledged ,
the grantor must be regarded as having adopted the sig
nature — whether mark or name — and a
s
the acknowledge
ment is prima facie evidence o
f
execution , 17 witnesses are
o
f
little advantage in most cases . 18
It is to be noted that the matter o
f signing bymark is
regulated by statute in many states , and in some a sig .
nature b
y
mark is allowable only when the signer is un
able to write . 19











f his intention to be bound , has been con
1
5Meazles v . Martin , 1892 , 93 Ky . 50 ; 18 S . W . 1028 ; Finley v . Pres .
cott , 1899 , 104 Wis . 614 ; 80 N . W . 930 ; 4
7
L . R . A . 695 .
1
6 Miller ex parte , 49 Ark . 18 ; 3 $ . W . 883 ; Davis . v . Semmes , 51
Ark . 48 ; 9 S . W . 434 .
1
7 See post , $ 259 .
1
8 Mackay v . Easton , 19 Wall . 619 , 632 ; Meazles v .Martin , 1892 , 93
Ky . 50 ; 18 S . W . 1028 .
1
9 See ReGuilfoyle , 1892 , 96 Cal . 598 ; 31 Pac . 553 ; 22 L . R . A . 370 .
1
9
— BREws . Con .
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sidered a sufficient signing , 20 as has been the signing by
initials alone .21 And where the grantor 's name appears
in one and the same form in both the body of the deed
and in the certificate of acknowledgment , but is signed in
a different form , it has been held in many cases that such
a variance does not invalidate the conveyance ,22 but, on
the other hand , there is authority for the view that a deed
so executed appears to be signed and acknowledged by
different persons, and that the record of such an in
strument is not admissible without further proof of the
identity of the person signing and acknowledging .23
In the preparation of conveyances such variations
should be avoided ; and where , in the examination of
titles , they are found , as well as where the signatures are
irregular or unusual (as by part of the name, etc. ) , they
should , to avoid all question , be corrected by a new con
veyance , if possible , or by obtaining proof that the sub
stituted or irregular signing was intended by the signer
to bind him .
§ 238 . Signing by another for grantor . - It is not gen
erally necessary that the grantor should personally sign
his deed , for if it be signed by another person for him ,
under his direction and in his presence , it is generally re
garded as effective as if actually signed by him .24
In these cases the distinction between deeds so executed
and those executed by an attorney - who must be author
ized by an instrument equal in dignity to the instrument
20 Zann v . Haller , 71 Ind . 136 ; 36 Am . R . 193 ; Knox ' s Estate , 131 Pa .
St. 220 ; 18 Atl. 1021 ; 6 L . R . A . 353 ; an interesting case discussing
signatures .
21Sanborn v . Flagler , 9 Allen 474 ; Salmon & c . Mfg . Co . v . Goddard ,
14 How . 446 .
22Hill v . Banks , 1891, 61 Conn . 25 ; 23 Atl . 712 ; Middleton v . Findla .
25 Cal. 76 ; Houx v . Batteen , 68 Mo . 84 ; Zann v. Haller, 71 Ind . 136 .
28 Boothroyd v. Engles , 23 Mich . 19 .
24Gardner v. Gardner , 5 Cush . 483 ; 52 Am . Dec . 740 ; Middlebrook v .
Barefoot , 121 Ala . 642; 25 So . 102 ; Lewis v . Watson , 1892, 98 Ala . 479 ;
13 So . 570 ; 39 Am . St. R . 82 ; 22 L . R . A . 297.
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to be executed — is recognized . If the disposing capacity
is present, the mere fact that the grantor , fo
r
any reason ,




his own to perform
the physical act of signing , makes the signing none the
less his act . “ To hold otherwise would be to decide that
a person having a clear mind and full capacity , but
through physical inability incapable of making a mark ,
could never make a conveyance or execute a deed , for the
same incapacity to sign and seal the principal deed would
prevent him from executing the letter o
f attorney under
seal . ” 25
And even if the grantor is not present when his signa
ture is affixed b
y
another he may afterward adopt the
signing by acknowledging the deed as his own , although
n
o previous authority had been given the signer . 26
§ 239 . Signing under power of attorney . - A deed
signed by another person than the grantor is , however ,








In such a case the deed , to follow the most generally
approved form , should contain only the name of the prin
cipal till the testimonium clause is reached , being in fact
o
f
the same form as an ordinary deed to be signed by the
principal . The testimonium clause may then be :
“ In witness whereof the said A B has , b
y
his attorney
in fact , C D , hereunto se
t
his hand (and seal , if needed )
this — day — , etc .
(Witnesses AB . [Seal ]
if needed . ) By C D , his attorney in fact . ”
2
5 Gardner v .Gardner , 5 Cush . 483 ; 52 Am . Dec . 740 . While this is
the generally accepted view , the construction placed on particular stat
utes in some cases will probably prevent it from being universally ac
cepted : Wallace v . McCullough , 1 Rich . Eq . ( S . C . ) 426 ; Simpson y .
Commonwealth , 89 Ky . 412 ; 12 S . W . 630 .
2
6 Blaisdell v . Leach , 1894 , 101 Cal . 405 ; 35 Pac . 1019 ; 40 Am . St . R .
6
5 ; Bartlett v . Drake , 100 Mass . 174 ; 97 Am . Dec . 92 ; 1 Am . R . 101 ;
O 'Donnell v . Kelliher , 1895 , 62 Ill . App . 641 ; Nye v . Lowry , 82 Ind .
316 .
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It is the usage in many localities to insert in the deed
a brief recital as to the power of attorney , its place of
record , etc ., which is convenient for purposes of refer
ence .27
The deed should be in the name of the principal and be
executed as his deed by the attorney ,28 and not as the
deed of the attorney .29 And where the deed is executed
as the deed of the attorney parol evidence of an intention
to bind the principal has been held inadmissible .30
To avoid a
ll question as to the form of signing , the
attorney should sign both the principal ' s name and his
own , and not merely the principal ' s , 31 though where the
fact o
f the deeds being executed b
y
the attorney is stated
in the body o
f





pal ' s name alone has been held enough . 32 And it should
b
e
noted also that the strictness o
f
the older general rules ,
a
s
to the form o
f




ney , is modified by statute in several states — the general
purport of such statutes being that it is enough if it ap
pears from the deed as a whole , or from the signature ,
that the conveyance is that o
f
the principal and not that
o
f
the attorney . 33
While there is thus a generally approved form of deed
for one acting under a power o
f attorney , still , even in
the absence o
f
such statutes as those just referred to , it




expression is indispensable if it appears from the face of
2
7 The testimonium clause will , of course , be varied to suit the form
o
f
deed used . See above , p
p
. 23 and 25 .
2
8 Elwell v . Shaw , 16 Mass . 42 .
2
9 Williams v . Paine , 1897 , 169 U . S . 55 , 77 ; Clarke v . Courtney , 5
Pet . 319 ; Bassett v . Hawk , 114 Pa . St . 502 ; 8 Atl . 18 .
8
0 Hackney y . Butts , 41 Ark . 393 . See Salem Bank v . White , 1895 , 159
II
I . 136 , 143 ; 42 N . E . 312 ; Townsend v . Hubbard , 4 Hill 351 .
3
1 Wood v . Goodridge , 6 Cush . 117 .
8
2 Devinney v . Reynolds , 1 Watts & S . 328 .
1
3 See Ohio R . S . , $ $ 4109 , 4110 ; Penn . B . P . D
ig
. , 12th ed . , p . 152 , $ 8 ;
Tenn . Shan . Code , $ 3679 — McCreary v . McCorkle , 1899 , 54 S . W . 53 ;
Va . , $ 2416 ; W . Va . , ch . 71 , $ 3 .
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the instrument who is intended to be bound , and if the
mode of execution be such as to bind him ,34 and a deed ,
for example , purporting at its beginning to be the deed
o
f
“ A and B , o
f





the first part , concluding : “ In witness whereof
said parties o
f
the first part have hereunto set their hands
and seals .
(Signed . ) MN (Seal ) and X Y ( Seal ) ,
Attorneys in part for A and B , ”
has been held to be the deed o
f
A and B . 35





corporation acts through agents , the general principles
applicable to conveyances b
y
a
n attorney apply to convey
ances made on behalf of a corporation .
The corporation is mentioned as grantor , mortgagor or
party o
f
the first part , and the testimonium clause may
be :
In witness whereof , the said The M N Company has
hereunto caused it
s corporate name to be signed and it
s
corporate seal to be affixed , and the same to be attested by
the signatures of OP , its president , and X Y , its secre
tary , thereunto duly authorized , on this - day of — ,
1
8
— , etc .
(Witnesses if needed . )
(Corp . Seal . ) The M N Company ,
b
y
0 P , its President ,
and XY , its Secretary .
O
r , the conveyance is often signed as follows :
“ The M N Company ,
(Corp . Seal . ) b
y
O P , it
s
President .
Attest , X Y , Secretary . 36
McClure v . Herring , 70 Mo . 18 .
8
5 Martin v . Almond , 25 Mo . 313 , and see Nobleboro v . Clark , 68
Maine 87 , where a deed signed by the attorney in his own name alone




the principal , as it appeared from the body
of the deed to be the intention of the parties to bind the principal . See
also Hunter v . Eastham , 1902 (Texas ) , 67 S . W . 1080 .
3
6 The testimonium clause , as in conveyances b
y
individuals , being
adapted to the form o
f
deed used , whether indenture or deed poll .
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The conveyance should purport to be that of the corpo
ration , and not merely that of its officers . 37 The testimo
nium clause should recite the mode o
f
execution and
should give the nameand title o
f
the officer who is author
ized to execute the conveyance on behalf o
f
the corpora
tion . The particular officers who should execute the con
veyance o
f
a corporation are in many states specified by
statute , but in the absence o
f










the corporate seal was
the important element in the execution o
f
a corporate
deed it will still ( it seems ) be a sufficient execution — the
proper officers signing their names — without the signing
o
f
the corporate name , unless the signing o
f
its name is
required by statute . 39 Affixing the seal without signing
the corporate name is not , however , enough when signing
is required b
y
statute as an element in the execution of
conveyances in general ; and signing the name may be of
more importance than affixing the seal . 40
§ 241 . Conveyances by municipal , religious , o
r liter
ary corporations . — Particular modes are often prescribed
b
y special o




f corporations , as , for example , munic
ipal corporations , o
r private incorporated societies not
organized fo
r
profit , but for religious , literary , and kin
dred purposes .
8
7 Norris v . Dains , 1894 , 52 Ohio St . 215 ; 39 N . E . 660 ; Brown v .
Farmers ' Supply Co . , 1893 , 23 Ore . 541 ; 32 Pac . 548 ; if the instrument
is clearly that o
f
the corporation an execution by the proper officers in
their own names may be enough , though not in the best form : Fond du
Lac v . Otto ' s Est . , 1902 , 113 Wis . 39 ; 88 N . W . 917 .
8
8 Ellison v . Branstrator , 1899 , 153 Ind . 146 ; 54 N . E . 433 .
$ 9 Bason v .Mining Co . , 90 N . C . 417 ; West Side Auction Co . v . Conn .
M . L . Ins . Co . , 1900 , 186 Il
l
. 156 ; 57 N . E . 839 .
4
0 Isham v . Iron Co . , 19 Vt . 230 ; Hutchins v . Barre Water Co . , 1901 ,
7
4 Vt . 36 ; 52 Atl . 70 ; Globe Ins . Co . v . Reid , 1897 , 19 Ind . App . 203 ; I
Wilgus Corp . Cases 1142 ; 47 N . E . 947 ; 49 N . E . 291 . (As to the neces
sity o
r desirability of using the corporate seal , in view o
f
statutes dis
pensing with seals in general , see post , $ 249 . )
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The special mode prescribed for conveying property of
a municipal corporation should be followed ,41 and if no
special mode is prescribed , the conveyance should be un .
der the corporate seal and in the corporate name.42
The legal title to the property held by religious or lit
erary societies is often vested in trustees ; conveyances by
such corporations are generally made by the trustees .
When the method of conveyance is prescribed by statute
-- and there are often requirements not found in other
cases — that method is essential.43
Religious societies often have occasion to borrow money
by mortgaging their property ; the members may build
a meetinghouse with borrowed money and use it as a
place of worship , and yet raise technical objections to
the validity of a mortgage securing the loan .4 So the
lawyer 's caution should not be laid aside in dealing with
them .
" Pimental v . San Francisco , 21 Cal. 351.
12 Tiffin v . Shawhan , 43 Ohio St. 178 ; 1 N . E . 581 .
- Lombard v . Chicago Sinai Cong ., 64 Ill . 477 , 487 .
4 Scott v . Trustees First Meth . Ch . , 50 Mich . 528 ; 15 N . W . 891 .
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249 . The corporate seal .
§ 242 . The seal — When necessary a
t
common law .
Since about the thirteenth century a seal has been essen
tial to a deed at common law . From that time to this ,
when a deed has been mentioned a sealed instrument has
been intended , unless some controlling statute has
changed the word ' s meaning .




f land . 1
The conveyance , however , of those interests in land
that could not be transferred b
y
feoffment , that is , incor
poreal interests , required at common law a “ grant , " and
a grant was always a deed , that is , an instrument under
seal .
S




easement must be b
y
deed un
less some statute provides otherwise . Such interests
See ante , $ $ 11 - 15 .
·Wood y . Leadbitter , 13 Mees . & W . 838 ; Huff v . McCauley , 53 Pa .
S
t . 206 ; 91 Am . Dec . 203 ; Fuhr v . Dean , 26 Mo . 116 ; 69 Am . Dec . 484 ;










to “ lie in grant ” and “ not in
livery . ”
§ 243 . Tendency to dispense with the seal — Effect o
f
statutes . - In the United States a
t
the present time the
state o
f
the law as to whether conveyances must be under
seal , and as to sealed instruments in general , is somewhat
peculiar . On the one hand , the code of California : pro
vides that all distinctions between sealed and unsealed
instruments are abolished , while b
y
statutes in New
Hampshire and Vermont a " deed ” o
f
conveyance is ex
pressly required to b
e signed and sealed ; and in some of
the older states there must be an actual seal , a " scroll , ”
such a
s
is permissible and usual in many states , not be
ing sufficient . 5
The matter is a little complicated on our statute books ,
from the fact that various acts have been passed at differ
ent times in many states relating to the subject , the later
act very often not referring to the earlier , and frequently
being found under a different division or part of the gen
eral laws from that containing the previous statute ;
thus , under the title “ Conveyances " there may be one
provision a
s
to seals , under the title “ Actions ” another ,
under the title “ Evidence " another , and it is not
always easy to reconcile them . There will often be found
a provision that conveyances o
f
land may be b
y





deed , signed and sealed , ” and , in the same com
pilation , a provision dispensing with private seals .
Statutes doing away with seals do not always abolish




t first sight they seem to . For example , the statute
o
f
Texas , which is similar to those o
f many states , pro
vides that “ no private seal or scroll shall be neces
• California Civ . Code , ; 1629 .
* N . H . Pub . Stat . 1901 , ch . 437 , 8 3 ; V
t
. Stat . 1894 , $ 2213 .
5 See § 246 .
6 Sayles , Ann . Civ . Stat . , Art . 4862 .
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sary to the validity of any contract , bond or conveyance
* * * except such as are made by corporations, nor
shall the addition or omission of a seal or scroll in any
way affect the force and effect of the same.” In the
case of Sanger v . Warren ,” the effect of this statute
upon the older rules of law is considered . In this case
an attempt was made to hold an undisclosed principal to
an obligation assumed by his alleged agent , who had
taken a conveyance in his own name, in which convey
ance certain obligations were expressly assumed by the
grantee . The rule that an undisclosed principal , when
discovered , may be held in many cases is recognized , as
are also several important exceptions to that rule, among
other exceptions that regarding sealed instruments ( in
which case the undisclosed principal could not be held
fo
r
the obligations of his agent assumed in the sealed in
strument ) , and the court considers that this principle of
law is not changed b
y
the above statute , the effect o
f
which is simply to dispense with seals for the validity o
f
a
conveyance , leaving the instrument still possessing the




Under the statute o
f Michigan , 8 providing that “ no
bond , deed of conveyance * * * shall be deemed in
valid fo
r
want of a seal or scroll , ” while a deed of con
veyancemay perhaps not require a seal , still the distinc
tion between specialties and simple contracts is not done
away with , and a “ deed ” o
r
“ bond , ” though unsealed ,
possesses qualities such as a sealed instrument possessed
a
t
common law - fo
r
example , an action of covenant
may be brought on such an instrument if it is actually a
“ bond ” o
r




f limitations . And it is considered that the
? 1898 , 91 Texas 472 , 483 ; 44 S . W . 477 ; 66 Am . St . 913 .
8 C . L . 1897 , § 10417 .
º Rondot v . Rogers T
p
. , 1900 , 99 Fed . 202 ; Jerome v . Ortman , 66 Mich .
668 ; 33 N . W . 759 .
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question of a seal or no seal may become of importance
in determining whether or not a particular instrument is
a conveyance - as the absence of a seal, in spite of this
statute , may be significant when the purpose of the in
strument is not clear.10
In Jones v . Morris,11 the court says : “ Though a seal
may not now be necessary to a conveyance of a legal es
tate in lands, yet the instrument , the deed of conveyance ,





a deed sealed a
t
common law . * * *
The estoppel which a
t







a sealed instrument , attaches now
to an unsealed conveyance o
f
the legal estate in lands . "
While the tendency of modern law is to do away with
the old distinctions , statutes dispensing with the necessity
o
f sealing conveyances do not necessarily abrogate com
mon law rules as to the effect o
f
deeds as distinguished
from unsealed instruments .
§ 244 . Importance of the seal a
t
common law . - Much








s origin and early history . It is regarded as settled
that the " charters ' ' of the Anglo -Saxons before the Nor
man Conquest were generally signed , but not sealed .
The illiterate signed by making a mark , usually the mark
o
f
the cross . Some of the Anglo -Saxons had seals , and
used them before the Conquest , but they were not then
regarded a
s indispensable , and it was not till about a
century after the Conquest that seals came to be regarded
a
s necessary to a deed . 12 For the same reason that the
Saxons signed with a cross , the Normans used a seal
that is , because they were generally too ignorant to write
— and as the judges and lawyers after the Conquest were
Normans , the seal was introduced into England b
y
1
0 Spicer v . Bonker , 45 Mich . 630 , 635 ; 8 N . W . 518 .
1
161 Ala . 518 , 522 .
1
2 Palgrave Eng . Comm . , p . CCXVI .
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them .13 Before the thirteenth century the necessity of
sealing for a deed became fully established . 14
The importance attached to sealing soon after the Con
quest is illustrated by a case decided by Henry II, in the
twelfth century , the dispute being between a bishop and
an abbot over land ; Henry decided the dispute with
what was then said to be the wisdom of Solomon , and
held that the unsealed " land books” of the Anglo -Saxon
kings were as good as sealed , since they were confirmed




s English law is concerned , therefore , the seal
seems to have had it
s origin chiefly , though probably not
wholly , in ignorance ; and in view o
f
this origin it is in
teresting to note such judicial observations as occur in
many cases — fo
r
example , in Jackson v . Wood , 16 the mat
ter is referred to thus : “ This venerable custom o
f sealing
is a relic o
f
ancient wisdom . ”
However , most naturally the seal itself , being the chief
distinguishing feature about a writing ( especially to the
unlearned , who were many ) , became an object o
f impor
tance , and the act o
f sealing came to be regarded as a
solemn and important act . The general consequence has
been that the presence or absence of a seal has had for




contract , the application of some of the rules of law
producing most unjust results . 17
1
3 Digby Hist . Law of Real Prop . , p . 57 , note .
1
4 Pollock The Land Laws , p . 73 .
1
5 See Poll . & Mait . Hist . o
f Eng . Law , Vol . I , 136 .
1
6 1
2 Johns . 73 , 76 .
1
7 The seal is undoubtedly o
f great antiquity . It is mentioned in an
cient writings , among others frequently in the oldest books of the Bible .
Its age ,however , has not exempted it from abuse and ridicule . See , for
example , an epitaphic annotation to the Mississippi Annotated Code ,
ch . 120 , p . 899 : “ Beneath this lies all that remains o
f
Locus Sigilli , a
character o
f
ancient date , etc . ” And note the contemptuous attack of
Judge Lumpkin on this venerable character in Lowe v . Morris , 13 Ga .
147 , 15
0 , and the interesting defense of it in the same case , p . 159 , b
y
Judge Nisbet . The discussion between these judges , though relating
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$ 245 . Some effects of the seal- Legal and equitable
doctrines . - In view of the fact that seals, or substitutes for
them , are still required for some purposes in many states ,
and were until recently required in many others, certain
peculiar doctrines associated with the seal should be noted .
The view taken often by courts of equity as to this formal
matter of sealing , as distinguished from that taken by
courts of law , should also be noted .
Some instances of these doctrines are:
1 . An instrument imperfectly executed for want of a




f real estate , 18 and yet may be
regarded in equity a
s
a
n agreement to convey , and as
creating an equitable lien upon or interest in real estate . 19
And where the seal is omitted b
y
mistake from any
instrument a court o
f
chancery will correct the instru
ment b
y affixing a seal , or accomplish the same end by








2 . In contracts under seal a consideration was not
essential a
t
law to give validity to the promise . 21 One
object o
f
the rule requiring a consideration in the case o
f
a simple contract being to insure an intention on the
part o
f the promisor that his promise should be binding ,
the same security was not required for contracts under
seal , because a deliberate intention to make a binding
promise is presumed to be sufficiently insured b
y
the




chiefly to the seal o
f
a court , has furnished valuable ammunition to the
friends and foes o
f
the seal who have since been in conflict .
1
8 Irwin y . Powell , 1900 , 188 Ill . 107 , 109 ; 58 N . E . 941 .
1
9 Frost v . Wolf , 1890 , 77 Texas 455 ; 14 S . W . 440 ; 19 Am . St . R . 761 ;
Hyne v . Osborn , 62 Mich . 235 , 244 ; 28 N . W . 821 ; Todd v . Eighmie ,
1896 , 4 App . Div . ( N . Y . ) 9 , 13 ; Beardsley v . Knight , 10 Vt . 185 ; 33
Am . Dec . 193 .
2
0 Bernard Township v . Stebbins , 109 U . S . 341 , 349 .
2
1
See supra , $ 54 .
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· That is , the common law required a consideration in
order to render an agreement binding , but declared that
a seal was evidence of consideration , and would not allow
the seal' s effect to be altered by evidence of no considera
tion .22
Equity also required a consideration , but allowed the
absence of it to be shown notwithstanding the seal. So
equity will not grant specific performance of a sealed
instrument unless there be an actual consideration .23
3 . The act of sealing being such a solemn act , it was
not competent fo
r
one to give authority to another to exe




equal solemnity . Hence the authority to execute a sealed
instrument must be under seal . 24
4 . So a sealed instrument could not at common law be
set aside except b
y
a
n instrument under seal . It was
considered impossible to cancel such a solemn act by




e under seal . 25
Therefore , if a debtor on a sealed instrument had paid
the debt , but had not obtained a release or a surrender of
the sealed instrument , he was still liable at law for the
debt . But equity here , as in other cases , not recognizing
the force o
f
the seal , would enjoin a second action . 26
5 . So a special form of action was set apart for sealed
instruments , that o
f
covenant . An action on a sealed
contract when the damages were unliquidated had to be
declared on in covenant ; if it were merely a promise to
2
2 Cosgrove v . Cummings , 1900 , 19
5
P
a . St . 497 ; 46 Atl . 69 .
1
3 Burling v . King , 66 Barb . 633 ; Tatham v . Vernon , 29 Beav . 604 ,
615 .
2
4 Hibblewhite v . M 'Morine , 6 M . & W . 200 , 215 ; Blood v . Goodrich ,
9 Wend . 68 ; 24 Am . D . 121 .
2
5 C
o . Litt . 222 B . See Pratt v . Morrow , 45 Mo . 404 , 407 .
2
6 This equitable doctrine has become generally the rule a
t
law . See
Blagborne v . Hunger , 1894 , 101 Mich . 375 ; 59 N . W . 657 .
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pay a definite sum of money , there might be an election
between covenant and debt.27
6 . Contracts under seal had a superiority over simple
contracts in respect to the period of limitation for actions.
A statute of James 1 , 28 limiting the time within which
actions could be brought , imposed no limitations on
actions of covenant or debt on sealed instruments .
Generally the American statutes have allowed a longer
period within which to bring an action on a contract
under seal than on one not under seal .
§ 246 . What is a sufficient seal. — The seal having had
these and other important effects , the question has often
arisen as to what a seal is at common law .
It was formerly generally an impression on wax ,but as
the impression and not the substance on which it was
made was its characteristic , it was later considered that it
might be on a wafer or other tenacious materialnot neces
sarily of wax . And it appears now that annexing a
piece o
f paper by any adhesive substance is enough to
make it a private common law seal , though no impression
is made , 29 and an impression on the paper itself would
now generally be regarded as a sufficient seal . 30
But there should generally , where the common law seal
is needed , be some wafer annexed , or impression made ,
for it has been held lately that the letters “ L . S . ” do not
make a common law seal , though equity will recognize
them a
s
a seal if the intention is clear to make them
2
7
1 Chitty Pldg . 115 .
2
8
1623 , 21 Jac . I , c . 16 .
1
9 McLaughlin v . Randall , 66 Me . 226 .
3
0 Pierce v . Indseth , 10
6
U . S . 546 ; Town of Solon v . Bank , 114 N . Y .
122 ; 21 N . E . 168 . In Pease v . Lawson , 33 Mo . 35 , 39 , it was held that
a good common law seal need make no impression that was visible , but
that a small round piece of paper a
t
the end of the signature was a com
mon law seal , because when it was caused to adhere to the paper , it
must from physical necessity have made an impression sufficient to
comply with the law , though no impression was visible .
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such .31 And in Manning v . Perkins,32 which was an ac
tion for covenant broken , based upon an instrument in
writing , it was held that the word “ Seal” with a brace at
each end , printed when the blank was printed , and fol.
lowing defendant 's signature , was not a seal.
On the other hand , as showing remarkable liberality
on the question as to what is a seal , see Hacker 's Appeal.33
It appears that by usage , and without statute , in Penn
sylvania a scroll is authorized . The question involved
in this case was whether the donee of a power had ex
ecuted the power properly , that is, under seal. The do
nee had made a testamentary instrument , and at the end
of her signature placed a dash , between one-sixteenth and
one -eighth of an inch long, and the dash was exactly like
punctuation marks a
ll through the instrument . There
were no periods , commas or other marks of punctuation ,
except this small dash , like that following her name a
t
the end . It was contended that there was no proper ex
ercise o
f
the power because the instrument was not under
seal , but the court held that this dash was a seal , and in
reply to the argument that the dash was simply like every
other punctuation mark in the instrument , the court said :
“ If the donee used this sign indiscriminately for a com
ma , colon , or a period , why could she not have used it
for a seal ? ”
In many states a seal of some kind is essential to the
execution o
f
a conveyance ; and while in many of these






the courts that a scroll or , as it is
sometimes called , a “ scrawl , ” or other device , may be
used . 34
8
1 Barnard v .Gantz , 1893 , 140 N . Y . 249 , 258 ; 35 N . E . 430
5
2






. 192 ; 15 Atl . 500 .
3
4 Among such states are : Florida , Georgia , Illinois , Maryland ,
Minnesota , North Carolina , Oregon , Pennsylvania , Virginia , Wiscon
sin .
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In other states no seal or other device (where the
grantor is a private individual ) seems necessary , though
one is often used ,35 while in others a common law seal
seems still necessary .36
§ 247 . Recital in instrument as to seal — Necessity for,
and effect of, recital. - It was generally the practice at
common law to recite at the conclusion of a deed that
it was under seal: “ In witness whereof the said party
has hereunto set his seal . ” This practice is still pre
served where under modern law , either statutory or by
judicial decision , a symbolic seal, a “ scroll ,” or “ scrawl,”
is used , and the question arises as to whether such a reci
tal is necessary to make a sealed instrument .
Some text writers lay down the proposition generally
that an instrument is not sealed unless so recited to be,37
and this appears to be the law in somestates, unless at least
an actual seal is used . For example , in Breitling v .Marx ,38
theaction was on a writing, in the form of a promissory note ,
but with L . S . in brackets after the maker 's name. It was
objected that it could not be declared on as a promissory note
because it was under seal. The court, agreeing with the
proposition that a written promise under seal to pay
money is not a promissory note , and cannot be declared
on as such , holds that a writing is not under seal unless
the purpose to seal it is expressed or indicated in it
s body ,
and the mere suffixing a scroll containing theword “ seal ”
o
r
letters “ l . s . ” to the name of the subscriber does not
make it a sealed writing . Hence in this case the instru
3
5 Among such states are : Arkansas , California , Colorado , Indiana ,
Iowa , Kansas , Kentucky , Michigan , Missouri , Montana , Nebraska ,
North Dakota , Ohio , South Dakota , Tennessee , Texas , Utah , Washing
ton .
* Maine , Massachusetts , New Hampshire , Vermont .
3
7 Daniels Neg . Inst . , $ 32 ; Tiedeman Com . Paper , $ 32 .
# 1899 , 123 Ala . , 222 ; 26 So 203 .
2
0 BREWS . Con .
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ment was properly declared on as a note. And this ap
pears to be the la
w
in Virginia and Georgia . 39
Such a recital was not necessary a
t
common law .
" And note the order of making a deed is first , to write it ,
then to seal it , and after to deliver it , and therefore it is
not necessary that the sealing or delivery be mentioned
in the writing , for as much as they are to be done
after . ” 40
And so now the recital appears , b
y
the weight of
authority , to be unnecessary , to make an instrument
which is sealed , a sealed instrument . As where the re
cital was “ in witness whereof we set our hands , ” but
seals , consisting of wafers , were attached , it was held that
these were the seals both o
f
the individual and corpora
tion , and that the corporation could adopt any seal ; 41 and
so , where without a recital , the word “ seal ” in brack
ets was on a note , the court held it was not a note ,
negotiable , etc . , and observed that it is difficult to see
how one could express that the device was a seal more
clearly than b
y






On the other hand , the recital in an instrument that it
3
9 Humphries v . Nix , 77 Ga . 98 . In Alt v . Stoker , 1895 , 127 Mo . 466 ;
3
0
S . W . 132 , the cases are collected . The former statute in Missouri ,
having made a scrawl sufficient for a seal , required also a recital on the
face of the instrument that it was sealed . But the court says that where
there is a real seal the requirement as to recital does not obtain . In





0Goddard ' s Case , 2 Coke 5 .
“ Foundry C
o . v . Hovey , 21 Pick . 417 .
4
2 Brown v . Jordhal , 32 Minn . 13
5 ; 19 N . W . 650 . See also Osborne
v . Kissler , 35 Ohio S
t
. 99 ; Eames v . Preston , 20 Il
l
. 389 . A distinction
is recognized by some authorities between instruments , like convey .
ances , that are acknowledged and recorded - which , if having a seal ,
should be regarded as sealed , though there is no recital o
f sealing in
the instrument - and other instruments , like promises to pay money ,
which should not be regarded as sealed unless the seal is recognized
by a recital in the instrument . Cosner v . McCrum , 40 W . Va . 339 , 345 ;
2
1
S . E . 739 .
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is sealed will not generally be enough to make it a sealed
instrument , when it is actually not sealed , or provided
with a substitute fo
r
the seal , where such a substitute is
allowable . 43




several persons — Time
and method o
f affixing the seal . - Often one seal is
adopted by several different persons executing the instru
ment , and this is a sufficient seal as to each , though the
seal may be opposite the signature o
f
but one of them .
When the instrument purports b
y
a recital to b
e
sealed ,
the law presumes , prima facie , that each adopts the seal
a
s his , though he may show that he did not do so : 44 The
seal is not usually affixed a
t
the time o
f signing , nor need
it be , fo
r
the person executing the instrument may adopt
the seal already placed on it . 45
§ 249 . The corporate seal . - Statutes dispensing with
private seals quite generally except the seals o
f corpora
tions , and , though the corporate seal is not universally
required to a conveyance b
y
a corporation , it is used even
where legislation on the general subject has been most
radical , 46 and it is , according to many authorities , essen
tial to a corporate conveyance . 47 In conveyances by cor
porations there is often a recital o
f




the conveyance , but the seal itself
4
3 Patterson v . Galliber , 1898 , 122 N . C . 511 ; 29 S . E . 773 ; Vance v .
Funk , 3 Ill . 263 ; Taylor v . Glaser , 2 S . & R . 502 .
4
4 Davis v . Burton , 3 Scam . ( Ill . ) 41 ; 36 Am . Dec . 511 ; Lunsford v .
La Motte Co . , 54 Mo . 426 ; Northumberland v . Cobleigh , 59 N . H . 250 ;
Pickens v . Rymer , 90 N . C . 283 ; 47 Am . R . 521 .
4
5 Shep . Touch . 54 , 57 .
4
6 Fudickar v . East Riverside & c . , 1895 , 109 Cal . 29 ; 41 Pac . 1024 ;
Blood v . Land Co . , 1896 , 113 Cal . 221 ; 41 Pac . 1017 ; 45 Pac . 252 .
4
7Garrett v . Belmont Co . , 1895 , 94 Tenn . 459 , 475 ; 29 S . W . 726 ; 1
Wilgus ' C . C . 1138 ; Danville v . Mott , 1891 , 13
6 Il . 289 ; 28 N . E . 54 ;
Shropshire v . Behrens , 1890 , 77 Texas 275 ; 13 S . W . 1043 . See , how .
ever , as to the importance o
f signing , ante , $ 240 .
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has been held as prima facie evidence that it was affixed
by the authority of the corporation .48




-laws , and when the proper officers affix the seal and
sign the conveyance , the corporation is estopped as to pur
chasers without actual notice to deny the power of it
s of
ficers . 49 On the other hand , if there is no corporate seal
affixed it will be necessary in some jurisdictions for the




the corporation . 50 A corporation may adopt
and use any seal which an individual might use . 51
As a corporation cannot have a characteristic hand
writing , and as a public officer ( as such ) also has no dis
tinctive and characteristic “ hand , ” there is more reason
fo
r
the continued use o
f corporate and official seals than
for the use o
f the private seal .
4
8Gray v . Waldron , 1894 , 101 Mich . 612 ; 60 N . W . 288 ; Sheehan v .
Davis , 17 Ohio S
t
. 571 ; Jinright v . Nelson , 1894 , 105 Ala . 399 ; 17 So . 91 ;
Little Sawmill Co . v . Federal R . Co . , 1899 , 194 Pa . St . 144 ; 45 Atl . 66 ;
7
5 Am . S
t
. R . 690 ; 1 Wilgus ' C . C . 1147 ; Marvin v . Anderson , 1901 , 111
Wis . 387 ; 87 N . W . 226 .
4
9 Ins . Co . v . White , 106 Ill . 67 ; Kansas v . R . R . Co . , 77 Mo . 180 .
5
0 Barney v . Pforr , 1897 , 117 Cal . 56 ; 48 Pac . 987 ; Duke v . Markham ,
1890 , 105 N . C . 131 ; 10 S . E . 1017 ; 18 Am . St . R . 889 .
6
1
G . V . B . Min . Co . v . Bank , 1899 , 95 Fed . R . 23 , 33 ; Thayer v . Ne
halem Mill Co . , 1897 , 31 Ore . 437 ; 51 Pac . 202 . But see Caldwell v .
Mfg . Co . , 1897 , 121 N . C . 339 ; 28 8 . E . 475 .
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§ 250 . Witnesses to conveyances at common law . — No
attestation of a deed was necessary at common law . 1
There early arose a practice , however , of appending to
the deed the names of many persons as witnesses , not
always in early times the names of those only who were
present, though undoubtedly later the names of witnesses
were mainly the names of those present who heard the
deed read . They appear to have been often numerous ,
and were written , not by the witnesses themselves , but
by the person who prepared the deed . About the time of
Henry VIII it became the practice for the witnesses to
sign their own names either at the bottom of the deed or
indorsed on it.8
Yet this later form of attestation was not a part of the
Co . Litt. 7a ; Garrett v . Lister , 1 Lev . 25.
? " * * * people wrote down the names of absent friends and
got their consent afterwards . * * * A witness to a deed , according
to the popular conception , was not necessarily one who had seen it
executed , but one who was willing to give it credit by his name. This
may account for it
s turning out so often , when witnesses were ques
tioned , that they knew nothing about the matter . ” Thayer Treatise
o
n Evidence , p
p
. 97 , 98 ; and the witnesses formed part o
f
the jury to
try the validity o
f
the deed : Ib . ; Fox v . Reil , 3 Johns . 477 .




. 456 , 457 .
( 309 )
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deed , necessary to its validity , but was merely a means of
preserving the evidence of its due execution .
Where there were witnesses it was necessary , in order to
prove the execution o
f
the deed , to first call some o
f
them ,
if possible , and other evidence could not be given of its
execution until they were produced , o
r
until it appeared
that they could not be produced , or , if produced , that
they denied its execution o
r
were incompetent to testify . *
It is still the general rule ( in the absence o
f
a statute to
the contrary ) that at least one o
f
the attesting witnesses
to a written instrument must be called when the execu
tion o
f
the instrument is in dispute .
This common law rule has been changed , however , in
some states , as in England , and statutes make it applica




attested , and unless the instrument is one of
this character , it may be proved as if unattested , though
it is actually attested . 5
Moreover , it has been held , though it seems not in
accord with the weight of authority , that , as one of the
reasons fo
r
the rule requiring the attesting witness to be
called was that at the time it arose the parties to an
action were incompetent to testify (which is no longer
so ) , the necessity for the rule no longer exists , and
therefore , the execution o
f
a deed may be proved by the
grantor o
r
the officer before whom it was acknowledged ,
a
s well as b
y
the attesting witness . 6
* Dundy v . Chambers , 23 Ill . 369 ; Brigham v . Palmer , 3 Allen 450 .
6 For example : Mich . C . L . 1897 , $ !0199 provides : “ That whenever ,
upon the trial of any action * * * a written instrument is offered in
evidence , to which there is a subscribing witness , it shall not be neces
sary to call such subscribing witness , but such instrument may be
proved in the same manner as it might be proved if there were no sub







more subscribing witnesses are required
by law . ” And see N . Y . Rev . Stat . 1901 , p . 1283 , § 107 ; R . I . Gen . L .
1896 , ch . 244 , § 43 ; No . Dak . Rev . Co . 1899 , § 3888a ; McManus v .
Commow , 1901 , 10 N . D . 340 ; 8
7
N . W . 8 .
6 Garrett v . Hanshue , 1895 , 53 Ohio St . 482 ; 42 N . E . 25
6 ; 35 L . R . A .
§ 251 311ATTESTATION .
Attesting witnesses can result in little inconvenience ,
even when not necessary , especially where the common
law rule as to the necessity for calling them is not in
force , and they may under some circumstances be of
value where proof of execution becomes necessary ; deeds
are , therefore, often witnessed in those states where they
need not be.
§ 251. Witnesses under statutes in the United States.
Not being necessary at common law , attesting or sub
scribing witnesses are required to a conveyance in the
United States only when some statute so provides .
In about one-half the states they are not required for
any purpose to deeds , but in most of such states they may
make proof before some officer , who certifies to this proof
in a certificate on the deed similar to the certificate of ac
knowledgment and for the same purposes .?
In about an equal number of states statutes require
them for some purposes and under some circumstances ,
and in these states in which they are required they are
not always required fo
r
the same purposes .





a legal conveyance that there be
subscribing witnesses , two witnesses being essential in
Ohios and in Connecticut .
But , generally speaking , in those states where statutes
provide that conveyances shall be attested b
y
witnesses
the requirement is not essential to the validity of the deed
a
s
between the parties , but , like the requirement as to
acknowledgment , 10 is a formality necessary under the
statute to entitle the deed to be recorded , the title to the
321 , with note a
s
to necessity o
f calling subscribing witnesses . See
Bowling v . Hax , 55 Mo . 446 .
See post , $ 295 .
8 Langmede v . Weaver , 1901 , 65 Ohio St . 17 ; 60 N . E . 992 ; Richard
son v . Bates , 8 Ohio S
t
. 257 , 261 .
9Winsted Bank v . Spencer , 26 Conn . 195 .
1
0
See post , $ 261 , n . 19 .
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land passing from the grantor to the grantee on the sign
ing of the deed (and sealing it when necessary ) and it
s
delivery .
For example , although the statute of Michigan ' pro
vides that “ deeds executed within this state * * * shall
b
e
executed in the presence o
f
two witnesses , who shall
subscribe their names to the same as such * * * , " a deed
with but one witness , or with no witness , is valid as
a conveyance o
f
the legal title , though it may not be re
corded , 12 and a statute in the same terms is construed in
the same way in Wisconsin , 13 and similar statutes in the
same way in several other states . 14
§ 252 . The method o
f attesting . - It will be noticed
that statutes providing for witnesses to deeds generally






witnesses , ” etc .
In order that it may appear on the instrument that
they sign in this capacity , their signatures usually follow





ment and to the left of the grantor ' s signature . This
clause varies in form , the more usual forms being :
“ Signed , sealed and delivered in the presence o
f , "
“ Sealed and delivered in the presence o
f , ” “ In the
presence o
f , ” or , in some states , simply one word , as
“ Attest , ” or “ Witness " is used . 15
While it is the better practice to have the witness sign
directly under a clause in the form usual in the state
11C . L . 1897 , § 8962 .
1
2 Carpenter v . Carpenter , 1901 , 12
6
Mich . 217 ; 85 N . W . 576 ; 17
Detroit Leg . News 778 ; Fulton v . Priddy , 1900 , 12
3
Mich . 298 ; 82 N .
W . 65 ; 6 Detroit Leg . News 1053 .
1
8 Harrass v . Edwards , 1896 , 94 Wig . 459 ; 69 N . W . 69 .
1
4Howard v . Russell , 1898 , 104 Ga . 230 ; 30 S . E . 802 ; Kingsley v .
Holbrook , 45 N . H . 313 ; 86 Am . Dec . 173 ; Conlan v . Grace , 36 Minn .
276 ; 30 N . W . 880 ; Pearson v . Davis , 1894 , 41 Neb . 608 ; 59 N . W . 885
(and see Strough v . .Wilder , 1890 , 119 N . Y . 530 , 535 ; 23 N . E . 1057 ) .
1
5 Though the word “ delivered ” often is used as above , in most





,1 896 , 94 W
ir
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where the land lies , no particular place or form seems in
dispensable, provided it appears that the person signing
signed as a witness. 16
Where there are several grantors in the same deed their
several executions may , of course , be attested by the same
witnesses , but where the deed is executed by different
grantors at different times and places , and before differ
ent witnesses ( as is often the case in practice ), there
should be a statement near the name of the witness indi
cating which particular grantor 's execution he attests .17
And in such cases the attestation as to each grantor should
be complete , for a defective attestation as to one of sev
eral grantors is not made good by a proper attestation as
to the other grantors in the same deed .18
It is not necessary that the witness should see the




called in to subscribe his name after the grantor has
signed his ; in such cases the grantor should acknowl .
edge his signature to the witness , who should sign in the
grantor ' s presence and at his request , 19 and the witness
should either see the grantor sign o
r




f his signature .
$ 253 . Disqualification of witness b
y
interest . — One
having a direct interest in the conveyance as grantee or
mortgagee should not be an attesting witness to it , 20 nor
1
6 Culbertson v . Witbeck Co . , 127 U . S . 32
6 ; Link v . Connell , 1896 ,
4
8 Neb . 574 ; 67 N . W . 475 ; Arrington v . Arrington , 1898 , 122 Ala .
510 ; 26 So . 152 . ( Though as to “ subscribing , " which is the term some
times used in the statute concerning witnesses , see supra , § 235 . )
1
7 See Culbertson v . Witbeck Co . , 127 U . S . 326 .
1
8 Harrass v . Edwards , 1896 , 94 Wis . 459 ; 69 N . W . 69 ; Hall v . Red
son , 10 Mich . 21 .
1
9 Jackson v . Phillips , 9 Cow . 94 , 113 ; Tate v . Lawrence , 11 Heisk .
503 .
2
0 Amick v . Woodworth , 1898 , 58 Ohio S
t . 86 ; 50 N . E . 437 ; Donovan
v . St . Anthony & c . Co . , 1899 , 8 N . Dak .585 ; 80 N . W . 772 ; 7
3
Am . St . .
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should one of several grantors witness the execution of
the conveyance by another grantor ; and it has been held
that the wife of the grantor is not competent to witness
her husband ' s deed .21
R . 779 ; Coleman v. State , 79 Ala . 49 . See Child v . Baker , 24 Neb . 188 ,
201 ; 38 N . W . 725 .
21 Corbett v . Norcross, 35 N . H . 99 ; Bank v. O 'Brien , 1894 , 94 Tenn .
38 ; 28 S. W . 293 .
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statute - Form of ac- 272 . Identity of party – “ Per
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knowledgment . 27
4
. Authority to take wholly
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to evidence . land is .
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o
f conveyance . commissioner of deeds .
262 . Necessary to convey legal 277 . When taken in another
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f conveyance of 278 . Taken in another state
homestead . Showing a
s to official
264 . When necessary in convey character , etc .
ance by married woman . 279 . Taken in another state
265 . The form o
f
the certificate Certificate o
f conformity
o
f acknowledgment . to foreign law .
266 . Certificate should show 280 . Acknowledgments taken
facts necessary . out o
f
the United States .
267 . Substantial compliance 281 . Competency of officer af
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pliance . 282 . Practical effect o
f
rule that
269 . Substantial compliance - party cannot take ac
Fact o
f acknowledge knowledgment .
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$ 283. Rule disqualifying party
generally applies to ac
knowledgments of all in
struments .
284 . Effect of relationship on
officer 's competency .
285 . Undisclosed interest as af.
fecting competency of of
ficer to take .
286 . Undisclosed interest as af
fecting competency .
287. Officer of corporation not
generally disqualified un
less also a shareholder .
288 . Agent or attorney of party
to a conveyance may
generally take acknowl
edgment.
$ 289 . The parts of the certificate
- Venue .
290 . Date .
291. Signing by officer - His of
ficial , not his personal
signature .
292 . Sealing .
293 . Impeachment of the certifi
cate - When it is conclu
sive .
294. Form of certificate to con
veyance of corporation
or by attorney .
295 . Proof instead of acknowl.
edgment .
§ 254 . Terms used . - Acknowledgment is the declara
tion , before a competent officer or court , by one who has
executed an instrument that it is his act or deed .
The act of acknowledging the execution of an instru
ment is properly called “ the acknowledgment ."
The statement by the officer in the form of a certificate
that the instrument was acknowledged before him is prop
erly called “ the certificate of acknowledgment .” 1
The person acknowledging is said to make the acknowl
edgment . The officer before whom this acknowledgment
is made takes the acknowledgment .?
§ 255 . What writings may be acknowledged . — The in
struments most commonly acknowledged , and regarding
the acknowledgment of which there are statutory pro
* But , " as the law knows no acknowledgment without a certificate ,"
the term “ acknowledgment ” is often used as designating the certificate
of the officer , as well as the act of the person acknowledging . Rogers
y . Pell , 1898 , 154 N . Y . 518 , 529 ; 49 N . E . 75 .
Statutes on the subject often mention " prove " as practically equiv
alent to " acknowledge ; e . g ., the statement is quite common in stat
utes that , for certain purposes , a conveyance " must be acknowledged
or proved .” What is intended by “ proved ," as used in this connec
tion , will be considered later . See post , $ 295 .
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visions in nearly all the states , are deeds, or other
writings disposing of interests in real estate .
But provisions are quite general , either ,
First, requiring certain other writings to be acknowl
edged before they are to be regarded as completely effect
ive , or,
Second , authorizing or permitting certain other writings
to be acknowledged .
Examples of statutes requiring the acknowledgment of
writings other than deeds and instruments conveying
interests in real estate are those requiring the acknowl
edgment of " articles of association , ” or similar instru
ments , by which persons associate themselves together to
form a corporation ; chattel mortgages in many of the
states ; deeds of adoption in several (Missouri , Iowa ,










f writings other than deeds or instru
ments affecting real estate , and providing the effect of
such acknowledgment are those of Iowa and Michigan ,
viz . :
Iowa : 3 “ Every private writing , except a last will and
testament , after being acknowledged or proved and certi
fied in the manner prescribed fo
r




real estate , may be read in evi
dence without further proof . ”
Michigan : * “ Every written instrument , except promis
sory notes and bills of exchange , and except the last wills
o
f
deceased persons , may be proved or acknowledged in
the manner provided by law for taking the proof or ac
knowledgment of conveyances o
f
real estate , and the cer
tificate o
f
the proper officer indorsed thereon shall entitle
such instrument to be received in evidence on the trial of
' Iowa Code 1897 , § 4621 .
* Michigan compiled laws , $ 10168 .
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any action with the same effect and in the same manner
as if such instrument were a conveyance of real estate .”
That is, the proper certificate is presumptive evidence
of genuineness ,5 “ but the effect of such evidence may be
rebutted by other competent testimony . "
Statutes similar to these of Michigan and Iowa exist in
other states , while in many there appear to be no such
general statutes .?
Knowledge of such a statute in a particular state will
often be of advantage , for under it various instruments ,
as, for example , chattel mortgages, bills of sale , etc .,
which may not require an acknowledgment , may never
theless be acknowledged ,the effect being to dispense gen
erally with further or other proof on a trial than the
certificate of acknowledgment .
§ 256 . The subject regulated by statute - Form of ac
knowledging deeds generally the test. — Many of these
statutes relating to the acknowledgment of instruments of
different kinds (and whether requiring or merely permit
ting it) refer to the manner and form of acknowledging
conveyances of real estate as the test . Others simply
speak of the instrument as being “ acknowledged , ” with
out adding “ as conveyances of real estate are .” The
usage in such cases is to follow , as far as the circum
stances of the case allow , the law as to the acknowledge
ment of instruments conveying real estate . By following
this usage one will generally get an acknowledgment that
will withstand any criticism . At the same time it does
not necessarily follow that all instruments for which an
acknowledgment is desirable or necessary can be acknowl
edged only as real estate conveyances are : it has been
5 Cameron v . Calkins, 44 Mich . 533 ; 7 N . W . 15
7 ; C . L . 1897 , $ 8990 .
6 For example : Cal . Co .Civ . Proc . , $ 1948 ( 83 Cal . 270 ; Minn . G .Stat .
1894 , $ 5727 ; Neb . Stat . 1897 , $ 5921 ; N . Y . Co . Civ . Pro . , § 937 ; Utah
R . S . 1898 , $ 3407 ; Wis . Stat . 1898 , § 4185 .
For example : Alabama (see Ala . R . Co . , $ 3025 ) , Colorado , Illinois ,
Indiana , Kansas , Massachusetts , Missouri (see Mo . R . S . , $ 5073 ) ,
Ohio , West Virginia .
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recently held , for example , that a certificate of acknowl
edgment which might be defective if to a deed conveying
real estate may be valid if to articles of incorporation ;8
and there are in some states special statutes regulating the
acknowledgment of special instruments ; for example ,
chattel mortgages in Illinois by a residentmortgagor can
not be acknowledged before a notary public as a deed may
be.9
If one is fairly familiar with the questions that arise as
to the acknowledgment of a conveyance of realty , he
will find no difficulty in dealing with such special cases.
$ 257 . General purposes of acknowledgment . - While
the subject is regulated by statute in each state , there are
nevertheless certain general principles which may be con
sidered before taking up any important details .
The purpose of the acknowledgment ofan instrument is :
First , to entitle the instrument to be recorded , or ,
Second , to entitle it to be read in evidence , or ,
Third , in some cases , to give it validity . In some
states ( and in other states as to some instruments ) all
these purposes are within the purview of the statutes
regulating the subject .
While the statutes vary in their details , there is a gen
eral tendency nowadays toward uniformity .10
8 Smith v . Sherman , 1901 , 113 Iowa 601 ; 85 N . W . 74
7
.
9 Long v . Cockern , 128 Ill . 29 ; 21 N . E . 201 . See Gilbert v . Sprague ,
1902 , 196 Ill . 444 , 451 ; 63 N . E . 993 .
1
0 It is sometimes said that the “ acknowledgment ” is entirely o
f
American statutory origin , and was not known to the common law .
It appears not to have been known to the early common law , but from
references wbich occur in cases arising after the Statute o
f
Enrollments ,
it appears that there was in England a custom o
f acknowledging deeds
before they were enrolled . See , fo
r
instance , Taylor v . Jones , 1 Salk .
389 , where the practice is spoken of a
s
follows : “ If a man lives in
New England and would pass lands here in England , they join a mere
nominal party with him in the deed , who acknowledges it , and it
binds . " And in Winscomb and Dunches Case , Godbolt 27
0 , the bar .
gainor is spoken o
f
a
s having died before the enrollment o
f
the deed ,
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$ 258 . First, to entitle the instrument to be recorded .
- We have in this country a system under which instru
ments in writing affecting the title to real estate may be
recorded in some public office . The record becomes no
tice , and persons dealing afterward with the property de
scribed in the recorded writing are charged with notice of
the contents of the writing . Whether they actually knew
of it or not, they are in general deemed in law to have
notice of it. Furthermore , under this system properly
recorded instruments are generally given preference over
other instruments relating to the same property , actually
made before the recorded instrument , but not recorded .
These instruments are recorded by a public officer , known
generally as the register of deeds or recorder .
The records , having these important effects upon titles,
should not , it is considered , be encumbered with unau
thenticated writings . So the statutes generally provide
that only instruments duly authenticated are authorized
to be recorded . This authentication usually consists of
the certificate of some public officer , stating that the per
son named in the writing as transferring his interests in
the property , acknowledged the execution of the writing .
Upon this authentication the recording officer acts , and
records the instrument . A writing actually acknowledged ,
but to which there is no certificate of that fact is not as a
rule entitled to record ; and if the recording officer should
record it, its record is a nullity . It is not constructive
notice , and has not the other effects which a proper record
has .
S
o , also , a certificate of acknowledgment which is de
fective in substance does not authorize the instrument to
b
e
recorded . It is generally considered as no certificate .
Therefore , if such an instrument is recorded it is not no
tice , and the grantee or mortgagee named in it acquires
and , “ it not being acknowledged , ” themaster of the rolls allowed it to
be proved by witnesses .
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no interest in the property described in it, as against a
subsequent purchaser in good faith and without actual
notice of the previous conveyance .
In actual practice , the recording officer often records
documents not properly authenticated, either because he
does not scrutinize them , or because he does not know
what the law requires, and if he sees any kind of a certif
icate of acknowledgment he does not stop generally to
consider whether it is valid or not . But the fact that an
instrument is actually written into the records , and ap
pears at first sight to be regularly recorded , is not gener
ally enough to warrant the subsequent introduction of
the record in evidence , or to make it constructive notice ,
unless the instrument was entitled to record .
This may be stated as the general rule , as will be seen
from the decisions cited later.11
11 But in this connection it should be noted that in somestates statutes
provide that deeds and other writings relating to real estate may be
filed for record though not acknowledged or proved , and shall be
deemed , from the time of filing , notice to subsequent purchasers and
creditors , but they may not be read in evidence unless their execution
be proved as required by the rules of evidence so as to supply the
defects of such acknowledgment . See , for example , Illinois , ch , 30 ,
par . 32, 831 ; Colorado , 448 ; Alabama Code , $$ 991, 992. A statute
of Michigan - C . L . 1897 , $ 9051 - provides substantially that no con
veyance of land made in good faith and upon a valuable consideration
shall be wholly void by reason of defects in statutory requirements as
to execution or acknowledgment , but may be enforced as a contract ,
and when it has been recorded in the office of the register of deeds of
the proper county such record shall operate as legal notice of all the
rights secured by the instrument . Chicago Co. v. Powell , 1899 , 120
Mich . 51 ; 78 N . W . 1022 ; Lariverre v. Rains , 1897 , 112 Mich . 276 ; 70
N . W . 583 . “ Curative ” or “ validating " acts have been passed in per
haps most of the states making valid , for one purpose or another , defect
ive records - and they cure many defects in the acknowledgment and
execution of deeds . Such statutes are practically important , but they
vary so much in their terms that it is impracticable to refer to them in
detail .
21 - BREWS . Con .
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§ 259. Purpose of acknowledgment — Statutes relating
to evidence . — The second general purpose , as stated
above , is to entitle the instrument to be read in evidence .
The statutes of most of the states provide that a convey
ance properly acknowledged and certified by the official
taking the acknowledgment may be read in evidence with
out further proof .
The effect of statutory provisions of this character is
that the certificate of acknowledgment in proper form is
prima facie evidence of the due execution of the instru
ment to which it is attached .
If it be claimed , for instance , that the instrument is a
forgery , there is a presumption from the presence of the
certificate that the alleged forgery is genuine , and this
presumption can be overcome only by clear and convinc
ing proof to the contrary .12
Or if the conveyance is attacked on other grounds , as ,
for example , that it was obtained by duress , the proper
certificate is prima facie evidence of it
s
due execution , and
the burden o
f proof is on the person attacking it . 18
The statutes generally provide also that the record of such
instruments , which purport to be properly acknowledged
and certified , 14 and which are thus authorized to be re
corded , may be received in evidence : that is , these cop
ies are practically equal to the originals , a
s they may be
offered and received in evidence as prima facie showing
title .
Moreover , certified copies o
f
the records ( i . e . , copies of
copies ) may be admitted in evidence in many states . 15
1
2 Shelden v . Freeman , 1898 , 116 Mich . 646 ; 74 N . W . 1004 ; Albany
C
o . Bank v . McCarty , 1896 , 149 N . Y . 71 ; 43 N . E . 427 ; Sassenburg v .
Huseman , 1899 , 182 Il
l
. 341 ; 55 N . E . 346 .
1
3 Insurance Co . v . Nelson , 103 U . S . 544 ; Marston v . Brittenham , 76
Ill . 611 ; Springfield Engine Co . v . Donovan , 1898 , 147 Mo . 622 ; 49 8 .
W . 500 . See § 293 , as to when the certificate may be impeached .
" And , in many states , which are also properly attested ; see supra ,
1
5 Cal . Co . Civ . Proc . ( ed . 1901 ) , $ 1951 ; Ind . , Burns ' R . S . , 88 466 , 3372 ,
$ 251 .
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recIn other states the ord may be introduced in evi
dence on a proper showing that the original deed is lost
or beyond the reach of those claiming under it — or a cer
tified transcript of the record may often be used under
the same circumstances. 16
§ 260. Some points to notice as to such statutes. — The
practical importance of a consideration of statutes of the
character mentioned in the last section is obvious : it is
important to know what is , and what is not, evidence
of title .
Some matters worthy of attention in regard to such
statutes are :
( 1 ) That the acknowledgment of an instrument in
writing does not dispense with proof of the execution
of the instrument unless it is an instrument authorized
to be acknowledged : for example , a certificate of acknowl
edgment attached to a promissory note or a will would
not generally establish , even prima facie , the execution .
( 2 ) That the acknowledgment being made primarily
to entitle the instrument to record ( in the case of convey
ances at least) , it does not necessarily follow that because
the instrument is recordable it is also admissible in evi
dence .
( 3 ) That in the absence of statutes so providing,
neither the record of a conveyance nor copies of it are
competent evidence .
( 4 ) That neither records of conveyances nor copies of
such records are admissible in evidence , unless the con
3374 ; Mich . C . L . 1897 , § 8990 ; Ore ., Hill 's Ann . L ., $ 3028 _ Serles v .
Serles , 1899 , 35 Ore. 289 ; 57 Pac. 634 ; Pa. Act 1715 , May 28 , $ 5 ; P . &
L . Dig ., p. 1570 , § 88 ; P . & L . Dig ., p. 1891, % 10 ; Cary v. Cary , 1899 ,
189 Pa . 65 ; 42 Atl. 19 .
15 A
la . Code , $ 8 986 , 992 ; Ill . R . S . , ch . 30 , $ 36 ; Scott v . Bassett ,
1898 , 174 Ill . 39
0 ; 51 N . E . 577 ; Iowa Code , $ 4630 ; Kreuger v .
Walker , 1890 , 80 Iowa 733 ; 45 N . W . 871 ; Oakland v . Hewitt , 1898 , 105
lowa 663 ; 75 N . W . 497 ; Kan . Gen . Stat . 1901 , $ 1229 ; Mo . R . S . 1899 ,
$ 933 ; Neb . Com . Stat . 1901 , p . 939 , § 13 ; Utah R . S . , $ 3409 .
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veyance recorded was entitled to record . For example ,
where an acknowledgment and certificate of acknowledge
ment are necessary for the recording , and an unacknowl
edged conveyance is recorded ,17 or one is recorded with a
substantially defective certificate ,18 such records or copies
of them cannot be used .
§ 261. When necessary to validity of conveyance . In
the third place , acknowledgment and a certificate of that
fact are necessary in some cases to give validity to the
conveyance .
It is well established , as a general rule , that a deed of
conveyance is valid as between the parties to it without
an acknowledgment . Therefore , if a deed is not acknowl
edged , or if it is so defectively acknowledged as not to be
entitled to record , it nevertheless is a good conveyance of
the legal title from the grantor to the grantee , generally
speaking .19
But to this general rule there are exceptions, and
among the most important of these exceptions are the
following :
( 1 ) Acknowledgment (or proof ) and a proper certifi
cate are essential to the validity of all deeds in some
states ;
( 2 ) They are essential to the validity , in many states ,
of conveyances of certain kinds of real property , especi
ally the “ homestead ” ;
( 3 ) They are essential to the validity , in many states ,
of conveyances by certain persons, e . g ., sheriffs , and ,
especially , married women .
17Starnes v . Allen , 1898 , 151 Ind . 108 ; 45 N . E . 330 ; 51 N . E . 78 .
18 Heintz v . Thayer, 1899 , 92 Texas 658 ; 50 S . W . 929 ; 51 S. W .640 .
19 Taylor v . Youngs , 48 Mich . 268 ; 12 N . W . 208 ; Hayden v . Peirce .
1896 , 16
5
Mass . 359 ; 43 N . E . 119 ; Fisk v . Osgood , 1899 , 58 Neb . 486 ;
7
8
N . W . 924 ; Kruger v . Walker , 1895 , 94 Iowa 506 , 511 ; 63 N . W . 320 ;
Grant v . Oliver , 1891 , 91 Cal . 158 ; 27 Pac . 596 , 861 ; Hannah v . Davis ,
1892 , 112 Mo . 599 ; 20 S . W . 686 ; Cable v . Cable , 1892 , 146 Pa . St . 451 ;
2
3 Atl . 223 .
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§ 262 . Necessary to convey legal title in some states.
The acknowledgment and a certificate of that fact are
essential to the conveyance of the legal title in Ohio .20
And if the certificate is substantially defective , the effect
is the same as if there were no certificate at all ; for
example , if the name of the grantor is omitted from the
certificate .21 The general effect of a conveyance not
acknowledged , or defectively acknowledged , in states
where this is the rule , is to make it a contract enforceable
in equity , unless there is some ' curative statute '' making
it valid .
§ 263 . In many states acknowledgment necessary to
validity of conveyance of homestead . — Where the prop
erty involved in the transaction is a “ homestead , ” an
acknowledgment is absolutely essential in many states ,
at least where the owner is married , as is generally the
case in practice .
In states where such statutes prevail , a conveyance of
the “ homestead ” without the proper acknowledgment is
not even an equitable conveyance ; it is generally simply
void - a nullity so far as the homestead is concerned .22
For example , in Illinois the statute provides that both
husband and wife must subscribe and acknowledge the
conveyance of a homestead ( if the owner is married ) ;
therefore the conveyance of such property by the husband
to the wife without her signing and acknowledging , is
20 Hout v . Hout, 20 Ohio St. 119 ; Hume v . Dickson , 37 Ohio St. 68 ;
Kingman v. Loyer , 40 Ohio St . 109 .
31 Smith 's Lessee v . Hunt , 13 Ohio 260 ; Anderson v . Logan , 99 N . C .
474 ; 6 S . E . 704 ; legal estate does not pass in North Carolina until the
deed is proved and registered ; Caperton v. Hull , 83 Ala . 171 ; 3 So . 234 —
legal title not conveyed in Alabama unless deed attested or acknowl
edged .
22 It is not intended at this point to consider what a " homestead ” is ,
etc ., or how it should generally be conveyed , but simply to call atten
tion to this particular matter of acknowledgment .
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not good . 22
4
And a chattel mortgage o
f




leased land has been held fatally defect
ive , because the certificate o
f acknowledgment did not
show that the mortgagor was “ personally known , ” as
is required b
y
the Illinois statute 23
§ 264 . When necessary in conveyance b
y
married
women . — The general rule has been and is now , except
where changed b
y
recent statutes , that acknowledgment
and a proper certificate of that fact are essential to the
validity o
f
a married woman ' s conveyance .




her real property (except b
y
special custom in some places ; see post , section 360 ) .
Although for some time she has been quite generally free
to hold and transfer real property , it must be remembered
that her power to convey depends upon statute . She
may convey in themode , or b
y
the method , prescribed b
y
the statute alone ; and , generally , any substantial de
parture from the course laid down b
y
the statute renders
her deed not merely defective , but void .




execution . The power may be said to result from
the mode , and when the mode prescribed is not followed
there is a want of power , and her deed therefore is not
· merely incomplete but is void . 24
Among the requirements as to the mode o
f making a
married woman ' s deed , a very common one has been that
her deed shall be knowledged , and in nearly all the states
there has been required fo
r
her something more than




Kitterlin v . Ins . Co . , 1890 , 134 11
1
. 64 ; 25 N . E . 772 ; Mueller v .
Conrad , 1899 , 178 Il
l
. 276 , 283 ; 52 N . E . 1031 .
2
3 Gage v . Wheeler , 12
9
Ill . 19
7 ; 21 N . E . 1075 . See also the statutes
o
f
Alabama , Arkansas , California , Nebraska , Texas , Tennessee ,Wash
ington , Wyoming , North Dakota and Montana ; title " Homestead . ”
3
4 Sullivan v . Cummins , 13 Ohio 116 , 119 .
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in most of the states, until recently , that she should ac
knowledge the deed after a private examination apart
from her husband .
Though the law as to this may have been altered many
years ago , it still often becomes necessary , in the trials of
actions relating to titles and in the examination of ab
stracts , to consider the former state of the law .25
$ 265 . The form of the certificate of acknowledgment .
- Having noticed , in this general way , the effects , on the
one hand , of a proper acknowledgment and certificate of
acknowledgment , and on the other hand , some of the effects
of deficiencies, it will be necessary to consider what varia
tions from the standard form , or from the essentials stated
in the statute , will be regarded by the courts as fatal .




f acknowledgment ; in others there is simply a
general statement a
s
to what is required to b
e
done and
what the certificate shall show .
The following general form is given to indicate the par
ticulars that may be essential , though all these particulars
are not necessary in all the states — while in some states ,
perhaps , some additional particulars are required , al





— , ss :
I , (insert name and title of officer ) hereby certify that
o
n the — day o
f
— , in the year — , before me per
sonally appeared — and — , his wife , whose names
are subscribed to the foregoing instrument as grantors
( or mortgagors , lessors , etc . ) , to me personally known to
be the same persons described in and who executed the said
instrument , and acknowledged that they signed , sealed
and delivered the same a
s
their voluntary act and deed for
the consideration , uses and purposes therein mentioned ,





stead ) . And I further certify that the said — , wife o
f
the said — , being of lawful age and being examined b
y
2
5 See post , $ 36
6
.
328 § 266THE LAW OF CONVEYANCING .
me separate and apart from her said husband , and the
contents of said instrument being bymemade known and
fully explained to her , did declare and acknowledge that
she did voluntarily and understandingly sign , seal and
deliver the same, without any coercion or compulsion of
her said husband , and that she is still satisfied therewith
as her voluntary act and deed fo
r
the consideration , uses
and purposes therein mentioned , and does not retract the
same .
In testimony whereof I have hereunto subscribed my
name and affixed my official seal this — day of — in
the year






The form recommended b
y
the American Bar Associa
tion , and substantially adopted in Iowa , Massachusetts ,
Minnesota ,Michigan , and Missouri , is ( fo
r
natural per





— , ss :
On this day of — 19 — , before me personally
appeared — ( o
r
– and — ) , to me known to be the
person ( or persons ) described in and who executed the
foregoing instrument and acknowledged that he ( or they )
executed the same a
s
his ( or their ) free act and deed .
(Seal . ) (Signature and title of officer . )
9
2 ,




§ 266 . Certificate should show facts necessary . It
may be stated in general that the certificate should show
o
n its face that the statutory provisions have been sub
stantially complied with . That is , it will not generally
suffice for the officer to certify that the foregoing instru
ment was “ duly acknowledged ” o
r
was “ lawfully ac
knowledged . ” Such statements in the certificate simply
certify the officer ' s conclusion . They are inferences
which the officer is not , as a general rule , warranted in
drawing . For example : “ Signed , sealed and acknowl
edged in my presence the day and year aforesaid . J . J .
K . , Notary Public ” , is not enough . The court says :
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“ This falls short of such acknowledgment as has been
sufficient to make legal evidence. ” 26
§ 267 . Substantial compliance with statute enough
Clerical errors . In considering the matter of defective
certificates , there is generally applied a rule which will
often relieve from the consequences of what seem to be
serious defects. This rule is, that a substantial compli
ance with the statutory requirements is sufficient ; exact
and literal compliance is not necessary . It is the policy
of the law to uphold certificates of acknowledgment , and
to disregard technical defects and plain clerical errors .
This principle is stated in most of the cases herein cited ,
and is applied , as will be seen from them , wherever it
may be. 27
So the instrument to which the certificate of acknowl
edgment is attached may be examined to supply defects in
the certificate , or one part of the certificate may , in many
cases , supply defects in another part . For example , if the
mortgagor 's name is entirely omitted from the certificate
the omission will notmake the certificate fatally defective ,
if the defect may be supplied by a reference to the body
of the mortgage 28
In Fredrick v . Wilcox ,29 the husband 's name was
26 Cooper v . Smith , 1889, 75 Mich . 247 , 252 ; 42 N . W . 815 . Statutes
may make this general rule inapplicable . But such statutes seem un
usual . For example , Kentucky : “ Where the acknowledgment of a
married woman shall be taken by an officer of this state , he shall sim
ply certify that it was acknowledged before him , and when it was done,
which shall be evidence that there was a separate examination : expla
nation of the contents , voluntary acknowledgment , and consent to re
cord , are all presumed .” Hence , a certificate in briefest form may be
there sufficient , as , “ Acknowledged by Willia C . Woods , this May 5 ,
1873,” signed by the officer . Woods v . James, 87 Ky.511 ; 9 S . W .513.
27 For example , King v. Merritt , 67 Mich . 194 , 206 ; 34 N . W . 689 ;
where the certificate read that the married woman acted “ with fear ,"
the court read it as " without . "
28Milner v . Nelson , 1892 , 86 Iowa 452 ; 53 N . W . 40
5 ; 41 Am . St . R .
506 ; 19 L . R . A . 279 .
2
9
1898 , 119 Ala . 355 ; 24 So . 582 ; 72 Am . St . R . 925 .
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omitted from the wife 's acknowledgment ,but there being
two certificates , it was held that they could be read to
gether , and in connection with the mortgage to which
they were attached , to supply the defects in the certifi
cate .
In Canal Co. v . Russell ,30 J . F . and C ., his wife , were
stated as having personally appeared , being personally
known , etc . And the certificate stated that said C . was
examined separate and apart from her said husband , and
the contents and meaning of the said husband were fully
explained and made known to her , and she acknowledged
that she executed the same and relinquished her dower
in the premises described . It was claimed that the cer
tificate was defective, because it stated that the contents
and meaning of the husband were explained , instead of
the contents and meaning of the deed . But the court
says the certificate must be regarded in a common
sense view , and filling the blank with the word “ hus
band ” renders the subsequent part of the certificate
meaningless , but putting in the proper word , or leaving
a blank , the vacancy is supplied by the subsequent
tenor of the certificate .
§ 268 . What is substantial compliance . — What is a
substantial compliance will of course vary somewhat in
the different states, owing to differences in statutory
detail . But there are some facts which , being obviously
more important than others , are generally considered
essential .
The prominently essential features are :
1 . The fact of the acknowledgment of the instrument
by the grantor .
2 . The identity of the party making the acknowledge
ment with the party executing the instrument .
3 . The showing in the certificate that the acknowledg .
8068 III. 426 , 430 , 432 .
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ment was made before , and taken by , a competent ,
authorized officer , who certifies to these facts in the
proper mode .
To state the matter more particularly , it may be said
that the parts of the certificate requiring attention are
( though all the parts are not of equal importance and
value ) :
1. Venue , or statement of locality .
2 . Body of certificate , stating :
Date when acknowledged , before whom , grantor ' s
presence , grantor 's name , officer's acquaintance with
grantor , grantor ' s acknowledgment ; when grantor is
married woman some states require further : separate
examination , explanation of instrument , separate ac
knowledgment of its execution , continued satisfaction
with it ; and when the property is a “ homestead ” a spe
cial clause releasing it is required in some states . .
3 . Officer ' s testimonium .
4 . Officer ' s official signature and seal .
$ 269 . Substantial compliance Fact of acknowledg
ment . - It is evident that many mistakes arise from the
improper filling in o
f printed blank forms or from neg
lecting to fil
l
the blank in any way .






A certificate showing that the grantor appeared before
the certifying officer , was known to him , et
c
. , is not
enough unless it also shows that he acknowledged : this
omission will not be supplied by intendment or presump
tion . 31
One would hardly suppose that so important a part
o
f
the certificate as the statement o
f
this fact would be
omitted ; nevertheless , because of haste , carelessness , or
3
1 Short v . Conlee , 28 Ill . 219 ; Bryan v . Ramirez , 8 Cal . 462 ; Stanton
v . Button , 2 Conn . 52
7 ; Heintz v . Thayer , 1899 , 92 Texas 658 ; 50 S . W .
929 ; 51 S . W . 640 .
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ignorance , this mistake occurs in practice not infre
quently . For example , in Sarazin v . Railroad , 32 an ac
tion was brought against the defendant railroad company
to recover damages for the alleged negligent killing of a
child ; the child was granddaughter of plaintiffs and had
been adopted by them ; this action was begun by the
adopting father and mother , but the father having died ,
it was continued by the mother. A necessary part of
plaintiff 's case was proof of adoption by deed which must
be ( in Missouri ) acknowledged . A material part of cer
tificate of acknowledgment was , “ before me personally
appeared S . , and S ., his wife , to me known to be the person
described in and who executed the foregoing instrument ,
and acknowledged that he executed the same as his free
act , etc .” - i. e ., the certificate shows that they person
ally appeared , but that he alone acknowledged ; hence
the deed , so far as the plaintiff is concerned , is void , as
not acknowledged by her , and she cannot recover .
But in another recent case a mistake similar to that in
the last case cited was held a clerical error; the court say
ing that to invalidate the certificate , for this “ would be a
strained and technical construction of the language
used .” 33
This slip (which may be, ormay not be , a serious mat
ter, according to the temper of the court ) is very apt to
occur in the use of printed blanks, where " - he " is
printed , to be made into " she ," or " they , " or left “ he,"
as the circumstances require .
• § 270 . When the word " acknowledged ” should appear .
- In certifying to the fact of acknowledgment , where the
statute requires the instrument to be “ acknowledged , ”
the word “ acknowledge ” is clearly the best to use ; but
this word is not absolutely necessary if an equivalent
word is used . There can be little gained in using what
82 1900 , 153 Mo. 479 ; 55 S. W . 92.
$3McCardia v . Billings , 1901, 10 N . Dak . 373 ; 87 N . W . 1008 .
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seems to one an equivalent , however, for it may not seem
so to another .
Where it was required that the certificate should show
that a married woman “ acknowledged ," it was held 34
that a certificate that she " stated , ” etc ., was void :
" stated ” being held not equivalent to " acknowledged .”
On the other hand , " stated ” may be proper where the
statute provides that an acknowledgment shall be made
by the grantor " stating that he executed the deed ” .35
The case of Bryant v . Richardson ,36 where “ acknowl
edged " was omitted , appears likely to mislead some into
believing that , in the opinion of this court, this word or
an equivalent is not essential .
But in this case the original instrument itself appears
to have been offered in evidence , and the court holds that
the instrument is not invalid by reason of the omission .
§ 271 . Substantial compliance - Identity of party .--
To show the identity of the party he should be named in
the certificate . The name should correspond with the
name in the deed and with that signed to it .
And the purchaser should avoid all question by seeing
that there is this correspondence .
The difficulties caused by not doing so ar
e
illustrated
by a case37 where the record o
f
a deed signed Harmon S . ,
and certified to , has been acknowledged b
y
Hiram S .
(that being also the name inserted in the deed ) , was held




Hiram S . because
it appeared to have been “ signed and acknowledged b
y
different persons . ” 38 So , although it seems that the Illinois
3
4 Dewey v . Campau , 4 Mich . 565 .
8
5
E . g . , Ark . Stat . 1894 , p . 355 .
8
6
1890 , 126 Ind . 145 ; 25 N . E . 807 .
3
7 Boothroyd v . Engles , 23 Mich . 19 .
3
8 The omission o
f grantor ' s name in the certificate , or an error in it ,
will sometimes be cured by reference to other parts of the instrument
acknowledged , on the principles stated above , $ 267 ; but the prudent
course for a proposing purchaser is not to leave such questions open .
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court will change the word " husband ” to “ deed ” 39 it can
not fi
ll
a substantial blank that should have been filled
before acknowledgment ; as where the certificate stated
that the grantors , naming them , personally appeared and
acknowledged the deed , “ and the said ( blank ) , wife of
said ( blank ) , having been b
y
me examined , et
c
. , acknowl
edged that she freely executed , et
c
. , ” it was held that the
deed could not be received in evidence . The certificate
did not state who or whose wife was examined , et
c
. 40
$ 272 . Identity of party — “ Personally known . " — To
further assist in establishing the identity o
f
the party ac
knowledging with the party executing , there is a very
general statutory requirement that the officer shall not
make a certificate o




If he does not know this fact he may generally require
evidence o
f it , and if he certifies that he knows of this
identity , when he does not , he and his sureties are liable
for damages . 41 And if the officer wilfully certifies falsely
h
e
is in some states guilty of a felony . 42
He is not expected to know , however , that the person
acknowledging is the owner of the land described in the
conveyance , and he is not obliged to certify to this fact . 43
The law does not generally prescribe the extent of the
officer ' s acquaintance : an ordinary introduction which
satisfies his own conscience appears to be enough , though
a





not enough to warrant his official certificate that he knows
3
9 Canal C
o . v . Russell , 68 I11 . 426 ; supra , $ 267 .
4




1 Bartels v . People , 1894 , 152 Ill . 557 ; 38 N . E . 898 ; 8 . c . former ap
peal , 13
8
Ill . 322 ; Hatton v . Holmes , 1893 , 97 Cal . 208 ; 31 Pac . 1131 ;
Doran v . Butler , 74 Mich . 643 ; 42 N . W . 273 ; State v . Ryland , 1901 ,
163 Mo . 280 ; 63 S . W . 819 .
4
2 . Y . Pen . Co . , 8 510 .
4
8 State v . Thompson , 1899 , 81 Mo . App . 549 ; Overacre v . Blake , 82
Cal . 77 ; 22 Pac . 979 ; Browne v . Dolan , 68 Iowa 646 ; 27 N . W . 795 .
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the former .44 While the statutes very generally provide
that the officer shall not take the acknowledgment unless
he knows the person acknowledging to be the person ex
ecuting, et
c
. , it is not required in all states that this per
sonal knowledge shall be certified to ; but where it is re
quired , its omission from the certificate is a fatal defect .
For example , b
y
New York statute the officer must
know or have satisfactory evidence that the person ac
knowledging is the individual described in and who
executed the conveyance , and it is held that the certificate
should show this though the statute does not in terms .
require it to be shown . Therefore , a certificate : “ Before
me came J , to me personally known , and acknowledged
the above to be his act and deed , ” is defective in not
stating that the person who appeared was known to be
the person described in and who executed , et
c
. 45 And
such a showing in the certificate would be more certainly
necessary where the statute expressly requires it . 46
§ 273 . Who may take the acknowledgment . — The ac
knowledgment must bemade before , and taken by , a duly
authorized and competent officer ; who must certify to the
necessary facts in the proper mode .
This statement involves , practically , much more than
a
t
first sight appears on its face .
If the writing acknowledged is a conveyance of interests .
in real estate , the certificate should show that the certify





where the land is , is authorized to take the acknowledg
ment .
As the instrument may be , and often is , acknowledged
either at the place where the land is or elsewhere , some
* Lindley v . Lindley , 1899 , 92 Texas 446 ; 49 S . W . 593 ; Wood v .
Bach , 54 Barb . 13
4 ; Bidwell v . Sullivan , 1897 , 17 N . Y . App . Div . 629 .
4
5 Paolillo v . Taber , 56 App . Div . 241 .
s6 Hart v . Randolph , 142 Il
l
. 521 , 527 ; 32 N . E . 517 . “ Known ” is
equivalent to “ personally known " : Schley v . Car C
o . , 120 U . S . 575 .
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rules must be adopted to suit the different circumstances .
There will be found , generally , statutory provisions in each
state for three different sets of circumstances, viz .:
1 . When the acknowledgment is made and taken
where the land is,
2 . When it is made and taken in one of the United
States other than that where the land is ,
3 . When it is made and taken in a foreign country .
The officials who may act under these different circum
stances are named in the statutes , and the modes in
which they must respectively certify to the acknowledge
ment are prescribed .
If the certificate does not show on its face conformity
to the law o
f the place where the land is it is no certifi
cate , and the instrument is practically unacknowledged .
Many different officers are authorized to act in this
matter ; some o
f
the statutory provisions are peculiar . 47
The statutes are subject to amendment and are , as a fact ,
being constantly amended .
It is necessary , in each case , to look to the law at the
time an acknowledgment is made .
For example , in Loree v . Abner , 48 which was ejectment
for thirty thousand acres , the deed in question was ac
knowledged in 1788 – over one hundred years before the
trial - before two justices o
f
a court in Philadelphia : the
land , though now in Kentucky , was then under the juris









the domestic officials who may , or may not , take acknowledgments , the
following provisions may be cited : In Michigan , every senator and
representative in the state legislature may , by Public Acts 1901 , page
175 , take acknowledgments , - and a similar law exists in Minnesota ,
while in Rhode Island a state senator may d
o
so : notaries public and
justices o
f
the peace may generally take acknowledgments , but a New
Jersey notary may not , nor may a justice o
f
the peace in Utah , while
in Delaware two justices o
f
the peace of the same county may . In
about ten states mayors o
f
cities may so act , while in Pennsylvania the
mayors and aldermen o
f
seven cities , only , may .
4
8 1893 , 6 U . S . App . 649 .
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this Philadelphia court ) did not constitute “ a court ”
within the meaning of Virginia ' s law : so the deed was
not properly acknowledged , nor legally recorded , and a
copy of it was not admissible in evidence .49
§ 274 . Authority to take wholly statutory . - In all
cases the general principle is applied that only those offi
cers authorized by statute to take acknowledgments may
do so ; an acknowledgment taken by any other is inef
fectual .





a particular kind of instrument specifies the officer or
officers before whom it may be taken , an acknowledgment
taken before any other officer ( though he may be author
ized to take acknowledgments o
f
most instruments ) is
void .
For example : a chattel mortgage may not generally be
acknowledged before a notary public in Illinois , 50 nor a tax
deed before a notary public in Missouri , 51 nor a recogni
zance o
f special bail before a notary public in Michigan , 52
nor ( formerly ) articles of incorporation before a notary
public in Ohio . 53
§ 275 . Who may take - When acknowledgment is taken
in the state where the land is . — Among the domestic offi
cers ( i . e . , officers of the state where the land lies ) most
commonly named in the statutes as qualified to take ac
knowledgments are notaries public and justices o
f
the
peace . Other officials are also designated in most o
f
the




record , in some states
other judges , clerks of courts , registers or recorders of
deeds , mayors , etc . ; but in practice most acknowledg
4
9 See Trowbridge v . Addoms , 1897 , 23 Colo . 518 ; 48 Pac . 535 .
6
0 Long v . Cockern , 128 II
I
. 29 ; 21 N . E . 201 .
6
1 Dunlap v . Henry , 76 Mo . 106 .
6
2 Clink v . Russell , 58 Mich . 242 ; 25 N . W . 17
5
.
* State v . Lee , 21 Ohio St . 662 .
2
2
— BREWS . Con .
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ments are taken by notaries public and justices of the
peace .
In several jurisdictions if a justice of the peace takes
an acknowledgment to a conveyance of lands which are in
his state , but outside his county , there must be added
to his certificate of acknowledgment a further certificate
by the clerk of his county that he was at the time of taking
the acknowledgment a justice of the peace in that county :54
$ 276 . Who may take — When acknowledgment is
taken in another state - The commissioner of deeds.
Where the acknowledgment to a conveyance is taken in
the United States , but in a state other than that in which
the land conveyed is situated , it must be taken before
some officer designated by the statutes of the state where
the land lies. Otherwise , on the principles stated in
Chapter I, the conveyance cannot be recorded in the state
where the land lies , nor received in evidence in the courts
of that state without further proof .
One of the most useful officers for this purpose is the
“ commissioner of deeds .” The statutes of probably each
state authorize the governor to appoint commissioners of
deeds for his ( the governor 's ) state resident in every
other state ; and there may be found in almost every city
one or more commissioners of deeds for every state :
usually the same person is commissioner for many of the
states .
This official is recognized as an officer of the state from
which he derives his appointment ,55 and is authorized ,
generally , not only to take acknowledgments of convey
ances of lands in that state , but to perform other acts; for
example , to take depositions for use in that state . Gener
ally speaking , his certificate of his official acts, under his
hand and seal, is all that is needed for the authentication
of such acts in the state from which he derives his ap
64 This is so in Colorado , Illinois , North Carolina and Oklahoma .
56 Fisk v . Hopping , 1897 , 169 Ill . 105 , 107 ; 48 N . E . 323 .
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pointment : because he is an officer of that state and his
official acts will be recognized there .56
The statutes generally require the commissioner to affix
his official seal to his certificate ,and where this is required
it
s
omission is fatal to the validity o
f
the certificate . 57
The seal should be one capable o
fmaking an impression
o




a wafer attached to the paper , for if





seal , and the certificate , for this reason ,
ineffectual . 58
§ 277 . When taken in another state - Questions as to





conveyances in other states before
officers other than the commissioner o
f
deeds ; and , as a
commissioner is not always accessible , such provisions
must often be resorted to in practice .
These other officers are not officials of the state where
the land lies ( as is the commissioner o
f
deeds ) . More
over , the forms or essentials of the acknowledgment may
differ in the two states .
Hence the questions o
f practical importance to settle in
each case o
f
this kind are :
What are the statutory requirements of the state where
the land lies :
( a ) Regarding the officers in the other state who may
take the acknowledgment ?




least two states ,however (New York and Nebraska ) , a further
certificate from the secretary of state o
f
the appointing state is needed
before the commissioner ' s certificate is effective there : this requirement
seems to b
e unusual . Nebraska Com . Stat . 1901 , $ 4129 ; Omaha Real
Est . & c . Co . v , Kragscow , 1896 , 47 Neb . 592 ; 66 N . W . 658 ; New York
Ch . , 46 Gen . L . , $ 260 (Real Prop . Law ) ; Williamson v . Branning ,
1895 , 86 Hun 203 . See Evans v . Etheridge , 99 N . C . 43 ; 5 S . E . 386 .
5
7 Buell v . Irwin , 24 Mich . 145 .
5
8 Oelbermann v . Ide , 1896 , 93 Wis . 669 ; 57 Am . St . 947 ; 68 N . W .
393 ;Gage v . Railroad , 11 Iowa 31
0 ; 77 Am . Dec . 145 .
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lish the official character of the officer taking the ac
knowledgment ?
( c ) Regarding the form of the certificate of acknowl
edgment ?
There is much variance among the statutes of the sev
eral states on these points .
( a ) The officers of the other state who may take the ac
knowledgment are generally specifically enumerated , and
are of the same general character as the domestic officers
who may act. But there is often added after their enu
meration a general clause that any other officer may take
the acknowledgment if he be authorized to take acknowl
edgments by the law of the state where the act is done,
the result being in such cases that a foreign officer may,
in some instances , take and certify to a valid acknowledg
ment when a domestic officer of the same quality could
not do so.
§ 278 . Taken in another state - Showing as to official
character , etc. — (b ) Where the acknowledgment is taken
in the foreign state it is quite usual to require , before it
will be recognized in the state where the land is , another
certificate ( besides the certificate of acknowledgment ) from
the clerk of a court of record , or from some other official,
duly authenticated by his official seal , stating that theof
ficer taking the acknowledgment is the officer he purports
to be , is authorized to act, and that his signature to the
certificate of acknowledgment is genuine .
Where such requirements exist they must be strictly
complied with or the conveyance is no more entitled to
record than if not acknowledged . 59 But it is held that
“ unless the statute requires evidence of official character
to accompany the official act which it authorizes , none is
necessary .” 60
59 Dohm v . Haskin , 1891 , 88 Mich . 144 ; 50 N . W . 108 ; Fleschner v .
Sumpter , 12 Ore . 161 , 167 ; 6 Pac . 506 .
60 Carpenter v . Dexter , 8 Wall . 513 , 531 ; Knight v . Leary , 54 Wis .
459 , 470 ; 11 N . W . 600 .
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This further certificate is generally required where the
acknowledgment is taken in the foreign state by a justice
of the peace , but it may be necessary in other cases .
The tendency now is to dispense with such a certificate
of the official character of the person taking the acknowl
edgment where the foreign officer uses his regular official
seal in certifying to the acknowledgment .
By many statutes , if the official acting is a notary
public , who attests his acts with his seal, no other authen
tication is required .61
In such cases the proper practice is to use the form of
certificate of acknowledgment used in the state where the
land lies. 62
§ 279 . Taken in another state - Certificate of conform
ity to foreign law . - ( c ) Where the acknowledgment is
taken in a state other than that in which the land lies , it
is permissible by some statutes to take it in accordance
with the law of the place where it is taken . The law of
the state , where the land is, adopts fo
r
this purpose the
foreign law . 62
a
In such cases , however , a certificate o
f conformity to
the foreign law is often required from some other official




. ) , in addition to the
certificate o
f
official character mentioned above . The
certificates as to these two matters are usually (and it
seems should be combined in one certificate ; though a
certificate as to one o
f
these facts alone may be required .
In each case itmust be ascertained whether the certificate
should be a
s





ity to the foreign law alone , or as to both .
Where , however , the statute o
f
the place where the
6
1 This is so now in Alabama , Colorado , Iowa , Illinois , Indiana ,
Michigan , Ohio , Pennsylvania , Tennessee , West Virginia , and prob
ably other states .
6
2 Glos v . Gerrity , 1901 , 190 Ill . 545 , 54
6 ; 60 N . E . 833 ; Goree v .
Wadsworth , 1890 , 91 Ala . 416 ; 8 S




See ante , $ 9 .
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land lies permits the acknowledgment to be made in con
formity with either the foreign law or its own law , the
acknowledgment must conform wholly with one o
r
the
other , for if it conforms partly with one law and partly
with the other it is ineffective . 63
In all cases where a lawyer sends an instrument out
side his state for acknowledgment it is proper and desira
ble for him to send explicit directions as to how the
acknowledgment should be made and taken , and whether
o
r
not a further certificate is required , and , if so , its na
ture .
§ 280 . Acknowledgments taken out of the United
States . — The same principles apply to acknowledgments
taken out o
f
the United States a
s
to those taken in other
states . The statutes designate the officers : consuls , com
mercial and diplomatic agents o
f
the United States , no
taries public , judges and mayors being usually named .
The officer must be one authorized by the statutes o
f
the state where the land lies to take the acknowledgment
in the foreign country . 64
Importance is attached in such cases to the official seal ,
and most o
f the statutes require it . 65





ty cannot take acknowledgment . - Besides being compe
tent in the sense that he is one o
f
the officials who may ,
under the statute , take an acknowledgment , the particu
6
3 Adams v . Bishop , 19 Ill . 395 ; Farrell Co . v . Dart , 26 Conn . 376 ;
Carney v . Hopple , 17 Ohio St . 39 . See Kruger v . Walker , 1895 , 94
Iowa 506 ; 63 N . W . 320 .
6
4 De Segond v . Culver , 10 Ohio 188 ; McMinn v . O 'Connor , 27 Cal .
238 ; Sartor v . Bolinger , 59 Texas 411 .
6
5 It is sometimes provided that the certificate may be in a foreign
language , accompanied by a sworn translation ; e . g . , Mo . R . S . 1899 ,
$ 909 , o
r
that , if in a foreign language , the certificate must be accompa
nied b
y
a further certificate o
f
the United States consul , o
r
other desig
nated officer , stating the meaning of the certificate of acknowledgment ;
e . g . , Ind . , Burns ' R . S . 1901 , $ 3357 .
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lar officer must not be rendered incompetent to take the
acknowledgment by his interest in the transaction .
It is well settled as a general rule that an officer cannot
take the acknowledgment of the conveyance to which he
is a party or in which he is directly interested .
In a case which is generally cited on this subject in
later discussions, 66 it is said that this rule is based on the
fundamental principle that no one can properly be a judge
in his own case or an executive officer in his own behalf ;
and , as it is always within the power of the parties to get
a disinterested officer to take the acknowledgment , there
is no reason why this fundamental principle should not
apply , whether the act of the officer in taking the ac
knowledgment is regarded as ministerial in its nature , or
a
s judicial , or “ semi -judicial . ” 67
In other decisions the reason given for the rule is that
it is contrary to public policy for one interested in the
transaction to take an acknowledgment to an instrument
to which he is a party . Hence an officer named as grantor
cannot take his own acknowledgment so as to entitle the
conveyance to record . 68




rmortgagees named in the conveyance .
In Amick v . Woodworth 69 it was contended that , there
being nothing on the face o
f
the mortgage other than
identity of name to indicate that the mortgagee and
notary taking theacknowledgment were the same persons ,
6
6 Wilson v . Traer , 20 Iowa 231 .
6
7 Itmay be noted that the court is not correct in saying it is always
within the power o
f parties to get a disinterested officer : the only
qualified officer may be a party to the instrument . Where this has
happened it has been held that an acknowledgment was good though
taken before a party , partly because he was the only officer who could
take it . Stevenson v . Brasher , 1890 , 90 Ky , 23 ; 13 S . W . 242 . On the
other hand , it has been held that the acknowledgment cannot be taken
b
y
a party , even though no one else can take it . Hammers v . Dole , 61
Ill . 307 .
6
8 Leftwich v . Richmond , 1902 , 100 Va . 164 ; 40 S . E . 651 .
6
9
1898 , 58 Ohio St . 86 ; 50 N . E . 437 .
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the mortgage ought to be entitled to record and have
the effect of notice , etc . , but it was held that the general
rule is that identity of name shows identity of person , and
that it is contrary to public policy that a party to a con
veyance should take an acknowledgment , even though it
appear , as in this case , that he is merely a nominal mort
gagee , having practically no substantial interest in the
mortgage. 70
Where , however , the grantor acknowledges a deed be
fore one of several grantees , each one of whom takes
under the deed a separate and defined interest , the deed
may reasonably be regarded as if made separately to each
grantee , and the acknowledgment being good as to al
l
the
grantees except the grantee taking it will enable the deed
to b
e
read in evidence . 71
§ 282 . Practical effect o
f
rule that party cannot take





rule will be that the instrument , so acknowledged before
a party to it , will remain valid between the parties in all
cases where it would be valid without any acknowledg .
ment ; but , as it cannot properly be recorded , its record
is not noticed , nor should it be received in evidence with
out other proof than the certificate o
f acknowledgment .
When , however , the acknowledgment is essential to
the validity o
f
the conveyance , the effect of an acknowl
edgment before a party would be to render the convey .
ance invalid ; this seems to follow as a logical conclusion ,
because there is in such cases really no acknowledgment .
Hence where the acknowledgment is necessary to the
validity o
f
a conveyance by a married woman , both
acknowledgment and conveyance are void if the officer
taking the acknowledgment is a party to the conveyance . 72
7
0 See also Lee v . Murphy , 1897 , 119 Cal . 36
4 ; 51 Pac . 549 , 95
5 ; Hun
ton v . Wood (1903 , Va . ) , 43 S . E . 186 .
7
1 Murray v . Tulare Ir . Co . , 1898 , 120 Cal . 311 ; 49 Pac . 563 ; 52 Pac .
586 .
7
2 Rothschild v . Dougher , 1892 , 85 Texas 332 ; 20 S . W . 142 ; 34 Am .
S
t
. R . 811 ; 16 L . R . A . 719 ; Tavenner v . Barrett , 21 W . Va . 156 , 686
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And in a state where an acknowledgment is essential to
the validity of a conveyance of a homestead , a mortgage
of the homestead has lately been held absolutely void be
cause the acknowledgment of the mortgagor was taken by
the real party interested as mortgagee , though the nomi
nal, ostensible mortgagee was this party 's wife .73
§ 283 . Rule disqualifying party generally applies to
acknowledgments of all instruinents . This rule that a
party cannot take an acknowledgment applies not merely
to deeds of real property and ordinary mortgages , but, in
general, to all instruments requiring acknowledgment .
Illustrations: The acknowledgment of an assignment
of a bond and mortgage by the holder thereof before one
of the assignees is a nullity : the instrument though
recorded is not legally entitled to record , and the record
does not constitute notice of its existence , and one claim
ing under such assignee is not a bona fide purchaser as
against a person to whom the holder had assigned the same
bond and mortgage for value b
y
a prior assignment . 74 A
chattelmortgage cannot b
e lawfully acknowledged before
a mortgagee — even though he b
e
the only officer who could
take the acknowledgment . 75 A trustee under a deed o
f
trust cannot properly take the acknowledgment : the re
cording o
f
the deed so acknowledged is improper and the
record does not impart notice to subsequent purchasers . 76
And the same result has been held to follow though the
trustee taking the acknowledgment did not know at the
time that he was named in the trust deed as a party , and







was trustee . ? ?
7
3 Hedbloom v . Pierson (Neb . 1902 ) , 90 N . W . 218 . '
7
4 Armstrong v . Combs (1897 , N . Y . ) , 15 App . Div . 246 .
7
5 Hammers v . Dole ,61 Ill . 307 .
7
6 German Am . Bank v . Carondelet , 1899 , 150 Mo . 570 ; 51 8 . W . 691 .
Iron Belt Bldg . & c . Ass ' n v . Groves , 1898 , 96 Va . 138 ; 31 S . E . 23 .
346 § 284THE LAW OF CONVEYANCING .
§ 284. Effect of relationship on officer 's competency .
It is his interest in the matter which disqualifies the of
ficer from taking the acknowledgment , therefore , mere
relationship , by blood or marriage, to one or both of the
parties, is held , generally , not to render him incompetent
to act officially . This is especially so wherever the act of
taking the acknowledgment is regarded as a ministerial
act rather than judicial.
Hence where the grantor was the officer 's father , and
the grantee the officer ' s wife , he was held not disquali
fied .78 And an acknowledgment of a mortgage before a
brother of the mortgagor , including the privy examina
tion of the mortgagor 's wife by the same officer , is held
valid .79 But conveyances of married women acknowl .
edged before the husband of the grantee have been held
invalid : the reason fo
r
this view being , that the act of
taking the acknowledgment in such cases , especially
where the officer must ascertain whether the woman acts
freely , without coercion , etc . , is more judicial in its
nature than ministerial , and such relationship as would
disqualify a judge should disqualify the officer to per
form this judicial or quasi -judicial act . 80
§ 285 . Undisclosed interest as affecting competency of
officer to take . — The rule that interest disqualifies the
officer when it is direct and appears on the face o
f
the in :
strument , is settled b
y
the great weight o
f authority , but





the papers , the questions arising are
different , and there is disagreement on some points among
the courts .
But in V
a . Acts 1901 - 2 , ch . 127 ,after reciting the fact that numerous deeds
o
f
trust have been acknowledged before notaries and justices who were
trustees in said deeds , validates all such acknowledgments .
7
8 Remington Co . v . O 'Dougherty , 81 N . Y . 474 .
7
9McAllister v . Purcell , 1899 , 124 N . C . 262 ; 32 S . E . 715 .
8
0 Silcock v . Baker , 1901 , 25 Texas Civ . App .508 ; 61 S . W . 939 ; Jones
v . Porter , 59 Miss . 628 .
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The question whether the certifying officer is disquali
fied frequently arises when he is agent or attorney fo
r
one o
f the parties , when he is a shareholder or officer o
f




is a member , is a party .
While his interest will vary according as he sustains
one o
r the other o
f
these relations to the parties , the
question o
f general importance in most of such cases is ,
should a
n
interest , often slight and remote , not disclosed
in any way b
y
the instrument or it
s
record , avoid the ac
knowledgment and make the record no notice , and , in
some cases , make void the conveyance ?
Some courts hold that an actual interest disqualifies the
officer , whether the interest is apparent or not .
Hence , under such a rule , the acknowledgment o
f
a
mortgage where a partnership is a party , before one of
the partners , although his name does not appear in the
firm name , is void ; the mortgage is not entitled to rec
ord , and its actual record does not afford constructive
notice to a subsequent mortgagee ; the latter ' s mortgage ,
therefore , taken without actual notice , takes priority over
the mortgage so acknowledged and recorded . 81
A shareholder has an interest in the business and assets
o
f
the corporation whose stock h
e
holds , and therefore it
has been held that the acknowledgment of an instrument
before a shareholder o
f
a corporation which is grantee ,
mortgagee , or beneficiary under the instrument , is void ,
and the record o
f
such a
n instrument affords n
o
notice , 82
and if the instrument so acknowledged before a share
holder is one of those for whose validity an acknowledg





a homestead , then the in
8
1 Bank v . Radtke , 1893 , 87 Iowa 363 ; 54 N . W . 43
5
. Name of the
firm in this case was : “ City Bank o
f
Boone " - that is , it did not con
tain the name o
f
the officer taking the acknowledgment .
8
2 Smith v . Clark , 1897 , 100 Iowa 605 ; 69 N . W . 1011 ; Kothe v . Krag
Reynolds C
o . , 1898 , 20 Ind . App . 293 ; 50 N . E . 594 .
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strument acknowledged is invalid , though the interest
which disqualifies the officer taking the acknowledgment
nowhere appears on it
s
face . 83
In Ogden Bldg . Ass ' n v . Mensch , 84 a mortgage of a
homestead acknowledged before a shareholder in the cor
poration mortgagee is held inoperative as to the homestead
interest o
r
estate , but valid and binding as to all over the
homestead estate , when its execution is proved by evi
dence other than that afforded b
y
the acknowledgment ;




end ' ) that , as the disqual
ifying interest o
f
the acknowledging officer was not ap
parent , the registration and recording o
f
the mortgage
was effectual to charge subsequent mortgagees o
r pur
chasers with constructive notice . 85
8
8 Hayes y . Southern Home & c . Ass ' n , 1899 , 124 Ala . 663 ; 26 So . 527 ;
8
2 Am . S
t
. R . 216 ; Bexar Bldg . & c . Ass ' n v . Heady , 1899 , 21 Texas C .
App . 154 ; 50 S . W . 1079 ; 57 S . W . 583 ; Workman ' s Mut . Aid Ass ' n v .
Monroe , 1899 ( Texas Ciy . App . ) ; 53 S . W . 1029 ; Wilson v . Griess , 1902 ,
6
4 Neb . 792 ; 90 N . W . 866 . In the last case the conveyance was a mort
gage o
f
the homestead , not given , however , directly to the corporation
( a bank )whose stockholder was the officer before whom the mortgage was
acknowledged , but to another bank . The debt secured was one in which
both banks were interested , and that one whose stockholder took the
mortgagor ' s acknowledgment was also owner of stock in themortgagee .
The court considered the stockholder ' s interest sufficient to disqualify
him from taking the acknowledgment and held the mortgage void ,




the homestead in Nebraska . But as such a conveyance is not void on
it
s
face — the interest o
f
the certifying officer not being apparent - it has
been held valid for all purposes until it has been canceled in some di
rect proceeding brought for the express purpose o
f having the convey
ance adjudged void ; Monroe v . Arthur , 1899 , 126 Ala . 362 ; 28 So . 476 ;
8
5 Am . St . R . 36 , and its invalidity cannot be shown in an action o
f
ejectment by the mortgagor against the corporation mortgagee after
purchase by the latter a
t
foreclosure sale under the mortgage . National
Bldg . & Loan Ass ' n v . Cunningham , 1900 , 130 Ala . 539 ; 30 So . 335 .
8
4 1902 , 196 Ill . 554 ; 63 N . E . 1019 ; 89 Am . St . R . 330 . See post ,
$ 287 , n . 92 .
8
6 Thus the acknowledgment in this case is both valid and invalid :
which is not as unreasonable as it may perhaps seem , because an
acknowledgment may exist for more than one purpose in the same
state .
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§ 286 . Undisclosed interest as affecting competency .
On the other hand , an acknowledging officer 's interest in
the transaction not disclosed on the face of the instrument
acknowledged has been considered by other courts as not
disqualifying him to take the acknowledgment . Hence a
mortgage to one of two executors , acknowledged before
the other executor and recorded on the strength of this
acknowledgment , is held properly recorded so as to afford
constructive notice to one afterward acquiring a lien on
the property mortgaged ,86 and a chattel mortgage to a cor
poration acknowledged before a notary public who was
a shareholder in the corporation , has been held enti
tled to record so as to afford notice to a subsequent mort
gagee .87 In neither of these cases was the acknowledg
ment necessary to the validity of the conveyance : the
mortgage in each case was valid as between the parties
without an acknowledgment ; the question was as to the
effect of the record as notice .
But in Cooper v . Hamilton & c . Ass 'n ,88 a mortgage
of a homestead acknowledged before a shareholder in the
corporation mortgagee was held valid , though the ac
knowledgment seems to be, in Tennessee , essential to the
validity of such a conveyance . The court regards it as
not good practice to have an acknowledgment so taken ,
but holds that unless the officer 's bad faith or improper
conduct is shown the acknowledgment should not be held
void . 88
8
$ 287 . Officer of corporation not generally disqualified
unless also a shareholder . — While a shareholder ' s inter
est has thus often been considered sufficient to render




6 Morrow y . Cole , 1899 , 58 N . J . Eq . 203 ; 4




Benson v . Hove , 1890 , 45 Minn . 40 ; 47 N . W . 449 .
8
8






See Read v . Toledo Loan Co . , 1903 , 68 Ohio St . 280 ; 67 N . E . 729 .
795 .
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veyance to which the corporation is a party , it is gener
ally held that an officer of the corporation (who is not
shown to be a shareholder ) is not thus incompetent by
reason of such connection with the corporation .
This would seem especially to be so where the nature
of the officer 's act is held to be ministerial rather than
judicial, and where the rate of his compensation does not
depend on the losses or gains of the corporation . And
even some interest in the particular transaction has been
considered insufficient to disqualify him ; as, for example ,
where the cashier of a bank took the acknowledgment to
a mortgage made by his debtor to the bank , the fact that
part of the proceeds of the loan was used to pay of
f
the
cashier ' s debt did not give him such an interest in the
matter as to invalidate his certificate of acknowledgment . 90





a homestead , acknowledged
before the secretary and treasurer o
f
the corporation
mortgagee , the majority of the court , in holding the
mortgage valid , considered it important to determine that
the act o
f
the officer in taking the acknowledgment was
ministerial merely ; in the dissenting opinion , however ,
no importance is attached to the determination of the
character o
f
the officer ' s act — whether ministerial or
judicial — but it is considered o
f
great importance that in
performing an act which is essential to the validity of
the conveyance o
f








Woodland v . Oberhaus , 1899 , 12
5
Cal . 32
0 ; 57 Pac . 1070 .
9
0 Bardsley v . Bank , 1901 , 113 Iowa 216 ; 84 N . W . 1041 .
9
1 1896 , 48 Neb . 514 ; 67 N , W . 485 , 489 ; 37 L . R . A . 434 .
9
2 Legislation has been considered necessary on this matter in some
States , and must be looked for in others , for example :
Illinois . Laws 1903 , p . 120 , acknowledgments taken by officers and
stockholders legalized .
Indiana . Burns ' R . S . 1901 , $ 8041 . No one being an officer in any
corporation , bank , or association possessing banking powers , can act
a
s notary public in any business o
f
such corporation , etc .
Pennsylvania . See P . & L . Dig . 3239 , $ 5 .
Ohio . R . S . , $ 111 , am ' d 90 O . L . 119 . Certain officers and agents
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§ 288 . Agent or attorney of party to a conveyance may
generally take acknowledgment . — When the certifying
officer is simply agent or attorney for a party interested in
the instrument acknowledged , the general rule is that he
is not disqualified unless it is shown that he has some
beneficial interest in the conveyance , or that the amount
of his compensation depends on the making of the con
veyance .93
§ 289 . The parts of the certificate - Venue. - The com
petent, authorized officer must certify to the acknowledg
ment in the proper mode.
The purpose of the venue is to show where the official
act is done, and that it is donewithin the territorial juris
diction of the officer .94 For the sake of regularity , and to
save all question , this should always appear.96 The juris
diction of the officer taking the acknowledgment is often
limited to the county (or other territorial district ) for
which he is appointed , and in such cases especially should
the certificate show the county (or district) .
A certificate , however , without a venue will not be
fatally defective if the place where the acknowledgment
was taken appears either from the body of the certificate
or (as some cases hold ) from the deed read in connection
with the certificate .96
If the place of acknowledgment cannot be determined
from the venue , the body of the certificate , or the instru
of banks cannot act as notaries in any matter in which the bank is in
terested .
Minnesota .' General Laws 1899 , pp . 17, 60 , 202. Acknowledgments
by officers and stockholders validated and permitted in the future .
North Dakota . R . Co. 1899, $ 475a - validates acknowledgments taken
by officers and stockholders -- and see $ 3593 a .
93Havemeyer v. Dahn , 1896 , 48 Neb . 536 ; 58 Am . St. 706 ; 33 L . R . A .
332 ; 67 N . W . 489 ; Penn v . Garvin , 1892 , 56 Ark . 511 ; 20 S . W . 410 .
94Middlecoff v . Hemstreet , 1901, 135 Cal. 173 ; 67 Pac . 768 .
95 In re Henschel , 1901, 109 Fed . 861.
96Carpenter v . Dexter, 8 Wall . 513 , 528 ; Beckel v . Pettigrew , 6 Ohio
St. 247 .
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ment acknowledged , it will generally be considered as
fatally defective.97 And under some decisions an absence
of locality from the certificate will not be remedied by
the nameof a state and county at the beginning of the
deed . 98
The acknowledgment should be actually taken within
the officer 's jurisdiction , and the venue should show this
correctly , 99 but if he may act in any part of the state , and
no county is named in the venue , the certificate will not
be fatally defective . 10
0
$ 290 . Date . — The date should be stated , but while it
is desirable that the certificate o
f acknowledgment should
b





it will not make the acknowledgment invalid ( in
the absence o
f
a statute ) if it is otherwise good . The true
date may be shown as in the case of a deed .
The true date of acknowledgment cannot , of course , be
earlier than the true date o
f
execution , but it may be
later , and the time is generally immaterial if it be after





different times (and places ) b
y




some states require the true date o
f ac
knowledgment to be stated , ? and in such cases the safe
rule to adopt , in order to save all question , is to follow
the statute .
A statement in the certificate that the acknowledgment
was made on the date o
f
the instrument acknowledged is
9




8 Emeric y . Alvarado , 1891 , 90 Cal . 444 , 462 ; 27 Pac . 356 .
9




Roussain v . Norton , 1893 , 53 Minn . 560 ; 55 N . W . 747 .
Durfee v . Grinnell , 69 Ill . 371 .
· For example , Mich . Com . L . , $ 8962 ; N . Y . R . S . , ch . 547 , L . 1896 ,
$ 256 ; Pa . B . P . Dig . , p . 632 .
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enough , or the date may otherwise appear from the con
veyance .*
§ 291. Signing by officer - His official , not his personal
signature . It is generally essential that the certificate
be signed by the officer taking the acknowledgment . Ir
respective of statutes requiring it , this should be done ;
and where the statute requires the certificate to be sub
scribed one not subscribed is ineffective , even if the
officer 's name appear in the body of the certificate , or
even if it be attested by his official seal.6 But as to this
particular a substantial compliance with the statute is
sufficient .
The officer 's signature should not be merely his personal
signature , but his official one , for he is acting , not in a
personal capacity , but officially : therefore,he should sign :
" A B , Notary Public , ” and further , if his locality has
not already been stated , his signature should be : “ AB,
Notary Public , X County , Michigan . "
It has , indeed , been held that the name of his county
is a part of a notary ' s official signature , and that his certi
ficate without it is not entitled to record , and the omis
sion of the county is not cured by his seal which contains
it,9 unless , at least , the body of the certificate sets out
that he is a " Notary Public in and fo
r
X county , " in
which case it appears sufficient for him to sign : "AB ,
Notary Public ” or “ Notary Public , as aforesaid . " ' 10
3 Abney y . DeLoach , 84 Ala . 393 ; 4 S
o . 757 .
* Kelly v . Rosenstock , 46 Md . 389 ; Dahlam ' s Est . , 1896 , 175 Pa . St .
455 ; 34 Atl . 807 . The relation of the date o
f
the certificate to the date
of delivery is referred to above , § 34 .
5 Marston v . Brashaw , 18 Mich . 81 ; Hout v . Hout , 20 Ohio St . 11
9
.
Clark v . Wilson , 127 II
I
. 449 ; 19 N . E . 860 .
? Fisk v . Hopping , 1897 , 169 Ill . 105 , 10
7 ; 48 N . E . 323 ; Agan v . Shan
non , 1890 , 103 Mo . 661 ; 15 S . W . 757 .
8 Greenwood v . Jenswald , 69 Iowa 53 ; 28 N . W . 433 .
9 Willard v . Cramer , 36 Iowa 22 , 24 .
1
0 Colby v . McOmber , 71 Iowa 469 ; 32 N . W . 459 .
2
3
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Abbreviations of official titles , as J . P . and N . P ., the
meaning of which is well understood , may be used ," but
are not in the best form to designate the title .
Where the acting officer is a notary public the laws of
several states12 provide that he shall add to his certificate
a statement of the date upon which his commission as
notary expires ( “ My commission as notary public expires
- , 190 — " ) . For a neglect to make this statement he
is, in some states ( e . g ., Indiana , Kansas ), deemed
guilty of a misdemeanor and may be fined : where no
such penalty is provided , it would seem that his neglect
might result in the loss of his commission . But the omis
sion of this statement should not invalidate the certifi
cate .13 Nor should the notary 's neglect to state “ his
place of residence " (which is required in some states ) in
validate the certificate : such omissions are notmaterial
defects .14
$ 292 . Sealing . – Many statutes require the officer to affi
his official seal to his certificate , and where such statutes
exist his certificate without such seal is fatally defective .15
By such statutes his official seal is meant, not his private
seal or " scrawl."'16 But where a seal is not required by
statute , the absence of one is not serious .17




9 , p . 79 ,Buple ; Co
lo . Ah , 218 ; Ro
m
1




2 For example : Colo . Ann . Stat . , $ 3281 , no penalty ; Ind . , Acts
1899 , p . 79 , Burns ' R . S . 1901 , § 8039a - b , penalty $ 25 ; Kan . , Gen . Stat .
1901 , SS 4271 - 2 , penalty $ 100 ; Mich . , Pub . Acts 1903 , No . 18 , no penal
ty ; Mo . , R . S . 1899 , § 8835 ; Pa . Laws 1901 , p . 70 , no penalty .
1
8 Kansas City R . Co , v . Railway Co . , 1895 , 129 Mo . 62 , 68 ; 31 S . W .
451 .
1 *Griffin v . Catlin , 1901 , 25 Wash . 474 ; 65 Pac . 755 ; 87 Am . St . R .
782 .
1
5 Grand Rapids v . Hastings , 36 Mich . 122 ; Pitts v . Seavey , 1893 , 88
Iowa 336 ; 55 N . W . 480 ; Thompson v . Scheid , 39 Minn , 102 ; 38 N . W .
801 .
1
6 Mason v . Brock , 12 Ill . 273 .
1
7 Fisk v . Hopping , 1897 , 169 Ill . 105 ; 48 N . E . 323 .
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those required to have seals ( except justices of the peace ,
who are not generally required to have them ) , and they
should , as a rule , use them . The seal of the notary pub
lic is especially important ,and judicial notice is generally
taken of his seal .
§ 293 . Impeachment of the certificate - When it is con
clusive . - As between the parties to a conveyance a certifi
cate of acknowledgment may be impeached for duress or
fraud in procuring it, when the grantee participated in
the wrong or knew of it,18 and a subsequent grantee hav
ing knowledge of the fraud should be in no better position
than his grantor .19 Moreover , irrespective of fraud on the
part of the grantee , or of his knowledge of the fraud or
mistake of the officer taking the acknowledgment , it may
be shown , in contradiction to the statement contained in
the certificate , that the grantor did not, in fact , appear
before the officer for the purpose of making the acknowl
edgment .20
The evidence , however , to show that the grantor did
not appear before the officer and acknowledge the deed as
certified must be clear and convincing . 21
It is permissible , also , to show that a certificate of ac
knowledgment is a forgery or fabrication .22
When , however , a grantor has actually appeared before
a competent officer to acknowledge the instrument , and
the officer attempts to take the acknowledgment , and cer










9 Ormsby v . Budd , 72 Iowa 80 ; 33 N . W . 457 .
2
0 Michener v . Cavender , 38 Pa . St . 334 ; 80 Am . Dec . 486 ; William
son v . Carskadden , 36 Ohio St . 664 ; Le Mesnager v . Hamilton , 1894 ,
101 Cal . 532 ; 35 Pac . 1054 ; 40 Am . St . R . 81 ; Wheelock v . Cavitt , 1898 ,
9
1 Texas 679 ; 45 S . W . 796 ; 66 Am . St . R . 920 ; Camp v . Carpenter , 52
Mich . 375 ; 18 N . W . 113 .
2
1Goulet v . Dubreuille , 1901 , 84 Minn . 72 ; 86 N . W . 779 ; Spivey v .
Rose , 1897 , 120 N . C . 163 ; 26 S . E . 701 .
2
2 Marden v . Dorthy , 1899 , 160 N . Y . 39 ; 54 N . E . 726 ; 46 L . R . A .
694 ,
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tifies to it in regular form , the certificate is generally held
conclusive as to those matters to which the officer is re
quired to certify ; and parol evidence cannot , therefore ,
be introduced to impeach the certificate in the absence of
fraud known to those claiming under the conveyance .
This rule applies , generally ,not only to ordinary acknowl
edgments , but to those made by married women ;23 al
though , as in some states the certificate is prima facie
evidence only , parol evidence has been held , in them , to
be admissible to show , for example , that the deed of a
married woman was not explained to her. 24
§ 294 . Form of certificate to conveyance of corporation
or by attorney . - The general forms given heretofore 24
8
are
appropriate to individuals acting in their own right , but
where an instrument is acknowledged on behalf of a cor
poration , o




the certificate should b
e
varied .
Forms to be used in both these cases are expressly pro
vided in many states , either those known as the “ Ameri
can Bar Association Forms , ” or others .
Where not provided , the usual form for an individual
may be varied to suit the case by remembering that the
instrument should be acknowledged as the deed o
f
the
principal rather than as that o
f
the agent who acts for
him , or as the deed o
f














n attorney in fact being given , the statutory .
2
8 Hitz v . Jenks , 123 U . S . 297 ; Linton v . Nat ' l L . Ins . Co . , 1900 , 104
Fed . R . 584 ; Mut . L . Ins . Co . v . Corey , 1892 , 135 N . Y . 326 ; 31 N . E .
1095 ; Am . Freehold & c . Mort . Co . v . Thornton , 1895 , 108 Ala . 258 ; 19
S
o . 529 ; 54 Am . S
t
. R . 148 ; Council Bluffs Sav ' gs Bank v . Smith , 1899 ,
59 Neb . 90 ; 80 N . W . 270 ; 80 Am . S
t . R . 669 .
2
4 Mays v . Pryce , 1888 , 95 Mo . 603 ; 8 S . W . 731 ; Barrett v . Davis ,
1991 , 104 Mo . 549 ; 16 S . W . 377 ; Dodge v . Hollinshead , 6 Minn . 25 ; 80
A




See supra , $ 265 ,
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form for the individual may be changed so as to read as
follows and this plan may be adopted in other states
where no form is prescribed ) :
STATE OF - lo
- County , SS:
I (name and title of officer ) do hereby certify that -
who is personally known to me to be the same person
whose name is subscribed to the foregoing instrument , as
attorney in fact of the said , appeared before me this
day in person , and acknowledged that he, as such attor
ney in fact, for and on behalf of his said principal , signed ,
sealed and delivered the said instrument , as the free and
voluntary act of himself and of the said — , his said
principal , fo
r
the uses and purposes therein set forth ( in
cluding the release and waiver of the right o
f
homestead ) .
Given under my hand and — seal , this day of
- , A . D . 19 — (Signature and title of officer . )
[ Seal . ]
Or fo
r












I (name and title of officer ) do hereby certify that — ,
president , and — , secretary o
f
the company , who
are personally known to me to be such officers and to be
the same persons whose names are subscribed to the fore
going instrument , appeared before me this day in person ,
and severally acknowledged that as such president and
secretary they signed and delivered the said instrument ,
and caused the corporate seal of said company to be a
f
.
fixed thereto pursuant to authority given by the board o
f
- of said company , as their free and voluntary act
and a
s
the free and voluntary act o
f
said company for
the uses and purposes therein set forth .
Given under my hand and — seal this — day o
f




Or in Indiana , for example , where the acknowledg
ment for the individual is simpler than in some states
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the acknowledgment in these cases may be simpler .25 For
a corporation there it may be much shorter than in many
states ; for example :
( Caption . )
Personally appeared before me ( name and title of offi .
cer ) this — day of — , 19 — , A B , president of the
(name of corporation ), and S P , secretary of (name of
corporation ) , and A B , as such president, and S P , as
such secretary , and on behalf of said (corporation ) ac
knowledged the execution of the annexed deed .
Witness my hand and seal of office this — day , etc .
[ Seal . ] ( Signature and title of officer . )
In many states , however , the certificate in the case of
acknowledgment by a corporation sets forth that the offi
cers of the corporation are sworn , etc .26
§ 295 . Proof instead of acknowledgment . - It is permit
ted in most of the states to prove deeds as well as to ac
knowledge them .
The general objects of the proof are the same as those
of the acknowledgment .
Where proof is made one ( or more ) of the witnesses to
the conveyance makes oath , before a duly authorized offi
cer, that the grantor executed the instrument in the pres
ence of affiant (and of the other witnesses generally ) , and
the officer makes a certificate of this oath on the convey .
ance as a certificate of acknowledgment is made, and the
conveyance , with the certificate , is recorded .
The same general principles apply to proof as to ac
knowledgment ; no substantial departure from the statu
tory requirements is permissible .27
25For acknowledgment by attorney , se
e
Butterfield v . Beal , 3 Ind .
203 .
2
6 For example , N . Y . R . S . , ch . 547 , L . 1896 , § 258 ; also Am . Bar Ass ' n
forms used in Iowa , Massachusetts , Minnesota , Michigan , Missouri ,
to be found in the statutes ; formerly so by usage in Pennsylvania , but
see a simple form in Pennsylvania Laws 1901 , p . 171 .
2
7 Irving v . Campbell , 1890 , 121 N . Y . 353 ; 24 N . E . 821 .
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It is better , generally, to have the conveyance acknowl
edged than proved ; and in some states " proof” can be
made only when the grantor has died , or cannot be found ,
or refuses to acknowledge , a statutory preference being
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§ 296 . Delivery essential to a deed and to the transfer
o
f
title . — Always prominent in every definition o
r descrip
tion - ancient o
r
modern - of a deed is the idea of deliv
ery . Assuming that the instrument is complete in sub
stance , and that all formalities which may be regarded as
representing sealing at common law are complied with ,
the instrument is not in a legal sense a deed , does not
fulfill the meaning of its old name factum , a thing done ,
until it is delivered . The purpose of making the instru
ment has been to transfer title , and while popularly we
may properly apply the term deed to the written instru
ment , and while in legal discussions we must often refer
to this paper as a “ deed , ” yet , strictly speaking , there is
(360 )
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no deed until the sealed writing is delivered . As on de
livery of the conveyance the grantor is divested of title
and the grantee is invested with it ; as the former has ,
after delivery , no title in the property described in the
deed which he may dispose of, or which may be taken by
his creditors , or which will descend to his heirs ; while
the latter has title which cannot - generally speaking
be lost by a destruction or surrender of the deed , it is im
portant in each case to determine whether there has been
a delivery , and , further , at what time the delivery was
complete ,
That the subject is worthy of attention and is not free
from difficulties , is demonstrated by the frequency of suits
in which the chief, and often the only , question is as to
delivery . The cause of difficulties in determining whether
there has been a delivery is that it is not always accom
plished by the simple manual transfer of the instrument
from the grantor directly to the grantee , but may be ac
complished in a great variety ofways — sometimes without a
direct manual transfer between the parties , and sometimes
without an actual transfer of the instrument at al
l
. It is
largely a matter o
f
intention , which is to be ascertained
from all the various circumstances o
f
each case .
$ 297 . Exception to rule that delivery is essential . — To
the general rule that delivery o
f
the conveyance is neces
sary to a transfer o
f
title there is an exception , which may
be noted at the outset , namely : that conveyances by the
government may transfer title without delivery o
f
the
patent or deed .
When a patent o
f government lands has been executed
and recorded in the land office , it has become a solemn
act of the government . Title to the land passes to the
grantee b
y
the record . The reason for the difference in
this respect between public and private grants is indi
cated b
y
the supreme court o
f
the United States , in a
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case 1 where one contention was that a patent purporting




want of delivery , but the court distin
guishes the public grant from the private grant , say
ing : “ The importance attached to the delivery of
the deed in modern conveyances arises largely from the
fact that the deed has taken the place of the ancient
livery of seisin in feudal times , when , in order to give
effect to the enfeoffment o
f
the new tenant the act o
f
de
livering possession in a public and notorious manner
was the essential evidence of the investiture of the title
to the land ; ' and then mentions the symbolical acts









the deed , and shows that in transfers
o
f
title by matter of record , whether the record was a
judgment or decree o
f
a court , as a fine or a recovery , or
the record made o
f
the king ' s grant , neither livery of
seisin was necessary , nor a delivery of the document
sealed with the king ' s seal . ?
§ 298 . Elements of delivery - Surrender of control b
y
the grantor . - Delivery is ,however , as essential to the deed
o
f
a private person as livery of seisin ever was under the
older law to transfer title .
Delivery practically signifies , according to manymod
ern authorities , not merely the act evidencing the inten
tion o
f
the grantor alone in liberating the instrument from
his control . According to them there must be , to effect
a complete delivery , an acceptance by the grantee of the
instrument into his control ; therefore , the conception o
f
the term " delivery ” embraces two distinct ideas : surren
der b
y
one , and acceptance b
y
the other .
While it will appears that the authorities are not en .
1 United States v . Schurz , 102 U . S . 378 , 398 .
? See also Gilmore v . Sapp , 100 Ill . 297 ; Leroy v . Jamison , 3 Sawyer
369 , 390 ; Alvarado v . Nordholdt , 1892 , 95 Cal . 116 , 128 ; 30 Pac . 211 .
* See $ $ 300 , 301 , post .
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tirely in accord as to the necessity of acceptance as an
element of delivery , al
l
agree that the first essential o
f
a
valid delivery is that the grantor surrender control of the
deed with intent that the grantee shall take title under it .
Surrender does not necessarily and always mean the






hence it is not always the case that a deed retained in the
grantor ' s hands is invalid for want of delivery . There
may be such attendant circumstances as , for example ,
relationship o










to show that the title is beyond his control , though the
deed is retained in his possession .
For example , in a case , the question was as to the
ownership o
f
real property which had been insured
and had burned , and the settlement of this question
depended upon whether there had been delivery of a
deed from husband to wife . The husband , the grantor ,
did not give the deed to his wife , but after recording it
kept it in his possession . It was decided that there was
enough evidence to warrant the jury ' s finding of delivery ;
the court observing that “ manual delivery is not always
necessary . "
This would especially be so in case o
f
a conveyance
from husband to wife , where the husband is the custodian
o
f
the wife ' s papers and manager of her property , either by
arrangement between them in the particular case , o
r by






the place . So , in the
very common case o
f
a parent ' s making a conveyance of
land to his children and retaining possession o
f
the deed ,
it is usually held that there has been a sufficient surren
der o
f
the deed by the parent , though there may have
been n
o permanent transfer o
f possession o
f
the deed . 6
*Glaze v . Insurance Co . , 1891 , 87 Mich . 349 ; 4
9
N . W . 595 .
5 Brown v . Brown , 61 Texas 56 ; Ruckman v . Ruckman , 32 N . J . Eq .
259 , 261 .
6 Reed v . Douthit , 62 I11 . 34
8 ; Valter v . Blavka , 1902 , 19
5
Ill .610 ; 63
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Nor is relationship between the parties necessary in al
l
cases for the application o
f
this principle . In a Massa
chusetts case ? the deed purported to convey to a town a lot
o
n condition that a library building be erected on it . The
deed had been recorded , but appears to have been kept b
y
the grantor , and after his death was found among his ef
fects , and there was no evidence of its surrender to the
town authorities : but the town had erected the building .
It was held there was evidence of delivery which was not
overcome b
y
the facts that the deed was kept b
y
the gran
tor and that the town authorities had no knowledge o
f
its
actual delivery . 8
$ 299 . Elements — The intent o
f
the grantor . This
surrender of control must be with the intent that the
grantee is to take title . Hence the mere placing of the
instrument in the hands of the person named as grantee
is not necessarily such surrender a
s will constitute the
first essential o
f delivery .
In Wisconsin ' it was argued that as the deed was
handed b
y
the grantor to the grantee there was a full
and complete delivery , and that evidence was not admis
sible to show the actual condition then existing . The
court says : “ No doubt a great deal o
f
discussion and un
necessary refinement may be found in the books bearing
o
n
this question ; but the main principle must predomi
nate , that , to constitute a valid delivery o
f
the deed , the
grantor must part with his dominion over it with intent






N . E . 499 ; Colee v . Colee , 122 Ind . 109 ; 23 N . E . 687 ; 17 Am . St . R .
315 ; Reed v . Smith , 1899 , 125 Cal . 491 ; 58 Pac . 139 ; Bunnell v . Bun
nell , 1901 , 23 Ky . Law R . 800 ; 64 S . W . 420 .
Snow v . Orleans , 126 Mass . 453 .
8 See also Wallace v . Berdell , 97 N . Y . 13 ; Scrugham v . Wood , 15
Wend . 545 .
9 Curry v . Colburn , 1898 , 99 Wis . 319 ; 74 N . W . 778 ; 67 Am . St . Rep .
860 .
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tion , and that he might take it to his counsel fo
r
such
examination , there was no delivery . 10
And the execution and recording of a deed b
y
a hus
band to his wife may be shown by him to have been done
without intent on his part to convey title , but simply to
relieve his wife ' s insane anxiety and fear of destitution . 11
As the intent of the grantor is o
f
such importance , a
transferring o
f
the deed from the grantor ' s possession to
that of the grantee , without the former ' s consent , conveys
no title ; such a deed has been said to be o
f
no more ef
fect than if it were a forgery . 12 And if a stolen deed has
been recorded , or is otherwise a cloud on the title o
f
a
grantor , it may be canceled upon his bringing suit for
that purpose . 13
This intent being o
f
such vital importance , it is fre
quently said that the intention of the grantor is " the
controlling element . " ' 14 But a mere intent on the part of
the grantor not evidenced b
y
some act which the law
deems sufficient to show that he parted with control is
not enough , because the first actual step in making deliv
ery is lacking , that is , surrender or the relinquishment
o
f
control . This principle is applied chiefly in those nu
merous cases where a grantor evidently intends his con
veyance to take effect as a deed after his death , yet does
1
0 See S . P . - Chick v . Sisson , 1893 , 95 Mich . 412 ; 54 N . W . 89
5 ; Hol
lenbeck v . Hollenbeck , 1900 , 185 Ill . 101 , 103 ; 57 N . E . 36 ; Kenney v .
Parks , 1902 , 137 Cal . 527 ; 7
0 Pac . 556 .
1
1 McCartney v . McCartney , 1900 , 93 Texas 359 ; 55 S . W . 310 .
1
3 Felix v . Patrick , 1892 , 145 U . S . 317 , 329 ; Fitzgerald v . Goff , 99
Ind . 28 , 40 .
1
3 Maratta v . Anderson , 1898 , 172 Ill . 377 ; 50 N . E . 103 . In Meeks v .
Stillwell , 1896 , 54 Ohio S
t
. 541 ; 44 N . E . 267 , husband and wife were in
possession o
f
a homestead the title to which was in the wife ; they
joined in a deed o
f gift , but with the intention o
f
not delivering it un
til after the death of both . The wife , however , during the lifetime of
her husband attempted to deliver the deed without his knowledge and
consent , and it was held that hi
s
right in the homestead could not b
e
affected by the deed .
" E . g . , Leavitt v . Leavitt , 1899 , 179 Il
l
. 87 , 90 ; 53 N . E . 551 .
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not in all cases completely surrender control of it : a mat
ter to be discussed presently . 15
$ 300 . Acceptance presumed until dissent is shown.
The question as to whether or not there must be an accept
ance by the grantee in order that there may be a trans
mission of title involves difficulties .
It seems true that “ the law certainly is not so absurd
a
s to force a man to take an estate against his will ” , 16 he
cannot ,therefore , be compelled to accept a conveyance . On
the other hand , experience has shown that , as a rule ,men
d
o not decline to accept an ordinary conveyance which
gives title to property .
If , then , a grantor executes a conveyance without the
knowledge o
f
the nominal grantee , and puts the convey
ance out o
f
his control , has the title to the property de
scribed passed from the grantor ? May the grantee then
decline to accept the conveyance , and if so , does the title
pass back to the grantor ? Who has the title in the mean
time — that is , after the grantor has surrendered all con
trol o
f
the conveyance and before the nominal grantee
has declined to accept it ? If during this interval third
persons acquire apparent interests in the property for
example , creditors o
f
either party to the deed — what be
comes o
f
these apparent interests ?
It seems to have been established b
y English decisions
that : ( a ) a conveyance o
f
real property will be presumed
to have been accepted b
y
the person named as grantee ,
even though he was ignorant of the fact of the convey
ance ; but that ( b ) the nominal grantee may , on learning
o
f
the conveyance , decline to accept it . The grantee ' s
dissent was called a “ disclaimer ; " and at one time a deed
seems to have been necessary to make the disclaimer
effectual , but b
y
modern decisions there may be a valid
1
5 See post , $ $ 306 , 307 .
1
6 Abbott , C . J . , in Townson v . Tickell , 3 Barn . & Ald . 31 , 36 .
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disclaimer by conduct alone .17 The matter was discussed
in Butler and Baker 's Case ,18 where it is said : “ If A
make an obligation to B and deliver it to C , to the use of
B , this is the deed of A presently . But if C offer it to B ,
then B may refuse it in pais, and thereby the obligation
will lose its force . " And see the later cases o
f
Smith v .
Wheeler19 and Thompson v . Leach . 20 The argument of
Justice Ventris in the latter case , which argument he




lords in finally deciding
the case o
n appeal , 21 appears to have been the chief
authority for later decisions .
It hasaccordingly been held in many cases that when
the grantor has parted with control o
f
the deed the deliv
ery is complete and no acceptance b
y
the grantee need b
e
shown , nor even his knowledge of the deed , for its ac
ceptance b
y
him will be conclusively presumed until his
express dissent is shown . 22
$ 301 . Acceptance by the grantee . On the other hand ,
it is held that there must be acceptance b
y
the grantee to
complete “ delivery . " .
In a Massachusetts case 23 a charge that " If , after sign
ing the deed , the grantor placed it upon the table , or placed
it in M ' s hands with the intention that it should become
effective and operative , then there was a good delivery o
f
1
7 See Stacey v . Elph , 1 My . & K . 195 ; Birchall v . Ashton , 40 Ch . D .
437 , 439 .
1
8 Butler and Baker ' s Case , 3 Co . Rep . 26 ( 1591 ) .
1
9 Smith v . Wheeler , 1 Ventris , 128 ( 1671 ) .
2
9 Thompson v . Leach , 2 Ventris , 198 ( 1690 ) .
2
1 Thompson v . Leach , 2 Ventris 208 .
2
2 Robbins v . Rascoe , 1897 , 120 N . C . 79 ; 26 S . E , 807 ; 58 Am . St . R .
774 ; Mitchell ' s Lessee v . Ryan , 3 Ohio St . 377 ; Jones v . Swayze , 42 N .
J . L . 279 ; Guggenheimer v . Lockridge , 1894 , 39 W . Va . 457 , 461 ; 19 S .
E . 874 . The theory that title can pass from the nominal grantor with
out the knowledge o
r
consent of the nominal grantee is assailed in an
interesting and forcible opinion b
y
Dixon , C . J . , in Welch v . Sackett ,
1
2 Wis . 270 .
2
3 Meigs v . Dexter , 1898 , 172 Mass . 217 ; 52 N . E . 75 .
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the deed , " was held to be erroneous , as M was merely
the scrivener , not representing the grantee in any way ,
and he simply left the deed on the table . The court con
siders it settled that an acceptance is necessary , and that
it must be either by the grantee or by some one represent
ing him , or by some one assuming to represent him ,
whose act of acceptance is afterward ratified . 24
Stronger evidence is required to show acceptance in
some cases than in others, and it is essential in many
cases to show an express acceptance .
Such would generally be the rule where, by theterms of
the deed , some obligation or burden is imposed on the
grantee , as , for example , the assumption of personal
liability for a mortgage.25 In such cases an express
acceptance may be by word , or by exercising acts of
ownership in accordance with the deed , as by the
grantee 's selling the land conveyed . But it is evident
that what might be acceptance in some other cases can
not amount to acceptance in such cases . A deed , for ex
ample , containing an assumption of a mortgage recorded
by the agent of the grantor could not estop the grantee
from disputing his acceptance of the deed as against a
purchaser who had relied on the record .26
But if the grantee in such a deed has disposed of the
land conveyed to him by the deed , or otherwise exercised
acts of ownership over it, he cannot deny his acceptance
when an obligation imposed upon him by the deed is
sought to be enforced .27
On the other hand , the law often supplies the evidence
of acceptance by a presumption , where the conveyance is
clearly beneficial , or at least not prejudicial to the grantee ,
24 Dagley v . Black , 1902 , 197 Ill . 53 ; 64 N . E . 275 .
2
5 Blass v . Terry , 1898 , 15
6
N . Y . 122 ; 50 N . E . 953 ; Kellogg v . Cook ,
1898 , 18 Wash . 516 ; 52 Pac . 233 .
2
6 Hare v . Murphy , 60 Neb . 135 ; 82 N . W . 312 . Same case , on a
former appeal , 45 Neb . 809 ; 29 L . R . A . 851 ; 6
4
N . W . 211 .
2
7 Beeson v . Green , 1897 , 103 Iowa 406 ; 72 N . W . 555 .
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and the grantee is not sui juris . In such cases a delivery
to the parent or guardian of the grantee is generally con
sidered a delivery . For example , a woman , in order to
put her land beyond the reach of her former husband ,





whom , with one exception , were infants ,
and retained the deed in her possession after recording
it . 28 The court says , substantially , that making a volun
tary conveyance , absolute in form and beneficial in effect ,
by a parent to onewho is not sui juris and placing it upon
record , although possibly not effectual , withoutmore ,be
tween adults , is deemed to evince an unmistakable inten
tion to give to the deed effect , and pass title , and the
assent o
f the grantee , if nothing further appears , is pre
sumed from the beneficial character o
f
the transaction . 29
§ 302 . If acceptance is prevented there is generally no
delivery . While slight evidence only is needed to show
acceptance in many cases , and while there will be a pre
sumption o
f
it in certain others , it cannot be found as a
fact , even where the conveyance is clearly beneficial ,when
there has been a direct declination o
f
the deed . For ex
ample , in Nicholl ' s Appeal , 30 the proceeding was to restore
2
8 Colee v . Colee , 122 Ind . 109 ; 23 N . E . 687 ; 17 Am . St . R . 34
5
. There
had been a divorce , though the report o
f
this case does not show it .
2
9 See Hall v . Cardell , 1900 , 111 Iowa 206 ; 82 N . W .503 . In this case
the grantee was an infant but a few weeks old . Although , as the court
says , the deed may not have been actually beneficial to such a young
child , yet , as it was not prejudicial , acceptance may be properly pre
sumed . Rhea v . Bagley , 1897 , 63 Ark . 374 ; 38 S . W . 1039 ; 36 L . R , A .
8
6 ; Arrington v . Arrington , 1898 , 122 Ala . 510 ; 26 So . 152 ; Winterbot
tom v . Patterson , 1894 , 152 Ill . 334 ; 38 N . E . 1050 ; Hall v . Hall , 1891 ,
107 Mo . 101 , 108 ; 17 S . W . 811 ; Compton v . Church , 1891 , 86 Mich . 33 ;
4
8
N . W . 635 . But the meremaking o
f
a conveyance by a father for the
benefit o
f
his children , without recording it or mentioning it , has been
considered a
s not evidence o
f delivery when taken in connection with
his continued dominion over the property and possession of the deed .
Cazassa v . Cazassa , 1893 , 92 Tenn . 573 ; 22 S . W . 560 ; 36 Am . S
t
. R . 112 ;
2
0
L . R . A . 178 .
8





. 308 ; 42 Atl . 692 .
2
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what was called a " lost deed . ” A father had made and
sealed a conveyance and handed it to his son , who de .
clined it, simply saying to his father to keep it and all he
had as long as he lived . The court remarks that as a re
sult of this “ filial suggestion ” the case has to deal, not
with a lost deed , but with an undelivered deed , which
is no deed at al
l
: it was undelivered and inoperative , be
cause it was tendered and refused . 31 Hence also , in those
states where acceptance is considered necessary to com
plete " delivery , ” if before acceptance something happens ,
other than express declination , to prevent it , there is no
delivery . For example , if the grantee die before accept
ance his heir cannot accept the deed so as to make the de
livery complete . 32 Or , if before acceptance of the convey .
ance b
y
the grantee , the grantor recalls the deed , there is
no delivery . 33 Nor is there if before acceptance the
grantor conveys the land to some one else . 34 So a lien
placed upon the land before assent is given b
y
the grantee
will take precedence o
f














However , surrender and acceptance need not be concur
rent acts , and , generally , where nothing happens to pre
vent acceptance , it may be made , it appears , a
t any time
after the grantor ' s surrender . The grantee ' s acceptance
will relate back to the grantor ' s surrender . The time be
tween the twomay be longer o
r
shorter , and its length ap
3
1 See Spencer v . Spruell , 1902 , 196 Ill . 119 ; 63 N . E . 621 .
3
2 Jackson v . Phipps , 12 Johns . 418 , 422 ; McElroy v . Hiner , 1890 , 133
Ill . 156 ; 24 N . E . 435 .
3
3




4 'Hawkes v . Pike , 105 Mass . 560 .
3
5 Parmelee v . Simpson , 5 Wall . 81 .
3
6 Woodbury v . Fisher , 20 Ind . 387 ; 83 Am . D . 325 ; Cravens v . Ros
siter , 1893 , 11
6
Mo . 338 ; 22 S . W . 736 ; 38 Am . St . R . 606 .
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pears to be immaterial , so long as the rights of third
parties have not intervened.37
§ 303 . Presumption of delivery from certain facts
Possession of deed . - If the essential elements of “ de
livery ” exist, it is evident that they may be shown in
almost innumerable ways . The discussion at length ,
therefore , of the question whether a particular fact con
stitutes delivery , would seem to be unprofitable , because
the correct answer to such a question must depend upon
what the other facts are that accompany the fact in ques
tion . There are , however , certain facts and circum
stances which , if found in a particular case , give rise to
presumptions of importance in settling the question of
delivery .
For example , the possession of a regularly executed
deed by the grantee named in it, or by one holding under
him , is prima facie evidence of its delivery . 38 And it has
been said o
f
such a circumstance “ that only clear and
convincing evidence can overcome the presumption , oth
erwise titles could be easily defeated , and no one could be
regarded as being secure in the ownership o
f
land . ” 39
Plainly , however , it is not prudent to rely entirely on the
nominal grantee ' s possession of the deed as evidence of
his ownership : he may have possession when there has
been no valid delivery , 40 and a person dealing with him
a
s
owner in perfect good faith may be the loser — a princi
ple well illustrated b
y
a recent case . 41
8
7See Dettmer v . Behrens , 1898 , 106 Iowa 585 ; 76 N . W . 853 .
8
8 Butrick v . Tilton , 141 Mass . 93 ; 6 N . E . 563 ; Ward v . Dougherty ,
7
5 Cal . 240 ; 17 Pac . 673 ; 7 Am . St . R . 151 ; Inman v . Swearingen , 1902 ,
198 I1
1 . 437 ; 64 N . E . 1112 ; McGee v . Allison , 1895 , 94 Iowa 527 ; 63 N .
W . 322 ; Hathaway v . Cass , 1901 , 84 Minn . 192 ; 87 N . W . 610 ; Swank
v . Swank , 1900 , 37 Ore . 439 ; 61 Pac . 846 .
3
9 Tunison v . Chamblin , 88 Ill . 379 .
4
0 Barron v . Mercure (Mich . 1903 ) , 93 N . W . 1071 ; 9 Detroit Leg .
News 671 .
Cameron v . "Gray , 202 Pa . St . 586 . See also cases cited in $ $ 306
and 310 .
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$ 304 . Presumption of delivery - Recording . — As to
what effect is to be given to the recording of a deed , and
to what extent it is evidence of delivery , there is some
conflict of opinion .
The general rule , however , appears to be that the re
cording of a deed is prima facie evidence of delivery , but
is not conclusive , and the presumption arising from re
cording may be rebutted , either by direct evidence or by
the circumstances under which the recording was done .12
In states where acceptance by the grantee or knowledge
by him of the deed need not be shown , the recording of
the deed by direction of the grantor would place the title
beyond his control so that he could not thereafter change
his mind and defeat the title of the grantee by resuming
possession of the deed , even though the grantee knew
nothing of it till after the attempted recall by the
grantor .43 On the other hand , where a deed has been re
corded by the grantor , without the grantee ' s knowledge
or assent, the recording has been considered simply as
some evidence of delivery to be regarded with other evi
dence of accompanying facts or later circumstances , such
as possession and control of the deed or the property . #
Though if the grantor , with the knowledge and consent
of the grantee , records the deeds with intent to divest
himself of title he will be concluded by the delivery thus
shown . 45
42 Jourdan v . Patterson , 1894 , 102 Mich . 602 ; 61 N . W . 64 ; Holmes v .
McDonald , 1899 , 119 Mich . 563 ; 78 N . W . 647 ; 5 Detroit Leg . News 914 ;
Sullivan v. Eddy, 1894 , 154 Ill. 199, 208 ; 40 N . E .482 ; Bush v .Genther ,
1896 , 174 Pa . St. 154 ; 34 Atl. 520 ; Sweetland y . Buell , 1900 , 164 N . Y . 541 ,
552 ; 58 N . E . 663 ; Koppelmann v . Koppelmann , 1900 , 94 Texas 40 ; 57
S . W . 570 ; Smith v. Smith 1903 , 116 Wis . 570 ; 93 N . W . 452 .
48Robbins v . Rascoe, 1897 , 120 N . C . 79 ; 26 S. E . 807 ; 58 Am . St . R .
774 .
44Cravens v . Rossiter , 1893 , 116 Mo. 338 ; 22 S . W . 736 ; 38 Am . St . R .
606 ; O 'Connor v . O'Connor , 1896 , 10
0
Iowa 476 ; 69 N . W . 676 ; Davis
v . Davis , 1894 , 92 Iowa 147 ; 60 N . W . 507 ; Weber v . Christen , 121 III .
9
1 ; 11 N . E . 893 ; 2 Am . S
t
. R . 68 .
4
5 Brady v . Huber , 1900 , 197 II
I
. 291 ; 64 N . E . 264 .
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The doctrine of some courts is that the mere recording
of a deed by direction of the grantor without some other
act or declaration manifesting his intent to deliver the
deed , is not evidence of delivery ,46 though the grantor
actually intended , when he had the deed recorded , to
pass the title to the land described in the deed to the
grantee .47
The general rule being that the record of a deed is but
some evidence of delivery , often overcome by circum
stances which are not matters of record , it is evident that
the popular conception of the value of a " record title ” is
not well founded in law , and that the record really is of
but slight assistance in establishing a fact relating to the
title which is of vital importance : that is, delivery . This
is one feature of our present system which is recognized
as furnishing ground for some such reform as the so
called “ Torrens System , ” under which it is claimed that
the disadvantages resulting from the failure of our records
to really show the title , in this and in other ways , will be
lessened if not wholly removed .
§ 305 . Postponing complete delivery till death ofgrant
or. - Among the most difficult cases in which the ques
tion of delivery is involved are those where a grantor
wishes to postpone till his death the complete effect of a
deed . In such cases disappointed heirs often claim that
46Egan v . Horrigan , 1901 , 96 Maine 46 ; 51 Atl. 246 .
47 Barnes v. Barnes, 1894 , 161 Mass . 381 ; 37 N . E . 379 . The court
says in this case : “ If the question were a new one there would perhaps
be nothing difficult or impracticable in the conception that the act of
leaving a deed with the register for record by the grantor , with the in
tent on his part thereby to vest the title in the grantee , should consti
tute the register the agent for delivery of the grantee , and that upon
the assent of the grantee the transaction should take effect as a valid
delivery . Butwe think the law is otherwise in this state .” It is, how
ever, now provided by statute in Massachusetts that the record of
a deed duly acknowledged , etc ., “ shall be conclusive evidence of the
delivery of such instrument , in favor of purchasers for value without
notice , claiming thereunder. ” Mass. R . L . 1902 , C . 127 , $ 5 .
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the deed is ineffectual for want of delivery , and while the
purpose of the grantor may have been the avoidance of a
contest over his will, had he made one, or the saving of
the expense of administration , the result often is very
different from what he intended , fo
r
the litigation and
expense are increased , rather than diminished , b
y
his
conduct . Grantors in such cases might generally accom
plish what they appear to desire b
y making conveyances
reserving to themselves life estates in the property con
veyed , and delivering the conveyance to the grantee , but ,
for one reason o
r
another , this course is often not pur
sued .
Cases in which the grantor wishes and attempts to post
pone the taking effect o
f
his conveyance until his death
may b
e grouped into two general classes :
1 . Those in which the grantor himself retains posses
sion o
f
the deed , still with the intention that after his
death it shall come into the grantee ' s possession .
2 . Those in which the conveyance is deposited b
y
the
grantor with a person other than the grantee , to be finally
delivered to the grantee after the grantor ' s death .
$ 306 . Effect o
f grantor ' s retention of possession and
control o
f
the deed . — As to the first general class of cases ,
namely , those where the grantor signs , seals and ac
knowledges a deed , but retains possession and control o
f
it , nevertheless plainly intending that it shall come into
the grantee ' s control after the grantor ' s death , the gen
eral rule is that there has been no valid delivery , even
though the grantor has left directions — written or other
wise - clearly showing his intention that the grantee is to
have the deed .
The grantor in such a case has not taken the first step
essential to delivery — that o
f surrendering control of the
deed . When it is said that the grantor ' s intention is con
trolling , itmust be meant not his intention merely that
the grantee shall some time possess the land , but his in
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tention that the deed shall be delivered in his lifetime ,
and that the grantee shall thereby finally possess the land .
For , so far as the grantor is concerned , the delivery must
be complete in his lifetime . Hemust therefore lose con
trol of the deed .
Hence , the grantor 's giving the grantee a key to his
safety deposit box , with directions to get the grantor 's
will in case of his death , will not amount to the delivery
of a deed found in the box with the will after the grant
or ' s death ; though the deed is in an envelope addressed
to the grantee , which also contains written directions for
the recording of the deed by the grantee on opening the
envelope .48 Nor will a deposit by the grantor of a deed
among the grantee ' s papers , of which the grantor has
charge , the grantor intending the deed to come into the
grantee 's possession on his death , constitute a delivery .49
The practical application of these principles will often
result in loss to a person who has purchased land relying
on the record title . For example , a deed was kept in the
possession of the grantor , but with written directions for
recording it and handing it to the grantee after the grant
or 's death : the grantee , having received the deed after
the grantor 's death and having had it recorded , afterward
sold the land described in it to a bona fide purchaser :
in this action by the heirs of the deceased grantor it
was held that there had been no delivery of the deed and
that therefore the deed was wholly void , and that the
subsequent bona fide purchaser acquired no title as
against the heirs of the grantor.50
In such cases the fact that the deed is found in the
maker 's possession is not enough of itself to settle the
question of delivery ; the mere fact that the grantor re
48Hawes v . Hawes , 1899 , 177 Ill . 409 ; 53 N . E . 78 . See also Taft v .
Taft , 59 Mich . 185 ; 26 N . W . 426 ; 60 Am . R . 291 ; Parrott v . Avery ,
1893 , 159 Mass . 594 ; 35 N . E . 94 ; 38 Am . St . R . 465 .
4
9 Van Dyke v . Grigsby , 1898 . 11 S . Dak . 30 ; 75 N . W . 274 .
6
0 Stone v . French , 37 Kan . 145 ; 14 Pac . 530 ; 1 Am . S
t
. R . 237 .
1
6 : 28 N . W . 928 3 . 60 A 1797 . B . 299 . 5 Parre
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tains the deed in his own possession and under his con
trol does not prevent its being enforced as a deed , if he
has once effectually delivered it .
Even , however , in those cases where strong presump
tions in favor of delivery are made ( as where parents
make deeds to children , but retain possession of the
deeds ) , there must generally be something more - in
order to constitute delivery — than the signing , sealing
and acknowledging o
f
the instrument , which is then re
tained b
y
the grantor ; and where delivery is found in
such cases it will generally be because some other fact ex .
ists besides the mere making of the instrument - as , for
example , recording with an expression of intention to
make a present delivery . 51
§ 307 . Effect o
f grantor ' s depositing deed with a third
person : reserving no control . — The second class o
f
cases
mentioned51a may include cases in which the grantor ,
though handing the deed to a third person , yet reserves
control over it , as well as cases in which he reserves no
control over the deed after parting with it
s possession .
Where the grantor deposits with a third person the
deed a
s his present deed , directing the depositary to
deliver it to the grantee a
t
the grantor ' s death , and re
serves no control over it , nor right to recall it , there is a
valid delivery . There is a delivery , that is , so far as the
grantor is concerned — he has surrendered control of the
deed with intent that title shall pass to the grantee . The
deed becomes operative when it finally is accepted b
y
the
grantee , on its being given to him b
y
the depositary in
accordance with the grantor ' s directions . In such cases





when the grantor surrenders control of it to the deposi
6
1 See Fain v . Smith , 14 Ore . 82 ; 12 Pac . 365 ; 58 Am . R . 281 ; Ireland
· v . Geraghty , 15 Fed . 35 , and note ; Cline v . Jones , 111 Ill . 563 .
b
lo See supra , $ 305 .
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tary : the delivery relates back to that time.52 So, fo
r
example , where a deed is delivered in this way to a custo
dian to give to the grantee on the grantor ' s death , title
vests a
t the time of delivery to the custodian , and the





the grantor . 53
Often in such cases there is a recital in the deed that it
is not to become operative or be “ delivered " until the
death o
f
the grantor . Such a recital , however , does not
make the instrument testamentary in character , nor pre
vent it
s taking effect as a deed if the grantor has actually
surrendered control of it to the depositary . 54
$ 308 . Effect of reserving control b
y grantor in such
cases . - Such cases as those last cited are to be distin
guished from those in which the grantor deposits the
deed with a third person to b
e
delivered to the grantee on
the grantor ' s death , but retains dominion over it , or re
serves to himself the power to recall it before his death .
In these latter cases there is no delivery and no title
passes to the grantee , and this is so , according to the
weight o
f authority , even though the grantor does not re
call the deed .
5
2 Cases in which the foregoing rule is applied are often before the
courts . From the many decisions on the subject the following will
suffice to show the general application o
f
the rule : Ruiz v . Dow , 1896 ,
113 Cal . 490 ; 45 Pac . 867 ; Shea v . Murphy , 1897 , 164 Ill . 614 ; 45 N . E .
1021 ; 56 Am . S
t
. R . 215 ; Stout v . Rayl , 1896 , 146 Ind . 379 ; 45 N . E . 515 ;
Dettmer v . Behrens , 1898 , 106 Iowa 585 ; 76 N . W . 853 ; 68 Am . St . R .
3
2
6 ; Meech v . Wilder (1902 , Mich . ) , 8 Detroit Leg . News 1141 ; 89 N .
W . 556 ; Fulton v . Priddy , 1900 , 123 Mich . 298 ; 81 Am . St . R . 201 ;
8
2
N . W . 65 ; 6 Detroit Leg . News 103 ; Martin v . Flaharty , 1893 , 13
Mon . 96 ; 32 Pac . 287 ; 40 Am . St . R . 415 ; 19 L . R . A . 242 ; Brown v .
Westerfield , 1896 , 47 Neb . 399 ; 53 Am . St . R . 532 ; 66 N . W . 439 ; Die
fendorf v . Diefendorf , 1892 , 132 N . Y . 100 ; 30 N . E . 375 ; Ball v . Fore




3 Ranken v . Donovan , 1899 , 46 App . Div . 22
5 ; affirmed , 166 N . Y .
626 ; 60 N . E . 1119 .
5
4 See ante $ 29 ; in addition to the authorities last cited .
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Where the depositary is the servant or employe of the
grantor , and is given charge of the deed in order to pre
serve it for the grantor and not absolutely for delivery to
the grantee , the case is notdifficult, for the possession of the
servant in such a case is the possession of the grantor and
his intent that the grantee shall ultimately have the deed
is ineffectual , as it is not accompanied by an act by which
the grantor parts with the possession of the deed for the
benefit of the grantee , 56 and even if the depositary is not
the general servant of the grantor but holds the deed sub
ject to his order as his bailee or agent , and in such a
manner that the grantor may revoke the deed , there is no
delivery .56 Nor will the title of the grantee be good even
though the depositary , holding the deed under such cir
cumstances , delivers the deed to the grantee after the
death of the grantor.57
The difficulty in many of these cases is in deciding
whether or not the circumstances warrant the conclusion
that there has been a reservation of control of the deed by
the grantor . For example , in one case the deed was
given to the grantor' s housekeeper to keep and to give
to the grantee ( a son of grantor ) at the death of the
grantor : the housekeeper placed the deed in the grant
or's trunk in his room and gave him the key of the
trunk , and he carried the key in his pocket till his death .
The deed seems therefore not to have left his possession
and control , but the majority of the court held that there
55Porter v . Woodhouse , 1890 , 59 Conn . 568 ; 22 Atl . 299 ; 21 Am . St.
R . 131 ; 13 L . R . A . 64 .
56 Burk v. Sproat , 1893, 96 Mich . 404 ; 55 N . W . 985 ; Kenney v. Park ,
1899, 125 Cal. 146 ; 57 Pac . 772 ; Tarlton v . Griggs , 1902, 131 N . C . 216 ;
42 S. E . 591.
57Osborne v . Eslinger , 1900 , 155 Ind . 351 ; 58 N . E . 439 ; 80 Am . St.
R . 240 ; Williams v. Schatz , 42 Ohio St. 47 ; Wilson v . Wilson , 1895 , 158
Ill. 567 ; 41 N . E . 1007 ; 49 Am . St . R . 176 ; Baker v . Haskell , 47 N . H .
479 ; 93 Am . D . 455 ; Johnson v . Johnson (1903 R . I.) , 54 Atl . 378 .
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was sufficient evidence to warrant the finding by the jury
of delivery .58
So in many cases the grantor , in giving the deed to the
depositary , directs him to give the deed to the grantee if
the grantor dies , but if the grantor recovers to return it
to him .
In such cases where the grantor reserves no power to
recall or revoke the deed , the question is whether it is
beyond his control, and as he cannot control his death or
recovery and has reserved no power to recall the deed be
fore his recovery , there appears to have been a valid de
livery , so far as he is concerned ; yet it has been held in
such cases that there has been no delivery , because the deed
is under the control of the grantor up to the time of his
death .59
$ 309 . Delivery in escrow . - In many of the decisions
concerning the depositing of a deed with a third person
to hold till the grantor 's death , the transaction is spoken
of as a delivery in escrow . Such cases , however , are not ,
strictly speaking , generally cases of delivery in escrow .
Whether when a deed is signed , et
c
. , and not immedi
ately delivered to the grantee , but is handed to a stranger
to be delivered a
t
a future time , it is to be considered as
the deed o
f
the grantor presently or as an escrow , is often
a matter o
f
some doubt ; the answer to the question will
generally depend rather on the words used and the pur
poses expressed , than upon the name which the parties
give the instrument .
Where the future delivery is to depend on the payment
o
f money or the performance o
f
some other condition it
will be deemed an escrow . Where it is merely to await
the lapse of time or the happening of some contingency ,
and not the performance o
f any condition , it will be
5
8 Monroe v . Bowles , 1900 , 187 Ill . 34
6 ; 58 N . E . 331 .
5
9 Williams v . Daubner , 1899 , 103 Wis . 521 ; 79 N . W . 748 ; 74 Am . St .
R . 902 ; Williams v . Schatz , 42 Ohio St . 47 .
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deemed the grantor 's deed presently — taking effect as a
deed at the “ second delivery , ” but by “ relation from the
first delivery ." 16
0
The distinction is sometimes stated to
be not important o
r
material , but it may be so , because if
there be a delivery in escrow no title passes till the
" second " delivery or the fulfillment o
f
the condition .
While if the deed is one in praesenti the title passes upon
the happening o
f





time : it passes b
y
relation , from the time the instru
ment was placed in the hands of the depositary .
A
n
escrow is , therefore , a writing , having the form of a
deed , but the effect of which depends upon the fulfillment of
conditions upon which it is to be delivered to the grantee . 61
The conditions upon which the escrow is to be delivered
may b
e expressed in writing , o
r may be spoken , o
r may
b
e partly in one form and partly in another . 62 Thus the
title is made to depend partly in parol , and it is said that
some o
f
the earlier authorities evidently contemplate that
all escrows should be evidenced b
y writing , though such
does not appear to be the modern rule . 63 Escrows have
therefore been called “ deceptive instruments , ” not what
they purport to be , and capable of being used to deceive
innocent purchasers . 64
Conditions , however , cannot , according to the weight o
f
authority , be thus attached to a deed when it is delivered
to the grantee , therefore there can be no delivery in
escrow to the grantee ; such a delivery must be to a
“ stranger ” o
r
a “ third person , ” one not a party to the
instrument nor identified with the parties in such a way
a
s
to prevent his being a depositary . 65
R
O Foster v .Mansfield , 3 Met . 412 . See Hathaway v . Payne , 34 N . Y .
9
2 , 107 .
6
1 Prutsman v . Baker , 30 Wis . 644 ; 11 Am . R . 592 .
6
2Gaston v . Portland , 16 Ore . 255 ; 16 Pac . 127 .
6
3 Taft v . Taft , 59 Mich . 185 , 19




4 Hubbard v .Greeley , 1892 , 84 Me . 340 ; 17 L . R . A . 511 ; 24 Atl . 799 .
And see Pawling v . U . S . , 4 Cranch 219 .
6
5 Darling v . Butler , 1891 , 45 Fed . R . 332 ; 10 L . R . A . 469 ; Cincin
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§ 310 . Effect of grantee's obtaining possession of es
crow wrongfully . — The obtaining by the grantee of a
deed held in escrow , before the fulfillment of the condi
tion , or otherwise wrongfully or fraudulently , can con
vey no title to him .
Whether an innocent purchaser from him acquires
title , is a question upon which there is some conflict of
opinion .
The evident hardship in such cases on the subsequent
purchaser, who is warned by nothing on the face of the
deed , has led many courts to protect a bona fide purchaser
from a grantee who has obtained possession of an escrow ,
without performing the condition upon which the deed
was delivered ;66 and especially where the original grantor
— who makes the escrow — has done some act by which he
should be estopped from claiming title as against an in
nocent purchaser , as, for example, putting the person
named as grantee ( in the " escrow "') in possession of the
property .67 But the rule that appears to be supported by
the weight of authority is, that in the absence of some
act on the part of the grantor creating an estoppel, or
amounting to a ratification of the conveyance by the
grantee who has wrongfully obtained possession of the
deed , no title passes to the subsequent purchaser . The
reason for this view is that the original grantee , in such
a case , acquires no title by the deed obtained from the de
positary without performing the condition , and so can
convey no title to his own grantee .68
nati & c . Railroad Co . v. Iliff, 13 Ohio St . 23




8 ; 87 N . W . 277 ; 8 Detroit Leg . News 701 .
6
6 See Blight v . Schenck , 10 Pa . St . 285 ; 51 Am . Dec . 478 ; Hubbard
v .Greeley , 1892 , 84 Maine 340 ; 24 Atl . 799 ; 17 L . R . A . 511 .
6
7 Schurtz v . Colvin , 1896 , 55 Ohio St . 274 ; 45 N . E . 527 ; Quick v .
Milligan , 108 Ind . 419 ; 9 N . E . 392 ; 58 Am . R . 49 . See Simson v . Bank ,
4
3 Hun 156 ; affirmed , 120 N . Y . 623 ; 23 N . E . 1152 .
6
8 Dixon v . Bristol Savings Bank , 1897 , 102 Ga . 461 ; 31 S . E . 96 ; 66
Am . St . R . 193 ; Jackson v . Lynn , 1895 , 94 Iowa 151 ; 62 N . W . 704 ; 58
Am . S
t












tl . 799 ; 17 L .Rec . 4
7
8 ;Hubbard
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§ 311. Effect of surrender or destruction of a deed .
The effect of a properly delivered deed being to transfer
the legal title to the grantee , this legal title cannot be re
invested in the grantor by a redelivery or surrender of the
deed , or by its accidental or intentional destruction . For
example , the cancellation o
f
the grantor ' s name is not
enough to revest the title in him ; 69 nor is the total de
struction of the deed , whether done with or without the
intention o
f reinvesting the grantor with the title . 70 If ,
however , the grantee surrenders or redelivers an unre
corded deed with the intention that it be destroyed for the
purpose o
f revesting the title in the grantor , though the
legal title may not be reacquired b
y
the grantor in this
way , he may acquire an equitable title . 71 And the inten
tional destruction b
y
the grantee of an unrecorded deed
for the purpose o
f revesting the title in the grantor may
practically , according to many decisions , have the effect
intended , for the grantee , having deliberately destroyed
the best evidence o
f
his title , may not produce secondary
evidence to sustain it , and therefore he cannot establish
it if he would . 72
Everts v . Agnes , 4 Wis . 343 ; 65 Am . Dec . 31
4
. In this case such a deed is
likened to a forged o
r
stolen deed , and distinguished from a deed which
the grantor is fraudulently induced to execute : “ In the latter case
the legal title passes , and a subsequent purchaser is protected . In the
former no title passes whatever , and a subsequent purchaser is not pro
tected . In the one class of cases there is the voluntary assent of the
grantor , in the other there is no assent at ll . ”
6
9 Turner v . Warren , 160 Pa . S
t
. 336 ; 28 Atl . 781 .
7
0 Spangler v . Dukes , 39 Ohio St . 642 ; Albright v . Albright , 70 Wis .
528 , 537 ; 36 N . W . 254 ; Hyne v . Osborn , 62 Mich . 235 ; 28 N . W . 821 ;
Brown v . Hartman , 1899 , 57 Neb . 341 , see note , p . 344 , 77 N : W . 776 .
1
1 Fletcher v . Shepherd , 1898 , 174 Ill . 262 ; 51 N . E . 212 .
7
2 See Potter v . Adams , 1894 , 125 Mo . 118 ; 28 S . W . 490 ; 46 Am . St .
R . 478 ; Farrar v . Farrar , 4 N . H . 191 ; 17 Am . Dec . 410 .
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322 . What constitutes disaffirm
ance .
323. Effect of conveyance to an
infant .
324 . How infants ' real property
may be conveyed .
325 . The general principle con
trolling in such cases .
326 . The application by proper
party - Notice .
327 . Such conveyances allowed
for certain purposes.
328 . Hearing on the application
- Guardian 's bond - Ap.
proval by court.
329 . Statutes curing effect of ir .
regularities .
330 . Power of chancery court to
order conveyance of mi.
nor's lands .
§ 312 . Restrictions on alienation - Disabilities — " Void "
and “ voidable ” conveyances . There are circumstances
attending the ownership of real property under which the
freedom of alienation is restrained , either wholly or par :
tially .
( 383 )
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It is generally true that freedom of transfer of the title
to the thing owned is one of the chief characteristics of
ownership , and in considering conveyances so fa
r
this
freedom has been generally assumed to exist , but restric
tions on the owner ' s freedom and the effects of attempted
alienation in violation o
f
such restrictions must be con .
sidered .
One owning real property may be disqualified from con
veying title to it b
y
reason o
f personal disability arising
either from lack of will power sufficient to direct the in
telligent performance o
f
the act attempted — as when he is
o
f





is the case in many states when the
owner is a married woman o
f
sound mind . This per
sonal disability may therefore be natural or , as having
been imposed by law , may in some cases be designated
legal ; and it may be , as when the owner is a minor ,
either natural or legal o
r




The owner may also be restrained from freely alien
ating real property to which he has the legal title because
o
f
the character or condition o
f
the property — a
s
when it
is a “ homestead , " or is held b
y
another adversely to
him ; and he may not be free to do as he wishes in a
particular instance because the conveyance he attempts
to make is in fraud o
f
creditors or subsequent purchasers ,
o
r because it imposes conditions that are invalid , o
r be
cause it violates the rule against perpetuities .
Attempts , however , to transfer title are often made b
y
a
n owner who is thus under some restraint . His at
tempted conveyance will be in some cases void , in others
voidable .
While these terms , " void " and " voidable , ” are some
times used a
s synonyms , there is properly a distinction
between them : the effect o
f
a conveyance that is void is
quite different from the effect o
f
one that is voidable .
When a conveyance is void , it is a mere nullity ; it con .
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veys no title; it binds neither the grantor nor the grantee ;
it cannot be ratified by subsequent acts, and it may be
disregarded by the parties to it and attacked by third
persons . But when it is voidable , it is valid , not only
as between the parties to it, but as to third persons , until
it is avoided by the person who is entitled to avoid it ;
and it may be made completely valid by ratification .
Contracts and conveyances are more rarely void than
voidable, and often , if somewhat defective, they may be
spoken of , when regarded from one point of view and as
to one person , as voidable; while if regarded from another
point of view or as to another person they may be , not im
properly , called void ;' and sometimes a conveyance is
said to be void and yet to be capable of ratification , by
which is intended that it is without validity until con
firmed .3
The different senses in which these words are actually
often used should therefore be borne in mind in consider
ing the consequences of a conveyance by one who is in
some manner disqualified from making the particular
conveyance .
There may be disabilities attending grantees as well as
grantors , for certain persons are disqualified , either par
tially or wholly , from taking and holding title ; as, for
example , aliens under certain circumstances, and corpo
rations to some extent. The general rule of law , however ,
as distinguishing disqualified or disabled grantors from
disqualified grantees , is that the power to take and to hold
real property is more widely extended than the power to
convey . :
§ 313 . Conveyances by minors — Voidable . — It is now
generally recognized as a settled rule of law that the con
See National Bank v . Wheelock , 1895 , 52 Ohio St . 534 , 549 , 550 ;
Pearsoll v. Chapin , 44 Pa . St. 9 ; Henry v . Root , 33 N . Y . 526 , 537 .
? Spafford y . Warren , 47 Iowa 47 .
Weeks v. Bridgman , 1895 , 159 U . S. 541, 547.
25 - BREWS. CON .
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veyances by an infant of his real property are voidable ,
and not void .*
Therefore , the general rule is , not that the conveyance
of a minor is inoperative until ratified or affirmed , but
that it is good until avoided . It transmits the title to the
grantee , who may transfer it to others, and the title will
thus continue and remain in the first grantee or sub
sequent grantees unless divested by the grantor , or, in
proper cases , by his heirs . Being simply voidable , it
is capable of ratification , but at the same time it does not
need ratification , as it will stand good until impeached .
The title obtained by the infant 's grantee is , however,
practically of little actual value , since the infant grantor
may , generally ( in the absence of certain circumstances
sometimes held to estop him in equity ) , entirely defeat it
after attaining his majority .5
§ 314 . Former distinctions between different kinds of
conveyances - Infants ' powers of attorney still sometimes
held void . - A distinction seems formerly to have been
made between a feoffment with livery of seisin and cases
where title was attempted to be conveyed by deed .
The older authorities held that where title usually
passed at common law by delivery of the deed — as in the
cases of grants, surrenders and releases — an infant was
unable to convey , and his deed was void . But if the in
fant, himself , personally made livery of seisin , the title
passed ; and his feoffment was voidable merely , because it
• Dolph v . Hand, 1893 , 156 Pa. St. 91 ; 27 Atl. 114 ; 36 Am . St. R .
25 ; Englebert v . Troxell , 1894 , 40 Neb . 195 ; 58 N . W . 852 ; 26 L . R . A .
177 ; 42 Am . St . R . 665 ; Keil v . Healey , 84 Ill . 104 ; 25 Am . R . 434 ;
Green v . Wilding , 59 Iowa 679 ; 44 Am . R . 696 . This principle applies
to mortgages . Singer Mfg . Co . v . Lamb , 81 Mo . 221 ; Shrock v . Crowl ,
8
3 Ind . 243 ; Walton v .Gaines , 1894 , 94 Tenn . 420 ; 29 S . W . 458 . There
are decisions to the effect that a conveyance made by an infant with
out consideration is void , and notmerely voidable ,because it is clearly
prejudicial to the infant . Robinson v . Coulter , 1891 , 90 Tenn . 705 ; 18
8 . W . 250 ; 25 Am . St . R . 708 .
See post , $ 315 , e
t seq .
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should have a greater effect on account of its greater so
lemnity .
After the Statute o
f
Uses ,when livery of seisin fell into
disuse , it was considered that an infant could not make




bargain and sale , which was still regarded as
void . And it was also held that even a feoffment where
the infant did not personally make livery of seisin was
void and not merely voidable . That is , if the infant
made a deed o
f
feoffment and gave a letter o
f
attorney to
another to make livery of seisin , the livery so made was
void . 6
While the distinction between the different sorts of
conveyances has been lost sight o




n infant to appoint an attorney has survived
and has been applied in some modern decisions : - - the in
fant ' s appointment of an attorney to convey being re
garded as void — though in some cases where this rule is
stated it appears not to have been necessary to the deci .




fant has been held invalid , and a sale under it absolutely
void ; and though the infant has ratified the mortgage ,
he nevertheless may redeem from the sale . 8
But this rule , that the appointment b
y
a minor of an
attorney to sell and convey land is void , is not recognized
in all the later decisions , and themore reasonable modern
doctrine appears to be that which applies the same rule
to a power o
f attorney a
s
to infants ' contracts and acts
generally , that is , that they are voidable rather than
void . '
6 See Shep . Touch . 232 ; Thompson v . Leach , 3 Mod . 301 , 310 ; Zouch
v . Parsons , 3 Burr . 1794 ; Tucker v . Moreland , 10 Pet . 58 , 68 .
? Philpot v . Bingham , 55 Ala . 435 ; Trueblood v . Trueblood , 8 Ind .
195 ; 65 Am . D . 756 ; Lawrence v . McArter , 10 Ohio 37 .
& Rocks v . Cornell , 1900 , 21 R . I . 532 ; 45 Atl . 552 .
9 Coursolle v . Weyerhauser , 1897 , 69 Minn . 328 ; 72 N . W . 697 . See
Ferguson v . Houston & c . R . Co . , 73 Texas 344 ; 11 S . W . 347 ; Askey v .
Williams , 74 Texas 294 ; 11 S . W . 1101 ; 5 L . R . A . 176 .
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§ 315 . When conveyance by an infant may be disaf
firmed - Not until majority . - While an infant's convey
ance of land may thus be avoided or disaffirmed , the
infant may not disaffirm it until his majority . 10
This is an exception to the general rule regarding
repudiation by infants of their ordinary contracts . Con
veyances of personal property may be repudiated by an
infant before his majority . So , for example , a chattel
mortgage made by an infant may be avoided before he
arrives at full age , orwithin a reasonable time thereafter .11
Various reasons are given for the difference in this regard
between conveyances of real property and those of per
sonal property . It is sometimes said to be due to the
transitory nature of personal property , and therefore , “ to
withhold the right of disaffirmance from an infant ( in
such a case ) until he became of age , would , in many
cases, be to make it valueless , ” - it being for his protection
that such a disaffirmance is allowed .12 Or, as is stated in
some decisions , the same rule is held not to apply to con
veyances of real property , because the infant is protected ,
while infancy lasts , by his right to enter the land con
veyed and take the profits without conclusively avoiding
the conveyance . 13 And the reason for the rule is also
said to be “ that a disaffirmance works a reinvestiture of
the estate in the infant , and he is presumed not to have
sufficient discretion fo
r
that . " ' 14
This general rule that an infant may not disaffirm his
1
0 Sims v . Everhardt , 102 U . S . 300 , 309 ; Welch v . Bunce , 83 Ind . 382 ;
Shipley v . Bunn , 1894 , 125 Mo . 445 ; 28 S . W . 754 ; Bool v . Mix , 17
Wend , 119 , 132 ; 31 Am . D . 285 .
1
1 Chapin v . Shafer , 49 N . Y . 407 ; Miller v . Smith , 26 Minn . 248 .
See Bloomingdale v . Chittenden , 74 Mich . 698 ; 42 N . W . 166 .
1
3 Towle v . Dresser , 73 Maine 252 , 256 .
1
8 Bool v . Mix , 17 Wend . 11
9 , 132 ; 31 Am . D . 285 . This right to
enter , et
c
. , is denied in some cases , however . Shipley v . Bunn , 1894 ,
125 Mo . 445 ; 28 S . W . 754 .
1
4 Sims v . Everhardt , 102 U . S . 300 , 309 .
§ 316 389CONVEYANCE OF INFANTS ' LANDS.
conveyance of real property during his minority has been
changed by statute in some states .15
§ 316 . How soon after majority must infant disaffirm
- Doctrine that he has statutory period of limitation .
While he may not generally disaffirm his conveyance
during his minority , he is not obliged to disaffirm it
at once on attaining his majority . Upon the questions
as to how much time he may have, after attaining his
majority, in which to consider the matter , and as to how
fa
r
mere silence on his part after majority amounts to
affirmance or ratification o
f
his former conveyance , there
is some conflict among the decisions .
The doctrine of probably the greater number o
f
courts
is that mere silence continued after attaining majority fo
r





tions for the recovery of land will not prevent his d
i
affirmanc
The reason generally given fo
r
this doctrine is that
mere silence o
r








affirmance the infant ought to have the




which to recover his land .
The effect o
f
this doctrine is illustrated b
y
a case 16 in
which two minors were , respectively ,nineteen and twenty
years o
f
age when they conveyed land , for a nominal con





the land conveyed ) the sureties on a bail
bond o
f
the minors ' brother . The mortgage was given to
the sureties , and was afterward foreclosed , and the land
passed to others , against whom , eight years after the
younger o
f
the minors came o
f
age , the former infants
1
5 California Civ . Co . , $ 35 ; Idaho Civ . Co . , $ 1983 ; Montana Civ . Co . ,
$ 1
8 ; North Dakota Civ . Co . 1899 , $ 2703 ; South Dakota Civ . Co . 1901 ,
$ 3415 .
1
6 Donovan v . Ward , 1894 , 100 Mich . 601 ; 59 N . W . 254 .





brought an action of ejectment . The court held that the
action was seasonably brought , if within the period pre
scribed by the statute of limitations , remarking that th
were no improvements made by the subsequent pur
chasers , nor had either plaintiff do e anything indicating
an affirmance or ratification of the deed .
A somewhat remarkable case, where there was no disaf
firmance fo
r
nearly twenty -one years after the infant
attained her majority , 17 is frequently cited . The court
considered that there were special reasons fo
r
the delay in
this case , and that it was excusable , but the general rule
is also stated as follows : " We think the preponderance
o
f authority is , that in deeds executed b
y
infants , mere
inertness or silence continued for a period less than that
prescribed by the statute o
f
limitations , unless accompa
nied b
y
affirmative acts manifesting an intention to assent
to the conveyance ,will not bar the infant ' s right to avoid
the deed . ” 18
A
s
the reason for this doctrine is that mere silence does
not amount to affirmance or estoppel , it is held , where the
doctrine is recognized , that the lapse of a shorter time ,
taken in connection with other circumstances , may
amount to a ratification , or estop the infant grantor from
avoiding the deed ; as , for example , standing by and see




n the validity o
f
the conveyance . In such cases the for :
mer infant should not be allowed the full time which
might be permitted in others , and he must , within such
a time as is reasonable under all the circumstances , give
notice of his election to disaffirm . 19 And the retention
1
7 Sims v . Everhardt , 102 U . S . 300 . See also Stull v . Harris , 51 Ark .
294 ; 11 S . W . 104 ; Cresinger v . Welch , 15 Ohio 156 ; Ship v . McKee ,
1902 , 80 Miss . 741 ; 32 So . 281 ; 92 Am . St . R . 616 ; Lacy v . Pixler ,
1894 , 120 Mo . 383 ; 25 S . W . 20
6
; Ricbardson v . Pate , 93 Ind . 423 .
1
8 Sims v . Everhardt , supra , but especially p . 312 .
1
9 Irvine v . Irvine , 9 Wall . 617 , 627 ; Davis v . Dudley , 70 Maine 236 ;
3
5 Am . R . 318 .
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and use of the consideration after reaching his majority
for a period much shorter than that prescribed by the
statute of limitations would amount to a ratification .20
§ 317 . How soon after majority must disaffirm
“ Within a reasonable time.” _ Other courts , however ,
hold that the former infant must disaffirm his conveyance
within a reasonable time after attaining his majority or
he will be bound by acquiescence , and by reasonable time
is intended , under this view , not necessarily nor gener
ally the full statutory period prescribed for the recovery
of real property .
In a Minnesota case, 21 the authorities are discussed ,
and the court says: “ A reasonable time after majority
within which to act is all that is essential to the infant ' s
protection . That ten , fifteen or twenty years , or such
other time as the law may give for bringing an action , is
necessary as a matter of protection to him , is absurd .
* * Reason , justice to others , public policy (which
is not subserved by cherishing defective titles ), and con
venience , require the right of disaffirmance to be acted
upon within a reasonable time. What is a reasonable time
will depend upon the circumstances of each case , and may
be either for the court or jury to determine . Where there
is mere delay , with nothing to explain or excuse it, it will
be for the court.” In this case a delay of three and a half
years was regarded as more than a reasonable time, and
prima facie the conveyance was ratified . 22
In a fe
w
states it is provided b
y
statute that the infant
must disaffirm within a reasonable time after attaining
2





2 ; 56 Am . St . R . 38 .
2
1Goodnow y . Empire Lumber C
o . , 31 Minn . 468 ; 47 Am . R . 798 .
2
2 See also Bentley v .Greer , 1896 , 100 Ga . 35 ; 27 S . E . 974 ; Englebert
v . Troxell , 1894 , 40 Neb . 195 ; 58 N . W . 852 ; 26 L . R . A . 177 ; 42 Am .
S
t . R . 665 ; Thormaehlen v . Kaeppel , 1893 , 86 Wis . 378 ; 56 N . W . 1089 .
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his majority ,23 and in at least two a definite short period
is fixed by statute ,24 while occasionally , though it seems
rarely , the courts have established a definite period of
time within which the former minor must disaffirm his
conveyance , though there is no statute to this effect . For
example , in Illinois three years after majority has been
settled upon as the time, because when the first decision
was made the time prescribed by the statute of limitations
was that period , 25 though of course the infant may , by
acts amounting to a ratification , be estopped within this
time. 26
§ 318 . Former infant may disaffirm , though his gran
tee has conveyed to another . — The former minor may not
only avoid his conveyance when the property which he
attempted to convey is in the hands of his immediate
grantee , but may do so even though the land conveyed by
him has been again conveyed by his grantee to a bona
fide purchaser for value; for the infant's right to avoid
his conveyance is an absolute right, superior to the equi
ties of other persons .27 In the last case cited it was con
tended on behalf of a subsequent grantee , that when the
grantee of a minor sells the land for value to such a pur
chaser , the right to disaffirm is lost, but the court says :
“ There is no authority to support such a proposition .
23California Civ . Co ., $ 35 ; Iowa Co . 1897 , § 3189 ; Idaho Ci
v
. Co .
1901 , § 1983 ; Kansas Gen . Stat . 1901 , § 4183 ; Utah R . S . 1898 , $ 1542 ;
Washington Ann . Co . & Stat . 1897 , § 4581 .





. Dak . Civ . Co . 1899 , $ 2703 ; So . Dak . Civ .
C
o . 1901 , $ 3415 .
2
5Keil . v . Healey , 84 I11 . 104 ; 25 Am . R . 434 ; Sayles v . Christie , 1900 ,
187 Ill . 420 , 437 ; 58 N . E . 480 .
2
6 In a valuable note on infants ' contracts , 18 Am . St . R . , at pages
675 and 677 ,many authorities on this subject are collected , showing the





7 Lacy v . Pixler , 1894 , 12
0
Mo . 383 ; 25 8 . W . 20
6 ; Buchanan v . Hub





. R . 837 .
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Such a doctrine would enable the minor 's grantee to make
the deed valid by a mere sale to an innocent purchaser ,
and would practically destroy a rule established to pro
tect minors against the consequences of their improvident
conveyances .”
§ 319 . Infant's heirs may disaffirm - Others may not
generally . - As the main ground for allowing the disaf
firmance of the conveyance by the former infant on reach
ing his majority is that he may protect himself from the
improvidence incident to youth , it is sometimes said that
this right to disaffirm is a personal privilege and may not
be taken advantage of by other persons.28 But what is
intended by such expressions is that during his life this
right to disaffirm is exercisable by the former infant alone
and not by third persons for him , as it is not assignable .
For example , the assignee of an insolvent debtor who
gave a mortgage while an infant , cannot avail himself of
the infant's privilege and relieve the estate from the mort
gage ; 29 nor may a creditor attach property conveyed by
his debtor while a minor , and thus disaffirm the convey .
ance for the minor . 30
If,however , the infant grantor has died without having
himself either affirmed or disaffirmed his conveyance , or
without being estopped to disaffirm it, his heirs may
avail themselves of his infancy and repudiate it ,31 and
they have the same time in which to do so that the infant
would have had if living .32
38 Beardsley v . Hotchkiss , 96 N . Y . 201, 211.
20Mansfield v . Gordon , 144 Mass . 168 ; 10 N . E . 773 .
80Kendall v . Lawrence , 22 Pick . 540.
31Gillenwaters v . Campbell , 1895 , 142 Ind . 529 ; 41 N . E . 1041 ; Wal
ton v . Gaines , 1895 , 94 Tenn . 420 ; 29 S . W . 458 ; Searcy v . Hunter ,
1891, 81 Texas 644 ; 17 S . W . 372 ; 26 Am . St . R . 837 .
32 Sayles v . Christie , 1900 , 187 Ill . 420 , 438 ; 58 N . E . 480 ; Eagan v .
Scully , 1898 , 29 App . Div . ( N . Y . ) 617 ; 51 N . Y . S . 680 ; affirmed 173
N . Y . 581 ; 65 N . E . 1116 ; Bozeman y . Browning , 31 Ark . 364 .
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§ 320 . Effect of infant 's misrepresentation as to age.
It sometimes happens that an infant makesmisrepresen
tations in regard to his age at the time of making his
conveyance . The question as to what effect such conduct
shall have upon his right to disaffirm presents itself in a
variety of ways ; it may arise in a legal proceeding or in
an equitable proceeding , and the representation may have
been accompanied by other facts, so that it is difficult to
state a general rule applicable , without qualification , to
all cases .
By the weight of authority the rule appears to be that
misrepresentations as to age made by an infant at the
time of making his conveyance do not estop him at law
from taking advantage of infancy after attaining his
majority. For example , in an action of ejectment for the
recovery of lands , the deed , executed by the plaintiff
while a minor ,33 recited that she was " unmarried and of
age,” and the court holds that by such a false recital in
the deed she is not estopped from disaffirming it, on the
general principle that the doctrine of estoppel is inappli
cable to infants.34
But if the proceedings in which the former infant
seeks to disaffirm his conveyance be in equity he has
sometimes been held estopped by his fraudulent mis
representations as to his age which have induced the
grantee to accept his conveyance .36
While actual misrepresentation as to age , or any arti
fice which misleads , may thus be held in equity to estop
the former infant, his mere failure to disclose his dis
ability will not so estop him ; that is, if a minor of nearly
full age , and appearing to be quite so , should (without
33 Wieland y . Kobick , 110 Ill . 16; 51 Am . R . 676 .
84 And see Alt v . Graff , 1896 , 65 Minn . 191 , 195 ;68 N . W . 9 ; Buchanan
v . Hubbard , 96 Ind . 1 ; 119 Ind , 187 ; 21 N . E . 538 ; Studwell v . Shapter ,
54 N . Y . 249 .
36 Ryan v . Growney , 1894 , 125 Mo. 474 ; 28 S. W . 189 ; Pemberton
Bldg. & c. Ass 'n v. Adams , 1895 , 53 N . J . Eq . 258 ; 31 Atl . 280 .
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misrepresenting his age ) convey to one who believed him
to be of full age , he could , nevertheless, disaffirm the
conveyance . 36 And in spite of false representations , the
infantwill not be estopped , even in equity , unless the other
party was actually deceived by such representations and re
lied upon them . Thus, if the representations as to age
were made to some person other than the grantee and not
communicated to him , or were made to the grantee by a
boy ten years old - in such cases it would be impossible
that the grantee could have relied on them , and the
grantor would not be estopped to repudiate the convey
ance . 37
In Sims v . Everhardt, 38 the case was in equity . The
grantor had made a written statement that she was of
age . But the court says, on the question as to whether
she was estopped , that estoppel in pais is not applicable
to infants, and a fraudulent representation of capacity
cannot be an equivalent of actual capacity . A convey
ance by an infant is an assertion of his right to convey .
A contemporaneous declaration of his right or of his age
adds nothing to what is implied in his deed . An asser
tion of an estoppel against him is but a claim that he has
assented or contracted But he can no more do that effec
tively than he can make the contract alleged to be con
firmed .39
To remove some of the uncertainty prevailing as to the
effect of misrepresentations , and to apply to al
l
cases the
rule applied often in equity , statutes have been adopted
3
6 Sewell v . Sewell , 1892 , 92 Ky . 500 ; 18 S . W . 162 ; Baker v . Stone ,
136 Mass . 405 ; Thormaehlen v .Kaeppel , 86 Wis . 378 ; 56 N . W . 1089 .
3
7 Watson v . Billings , 38 Ark . 278 ; 42 Am . R . 1 ; Ex parte Jones , L .
R . 18 Ch . Div . 109 , 120 ; Charles v .Hastedt , 1893 , 51 N . J . Eq . 171 ; 26
Atl . 564 ; Bradshaw v . Van Winkle , 1892 , 133 Ind . 134 ; 32 N . E . 877 .
8
8 Sims v . Everhardt , 102 U . S . 300 .
3





the husband against his wife , the infant grantor , ap
pears to have existed .
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in some states ,40 providing that “ No contract [of a minor ]
can be disaffirmed in cases where on account of the minor 's
own misrepresentations as to his majority , or from his
having engaged in business as an adult , the other party
has good reason to believe him capable of contracting. ”
And in Indiana the statute provides that if the infant
falsely represented himself to the purchaser to be over
twenty -one , and the purchaser acted in good faith and
relied upon the representation , the conveyance cannot be
disaffirmed without restoring the consideration .41
§ 321 . The restoration of the consideration on dis
affirmance . - In the absence of a statute on the subject ,
shall the consideration received by the minor be restored
upon his disaffirmance of his conveyance ?
Someof the earlier authorities state the rule to be that
on disaffirmance the former infant must restore the con
sideration . But the present doctrine cannot be stated
so broadly , and the general rule now is, that so much of
the consideration for the conveyance as remains in the in
fant's possession at his majority must be returned upon
his disaffirmance; yet his disaffirmance will not be pre
vented by his inability to return what he has parted with
during his minority .
In one form of expression or another , as applied to the
particular circumstances of each case , the law says to the
former infant who would disaffirm his conveyance that he
cannot regain his land , and also retain after his majority
what he received for it .43
v. SeeKentucon S . 1
9
0
1 , tel Ann .Cole S
ta
t . 1901 ,40 E . G . , Iowa Co . 1897 , § 3190 ; Kansas Gen . Stat . 1901 , $ 4184 ; Utah
R . S . 1898 . & 1543 ; Washington Ann . Co . & Stat . 1897 , § 4582 .
4
1 Ind . Burns ' R . S . 1901 , $ 3365 .
4
2 See Kent Comm . II , p . 240 ; Kilgore v . Jordan , 17 Texas 341 ; Fari
v . Sumner , 12 Vt . 28 ; 36 Am . D . 327 ; Bartlett v . Cowles , 15 Gray 445 .
4
9 MacGrael v . Taylor , 1897 , 167 U . S . 688 , 700 ; Ridgeway v . Herbert ,
1899 , 150 Mo . 606 ; 51 S . W . 1040 ; 73 Am . S
t
. R . 464 ; Bullock v .
Sprowls , 1899 , 93 Texas 188 ; 54 S . W . 661 ; 47 L . R . A . 326 ; 77 Am . S
t .
R . 849 ; Green v .Green , 69 N . Y . 553 , 55
6 ; 25 Am . R . 233 ; Englebert
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This principle has been made statutory in Iowa , Kan
sas , Utah and Washington , where the minor, on disaf
firming ,must restore “ al
l




virtue of the contract , and remaining within his
control at any time after his attaining his majority . ” 44
The force o
f
such a statute is somewhat lessened b
y
de
cisions that the former minor may disaffirm without
restoring the consideration , unless he has the identical
property , even the identical money , received b
y
him , 46
but statutes of similar character in a few states make it
unnecessary to consider this question o
f
identity , by re
quiring that if the minor was over eighteen years o
f
age
when the contract was made hemay disaffirm upon restor
ing the consideration , or its equivalent . 46
Where there are no such statutes the question of the
identity o
f
the consideration has sometimes been raised ,
and it has been held in some cases that , on disaffirmance ,
the former infant must return simply what he has , after
majority , o
f
the specific consideration received . For ex .
ample , where an infant had conveyed , 47 and the money
paid to the infant had been used b
y
his father to pur
chase a piano for the infant , it was held that hemight
disaffirm the conveyance without surrendering o
r
tender
v . Troxell , 1894 , 40 Neb . 195 ; 58 N . W . 852 ; 26 L . R . A . 17
7 ; 42 Am . St .
R . 665 ; Ison v . Cornett , 1903 (Ky . ) ; 75 S . W . 204 .
4
4 Iowa Co . 1897 , $ 3189 ; Kansas Gen . Stat . 1901 , $ 4183 ; Utah R . S .
1898 , $ 1542 ; Washington Ann . Co . & Stat . 1897 , § 4581 . See Montana
Civ . Co . , § 18 . See Indiana statute cited supra , note 41 , as to restora
tion of consideration when misrepresentations are made ; also the stat
ute in the same state , Burns ' R . S . 1901 , $ 3364 , requiring its return when
an infant feme covert conveys by a conveyance in which her husband ,
of full age , has joined , unless she avers that she has received none .
Shroyer v . Pittenger , 1903 , 31 Ind . App . 158 ; 67 N . E . 475 .
4
6 Hawes v . R . R . Co . , 64 Iowa 31
5 , 319 ; 20 N . W . 71
7 ; Leacox v . Grif
fith , 76 Iowa 89 , 90 ; 40 N . W . 109 .
4
6 California Civ . Co . , $ 35 ; Idaho Ci
v
. Co . , § 1983 ; North Dakota
Civ . Co . , $ 2703 ; South Dakota Civ . Co . , $ 3415 .
4
7 Englebert v . Troxell , 1894 , 40 Neb . 19
5 , 21
0 ; 58 N . W . 852 ; 26 L . R .
A . 177 ; 42 Am . S
t
. R . 665 .
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ing the piano . But in another case , 48 where it was con
tended on behalf of a former infant that a trust deed given
by her could be set aside without accounting for themoney
which had been raised by the deed and which had gone to
improve the very property conveyed , the ground of the con
tention being that , as the money could not be specifically
returned , it should not be accounted for , the court held
that , as the improvements were in the hands of the former
minor , she must account for them if the property could
be sold fo
r
enough . The aim o
f
the court was stated to
b
e




the time the trust deed was given , so far as it could
be done .
There would seem to be n
o hardship in requiring that ,
if the disaffirming party has not the specific consideration




s the direct proceeds o
f
the consideration should b
e sub
ject to the claims o
f
the other party . 19




consideration , a dis
tinction has often been made between cases a
t
law and in
equity ; the rule in proceedings at law being , that neither
a return o
f
the consideration , nor an offer to return , is a
necessary condition precedent to the remedy sought b
y
the action ; while where the proceeding is in equity a
return o
f
the consideration which remains in the former
infant ' s hands , or an offer to return , must be made as a
condition to granting relief ; for in equitable proceedings
the courts will apply to this class of cases the maxim
that " h
e who seeks equity must d
o equity , ” while in
4
8 MacGrael v . Taylor , 1897 , 167 U . S . 688 , 700 .
4
9 The former infant may not avoid a mortgage and a
t
the same time
retain the land benefited by the proceeds o
f the mortgage . Charles v .
Hastedt , 1893 , 51 N . J . Eq . 171 ; 26 Atl . 564 ; U . S . Investment C
o . v .
Ulrickson , 1901 , 84 Minn . 14 ; 86 N . W . 613 ; 87 Am . S
t . R . 32
6
. Nor
may he avoid a purchase -money mortgage and retain the land conveyed
to him , in part payment for which he gave the mortgage . Young v .
McKee , 13 Mich . 552 ; Callis v . Day , 38 Wis . 643 ; Ready v . Pinkham ,
1902 , 181 Mass . 351 ; 63 N . E . 887 .
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legal proceedings conditions cannot be attached to the
right to disaffirm .50
§ 322 . What constitutes disaffirmance . — Thedisaffirm
ance may be accomplished in a variety of ways , as is seen
from the foregoing cases .
The older authorities sometimes state the rule to be
that an act of disaffirmance must be of solemnity and
notoriety equal to that of the conveyance to be avoided ,51
because at common law an infant 's conveyance by livery
of seisin could be avoided only by an act of equal noto
riety — as an entry on the land .
But nowadays , generally speaking , any act which
clearly shows an intention to disaffirm , and with which
the continued validity of the former conveyance is incon
sistent, is sufficient as a disaffirmance. As, for example ,
an absolute conveyance to another person after majority ;
the bringing of an action in ejectment ; the filing of a bill
to cancel a former conveyance ; in some cases , the filing
with the recording officer of a notice of disaffirmance .52
The act after majority , however , must be inconsistent
with the former conveyance to amount to a disaffirmance
of it. And so a mortgage or quit claim deed made after
majority will not necessarily amount to a disaffirmance of
a mortgage given during minority . The two instruments
are consistent with each other and may stand together .53
And a conveyance made after majority may , by being
made expressly subject to one made during minority ,
rather ratify the former , than disaffirm it ; as , where a
50 Chandler v . Simmons, 97 Mass . 508 , 514 ; Eureka Co . v . Edwards ,
71 Ala . 248 , 256 ; 46 Am . R . 314 ; Stull v . Harris , 51 Ark. 294 ; 11 S . W .
104 ; Sewell v . Sewell , 1892 , 92 Ky. 500 ; 18 S . W . 162 .
51 Bool v. Mix , 17 Wend . 119 ; 31 Am . D . 285 . As to this , and the
distinction between acts of avoidance and acts of affirmance , see Irvine
v . Irvine , 9 Wall . 617 , 627 , 628 .
52 Tucker v . Moreland , 10 Pet. 58 ; Haynes v. Bennett , 53 Mich . 15 ;
18 N . W . 539; Shroyer v . Pittenger, 1903 , 31 Ind . App . 15
8 ; 67 N . E . 475 .
5
8 Singer Mfg . Co . v . Lamb , 81 Mo . 221 .
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mortgage made after majority recited a former mortgage ,
made during minority , it was held to give priority to the
former .54
§ 323 . Effect of conveyance to an infant . — When an
estate is conveyed to a minor the title vests in him , but
subject to his right to repudiate the purchase on arriving
at his majority , or within a reasonable time thereafter.
If, therefore , he retains possession of real estate conveyed
to him for an unreasonable time after majority he will be
considered to have affirmed the conveyance to him , and
it will then be impossible for him to repudiate the pur
chase and recover what he may have paid or given in ex
change fo
r
the property . 55 And affirmative acts o
f
owner
ship after majority , as , for instance , selling the land con
veyed to him , will the more clearly amount to a ratifica
tion and prevent a repudiation b
y
him . 56
§ 324 . How infants ' real property may be conveyed .
While a minor ' s own conveyance is voidable , it is often
desirable o
r necessary to convey or mortgage his real
estate , and to do so in such a way that the purchaser or
mortgagee may be secure in his title , and not hold it sub
ject to the infant ' s right to repudiate it on majority .
The parent o
r
other natural guardian has , as a rule , no
authority to make a conveyance o
f
the infant ' s land , and
a court may not authorize a natural guardian , as such , to
convey . 57 Nor may the guardian of the estate of an in
fant generally convey the lands o
f his ward without
special legal authority . 58
5
4 Ward v . Anderson , 1892 , 111 N . C . 11




5 Henry v . Root , 33 N . Y . 526 ; Scanlan v . Wright , 13 Pick . 523 ; 25
Am . D . 344 ; Baker v . Kennett , 54 Mo . 82 ; Ellis v . Alford , 64 Miss . 8 .
5
6 Langdon v . Clayson , 75 Mich . 204 ; Uecker v . Koehn , 21 Neb . 559 ;
5
9 Am . R . 849 ; and see note 4
9 , supra , $ 321 .
5
7 Dengenhart v . Cracraft , 36 Ohio S
t
. 549 , 572 ; Shanks v . Seamonds ,
2
4 Iowa 131 ; 92 Am . D . 465 ; Myers v . McGavock , 1894 , 39 Neb . 843 ,
856 ; 58 N . W . 522 ; 42 Am . St . R . 627 .
5
8 Wolf v . Holton , 1895 , 104 Mich . 107 ; 62 N . W . 174 ; State v . Com
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There is some difference of opinion on the question
whether courts of equity have inherently power to author
ize the conveyance of infants ' real property ,59 and partly
because of the doubts as to the existence of this power
statutes have been enacted in nearly every state , empow
ering certain courts to order a conveyance of infants ' real
property , under certain circumstances .
Each state has power over the property of infants
within it
s
bounds , to the extent that it may provide for
the disposition of their estates , the mode of appointing
guardians , their qualifications and duties , 60 and under
this general power these statutes have been passed .
In most o
f
the states the statutes give jurisdiction in
such cases to the probate courts or orphans ' courts ; in
some o
f
the states the chancery courts , or courts of gen
eral jurisdiction , like circuit and district courts ,are given
authority in these matters , and in some states concurrent
jurisdiction is given to probate and other courts .
§ 325 . The general principle controlling in such cases .




n infant ' s lands may be made , but no
matter what their particular requirements may be , it is a
general rule that all the provisions of the statute must be
complied with in order to transfer title from the minor
and vest it in the purchaser .





which the title o
f
one is to b
e
divested and transferred
to another , must be strictly pursued , and every requisite
thereof having the semblance of benefit to its owner must
b
e complied with in order to divest his title . ” 61 The
missioners , 39 Ohio St . 58 ; Johns v . Tiers , 1886 , 114 Pa . St . 611 ; 7 Atl .
923 .
6
9 See post , $ 330 .
6
0 Hoyt v . Sprague , 103 U . S . 613 , 631 .
6
1 Ellwood v . Northrup , 106 N . Y . 172 , 185 ; 12 N . E . 590 ; Carder v .
Culbertson , 100 Mo . 269 ; 13 S . W . 88 ; McMannis v . Rice , 48 Iowa 361 .
2
6
– BREws . Con .
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burden is on the party claiming title by such proceedings
to show by affirmative evidence that he acquired title,
and in the absence of proof there are no presumptions
that the material requirements of the statute have been
complied with ,62 and the purchaser at such a sale is pre
sumed to have knowledge of all the proceedings .63
§ 326 . The application by proper party - Notice . — The
first step in such cases is to apply to the court named in
the statute for permission to convey ; and the application
must, of course , be made by the proper party .64 This
party is generally the legally appointed guardian or cura
tor of the minor, and the court has no jurisdiction to
authorize a sale on the application of any one else when
the legal guardian is designated by statute . Hence con
veyances made on the application of a parent as natural
guardian merely , or on the application of the infant by
his next friend , have been held void . And where the
application must be by the guardian , if the appointment
of the guardian is void , a conveyance made on his appli
cation is void . 65
In a few states , however , the application may be made ,
and in some should be made, by the next friend of the
infant. In such cases the petition is presented to the
court by a natural guardian , or near relative , as next
friend , who thus brings thematter before the court , which
then appoints a responsible guardian , who gives security
for the faithful performance ofhis duty , and is authorized
to act on behalf of the infant.66
A very general provision of such statutes is that notice
of the application shall be given either to the infant him
62 Ellwood v. Northrup , 106 N . Y . 172, 186 ; 12 N . E . 590 .
68 Axtell 's Case , 1893 , 95 Mich . 244 ; 54 N . W . 889 ; Leuders v . Thomas ,
1895 , 35 Fla ,518 ; 17 So . 633 ; 48 Am . St. R . 255 ; Bachelor v . Korb , 1899 ,
58 Neb . 122, 13
0 ; 78 N . W . 485 ; 76 Am . St . R . 70 .
6
4 Grier ' s Appeal , 101 Pa . St . 412 .
6
6 State v . McLaughlin , 77 Ind . 335 .
6
6 Re Whitlock , 19 How . Proc . 380 .
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self or to someone interested in his behalf . A sale made
without notice of the application is , by some courts , held
invalid , the proceedings being regarded as adversary to





garded not as adversary to the infant o
r
ward , but as pro
ceedings in re
m , and in such cases it is held that the juris
diction o
f
the court does not depend on the giving of
notice , but that it is enough that the court has jurisdic
tion o
f
the subject matter . 68
§ 327 . Such conveyances allowed for certain purposes .
- The statutes generally provide that such a conveyance
may be ordered for certain purposes only . Therefore the












fant ' s lands for an unauthorized purpose is void . 69 The
most usual ground upon which such applications are au
thorized and are made , is that the sale is necessary for the
infant ' s maintenance and education , but other purposes
are authorized by some statutes — as , for example , sales for
the purpose o
f investing the proceeds in income producing
securities , or to discharge a debt on the land , or to pre
vent waste ; and some statutes provide in general terms
that a conveyance may be made if for any reason it may
be deemed for the minor ' s interest .
§ 328 . Hearing on the application — Guardian ' s bond
Approval by court . — The land is , o
f
course , accurately










facts set forth in it .
6
7 Rankin v . Miller , 43 Iowa 11 ; Kennedy v . Gaines , 51 Miss . 625 .
6
8 Myers v . McGavock , 1894 , 39 Neb . 843 , 862 ; 58 N . W . 522 ; 42 Am .
S
t
. R . 627 ; Thaw v . Ritchie , 1890 , 136 U . S .519 .
6
9 Beal y . Harmon , 38 Mo . 435 ; Fowler v . Lewis , 36 W . Va . 112 , 127 ;
1
4
S . E . 447 ; Lyman v . Conkey , 1 Met . 317 , 324 ; Beezley v . Phillips ,
1902 , 11
7
Fed . R . 105 ; 54 C . C . A . 491 ; Liter v . Fishback , 1903 (Ky . ) ;
7
5
S . W . 232 .
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The court, after a hearing on the necessity or desira
bility of the sale , orders a contract of sale , and requires a
bond from the guardian . If the guardian fails to give a
proper bond the sale is invalid .To Generally , the sale
must be reported to and approved by the court ; and
where this is required the validity of the sale depends on
its approval by the court . 71 Such conveyances by guard
ians under the court 's orders are judicial sales , and the
guardian acts as the instrument of the court in carrying
out its orders : hence , it has sometimes been held that an
irregular sale when duly ratified and confirmed by the
court is made valid , unless, at least, attacked in a direct
proceeding ;12 but for the court ' s confirmation to have this
effect , the sale must have been simply irregular or voida
ble and not void .73
§ 329 . Statutes curing effects of irregularities. — To
insure a fair degree of security to the purchaser in good
faith at guardians ' sales, the statutes of some states pro
vide that such sales shall not be deemed invalid for irregu
larities if it appears that certain enumerated essentials
have been complied with ; among which essentials usually
are : that a license to sell has been granted by the court
having jurisdiction , that the guardian took the oath re
quired , that he gave a bond , that he gave notice , that the
70 Stewart v . Bailey , 28 Mich . 251 ; Ryder v. Flanders , 30 Mich . 33
6 ;
Weld v . Johnson Mfg . Co . , 1893 , 84 Wis . 537 ; 54 N . W . 335 ; Barnett




1 Bone v . Tyrrell , 1892 , 113 Mo . 175 ; 20 S . W : 796 . In this case for
mer minors recover land over thirty years after a guardian ' s sale or
dered by the court , but not approved . Dohms v . Mann , 76 Iowa 723 ;
3
9
N . W . 823 ; Titman v . Riker , 43 N . J . Eq . 122 ; 10 Atl . 397 ; Lump
kins v . Johnson , 1895 , 61 Ark . 80 ; 32 S . W . 65 ; Hicks v . Blakeman ,
1896 , 74 Miss . 459 , 477 ; 21 So . 7 .
7
2 Eliason v . Bronnenberg , 1896 , 147 Ind . 248 ; 46 N . E . 582 ; Hamiel
v . Donnelly , 75 Iowa 93 ; 39 N . W . 210 .
7
3 Jenness v . Smith , 58 Mich . 280 ; 25 N . W . 191 ; Carder y . Culbert
eon , 1890 , 100 Mo . 269 ; 13 S . W . 88 ; McMannis v . Rice , 48 Iowa 361 ;
Frazier v . Jeakins , 1902 , 64 Kan . 615 ; 68 Pac . 24 ; 57 L . R . A . 575 .
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premises were conveyed in accordance with the license ,
that the sale was confirmed by the court, and that the
property is held by one who purchased in good faith .
Statutes of this general character are to be found in Indi
ana , Michigan , Minnesota , Nebraska , Oregon ,Wisconsin ,
and perhaps other states , though some require more to be
shown on behalf of a purchaser than do others .74
§ 330 . Power of chancery court to order conveyance
of minor 's land . - In some states it is held that a court of
chancery , acting under its general powers and without
any statute authorizing it , may order the sale of an
infant ' s real estate ,where it is shown to be for his benefit . 75
It has , however , been held b
y
the English courts that the






inherent powers , to order the sale o
f
a
n infant ' s real
property , even for his advantage , and acts of parliament
were considered necessary to enable guardians to convey
for the infant . 76 Some American courts have assigned
a
s
a reason for denying this jurisdiction in England that
by changing the character of the minor ' s estate from real
to personal the rights o
f
those who would be entitled to
the property , in case of the minor ' s death , would be
affected , as real and personal property descends and is dis
tributed , respectively , in different lines ; and these courts
have consequently considered that , as this reason does not
obtain in this country , therefore the English rule should
not be followed . 77 Other American courts (and it seems
7
6 Ind . Burns ' R . S . 1901 , $ 2698 ; Mich . C . L . 1897 , § 9129 ; Minn . G .
L . 1894 , $ $ 4612 , 4613 ; Neb . Com . Stat . 1901 , $ 2579 ; Ore .Hill ' s Ann . L .
1892 , p . 1855 , $ 3 ; Wis . Stat . 1898 , $ 3919 .
7
5 Hale v . Hale , 1893 , 14
6
Ill . 22
7 , 249 ; 33 N . E . 858 ; 20 L . R . A . 247 ;
Gorman v . Mullins , 1898 , 172 Ill . 349 ; 50 N . E . 222 ; Thorington v .
Thorington , 82 Ala . 489 ; 1 So . 716 ; Taylor v . Peabody & c . Co . , 65 Md . .
388 ; 4 Atl . 886 ; Hurt v . Long , 1891 , 90 Tenn . 445 , 459 ; 16 S . W . 968 .
7
6Macpherson on Infants , p . 318 .
7
7 See for discussion and review o
f
authorities : Richards v . East
Tenn . & c . R . Co . , 1899 , 10
6
Ga . 614 ; 33 8 . E . 193 ; 45 L . R . A . 712 ; Hale
v . Hale , 1893 , 146 Ill . 227 ; 33 N . E . 858 ; 20 L . R . A . 247 .
406 $ 330THE LAW OF CONVEYANCING .
the greater number ) have , however , followed the view of
the English courts, and have held that the power of the
court of chancery extends only to the personal estate of
infants and the income of real estate , and that the real
estate cannot be conveyed except under statutes of the
character mentioned . 78
78Losey v. Stanley , 1895 , 147 N . Y . 560 , 569 ; 42 N . E . 8 ; Hoback v .
Miller, 1898 , 44 W . Va. 635 , 638 ; 29 8. E . 1014 ; Faulkner v . Davis , 18
Grat . 651 ; 98 Am . D . 698 , n . p . 735 ; Liter v. Fishback , 1903 (Ky. ) ;
75 S . W . 232 . It was generally considered necessary formerly ,
before the enactment of these general statutes , to apply to the legisla
ture for a special act, authorizing the guardian to act in the particular
case . But special legislation is now expressly prohibited by the con .
stitutions of many states ; and, besides , many courts have held that
such laws, passed for the special purpose of allowing particular lands
of a minor to be sold , are unconstitutional , because there is involved
in the determination of such questions the exercise of judicial power
by the legislature. Answer of court , etc ., 4 N . H . 565 , 572 ; Gannett v.
Leonard , 47 Mo. 205, 208 ; Garth v. Arnold , 1902 , 115 Fed . R . 468 ; Hoyt
v . Sprague , 103 U , S. 613 , 634 . See supra , 8 324 .
CHAPTER XXI.
THE CONVEYANCE OF THE REAL ESTATE OF PERSONS OF
UNSOUND MIND .
$ 331. Insane persons' convey .
ances similar to infants '
- Yet the two classes
differ .
332 . Conveyance of insane per .
son , under guardianship ,
void .
333 . While guardianship con
tinues ward presumed in
competent - But not if
merely adjudged insane
or guardianship ended .
334 . Effect of guardianship of
spendthrifts and drunk .
ards.
335 . Conveyance of insane per
son not under guardian
ship generally voidable .
336 . Such conveyancesometimes
considered void - Powers
of attorney .
337 . Whether such a voidable
deed conveys title with
out being affirmed .
338 . The kinds and degrees of
insanity .
339 . The question as to insanity
must relate to the time of
the act .
$ 340 . Presumption of sanity - Not
overcome by mere weak
ness ofmind - Partial in
sanity .




342 . The conveyance where re
garded as voidable may
be affirmed .
343 . Deed of insane grantor may
be disaffirmed by him
when sane .
344 . May be disaffirmed by his
guardian .
345 . Insane grantor' s heirs may
disaffirm - Creditors gen
erally may not.
346 . As to the return of consid
eration on disaffirmance .
347 . Whether conveyance may
be disaffirmed as against
subsequent bona fide
grantee .
348 . Statutes providing for the
disposal of insane per
sons ' interests in lands.
§ 331. Insane persons' conveyances similar to infants '
- Yet the two classes differ . - It is sometimes said that
the same rules are applied in law to conveyances by per
sons of unsound mind as to conveyances by infants . But
(407 )
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the statement is not quite accurate. While the two classes
of cases strongly resemble each other at some points , the
differences are so many that it is practically unwise to
rely on the analogy between them . On many points re
garding conveyances by those of unsound mind there is
more conflict of opinion than there is on similar points
regarding conveyances by infants ; some of the conflict
has undoubtedly been caused by an attempt in many in
stances to press the analogy between the two classes too
far , and some by a failure to discriminate between acts
that are voidable and those that are void .
§ 332 . Conveyance of insane person , under guardian
ship , void . There is one general rule upon which there
is almost universal agreement, namely , the conveyance of
a person who has been adjudicated to be of unsound mind ,
and who has been placed under guardianship is absolutely
void .
Guardianship of this class of persons is provided for by
statute in probably every state , though such guardians are
known by different names in different states , as “ Com
mittee , ” “ Conservator " or simply “ Guardian .” The
general purpose of the guardianship is to protect the
property of the incompetent ; the guardianship takes from
him the management ofhis estate , hence follows the gen
eral rule just stated .2
The conveyance in such a case being void , the guardi
an 's assent to it will not make it valid , unless the assent
is authorized by a court under statutory proceedings simi
lar to those by which an infant's guardian conveys ; ; and
so , fo
r
example , where a wife may relinquish her dower
* See ante , $ 312 .
? See Hughes v . Jones , 1889 , 116 N . Y . 67 , 73 ; 22 N . E . 446 ; 15 Am .
S
t
. R . 386 ; 5 L . R . A . 632 ; Wait v . Maxwell , 5 Pick . 217 ; 16 Am . D .
391 ; New Eng . Loan and Trust Co . v . Spitler , 1895 , 54 Kan . 560 ; 38
Pac . 799 ; Imhoff v . Witmer ' s Admr . , 31 Pa . St . 243 .
8 See Ante , $ 324 .
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in the real estate of her husband only by a “ joint deed ”
of herself and her husband , if an insane man , his wife
and his guardian all join in a deed of the ward ' s land it
is of no effect , and the ward 's wife may claim her dower ,
because she has not barred it by executing a joint deed
with her husband .4
$ 333 . While guardianship continues ward presumed in :
competent — But not if merely adjudged insane or guard
ianship ended . — While the guardianship continues there
is a conclusive presumption that the ward lacks capacity
to make a conveyance , and evidence will not be received
to rebut this presumption . But to have this effect and
to raise this presumption the guardianship must actually
be in force at the time the conveyance is made. Hence ,
if the guardianship has ceased , either by removal of the
guardian or by his abandonment of the guardianship ,
there is no such conclusive presumption .6
A mere adjudication of insanity without the appoint
ment of a guardian does not establish this conclusive
presumption . A distinction is to be noted between a
proceeding to commit an insane person to an asylum for
treatment and custody , and a proceeding having for its
object the appointment o
f
a guardian for him on the
ground that he is not competent to manage his estate . A
person may b
e
so insane that he ought to be committed
to a
n asylum and yet b
e
sane enough to make a will or a
deed . In many states a commitment to some retreat is
not even prima facie evidence o
f
the committed person ' s
• Rannells v . Gerner , 80 Mo . 474 .
5 Rannells v . Gerner , 80 Mo . 474 ; Leonard v . Leonard , 14 Pick . 280 .
6 Willwerth v . Leonard , 1892 , 156 Mass . 277 ; 31 N . E . 299 ; Thorpe v .
Hanscom , 1896 , 64 Minn . 201 ; 66 N . W . 1 ; Elston v . Jasper , 45 Tex .
409 . This is the general rule where the matter has not been affected by
statute ; in some states the presumption exists by virtue of the statute ,
when idiocy o
r lunacy has once been found , even though the guardian .
ship may have been abandoned . Ridden v . Baker , 86 Ind . 191 ; Burn
ham v . Kidwell , 113 Il
l
. 425 .
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incapacity to contract; and, even if prima facie evidence
of such fact, evidence may , notwithstanding , be received
to show that he was competent .?
$ 334 . Effect of guardianship of spendthrifts and
drunkards . — There are other persons for whom guardians
may be appointed under the statutes of some states, who
are to some extent incompetent, and who yet are not
insane , in the ordinary sense of the term : these are
spendthrifts , drunkards and other persons who, by reason
of certain qualities named in the statutes , are deemed
unfit to have the management of their property .8
The statutes of several states provide that if a copy of
the application fo
r
a commission or inquisition in regard
to the competency o
f
such a person b
e





deeds , or other public office designated
in the statute , all contracts (except for necessaries ) , and
gifts , sales and transfers of property shall thereafter be
void , if , as a result o
f
the application , a guardian is ap
pointed for the alleged incompetent . "
§ 335 . Conveyance of insane person not under guard
ianship generally voidable . There are , however , many
persons who are of unsound mind , because of disease , old
age , accident or intoxication , who have never been placed
under guardianship , nor have been in any manner ad
judged insane o
r
otherwise incompetent . As to whether
? Dewey v . Allgire , 1893 , 37 Neb . 6 ; 55 N . W . 276 ; 40 Am . St . R . 468 ;
Leggate v . Clark , 11
1
Mass . 308 ; Topeka Water Supply Co . v . Root ,
1895 , 56 Kan . 187 , 194 ; 42 Pac . 715 ; Miskey ' s Appeal , 107 Pa . St . 611 ,
627 .
8 Indiana , Burns ' R . 8 . 1901 , $ $ 5743 , 5744 ; Iowa , Co . 1897 , $ 3219 ;
Missouri , R . S . 1899 , $ 3701 .
9Michigan , C . L . 1897 , 98 8712 , 8714 ;Minnesota Gen . Stat . 1894 , $ 4549 ;
Nebraska , Com . Stat . 1901 , $ $ 3228 , 3230 ; Oregon , Hill ' s Ann . L . 1892 ,
§ 2893 ; Wisconsin , Stat . 1898 , $ 3979 . See for somewhat different type
o
f
statute , Connecticut , Gen . Stat . 1902 , $ 1833 ; Massachusetts R . L .
1902 , ch . 145 , $ 8 .
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conveyances by such persons are void ormerely voidable ,
there is some difference of opinion .
The general rule , as laid down by most of the Ameri
can courts, is that the conveyance of a person of unsound
mind , but not under guardianship , is voidable , merely ,
and not void . 10
In states where this doctrine is announced in general
terms, it appears that there might arise cases in which
the conveyance would be held void — as, for example ,
where the grantor is so entirely devoid of mental power
as to be wholly incapable of comprehending the nature of
his act in making the conveyance , and especially where
the grantee knew that this degree of mental unsoundness
existed . 12 On the other hand, it seems that there might
arise cases in which the conveyance would be held not
even voidable — as where the person dealing with the
grantor was ignorant of his incapacity , and dealt with
him in entire good faith and paid an adequate considera
tion .13
§ 336 . Such a conveyance sometimes considered void
Powers of attorney . - While the greater number of auth
orities hold that the conveyance by one of unsound mind ,
not under guardianship , is voidable , merely , good reasons
have been given for holding it to be void , 14 and there are
recent decisions so holding .15
10 Moran y . Moran , 1895 , 10
6
Mich . 8 ; 63 N . W . 989 ; 58 Am . S
t
. R .
462 ; Castro v . Geil , 1895 , 110 Cal . 292 ; 42 Pac . 804 ; 52 Am . S
t
. R . 84 ;
Riley v . Carter , 1893 , 76 Md . 581 ; 25 Atl . 667 ; 19 L . R . A . 489 ; French
Lumbering Co . v . Theriault , 1900 , 107 Wis . 627 ; 83 N . W . 927 ; 81 Am .
S
t
. R . 856 ; 51 L . R . A . 910 ; McAnaw v . Tiffin , 1898 , 143 Mo . 667 , 678 ;
4
5
S . W . 656 ; Boyer v . Berryman , 1890 , 123 Ind . 451 ; 24 N . E . 249 .
1
1 French Lumbering Co . v . Theriault , 1900 , 107 Wis . 627 ; 83 N . W .
927 ; 81 Am . S
t
. R . 856 ; 51 L . R . A . 910 ; Castro v . Geil , 1895 , 110 Cal .
292 ; 42 Pac . 804 ; 52 Am . St . R . 84 .
1
3 Thrash v . Starbuck , 1896 , 145 Ind . 673 , 680 ; 44 N . E . 543 .
1
8 Rhoades y . Fuller , 1897 , 139 Mo . 179 ; 40 S . W . 760 .
1
4 Compare the court ' s opinions with the dissenting opinions in ,
Allen v . Berryhill , 27 Iowa 534 , and Elder v . Schumacher , 1893 , 18
Colo . 433 .
1
5 Boddie v . Bush , 1903 , 136 Ala . 560 ; 33 So . 826 ; Galloway v . Hen
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That such a conveyance is void , is sometimes said16 to
be the rule in the Federal Courts , “ however conflicting
the decisions of the state courts may be upon the question
whether the deed of an insane person is void or voidable,"
and the case of Dexter v . Hall ,17 is cited as fixing the
law for these courts . In this case , however , it was
merely decided that the power of attorney of an insane
person is void , although much is said of deeds in general
and reasons are given for holding them also void . But
in spite of these reasons it appears that now the Supreme
Court of the United States agrees with the majority of
state courts in holding such a deed not void , but merely
voidable . 18 ,
This conflict of opinion as to whether the conveyance
of one of unsound mind is void or voidable has arisen ,
probably , from the fact that it was formerly held in Eng
land that a feoffment with livery of seisin made by one
insane was not void , but voidable merely , though his
deed of bargain and sale was void - being similar to those
of infants . 19 The reasons for attaching greater impor
tance to the feoffment than to the deed no longer exist ,
and the distinction between the different sorts of convey .
ances has gradually been lost sight of by many , and yet
has been maintained by others . In this country a deed
executed in proper form and duly recorded or registered
is very generally regarded as equivalent to a feoffment ,20
and therefore conveyances of all kinds by incompetents
have often been held voidable merely , on the authority of
the old English rule .21
don , 1901 , 131 Ala . 280 ; 31 So . 603 ; German Savings & L . Soc . v . De
Lashmutt , 1895 , 67 Fed . 399.
16Parker v . Marco , 1896 , 76 Fed . 510 , 512 .
17 15 Wall. 9.
18Luhrs v . Hancock , 1901 , 181 U . S . 567 .
19See ante , $ 314 .
20See ante , $s 53 , 58 .
11See Riley v . Carter , 1893, 76 Md. 581 ; 25 Atl . 667 ; 19 L . R . A . 489 ;
Dexter v . Hall , 15 Wall . 9 ; Case of Sarah DeSilver, 5 Rawle 111 .
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For the same reasons that powers of attorney given by
infants have been held void 22 those given by persons of
unsound mind are often so considered ,23 but the older
rule which so holds is not always followed , for they have
been held voidable merely .24
§ 337 . Whether such a voidable deed conveys title
without being affirmed . - Whether an insane person 's
conveyance , in those states where it is held merely voida
ble , transmits the title as an infant 's does,25 subject to its
being divested , o
r
whether the title is good only after
confirmation o
r ratification , is a question , not , it seems ,
quite settled . It has been said26 that in such a case the
legal title passes to the grantee , and therefore , that his
title may not be attacked in a
n
action o
f ejectment , but
only by a bill in equity , when equitable defenses may be
made b
y
him . And that such a conveyance vests the
title in the grantee which h
e holds until the conveyance
is disaffirmed , appears to be the general doctrine . 27
It is , however , sometimes said that the conveyance of
a person o
f
unsound mind is ineffectual to convey title to
land unless it is confirmed b
y
the grantor himself when
o
f
sound mind , or b
y
his legally constituted guardian , or
his heirs or devisees . 28
2
2 See ante , $ 314 .
1
3 Plaster v . Rigney , 1899 , 97 Fed . 12 ; McClun v . McClun , 1898 , 17
6
Ill . 376 , 38
0
; 52 N . E . 928 .
2
4Williams y . Sapieha , 1901 , 94 Texas 430 ; 61 S . W . 115 .
2
5 See ante , $ 313 .
3
6 Moran v . Moran , 1895 , 106 Mich . 8 , 13 ; 63 N . W . 909 .
2
7 French Lumbering Co . v . Theriault , 1900 , 107 Wis . 627 ; 83 N . W .
927 ; 81 Am . S
t
. R . 856 ; 51 L . R . A . 910 ; McAnaw v . Tiffin ,1898 , 143
Mo . , 667 ,678 ; 45 S . W . 656 ; Castro v . Geil , 1895 , 110 Cal . 292 ; 42 Pac .
804 ; 52 Am . St . R . 84 ; Woolley v . Gaines , 1901 , 114 Ga . 122 ; 39 S . E .
892 ; 88 Am . S
t
. R . 22 ; Downham y . Holloway , 1902 , 158 Ind . 626 ; 64
N . E . 82 ; 92 Am . S
t
. R . 330 .
2
8 Brigham v . Fayerweather , 144 Mags . 48 ; Crawford v . Scovell , 94




s bearing on the remedy ; if legal title has passed to the grantee ,
the remedy for the grantor , or those who represent him would be
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$ 338 . The kinds and degrees of insanity . — The mental
unsoundness which will render a deed thus ( generally )
voidable may arise from one or more of several causes ,
and the different kinds of insanity will appear in a great
variety of forms. Insanity may present itself as idiocy
( or “ congenital insanity '') , lunacy or mania , caused by
grief, accident, disease , or continued intoxication , or it
may appear as dementia arising from old age ; it may be
continuous and permanent , or intermittent , leaving the
person “ lucid intervals . "
The proper inquiry in each case appears to be : whether





to render him incapable o
f transacting this particular
business ; or , as expressed b
y
some , was there an intelli
gent assent to this particular conveyance ?
Only a small degree of mental capacity is required to
make a valid conveyance , according to many authorities :
“ The question is not whether the grantor had ordinary
capacity to d
o business , it is whether he had any , the
smallest , capacity to understand what he was doing and
to decide intelligently whether or not he would do it . ” 29
A higher test , however , appears to be demanded b
y
some
courts , and if the grantor is lacking in that degree o
f
com
in equity and not b
y
ejectment , for , the legal title having passed , there
would be simply an equitable title in the grantor which would not sup
port an action o




r his representatives , to regain his land , are equitable pro
ceedings to cancel the conveyance . The equitable proceeding is neces
sary in most cases for the further reason that the grantee has , by the
decisions o
f
most courts , the right to a return of the consideration
under certain circumstances , and this cannot be considered in an action
o
f ejectment , being in the nature of an equitable defense . This dis
tinction has been affected by the blending o
f legal and equitable forms
of procedure in some jurisdictions , but still may affect the matter of
pleading . Where the conveyance of one non compos mentis is held ab
solutely void , proceedings in equity have been held inappropriate as
the remedy a
t
law is complete and adequate . Boddie v . Bush , 1903 ,
136 Ala . 560 ; 33 So . 826 .
2
9 Mann v . Keene Co . , 1898 , 86 Fed . 51 , 53 .
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prehension which would make him capable of transacting
ordinary business affairs in which his interest is involved
“ it may well be regarded he is incapable of understand
ing the nature and effect of the act of disposing of his
land to another . " 30
Generally a higher degree of mentality is needed to
make a valid deed than to make a will , because in the
bargaining which leads to the ordinary deed , mind is op
posed to mind , and there is necessary a greater exercise
ofmental power than is required to make a valid will.31
The uncertain point at which the disposing mind dis
appears and insanity begins can be ascertained only by
examining and weighing a
ll
the circumstances of each
case . 32
§ 339 . The question as to insanity must relate to the
time o
f
the act . — The inquiry as to the capacity o
f
the
grantor must relate to the very time of the act in ques
tion , 33 and , as delivery must be the surrender of the deed
with intent that the grantee shall take title under it , 34 a
deed signed and sealed b
y
one while sane , but retained
b
y
him , and only delivered at his direction while he is
insane , passes no title because there is no delivery . 35
§ 340 . Presumption o





mind - Partial insanity . - In considering a
case o
f
this character one must start out with the legal
presumption o
f sanity and ability , and , when lack o
f




0 Ring v . Lawless , 1901 , 190 II
I
. 520 , 533 ; 60 N . E . 881 .
3
1 Converse v . Converse , 21 Vt . 168 .
3
8 Dennett y . Dennett , 44 N . H . 531 ; 84 Am . D . 97 ; Conley v
Nailor , 118 U . S . 127 , 133 ; Bowdoin College v . Merritt , 1896 , 75 Fed .
480 , 487 .
3
9 Carnagie v . Diven , 1897 , 31 Ore . 36
6 , 49 Pac . 891 ; Francis v . Wil
kinson , 1893 , 147 Il
l
. 370 , 380 ; 35 N . E . 150 .
8
4 Ante , $ 299 .
3
5 McClun v . McClun , 1898 , 176 Ill . 37
6 ; 52 N . E . 928 .
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preponderance of evidence .36 And showing some impair
ment of the mind , by extreme age or disease , is not
enough to overcome this presumption .37
In practice a difficulty arises in this class of cases be
cause of the opinion which prevails among jurors , and to
some extent among medical men , who are often called as
witnesses , that partial insanity or monomania , or even
eccentricity on the part of the grantor , is enough to inval
idate a conveyance . But the true view is stated as fol
lows: “ Though long doubted , it is now well settled both
in England and the United States that the same person
may be at the same moment both sane and insane , or,
more accurately speaking , insane upon one or more sub
jects and sane upon all others , and in what he does with
reference to the former will be treated both by the courts
administering the criminal laws and by those administer
ing the civil as insane , while in respect to the latter he
will be held responsible in the criminal courts for crimes
committed by him , and in civil courts his contracts and
dispositions of property will be adjudged binding and
valid . ” 38
Unless, therefore, the partial insanity or monomania
relate to the particular subject out of which the convey
ance grew , or be of such a character as to induce the
conveyance , it should not render it even voidable .39
36 Argo v . Coffin , 1892 , 142 Ill . 368 ; 32 N . E . 679 ; Jones v . Jones ,
1893 , 137 N . Y .610 ; 33 N . E . 479 ; Brown v . Brown , 39 Mich . 792 ; El
cessor v . Elcessor , 1892 , 146 Pa . St . 359 ; 23 Atl . 230 ; Farnsworth v .
Noffsinger , 1899 , 46 W . Va . 410 ; 33 $ . E . 246 .
3
7 Shea v . Murphy , 1897 , 164 Ill . 614 , 619 ; 45 N . E . 1021 ; Cutts v .
Young , 1899 , 14
7
Mo . 587 , 599 ; 49 S . W . 548 ; Buckey v . Buckey , 1893 ,
3
8




“ Insane Delusions , ” 63 Am . St . R . 80 .
3
9 Meigs v . Dexter , 1898 , 172 Mass . 217 ; 52 N . E . 75 ; Elwood v .
O 'Brien , 1898 , 105 Iowa 239 ; 74 N . W . 740 ; Dennett v . Dennett , 44 N .
H . 531 ; 84 Am . D . 97 . This same principle is applied to wills in the
following cases : Trich ' s Ex ' r . v . Trich , 1895 , 165 Pa . St . R . 586 ; 30
Atl . 1053 ; Farmer v . Farmer , 1895 , 129 Mo . 530 ; 31 S . W . 926 ; Blough
v . Parry , 1893 , 144 Ind . 463 , 475 ; 40 N . E . 70 ; 4
3
N . E . 560 .
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§ 341. Weakness of mind combined with inadequate
consideration - Fiduciary relations . — While mere weak
ness of mind will not of itself warrant a court in setting
aside a conveyance - unless it be of such a degree as to
take from the grantor the power to intelligently assent to
the conveyance — the weak mental condition of the grantor
furnishes ground for suspicion , and if unfair advantage
can be either shown or inferred from the circumstances ,
equity will set aside the conveyance .
For example , a deed will generally be set aside , if, in
connection with weakness of mind , it is shown that the
consideration is nominal or grossly inadequate - from
such circumstances imposition will be inferred ; 40 or where
there is weakness of mind in the grantor and the grantee
sustains a fiduciary relation to him , or such a relation as
enables him to influence the grantor, a presumption of
undue influence is raised .41
The principle to be applied to such cases appears to be :
Such other circumstances combined with weakness of
mind do not constitute an absolute or necessary ground
for equitable relief, but they throw the burden of proof
on the grantee to show that the grantor acted freely , de
liberately and intelligently .42
§ 342. The conveyance where regarded as voidable
may be affirmed . The conveyance of an insane person
(not under guardianship ) being generally considered
40 Allore v . Jewell, 94 U . S. 506 ; Griffith v . Godey , 113 U . S . 89 , 95 ;
Ashmead v. Reynolds , 1893 , 134 Ind . 139 ; 33 N . E . 763 ; Hale v . Kob
bert , 1899 , 109 Iowa 128 ; 80 N . W . 308 .
41 Disch v . Timm , 1898 , 101 Wis . 179 ; 77 N . W . 19
6 ; Seeley v . Price ,
1
4 Mich . 541 ; Duncombe v . Richards , 46 Mich . 166 ; 9 N . W . 149 .
4
2 Smith v . Cuddy , 1893 , 96 Mich . 562 , 569 ; 56 N . W . 89 ; Thomas v .
Whitney , 1900 , 186 Ill . 225 ; 57 N . E . 808 ; Kellogg v . Peddicord , 1899 ,
181 Ill . 22 ; 54 N . E . 623 ; Carty v . Connolly , 1891 , 91 Cal . 15 ; 27 Pac .
599 ; Fitch v . Reiser , 1890 , 79 Iowa 34 ; 44 N . W . 21
4 ; Bruguier v .
Peppin , 1898 , 10
6
Iowa 432 ; 76 N . W . 808 ; Paddock v . Pulsifer , 1890 , 43
Kan . 718 ; 23 Pac . 1049 .
2
7 - BREWS . Con .
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voidable merely , and not void , may generally be affirmed
or ratified by those in interest.
Hence the grantor himself may affirm it, either after
complete restoration to sanity or during a lucid interval ;
but in either case the affirmation must be his intelligent
act , with an understanding on his part of the nature of
the instrument .43 Hemay confirm it in various ways ; as,
by receiving , while sane, the consideration ; by a new
conveyance or contract ; or by failure , under some cir
cumstances , to move in setting it aside. Any act which
shows clearly a recognition of the conveyance as valid is
competent evidence of ratification .44
But his guardian or committee cannot, generally , con
firm an insane ward 's conveyance , without the direction
of a competent court ; because , having no power to convey
a ward ' s estate without the court' s order , the guardian
has no power to do such acts in ratification as are equiv .
alent to a conveyance .45
§ 343 . Deed of insane grantor may be disaffirmed by
him when sane . — Where a deed has been made by one
who is mentally incompetent or insane , it may be disaf
firmed by him on his restoration to sanity .
The old English rule was that he himself could not
take steps to have such a conveyance set aside , because
no one should be thus allowed to stultify himself and be
cause he could not know , when he became sane, what he
had done while he was insane. But this doctrine has
been completely done away with : " it has been repudiated
by every American court , and denounced as having no





N . E . 187 .
1
4 This rule would not apply in those jurisdictions where the first con
veyance is held void . In them the grantor could cure the infirmity in
his former attempted conveyance only b
y
executing another after his
restoration to sanity - not strictly speaking a ratification .
4
5 Funk v . Rentchler , 1892 , 134 Ind . 68 ; 33 N . E . 364 , 898 ; New Eng .
C
o . v . Spitler , 1895 , 54 Kan . 560 ; 38 Pac . 799 .
$ 344 419CONVEYANCE OF INSANE PERSONS ' LANDS .
foundation in reason or justice , and as dishonoring the
jurisprudence of a civilized people ,'? 46
If, after his restoration to sanity , one conveys lands
which he had attempted to convey while insane, the
grantee in the second deed acquires by it the right which
his grantor had , to avoid the deed made during his insan
it
y . 47
$ 344 . May be disaffirmed by his guardian . - If the in
competent be not restored to reason his guardian may dis
affirm his conveyance b
y proceedings to have the convey .
ance canceled .
There has been some question a
s
to whether in such
cases the insane person may bring suit b
y
his “ next
friend , ” or whether itmust be b
y
his general guardian .
The matter is somewhat governed b
y
statute . The proper
practice is said in some cases to b
e





his guardian or conservator ,
and not by a next friend or guardian ad litem specially
appointed fo
r
this purpose : the guardian has control of
the incompetent ' s property and is responsible for proper
conduct of the proceedings . The more general practice
conforms to this view . 48
$ 345 . Insane grantor ' s heirs may disaffirm — Creditors
generally may not . - If the incompetent be dead his heirs
may bring suit to cancel the deed , and this is common
practice .
It was urged in one case that heirs , children o
f
a de
ceased grantor , seeking to set aside his deed , were guilty
o
f
laches in not having had his competency tested while
4






7 Clay v . Hammond , 1902 , 199 Ill . 37
0 ; 65 N . E . 352 .
4
8 Covington v . Neftzger , 1892 , 140 Ill . 608 ; 30 N . E . 764 ; Row v .
Row , 1895 , 53 Ohio S
t
. 249 ; 41 N . E . 239 ; Tiffany v . Worthington , 1896 ,
9
6 Iowa 560 ; 65 N . W . 817 . But see , Plymton v . Hall , 1893 , 55 Minn .
2
2 ; 56 N . W . 351 ; Wager v . Wagoner , 1898 , 5
3 Neb . 511 ; 73 N . W . 937 .
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he was living , but the court held this not such laches as
should bar their remedy , and it was observed that chil
dren might well hesitate to drag an aged parent into court
under such circumstances .49
While the grantor remains insane he has no power to
disaffirm his conveyance , and during that time the stat
ute of limitations will not run so as to bar an action by
his heirs should he remain incompetent during his entire
lifetime.50
While the heirs of a grantor non compos mentis may
thus have his conveyance set aside because of his incom
petency , his creditors have not generally the same privi
lege , and a conveyance will not be set aside in their be
half , unless, besides the grantor 's incompetency , other
reasons exist for it
s
cancelation . 51
§ 346 . As to the return o
f
consideration on disaffirm
ance . - On the question as to whether there shall be a re
turn o
f




competent person is attempted to be set aside , there is
less harmony among the decisions than there is on the
similar question which arises concerning the infant ' s
deed . 52
It appears that most courts in deciding this question
will take into account the fairness of the transaction
whether it is free from fraud and undue influence and
also the knowledge of the grantee as to the grantor ' s in .
competency . The general rule is : The conveyance of
a
n insane person will not be se
t
aside when the other
party has acted in good faith and in ignorance of the
grantor ' s unsoundness of mind , unless the consideration
4
9 Hemphill v . Holford , 1891 , 88 Mich . 293 ; 50 N . W . 300 .
b
u Downham v . Holloway , 1902 , 15
8
Ind . 626 ; 64 N . E . 82 ; 92 Am . St .
R . 330 .
5
1 See Rollet v . Heiman , 1889 , 120 Ind . 511 ; 22 N . E . 666 ; 16 Am . S
t
.
R . 340 ; Riley v . Carter , 1893 , 76 Md . 581 ; 25 Atl . 667 ; 19 L . R . A . 489 .
See for similar rule as to infants , $ 319 .
5
2 Ante , $ 321 .
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can be restored — that is , the parties placed substantially
in statu quo .53 Or, where the grantee acted in good faith ,
and it is impossible to return the consideration paid by
him to the incompetent grantor , the amount may bemade
a charge or lien on the land if the conveyance is set
aside . 54 Where , however , the grantee knew of the gran
tor's unsoundness of mind , a return of the consideration
received by the insane grantor does not seem to be a nec
essary prerequisite to an avoidance of the conveyance . 55
The doctrine that there must be a return of the consid
eration , where the grantee did not know of the grantor 's
insanity and acted in good faith , is not, however , univer
sally approved , for it has been considered that the con
veyance may be set aside without returning the consider
ation or placing the other party in statu quo ; nor is it
always considered material that in taking the deed the
other acted in good faith and without knowledge of the
grantor ' s insanity - because , it is said , he who deals with
an insane person does so at his peril .56
§ 347 . Whether conveyance may be disaffirmed as
against subsequent bona fide grantee. - As to the title of
subsequent purchasers in good faith , the same rule is fre
quently applied in these cases as controls in cases where
the original grantor is an infant.57
This doctrine has been expressed as follows : “ The in
sane man has not the power to convey an indefeasible
53 Eldredge v . Palmer , 1900 , 185 II
I
. 618 ; 57 N . E . 770 ; 76 Am . St . R .
59 : Warfield v . Warfield , 1880 , 76 Iowa 633 ; 41 N . W . 383 ; Boyer v .
Berryman , 1890 , 123 Ind . 451 ; 24 N . E . 249 ; Myers v . Knabe , 1893 , 51
Kan . 720 , 723 ; 33 Pac . 602 ; Schaps v . Lehner , 1893 , 54 Minn , 208 ; 55
N . W . 911 ; Pearson v . Cox , 71 Texas 246 ; 9 S . W . 124 ; 10 Am . St . R .
740 ; McKenzie v . Donnell , 1899 , 151 Mo . 431 , 458 ; 52 S . W . 214 .
5
4 Moran v . Moran , 1898 , 106 Mich . 8 , 11 ; 63 N . W . 989 .
5
5 Thrash v . Starbuck , 1896 , 145 Ind . 673 ; 44 N . E . 543 ; Crawford v .




6 Brigham v . Fayerweather , 144 Mass . 48 ; 10 N . E . 735 ; Wager v .
Wagoner , 1898 , 53 Neb . 511 ; 73 N . W . 937 .
5
7 Ante , $ 318 .
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title. This incapacity inheres in all titles derived from
him . The grantee whose title is thus derived must rely
on the covenants of his deed . He risks the capacity to
convey of a





insane alike to avoid their contracts
is an absolute and paramount right , superior to all equi
ties o
f
other persons , and may be exercised against bona
fide purchasers from the grantee . ” 58
But this rule has not been followed in cases of insane
grantors with nearly so much uniformity as in cases o
f
infant grantors . The presumption o
f
law is in favor o
f
sanity : “ When , therefore , a purchaser sees a regular
chain o
f
title , formal in all particulars , upon the registra
tion books , executed b
y
grantors o
f full age and not feme
coverts , he has a right to rely upon the presumption of
sanity , and if without any notice , or matter to put him
upon inquiry and fo
r
fair value , he takes a deed he should
b
e protected . Any other doctrine would place all titles
upon the hazard . ” 69
§ 348 . Statutes providing for the disposal o
f
insane
persons ' interests in lands . — There are statutes relating





n insane person ' s inter
ests in real property that should be noticed . There are
two chief classes o
f
such statutes .
First . Those which authorize the conveying or the
mortgaging o
f
the real property o
f
such a person b
y
his
“ committee , " " conservator ” or “ guardian ” under spe
cial direction of a court . Such statutes appear to exist in
6
8 Hovey v . Hobson , 53 Me . 451 , 458 ; 89 Am . D . 705 . And see , Hull
v . Louth , 109 Ind . 315 ; 10 N . E . 270 ; 58 Am . R . 405 ; Dewey v . All
gire , 1893 , 37 Neb . 6 ; 55 N . W . 276 ; 40 Am . St . R . 468 ; Germ . Savings
& L . Soc ' y v . DeLashmutt , 1895 , 67 Fed . 399 . The uncertainty as to
titles on this account is one reason advanced for the adoption o
f
the
“ Torrens System " o
f registration .
5
9 Odom v . Riddick , 1890 , 104 N . C . 515 , 520 ; 10 S . E . 609 ; 17 Am . St .
R . 686 ; 7 L . R . A . 118 ; Ashcraft v . DeArmond , 44 Iowa 229 , 235 ;
Greenslade v . Dare , 20 Beav . 284 .
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every state . In many states the statutes providing for the
disposal of infants ' lands60 also provide that the lands of
those of unsound mind may be disposed of under the
same circumstances ; and where separate laws exist relat
ing to the lands of the latter class , they are substantially
similar to those concerning the lands of infants , and are
governed by the same general principles .
Second . Statutes authorizing proceedings by virtue of
which an insane wife 's or husband' s interests in real
property belonging to the other spouse may be conveyed
or released . An insane wife cannot release her dower
in her husband 's lands , as such a release must be her
voluntary act, nor may her guardian do so fo
r
her without
statutory authority . 61
Therefore statutes have been passed in many states
authorizing a judicial examination , after which a release
o
f
her dower ( o
r
it
s statutory substitute ) , and in some
cases a release o
f





the court , on condition that the insane
wife ' s share in the purchase money is paid to her guard
ian o
r
secured to her use . 62
In several states ( e . g . Illinois , Indiana , Iowa and Mas
sachusetts ) , the same or similar statutes provide for such
proceedings when it becomes necessary to release an in
sane husband ' s interest in his wife ' s lands .
6
0
Ante § 324 et seq .
6
1 Eslava v . Lepretre , 21 Ala . 504 , 529 ; Ex parte McElwain , 29 Ill . 442 .
6
2 Illinois R . S . , ch . 68 , § 17 ; Indiana , Burns ' R . S . 1901 , $ 3388a ; Iowa
Co . 1897 , 98 3167 –3169 ; Kentucky , Stat . 1899 , $ 2145 ; Massachusetts , R .
L . 1902 , ch . 153 . $ 19 ; Michigan , C . L . 1897 , $ $ 8947 –8952 ; Missouri , R .
S . 1899 , $ 2985 ; Ohio , R . S . , $ $ 5725 , 6307 ; Virginia , Co . , $ 2625 , am ' d
1895 , p . 260 ; Wisconsin , San . & B . Stat . 1898 , $ 2225 .
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373 . Generally no act of the hus-
band alone can defeat





. Inchoate right o
f
dower not
strictly property - Re
leased not conveyed .
375 . Wife cannot generally re
lease dower to her hus
band .









377 . Married women ' s powers
o
f attorney to convey
lands or release dower .
§ 349 . The married woman ' s different interests in real
property . — The married woman appears as sustaining
various relations to real property ; and itwill depend upon
what relation she bears to the property in any particular
case whether she can sever that relation - and if so , how
- so that title may be conveyed freed from her interest ,
whatever it may be .
She may appear :
1 . As having an interest in the “ community prop
erty . ”
2 . As having an interest in an " estate by entire
ties . "
3 . As holding realty as a
t
common law - often called
her “ general estate " to distinguish it from those next
mentioned .
4 . As having a “ separate estate " - either an “ equi
table ” or a “ statutory ” separate estate .
5 . As having a dower interest , or a statutory interest
similar to dower , in her husband ' s property .
6 . As having an interest in the “ homestead . ”
Reference has already been made to “ community prop
erty , " and to “ tenancy b
y
entireties . "
In this chapter the general principles concerning her
other interests in realty , especially her separate estate and
dower , will be considered , while the homestead will be
discussed in the next chapter . 3
* Ante , & 167 .
* Ante , $8162 – 166 .
•Others than married persons may quite generally have a “ home
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$ 350 . The husband 's rights in , and control over , his
wife 's property at common law . - At common law a hus
band acquired , by virtue of the marriage , valuable rights
in the property of his wife with which the exercise by her
of powers of control and disposition were inconsistent .
He had , for example , an estate in the lands in which his
wife had a freehold estate which he could alienate with
out her concurrence , and he might take the entire rents
and profits of her lands , while she could not , during the
marriage , alienate them without his concurrence , and
not then generally by deed .
While the death of either husband or wife put an end
to this estate of the husband , yet if he survived her and
there had been born to them a child capable of inherit
ing , the husband became vested with an estate for his life
in all his deceased wife 's lands — his curtesy estate .
These estates or interests of the husband in his wife 's
real property were subject to his debts; but no disposition
could be made by him or his creditors of her freehold
estate which would endure beyond his own interest .
§ 351. The common law not wholly obsolete in this
country . In this country , by virtue of early statutes in
some jurisdictions , a husband 's rights in and over his
wife 's real estate (which was not her " separate estate '' )
were even greater than they were at common law , and
were equal to his rights at common law in her movable
or personal property in possession , but such statutes seem
unusual .
On the other hand ,modern legislation has much modi
fied the common law and has lessened , and in many
stead ," but it is mentioned in this connection , since husband and wife
are usually especially concerned in matters relating to its transfer or
release .
* Co . Litt . 351a ; Poll. & Mait . Hist . Eng . Law , 2d ed ., II, p . 404 ;
Eaton v. Whitaker , 18 Conn . 222 ; 44 Am . D . 586 ; Hackett v . Moxley ,
1895 , 68 Vt. 210 ; 34 Atl . 949 .
5 Hudgins v . Chupp , 1898, 103 Ga. 484 ; 30 S . E . 301 .
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states substantially abolished , the husband ' s common law
rights in his wife 's property . Prior to such legislation
courts of equity had permitted settlements of " separate
estates ” on married women .
In spite , however , of the influence of both equity and
legislation common law doctrines , as to husband and
wife , are not yet entirely obsolete in the United States ,
and in some states a husband 's common law marital
rights are still recognized in respect to such of his wife ' s
real property as is not her “ separate estate .” 6
UDGE .
§ 352 . The equitable separate estate - How created .
Courts of equity about the end of the seventeenth century
allowed property to be settled on a married woman so that
she should have the benefit of it to the exclusion of her
husband 's marital rights in it.
Such a “ separate estate ” may be constituted by a
woman 's reservation in her marriage settlement of a
power to dispose of her estate , or by a transfer by her be
fore marriage to a trustee .
Itmay also be created by the conveyance by her husband
of property to a trustee for her use ,8 and in many states
by a conveyance from a husband directly to his wife ,' as
well as by conveyance or devise of a third person to her
sole and separate use , either before marriage or after it.10
A trustee may be provided for by the instrument creat
ing the separate estate to hold and protect the estate for
the wife , 11 and such a provision was at one time consid
ered necessary , but there now need be no trustee , and the
conveyance or devise may be made directly to the mar
6 Dietrich v . Hutchinson , 1901 , 73 Vt. 134 ; 50 Atl. 810 ; 87 Am . St. R .
698 ; Brasfield v . Brasfield , 1896 , 96 Tenn . 580 ; 36 8 . W . 384 .
7Gore v. Knight , 1705 , 2 Vern . 535 .
8Ryland v. Banks , 1899 , 151 Mo. 1 ; 51 S. W . 720 .
9 Barnum v . LeMaster , 1903 ( Tenn . ) ; 75 S . W . 1045.
10Fears v . Brooks, 12 Ga. 195 ; Hamaker v . Hamaker , 88 Ala . 431 ; 6
So . 754 .
11 Jones v. Jones , 1899 , 96 Va. 749 ; 32 S. E . 463 .
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ried woman . The " separate estate ” being , however , de
pendent . upon the equitable doctrine of trusts — with the
legal and equitable titles separated — when a transfer is
thus made directly to a married woman for her sole use ,
her husband , in the absence of an express trustee, is re
garded in equity as taking the legal estate in trust for his
wife for her separate use .12
§ 353 . The intention to create the separate estate
must generally be clearly expressed . - In order to so cre
ate this equitable separate estate , the intention of the do
nor to give the married woman the complete use of the
property free from her husband ' s control must clearly ap
pear from the words used in the instrument creating the
estate .13
And while the expression “ sole and separate use ” has
been most often employed for this purpose , no special or
technical form of words has been considered essential, if
the intention to exclude the husband 's marital rights is
indicated .
Words which might be necessary , however , to show
such an intention when the donor is a stranger are not
always regarded as necessary in a conveyance by the hus
band to a trustee for the wife or in his conveyance
directly to her , and in such cases conveyances in ordinary
form without words evincing an intention to create a sep
arate estate have been construed as operating to the wife ' s
separate use , since otherwise they would be to a great ex
tent inoperative ; 14 and it has also been held that real
12 Bennet v. Davis , 1725 , 2 P . Wms. 316 ; Jones v . Clifton , 101 U . S .
225 ; Wood v . Wood , 83 N . Y . 575 ; Dezendorf v . Humphreys , 1898 , 95
Va . 473 ; 28 S . E . 880 .
13Hackett v . Moxley , 1895 , 68 Vt. 210 ; 34 At). 94
9 ; Lippincott v .
Mitchell , 94 U . S . 767 , 771 ; Holliday v . Hively , 1901 , 198 Pa . St . 335 ;
4
7 Atl . 988 ; Richardson v . De Giverville , 1891 , 107 Mo . 422 ; 17 S . W .
974 ; 28 Am . St . R . 426 .
" Barnum v . LeMaster , 1903 ( Tenn . ) ; 75 S . W . 1045 ; Hamilton v .
Hubbard , 1901 , 134 Cal . 603 , 606 ; 65 Pac . 321 .
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property belonging to a married woman may be invested
with the character of separate estate by the husband 's
long acquiescence in his wife 's uninterrupted control of
her property and his failure to contribute to her support ,
such facts being deemed equivalent to an express agree
ment on his part that her property should be held to her
sole use . 15
$ 354 . The " restraint on anticipation .” — In convey
ances generally provisions in restraint of alienation are
void ,16 as are provisions that the property shall not be
liable for the debts of its owner . 17
A
n exception , however , to this general rule has long
been recognized in the case o
f
the separate estate o
f mar
ried women , and if in the instrument b
y
which property
is conveyed to a woman for her separate estate there is a
clear expression o
f
the donor ' s intention that she shall
not be able to deprive herself of the enjoyment o
f
the
property she cannot alienate it .
This restriction , known as the “ restraint on anticipa
tion " (expressed in brief : “ to the said [wife ] so that the
same shall be for her separate use without power o
f
antic
ipation ” ) - is allowed as a protection to the wife , 18 and is
in effect a restraint on alienation . 19
§ 355 . The wife ' s power over her separate estate in
the absence o
f
such restraint . In the absence of such a
restriction the effect o
f the creation o
f
a separate estate
was finally considered b
y
the English courts o
f equity ,
after doubts and denials in earlier cases , to be that the
married woman had the same power over the property so
settled that a feme sole had over her property — she might
1
5 Curtis v . Simpson , 1900 , 72 V
t
. 232 ; 47 Atl . 829 ; but see Klenke v .
Koeltze , 75 Mo . 239 , 243 .
1
6 Ante , $ 186 , note 53 ; Potter v . Couch , 1890 , 141 U . S . 296 , 315 .
1
7 McCleary v . Ellis , 54 Iowa 311 ; 6 N . W . 571 ; 37 Am . R . 205 .
1
8 Fears v . Brooks , 12 Ga . 195 ; Tulett v . Armstrong , 1838 , 1 Beav . 1 ;
1839 , 4 Myl . & Cr . 377 , 390 .
1
9 In re Currey , 1886 , 32 Ch . D . 361 .
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dispose of it without her husband' s concurrence and
without the formality of acknowledgment which later
English la
w generally required when she conveyed her
realty . 20
In the United States there has been a difference of
opinion as to the wife ' s power of disposal over her sepa
rate estate . If there is in the instrument creating the es
tate no clause restraining alienation , she can , in most o
f
the states , dispose of her separate property — the English
doctrine being followed in a general way , but not fol
lowed exactly , it seems , in any state .
Some states adopt almost completely the English doc




s any other owner may , 21 at least , if statu
tory requirements as to acknowledgment are fulfilled . 22
In some o
f
the states where the English principle — that
she has power of disposal of her separate estate unless
restrained by the instrument creating it - has but partially
prevailed , she may convey and charge simply her per
sonal property and the income o
f
her real property , but
not , speaking generally , its corpus . 23
In a few states a married woman is held to be re
strained from alienating her separate estate , except so far
a
s alienation is expressly permitted b
y
the instrument cre
ating the estate ; if there is no provision in that as to the
mode o
f disposition she cannot dispose of the property ;
if one method is provided for b
y
that instrument she can
convey the property in no other way — the mode o
f alien
ation prescribed is exclusive . This view has prevailed
especially in Pennsylvania and South Carolina . 24
3
0 Taylor v . Meads , 4 De G . J . & S . 597 (69 Eng . Ch . Rep . ) .
2
1 Turner v . Shaw , 96 Mo . 22 ; 8 S . W . 897 ; 9 Am . St . R . 319 ; Cade
matori v . Gauger , 1901 , 160 Mo . 352 ; 61 S . W . 195 .
7 % Barnum v . LeMaster , 1903 ( Tenn . ) ; 75 S . W . 1045 .
2
3 Radford v . Carwile . 13 W . Va . 572 ; Price v . Planters ' Bank , 1896 ,
9
2 Va . 468 ; 23 S . E . 887 .
2
4 Holliday v . Hively , 1901 , 198 Pa . St . 335 ; 47 Atl . 988 ; Ewing v .
Smith , 3 Des . 417 ; 5 Am . D . 557 ; Porcher v . Daniel , 12 Rich . Eq .
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It appears , therefore , that there are in the United States
three rules as to the capacity of a married woman to con
vey her equitable separate property , namely :
1 . That , unless the instrument creating the separate
estate deprives her of this capacity , she has it ;
2 . That , unless she is thus expressly deprived of ca
pacity she may convey and charge merely her income
from separate real property ;
3 . That she has no capacity to deal with her separate
estate except what is expressly given by the instrument
creating it .
The lack of harmony on this subject is probably partly
due to the fact that some American courts have been in
fluenced by English decisions of one period and some by
those of another , for the final English rule was gradually
developed and was not recognized at all times .25
$ 356 . Manner of conveying separate estate . — When a
married woman has the capacity in a particular instance
to convey her separate estate she may convey without
specially referring to the instrument giving her the es
tate , 26 nor need the trustee join to render the conveyance
valid generally in equity ,27 and , unless the instrument of
settlement or some statute provides otherwise , she may
execute the conveyance as if unmarried , for she is re
garded as to such property as a feme sole .28
Statutes ,however , making general provisions regarding
conveyances by married women may apply to such equi
table separate estates , and in such cases the formalities
349 ; and see Kirby v . Boyette , 1896 , 11
8
N . C . 244 ; 24 S . E . 18 ; Ennor
v . Hodson , 1890 , 134 Ill . 32 ; 25 N . E . 582 .
2
5 See note 30 Am . D . 330 . .
2




7 Essex v . Atkins , 14 Ves . 542 ; Ryland v . Banks , 1899 , 151 Mo . 1 ; 51
S . W . 720 . See contra Kirby v . Boyette , 1896 , 118 N . C . 244 ; 2
4
S . E . 18 .
2
8 Taylor v . Meads , 4 De G . J . & S . 597 (69 Eng . Ch . Rep . ) ; American
Home Missionary Society v . Wadhams , 10 Barb . 597 , 602 . See Bress
ler v . Kent , 61 Ill . 426 .
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prescribed by statute as to a wife 's privy examination or
joinder of her husband should be complied with .29
To make a conveyance valid and effective both of the
equitable and legal estates , the methods and formsof both
law and equity should be combined ; and if more be done
than necessary , as if a husband should execute a convey
ance with his wife when she has the power in the partic
ular instance to make the conveyance alone, its validity
would not be affected b
y
thus joining a needless party . 30
§ 357 . Effect of statutes on the equitable separate
estate . — The practical importance of the separate equi
table estate has been much diminished b
y
the married
women ' s property statutes , which establish the “ statutory
separate estate . " 31
For while these statutes do not necessarily take away
the equitable separate estate o
r
the jurisdiction of courts
o
f equity over the property o
f
married women , 32 they do ,
b
y excluding to a greater or less extent the common law
marital rights o
f
the husband in his wife ' s property , re
move the necessity , to the same extent , for the creation
and existence o
f
the equitable separate estate .
Moreover , the general statutes concerning trusts in
several states33 prevent passive trusts for the separate use
o
f
married women ; and a statute relating , not to trusts in
general , but to those for married women alone may occa
sionally be found to the same effect ; 34 and under these
2
9 Barnum v . LeMaster , 1903 (Tenn . ) ; 75 S . W . 1045 . Though the
instrument settling the estate may make such compliance unneces
sary . Dewey v . Goodman , 1901 , 107 Tenn . 244 ; 64 S . W . 45 .
3
0 Sallee v . Chandler , 26 Mo . 124 .
3
1
See next section .
3
2 Holliday v . Hively , 1901 , 198 Pa . S
t
. 335 ; 47 Atl . 988 ; Jones v .
Jones , 1899 , 96 Va . 749 ; 32 S . E . 463 ; Richardson v . Stodder , 100 Mass .
528 ; Devries v . Conklin , 22 Mich . 255 , 26
0 ; Musson v . Trigg , 51 Miss .
172 , 182 . Though see Wood v . Wood , 83 N . Y . 575 , 579 .
3
3 For example , New York , Michigan , Minnesota and Wisconsin .
3
4 Simmons v . Richardson , 1894 , 107 Ala . 697 ; 18 S
o . 245 . Where
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statutes where lands are given to a trustee upon an ex .
press trust for the benefit of a married woman she takes
no estate and cannot convey or charge her interest.35
$ 358 . Constitutional and statutory provisions cre
ating a separate estate . The statutes of the different
states providing for the holding by married women of
property to their own use and enjoyment , and destroying
wholly or partially the husband 's common law rights in
his wife ' s property , differ greatly . What is a married
woman ' s separate real property is defined b
y
the statute ;
and property held b
y
her under such a statute is called
her " statutory separate estate " to distinguish it from her
“ equitable separate estate , ” which is not necessarily abol
ished b
y
the statute . 36 As the extent of her power over
her " separate estate " and the extent to which it was freed
from her husband ' s interests , before these statutes de
pended much upon the terms o
f
the instrument settling
the estate upon her , so now whether she has under these
acts a legal separate estate , depends much upon how she
acquires her title ; for these modern statutes , making radi
cal changes in the common law , in effect give a legal title
to married women much like the former equitable title .
The general rule in all the states is that whatever land
property is conveyed o
r
devised to a trustee for the separate use o
f
a
married woman his duty to protect it from the husband and his credit .
ors is generally deemed so far active as to prevent the legal estate from
vesting in the married woman by virtue o
f the statute o
f
uses ; if the
statute operated in such cases the purpose of the donor would be de
feated . Richardson v . Stodder , 100 Mass . 528 ; Dean v . Long , 122 Ill .
447 ; 14 N . E . 34 ; Bowen v . Chase , 94 U . S . 812 . The Alabama statute
expressly makes necessary an active trustee , otherwise the legal estate
vests in the woman , and even without such a statute a like effect has
been given in some cases to the married women ' s property laws . Mc .
Laughlin v . Ham , 1890 , 84 Ga . 786 ; 11 S . E . 88
9 ; Georgia & c . R . Co . v .
Scott , 1892 , 38 S . C . 34 ; 16 S . E . 185 , 839 .
3
5 See Pomeroy Eq . Jur . , $ $ 1003 - 1005 , 1105 .
3
6
See last section , note 32 .
2
8
— BREWS . Con .
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the wife owned before her marriage remains her separate
property after marriage .
Whether what she acquires after marriage is her sepa
rate property will depend upon whether she acquires it in
someway designated in the controlling statute .
In many states37 there are constitutional provisions as
to the married woman 's separate property , either defining
what it is in some detail and what her power over it shall
be, or merely directing the legislature to establish her
rights in such property.
In most of these states statutes have been enacted to
carry out in greater detail the general constitutional pro
visions, and in some cases the statutes enlarge the wife ' s
power over her separate estate beyond that given by the
constitution . 38
§ 359. Statutes creating separate estate do not al
ways remove the married woman 's disability to convey.
But these constitutional and statutory provisions freeing
real property of the wife from the control of her husband
and from liability for his debts , and giving her on the
other hand extensive powers in controlling it, have not
conferred upon her by implication power to convey the
property as if she were unmarried . While the courts
have not always construed the acts by a uniform princi
ple — some construing them more liberally than others
the general rule has been that the married woman ' s com
mon law disabilities still exist unless removed expressly
by the statute or by necessary implication from it
s
terms ,
nor do the acts abrogate the common law incidents of the
8
7 For example , Alabama , Arkansas , California , Georgia , Kansas ,
Maryland , Michigan , North Carolina , Oregon , South Carolina , Texas ,
Utah and West Virginia .
8
8 For example , in Michigan the constitution of 1850 gave her power
o
f testamentary disposition , but the act o
f
1855 , now C . L . 1897 , $ $ 8690 –
8694 , gave her power to convey b
y
instruments operating inter vivos .
Ransom v . Ransom , 30 Mich . 328 .
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marriage relation which are not within their evident
purpose .
For example , a provision making the wife 's real prop
erty hers and not liable for the debts of her husband and
giving her power to devise it “ as if she were unmarried , ”
does not enable her to convey it by her sole deed ,39 nor
may she so convey it under statutory power to “ own , pos
sess and enjoy it as if unmarried , ” 40 though she may thus
lease it under such a statute for a term of years , 41 and
even if the statute gives her power to convey , but pre
scribes particular formalities in the mode of exercising
the power , her deed must be executed with these formali
ties to be valid .
In spite of legislation , therefore , the position of a mar
ried woman with regard to contracts concerning , and
conveyances of, real property is not in all the states free
from difficulty , and , as in many of them legislation re
specting the matter has been comparatively recent , it is
necessary in investigating titles which depend upon
alienations by married women to recur to common law
rules as to their disabilities and to ascertain to what ex
tent these rules have been changed .
§ 360 . Common law methods of alienation by married
women - Deeds unusual - Fines . — While it appears that
by the earlier common law a married woman could , with
the consent of her husband , convey her land by feoffment
and execute a deed as evidence of her alienation , and that
in London and other cities her deed concurred in by her
husband (“ she having been ‘ separately examined ' by the
mayor or some other officer ”') was authorized by custom ,
it gradually became law - settled during the thirteenth
century — that the only proper conveyance for a married
89Ransom y . Ransom , 30 Mich . 328 .
40Swift y . Luce, 27 Maine 285 , 288 ; Moore v . Cornell , 68 Pa. St. 320 ,
" Parent v . Callerand , 64 Ill . 97 .
322 .
436 § 361THE LAW OF CONVEYANCING .
woman , except where some such special custom as that
of London was recognized , was a fine . Later the wife
was made a party to a common recovery for the same
purpose , though this proceeding was more usually re
sorted to in order to bar her dower .43
§ 361. The joinder of the husband at common law
The separate examination . — In order that the fine might
be effectual as a conveyance of a wife 's lands , her hus
band was required (except in certain unusual cases ) to
join with his wife in levying the fine.4 And since by
common law she could perform no effectual act of aliena .
tion without the concurrence of her husband , the general
rule has been in the United States that hemust join in
her conveyance , or assent to it, to make it valid , unless
some statute , either in express terms or by necessary im .
plication , renders such joinder or assent unnecessary .45
But besides the husband 's concurrence , it was, under
the older la
w , generally essential that there should be
proof o
f
the wife ' s free action in alienating her land , and
early instances are recorded o
f
her acknowledging her
gift of land in court . 46 When , therefore , the fine was
resorted to as a means of conveyance b
y
the married
woman , the court was supposed to ascertain b
y
a private
examination of the wife whether she acted voluntarily in
the proceedings and not under her husband ' s compul .
sion . 47 Therefore , another general result of these earlier
customs has been that a married woman ' s acknowledge




3 Shep . Touchstone 41 ; Eare v . Snow , Plowd . 504 , 515 . The Fines
and Recoveries Act abolished these proceedings in England in 1833 ,




s prescribed by the act .
* Pol . & Mait . Hist . Eng . Law II , p . 41
0 ; Clark v . Clark , 16 Ore .
224 , 226 ; 18 Pac . 1 .
4
5 Post , $ 363 .
4
6 Pol . & Mait . Hist . Eng . Law II , p . 410 .
4
7 Martin v . Dwelly , 6 Wend . 9 ; 21 Am . D . 245 .
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ment to a conveyance is a very different thing from that
of others — both in form and effect.48
§ 362 . Early usages in the United States — The joint
deed - Statutes requiring joinder . - In this country fines
and recoveries, though recognized as legal and proper
means of conveying the real property of married women ,49
were seldom used for this purpose . Before the matter
was regulated by statute the conveyance of the lands of a
wife by a deed in which her husband joined was sustained
by the courts as being in accordance with long established
usage - local common law — which arose partly from the
necessities of the colonists , courts not being always acces
sible , and partly , probably , under the influence of similar
local customs prevailing in England .50
These early usages were recognized and confirmed by
statutes , and in most of the states it has been expressly
required at some period that a husband should join in his
wife ' s conveyance of her real property .51
In many states where such joinder was formerly essen
tial it is not now , but statutes dispensing with the hus
band's concurrence or joinder in his wife's deed cannot
affect conveyances executed before their enactment at a
time when his concurrence or joinder was necessary .
§ 363 . When the husband 's joinder or assent is now
necessary .-- Whether a married woman 's conveyance
should be joined in or assented to by her husband de
pends upon statutes - often more than one in the same
state — and these are of such a character that the states
may be grouped in three general classes:52
48 See post , $ 365 .
49Manchester v. Hough , 5 Mason 67; Lawrence v . Heister , 3 Har. &
J . 371.
50 Durant v . Ritchie , 4 Mason 45 ; Lloyd v . Taylor , 1 Dall. 17 ; Fowler
v . Shearer , 7 Mass . 14 ; Gordon v . Heywood , 2 N . H . 402 .
51 In requiring the husband ' s concurrence to his wife 's alienation
such statutes are declaratory of the common law .
52 In illustrating this point decisions are generally cited rather than
statutes , as they refer to , discuss and construe the statutes .
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1 . In many states the married woman cannot convey
the legal title to real estate unless her husband concurs
in her conveyance : either , as is necessary in some of the
states of this class , by " joining in ” . the conveyance , or ,
as in others , by " assenting ” thereto .
To this general class belong , fo
r
example , Alabama ,
Florida , Idaho , Indiana , Kentucky , Minnesota , Nevada ,
North Carolina , Pennsylvania , Vermont and West Vir
ginia . 53





course , exist irrespective of the requirement o
f
a
" separate examination " o
f
the wife . 54 In several o
f
these
states where a husband ' s concurrence is ordinarily essen
tial a married woman may convey alone under certain
circumstances , as , if her husband is insane , has aban
doned her or is imprisoned , 65 but authority for her sole
conveyance under such exceptional circumstances must be
given b
y





the husband as to
be equivalent to his abjuration of the realm at common
law , when perhaps she may convey alone . 57
6
3 Adams v . Teague , 1898 , 123 Ala . 591 ; 26 So . 221 ; 82 Am . St . R . 144 ;
Walling v . Christian & c . Co . , 1899 , 41 Fla . 479 ; 27 So . 46 ; 47 L . R . A .
608 ; Idaho , Code 1901 , $ 2403 ; Bartlett v . Williams , 1901 , 27 Ind . App .
637 ; 60 N . E . 715 ; Werer v . Tanner , 1901 (Ky . ) ; 64 S . W . 741 ;
Lowe v . Lowe , 1901 , 83 Minn . 206 ; 86 N . W . 11 ; Nevada C . L . 1900 ,
$ 2658 ; Green v . Bennett , 1897 , 120 N . C . 394 ; 27 S . E . 142 ; Adams
Paper Co . v . Cassard , 1903 (Pa . ) ; 55 Atl . 949 ; Dietrich v . Hutchinson ,
1901 , 73 Vt . 134 ; 50 Atl . 810 ; 87 Am . St . R . 698 : See the statute re
ferred to in this case , under which she may obtain a decree authorizing
her to convey alone . Morgan v . Snodgrass , 1901 , 49 W . Va . 387 ; 3
8
S .
E . 695 . The real husband should join in such cases , and not merely
some one who is supposed by all parties to the conveyance to be the
real husband . See Cook v . Walling , 117 Ind . 9 ; 10 Am . S
t
. R . 17 .
6
4 Post , $ 365 .
6
5 Alabama Co . 1896 , § 2528 ; Idaho Code 1901 , $ 2404 ; Indiana ,
Burns ' R . S . 1901 , $ $ 3387a , 3388a , 6983 ; Pennsylvania , P . & L . Dig .
2904 ; Elsey v .McDaniel , 95 Pa . S
t
. 472 ; Hall v . Walker , 1896 , 118 N . C .
377 ; 24 S . E . 6 ; Bennett v . Pierce , 1898 , 45 W . Va . 654 ; 31 S . E . 972 .
6
6 Pike v . Clark , 40 N . H . 9 ; 77 Am . D . 698 ; Richards v . McClel




7 Compare Rhea v . Rhenner , 1 Pet . 105 , with Gallagher v . Delargy ,
5
7 Mo . 29 , 37 .
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2 . In other states a wife may convey the legal title to
her land without her husband ' s joining in , or assenting
to , her conveyance ; but as he has an inchoate interest in
her land , her deed without his joining will not release or
convey his interest .
Such states are , fo
r
example , Illinois , Iowa , Kansas ,
Ohio and Oregon . 58
3 . In still other states a married woman may convey
her land without the joinder or assent of her husband ,
and her grantee will take title free from any right or in
terest o
n the husband ' s part . The statutes of such states
have given her power to convey alone and have excluded
his rights to such an extent that he has an interest if he
survives her in that part only of her real property which
is left at her death undisposed of .
Among the states o
f
this class are Arkansas , Colorado ,
Michigan and New York ,besides other states ( e . g . North
and South Dakota and Utah ) whose statutes have either
limited curtesy to such realty as the wife has at her death
o
r
have expressly abolished it and have , at the same time ,
conferred upon a wife the power to convey her lands as if
sole . 59
§ 364 . Whether husband and wife should join as
grantors o
r merely execute the deed . — Where the statute
either expressly or by implication requires the husband
to join in the deed of his wife ' s lands , they generally both
appear a
s grantors in a single deed , the husband not
5
8 Ill . R . S . , ch . 41 , $ 1 ; ch . 68 , $ 9 ; Heisen v . Heisen , 1893 , 145 Ill .
658 ; 34 N . E . 597 ; Center v . Elgin Banking Co . , 1900 , 185 Ill . 534 ; 57
N . E . 439 ; Iowa Code 1897 , $ $ 2919 , 3366 ; Kansas Stat . 1901 , SS 4020 , "
2529 ; Jenkins y . Dewey , 1892 , 49 Kan . 49 ; 30 Pac . 114 ; Velten v . Car
mack , 1892 , 23 Ore . 282 ; 31 Pac . 658 ; 20 L . R . A . 101 ; Ohio R . S . ,
$ $ 3114 , 4188 .
5
9 Hampton v . Cook , 1897 , 64 Ark . 353 ; 42 S , W . 535 ; Colorado Cen
tral R . Co . V . Allen , 13 Colo . 229 ; 22 Pac . 605 ; Michigan C . L . 1897 ,
$ 8690 ; Hill v . Chambers , 30 Mich . 422 ; Frickee v . Donner , 35 Mich .
151 ; Hatfield v . Sneden , 54 N . Y . 280 ; Mygatt v . Coe , 1897 , 152 N . Y .
457 , 460 ; 46 N . E . 949 .
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merely signing his wife 's conveyance in token of his
assent. Under the statutes and decisions of some states
this is the only proper method . There are, however ,
decisions holding that it is enough if he expresses his as
sent to her conveyance under his hand and seal, without
joining in the granting clause ,61 especially if the deed is
acknowledged by both husband and wife. 62
Whether the husband should actually join as grantor
in the conveyance or should simply sign and seal it, will
depend not only upon the extent of his interest in his
wife 's lands,63 but upon the terms of the statute requiring
his concurrence, for a statute requiring his “ assent "
simply may well be construed differently from one re
quiring a " joint deed . "
Even where the latter is required to convey the legal
title, a conveyance by a married woman to which her
husband has assented by executing it ( though not by
joining as grantor ) may be valid as a contract to convey ;64
and it may be that under some statutes the husband 's
assent may be shown without his even executing the con
veyance ,65 though generally parol evidence of his assent
would not be admissible , as it must be shown by at least
his signature to the deed .66
So , on the other hand , the wife should be named in
the deed of conveyance as grantor , for merely signing ,
60Warner v . Peck , 11 R . I. 431 ; Weber v . Tanner , 1901 (Ky.) ; 64
8. W . 741 ; Adams v . Teague , 1898 , 123 Ala . 591 ; 26 So . 221 ; 82 Am .
St. R . 144 ; Dietrich v . Hutchinson , 1901, 73 Vt. 134 ; 50 At
l
. 810 ; 87
Am . St . R . 698 . See Collins v . Cornwell , 1891 , 131 Ind . 20 ; 30 N . E .
796 .
6
1 Schley v . Pullman Co . , 12
0
U . S . 575 ; Clark v . Clark , 16 Ore . 224 ;
1
8 Pac . 1 ; Morgan v . Snodgrass , 1901 , 49 W . Va . 387 ; 38 S . E . 695 .
6
2 Peter v . Byrne , 1903 (Mo . ) ; 75 S . W . 433 .
6
3 Dietrich v . Hutchinson , 1901 , 73 Vt . 134 ; 50 Atl . 810 ; 87 Am . St . R .
698 .
6
4 Rushton v . Davis , 1900 , 127 Ala . 279 ; 28 So . 476 .
6




6 Buchanan v . Hazzard , 95 Pa . St . 240 ; Melley v . Casey , 99 Mass .
241 ; Green v . Bennett , 1897 , 120 N . C . 394 ; 27 S . E . 142 .
§ 365 CONVEYANCES OF MARRIED WOMEN 'S INTERESTS . 441
sealing and acknowledging the deed on her part, in
which her husband is the only grantor named , will not
convey her estate.67
§ 365 . The married woman 's acknowledgment — The
separate examination . The requirement as to themar
ried woman 's separate examination before she can make
a proper acknowledgment to a deed , which has existed at
some time in most of the states,68 and which still exists
in several, was intended to answer the purposes of a fine
under the older la
w . The object o
f requiring a deed ac
knowledged in this manner was to make more simple the
conveyance o
f
real property by the married woman , and
a
t
the same time to protect her from her husband ' s com
pulsion . 69
As the acknowledgment of a married woman became ,
under statutes permitting her to convey b
y
deed acknowl
edged , a necessary part of the execution of her convey
ance , the effect of a failure to comply with the statute is
very different from the effect of non - compliance with stat
utory forms and requirements concerning acknowledg
ments in other cases . The general rule as to the ac
knowledgment o
f
others than married women is that it is





the parties , 70 but the conveyance o
f
a married woman
without an actual acknowledgment , and without a proper
certificate o
f
that fact has repeatedly been held void
wherever legislation has not enabled her to convey as
others convey . 71 And being thus void it has been held
6
7 Batchelor v . Brereton , 112 U . S . 396 ; Bradley v . Missouri Pac . R .
Co . , 91 Mo . 493 ; 4 S . W . 427 . See ante , $ 37 .
6
8 N
o separate examination seems to have been required in Maine ,
Massachusetts , New Hampshire and Vermont .
6
9 Hitz v . Jenks , 123 U . S . 297 , 301 ; Harkins v . Forsyth , 11 Leigh
( Va . ) 294 , 300 .
7
0 Ante , $ 261 .
7
1Mettler v .Miller , 129 11
1
.630 ; 22 N . E .529 ; Evans v . Dickenson , 1902 ,
114 Fed . 284 ; Wilson v . Wilson , 1899 , 6 Idaho 597 ; 57 Pac . 708 ; Krieger
v . Crocker , 1893 , 118 Mo . 531 ; 24 8 . W . 170 ; Spencer v . Reese , 1895 ,
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that a married woman ' s deed not properly acknowledged
and certified will not be enforced in equity as a contract
to convey , 72 nor reformed in equity by amending defects
in the method of execution , because the power to convey ,
depending on the mode of its execution , “ to amend the
mode is to create the power . ” 73
And so where a bill was filed against husband and wife
for the specific performance of a contract to exchange
lands , the lands involved being the wife ' s , who had
signed , but not acknowledged , the contract and refused
to perform it , the court in dismissing the bill said : “ The
rights and powers of a married woman have been sub
stantially revolutionized in recent years . But the mode
o
f exercising them in the alienation o
f
her land has re
mained without change for more than a century . ” 74
· In another case 75 a married woman had made a con
veyance , and afterwards again conveyed the property .
There were defects in the certificate o
f acknowledgment
to the first deed , and the court held that this deed , with
thedefective certificate o
facknowledgment ,was notmerely
voidable , but void ab initio , and that the paper , though
in form a deed , was no deed , and as to her passed no title
whatever , legal or equitable ; hence , the title remained
in her , and she could , and did , convey b
y
her subsequent
deed . And even though her subsequent grantee had
notice of the former seeming deed it did not alter the case ,
because his notice o
f
that was in legal effect notice o
f
nothing , as that deed was nothing in law . Nor did the
second grantee hold a
s
trustee for the former , nor could
the married woman ratify , b
y
admissions , pleadings , etc . ,
165 P
a . St . 15
8 ; 30 Atl . 722 ; First National Bank v . Paul , 75 Va . 594 ;
4
0 Am . R . 740 . See cases cited in the five notes following
7
2 Wambole v . Foote , 2 Dak . 1 ; Bagby v . Emberson , 79 Mo . 139 .
7
8 Silliman v . Cummins , 13 Ohio 116 .
7
4 Bingler v . Bowman , 1899 , 194 Pa . St . 210 ; 45 Atl . 80 . See , how .
ever , Pa . L . 1901 , p . 67 , abolishing the " separate examination . "
7
5 Central Land Co . v . Laidley , 32 W . Va . 134 ; 9 S . E .61 ; 3 L . R . A .
826 ; 25 Am . St . R . 797 .
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a deed so defective as the former deed was ; and the only
way the defect could be cured was by executing another
deed properly acknowledged , or by reacknowledging the
old deed . The conclusion was that the second purchaser 's
title was perfect , and themoney paid by the first as a con
sideration was not a lien on the land .
In a very recent case 76 the court, with evident reluc
tance because of the hardship inflicted on the defendants ,
held that a married woman who had permitted her grantee
and subsequent grantees to take possession of land and
make valuable improvements on it, could recover the land
and improvements , because her deed , though executed
according to the laws of the state where she lived , was
void in the state where the land la
y , as there had been no
acknowledgment and privy examination o
f
the grantor .
§ 366 . How far the separate examination must now be
regarded . The tendency o
f legislation is to do away with
the privy examination o
f
the married woman and to place
her acknowledgment , so far at least as its form is con
cerned , on the same footing as that of any other person . ? ?
It is to be noted , however , that while a separate exam
ination o
f
the wife may not now b
e necessary in a particu
lar state for her acknowledgment to conveyances in gen
eral , it may still be required in certain cases , as , for ex
ample , where she releases dower 78 or homestead . 79
And though the separate examination is not now nec
essary in most states , nevertheless in the investigation o
f
7
6 Smith y . Ingram , 1903 , 132 N . C . 959 ; 44 S . E . 643 ; 130 N . C . 100 ;
4
0




r privy examination appears to be necessary now in the
following states only , and is not necessary in all of these for ordinary
conveyances (see the two notes following ) : Alabama , Arkansas , Dela
ware , Florida , Idaho , Kentucky , New Jersey , Nevada , North Carolina ,
South Carolina , Tennessee , Texas , Wyoming .
7
8 Arkansas S . & H . Dig . 1894 , 88 705 , 716 ; McKenzie v . Sifford , 1897 ,
52 S . C . 104 ; 29 S . E . 388 .
7
9 Alabama Code , $ 2034 ; Burrows v . Pickens , 1901 , 129 Ala . 648 ; 29
S
o . 694 ; Wyoming , R . S . 1899 , $ $ 2732 , 2747 , 2770 , 2973 .
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titles and in the trial of actions relating to titles one must
remember that the former law was generally different
from what it is now ; and even though it was changed
some years ago, it may be important for him at the pres
ent time to ascertain its details . It is obviously too much
to expect that anyone can remember just what changes
have been made and when , but he should remember that
there have been in most states changes in this regard ,
and should look them u
p
before passing upon a title or
trying a case in which title is involved .
For example , in an action of ejectment decided in
1893 , 80 the plaintiff claimed title through mesne convey
ances from a deed executed in 1870 b
y
M . E . and her
husband . Title was in M . E . when she conveyed . The
plaintiff offers the deed in evidence . The certificate is
given in full in the report , and recites that the husband
and wife appeared before the officer , were personally
known to him , and that they acknowledged it , etc . , and
then proceeds : “ And she , the said M . E . , having been
b
y
me first made acquainted with the contents o
f
said in
strument of writing , acknowledged that she executed the
same freely and without compulsion or undue influence
o
f
her said husband . " The certificate failed to show that
she was examined separate and apart from her husband ,
a
s the law then required . Defendant objected to the ad .
mission o
f
the deed on this ground , and , while the plain
tiff contended that this objection was purely technical , the
court held the deed null and void , and that it transferred
no title .
S
o , although the separate examination of a married
woman was abolished in New York in 1879 , it became
necessary in 1893 to consider a
n acknowledgment made
in 1846 . 81 The action in this case was to restrain defend
ant from building in front of his premises on a portion of
8
0 Krieger v . Crocker , 1893 , 118 Mo . 531 ; 24 S . W . 170 .
8
1 Bradley v . Walker , 1893 , 138 N . Y . 291 ; 33 N . E . 1079 .
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his lo
t , which it was claimed b
y
the plaintiff was agreed
in 1846 to b
e kept open , the agreement to that effect be





1846 a servitude was attempted
to b
e imposed upon her separate property . The certifi
cate to the agreement does not show a private examina
tion , etc . Hence it was not , as against her , entitled to





received in evidence , nor , it seems ,
could the original , if produced . The main question in
this case was one o
f
evidence , but the court substantially
holds her agreement , so defectively acknowledged , void
as to her .
§ 367 . How far compliance with statutory provisions
a
s




the essential features of a married
woman ' s acknowledgment which distinguish it from an
ordinary acknowledgment — as , her examination apart





execution without fear , etc . ,
etc . - renders the acknowledgment , and therefore the con
veyance , fatally defective .
Not only in taking the acknowledgment , but in certify
ing to it , there has often been required a more nearly
literal compliance with the statute than has been con
sidered necessary in other cases . Therefore in drawing
certificates o
f acknowledgment in the states where the
separate o
r privy examination is still necessary the
prudent course is to follow the statute literally .
There are , however , recent decisions holding certificates
o
f acknowledgment valid which would formerly probably
have been held invalid . 82 But there always must be at
least a substantial compliance with statutory require
ments . 83
8
9 Geil v . Geil , 1903 (Va . ) ; 9 Va . L . Reg . 530 ; 45 S . E . 325 ; Curtis
v . Bunnell & c . Co . , 1898 , 6 Idaho 298 ; 55 Pac . 659 .
8
3 Wilson v . Wilson , 1899 , 6 Idaho 597 ; 57 Pac . 70
8 ; Cox v . Holcomb ,
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§ 36
8
. Conveyances between husband and wife . — The
doctrine o
f
the common law that husband and wife can
not convey to each other has long been well settled . The
authorities are not agreed , however , upon the reasons fo
r
this doctrine . Many hold that its reason is that the legal
existence o
f
the wife is suspended during marriage , or
merged in that of the husband . This not entirely satis
factory explanation is given in perhaps most o
f
the cases
where the question is discussed . Others maintain that
the explanation o
f
the doctrine is that the wife , though
legally existent , is under the dominion of the husband ,
and so presumably acts under his coercion . This , how
ever , does not quite explain why a conveyance by a hus
band to his wife is not valid .
Judge Cooley , speaking of the common law rule that
the husband could not directly convey to his wife , says :
“ Perhaps there was no sufficient reason why such a con
veyance should not have been allowed at common law ,
but as it was not it is necessary to find when and how the
common law was changed in this regard ; ' ? 84 and the
matter is sometimes disposed o
f
a
s follows : “ It is not
necessary for us to answer the inquiry which has been
made , 'why a deed from a husband to his wife should not
be a valid conveyance , ' in any other manner than b
y
ob
serving that the law o
f
the land declares such a deed to b
e
a mere nullity . " 85
The reason might , perhaps , be of little importance were
it not that the construction of the recent statutes affecting
property rights o
f
husband and wife will be found to de
pend somewhat upon what the court construing the par











N . E . 529 ; Spencer v . Reese , 1895 , 165 Pa . S
t
. 158 ; 30 Atl . 722 .
8
4 Ransom v . Ransom , 30 Mich . 328 .
8




See post , $ $ 371 , 375 .
Mich . 39 , 16
5
P
a . St . 168 ; 30 . X ; ; 12
9
IU
I . 630 ;
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In this connection itmay be noted that Pollock & Mait
land 86 express the view that the fundamental principle
underlying the subject of the property relations of hus
band and wife is that the husband is the wife 's guardian ,
and they observe that this explains a great deal “ when we
remember that guardianship is a profitable right.” Fur
ther : “ In particular we must be on our guard against
the common belief that the ruling principle is that which
sees a ‘unity of person ' between husband and wife . This
is a principle which suggests itself from time to time; it
has the warrant of holy writ; it will serve to round a par
agraph , and may now and again lead us out of or into a
difficulty , but a consistently operative principle it cannot
be." 87
.The common law rule has been affected practically by
three different causes :
1. By the practice of having the conveyance between
husband and wife made through some third person .
2 . By the influence of courts of equity .
3 . By statutes , which either expressly change the com
mon law rule , or which have been construed by the courts
to have had the effect of changing it.
It has resulted from these combined causes that the old
rule of the common law appears at the present time to be
most wholly done away with .
The subject is, however , affected by certain matters
that should be considered in each particular case ; as,
for example , which is grantor , the husband or the wife ?
or , what is the nature of the estate or interest sought to
be disposed of ? Is it separate property or is it some in
terest or estate growing out of the marriage relation , like
curtesy or dower ? or is it a ''homestead ” right ? or is a
joint conveyance of husband and wife ordinarily , in the
particular jurisdiction , required ?
86Poll. and Mait . His . Eng . Law , II, p . 403 .
87 See Poll . and Mait . His . Eng . Law , I, p . 468 .
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§ 369. Conveyances between husband and wife through
a third person . It is now recognized that there is no
legal impediment to this method , and it is very commonly
resorted to . Where a husband must join in a deed of
the wife 's real property , the conveyance by both of them
to a third person with the intention that the third person
shall convey to the husband is valid . When the third
person conveys to the husband in accordance with the
understanding , the husband has good title. 88 So, if the
husband , for the purpose of preventing his real property
from being taken by his creditors , voluntarily conveys it
to his wife through a third person without fraud on her
part , he himself cannot obtain a cancelation of the con
veyance . 89
Where it is the wife 's property that is conveyed to the
husband in this way , a court of equity will generally set
aside the conveyance upon less evidence of coercion or
undue influence than is required in other cases . It has
been held that the conveyance of the wife ' s estate for the
husband ' s use will be held void , unless it affirmatively
appears from the attending circumstances or otherwise
that the deed was her voluntary act and not induced by
undue influence on the part of her husband ; and that the
court is disposed to impute a deed to a husband through
a third person to influence rather than to love and affec
tion , though this presumption may be overcome by show
ing that the transaction was fair.90
§ 370 . Equitable view of conveyances between hus
band and wife . - The rule of the common law that hus
band and wife could not directly convey to one another
has been affected by the doctrine of courts of equity . This
88 Leach v . Rains, 1897, 14
9
Ind . 152 ; 48 N . E . 858 ; Wicks v . Dean ,
1898 , 103 Ky . 69 ; 44 S . W . 397 .
8
9 Fitzgerald v . Fitzgerald , 1897 ; 168 Mass . 488 ; 47 N . E . 431 .
s0 Darlington ' s Appeal , 86 Pa . St .512 ; 27 Am . R .726 ; Allen v . Drake ,
1891 , 109 Mo . 626 ,641 ; 19 S . W . 41 ; Boyd v . De La Montague , 73 N . Y .
498 , 502 .
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equitable doctrine is, that whenever such a conveyance
would have been good at law if made through the inter
vention of a trustee , it will be sustained in equity though
made directly between the parties . This doctrine is espe
cially applicable in cases of conveyances directly by the
husband to the wife , and such conveyances , in spite of
the common law rule , will be sustained in equity when
the rights of creditors are not interfered with .91 In such
cases , though the legal title may remain in the husband ,
he is in equity a trustee for his wife ; equity exercises a





the decisions speak o
f
conveyances from husband to
wife as invalid in law , but valid in equity , though in
some states this distinction may practically be more imag
inary than real ; “ the distinction between actions at la
w
and suits in equity is abolished . There is but one form
o
f
action . Why then shall we longer speak of the same
instrument as void in law but valid in equity ? ' ' 92 Later
decisions upholding conveyances made directly from hus
band to wife in such states do not discuss the distinction
between la
w
and equity . 93
§ 371 . Rule as to conveyances between husband and
wife affected by statute . — The so called married women ' s
acts have modified the common law rule as to convey




smight have been expected .
That conflicting constructions have been placed upon








1 Moore v . Page , 111 U . S . 117 ; Crooks v . Crooks , 34 Ohio St . 610 ;
Sims v . Rickets , 35 Ind . 181 ; 9 Am . R . 679 ; Turner v . Shaw , 96 Mo .
2
2 ; 8 S . W . 897 ; 9 Am . St . R . 319 ; Ogden v . Ogden , 1894 , 60 Ark . 70 ;
2
8
S . W . 796 ; 46 Am . S
t
. R . 151 ; Barnum v . Le Master , 1903 ( Tenn . ) ;
7
5
S . W . 1045 .
9
2 Thompson v . Mills , 39 Ind . 528 , 532 .
9
9 Building Ass ' n v . Scanlan , 1895 , 144 Ind . 11 ; 42 N . E . 1008 .
2
9
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prejudices and local influences and differences in the
course and history of legislation on the subject .
Upon one point there appears to be little conflict :
where statutes allow married women to hold and convey
real estate but also require that the husband shall join in
the wife 's conveyance , she cannot convey directly to him .
The reason generally given for this rule is that the hus.
band cannot be both grantor and grantee in the same
deed , as hemust be if the statutory requirement is ful
filled , while if it is not fulfilled his wife 's deed is invalid
in law . The only way , therefore, in such states for her
to convey to him is through a third person , even though
in the same states he may convey directly to her .94
Where , however , one statute provides that a married
woman cannot alienate her lands without the assent and
concurrence of her husband , to be manifested by his join
ing in the conveyance , but another provides “ the hus
band and wife may contract with each other, but all con





and between persons standing in confi
dential relations , " it has been held that a sale and con
veyance o
f
land is a contract , that the two statutes must
be construed together ,and that the provisions o
f
the for
mer apply only to conveyances b
y
a wife to a person




other states may be , first , those expressly
permitting contracts and conveyances between husband
and wife , or second , those simply referring to the wife ' s
disabilities . Statutes o
f
the former class declare in general
terms that a conveyance executed by either husband or
9
4 Johnson v . Jouchert , 1890 , 12
4
Ind . 105 ; 24 N . E . 58
0 ; 8 L . R . A .
795 : Rico v . Brandenstein , 1893 , 98 Cal . 465 ; 33 Pac . 480 ; 20 L . R . A .
702 ; 35 Am . S
t . R . 192 ; Bohannon v . Travis , 1893 , 94 Ky . 59 ; 21 S .
W . 354 ; Riley v . Wilson , 1893 , 86 Texas 240 ; 24 S . W . 394 ; Worrell v .
Drake , 1903 ( Tenn . ) ; 75 S . W . 1015 .
9
6Osborne v . Cooper , 1896 , 11
3
Ala . 405 ; 21 So . 32
0 ; 59 Am . St . R . 11
7
.
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wife to the other shall be valid to the same extent as be
tween other persons, or they provide that husband or wife
may enter into any transaction with the other which either
might if unmarried ;96 though some of the statutes of this
character have added to them the qualification that trans
actions between husband and wife are subject to the rules
of law applicable to contracts between persons standing
in confidential relations,97 or are qualified by other stat
utes excluding interests growing out of the marriage rela
tion - dower , curtesy and analogous interests — from the
classes of property as to which husband and wife may con
tract with each other .98
Statutes of the second class just referred to are those
enabling the married woman to hold and convey land
" as if unmarried ” or “ in like manner as her husband
or any other person .”
Such statutes have been construed by many courts as
doing away with the common law rule , although they do
not specially refer to conveyances by a wife to her hus
band . By these courts the disability of the married
woman is regarded as the basis of the rule , and as this
disability is removed by such statutes, it is considered
that either one may convey directly to the other without
the intervention of a third party .99
On the other hand it has been considered that statutes
96For example , see N . H . Pub . Stat. 1901 , ch . 176 , $ 3 ; N . Y . R . S . &
G . L . Birdseye 's Ed . 1901, I, p . 1048 , § 26 ; N . Dak . Co . 1899 , $ 2767 ;
R . I. R . L . 1896 , ch . 194 , $$ 3, 5 ; Utah R . S. 1898 , § 1200 ; Wis . R . S .
1898 , $ 2342 .
97 For example , Ala . Co., $ 2529 ; Nev . C. L . 1900 , $ 528 ; Crawford v .
Crawford , 1899 , 24 Nev . 410 ; 56 Pac. 94 ; Ohio R . S . , $ 3112 ; S . Dak .
Civ . Co . 1901, $ 3501 . As to the rules applicable when such relations
exist , see Pomeroy Eq . Jur., $$ 956 , 1053 ; Harraway v. Harraway ,
1903 , 136 Ala . 499 ; 34 So. 836 .
98Newberry v .Newberry , 1901, 114 Iowa 704 ; 87 N . W . 658 ; Potter v .
Potter , 1903 (Ore . ) ; 72 Pac . 702 .
99 Despain v . Wagner , 1896 , 163 Ill . 598 ; 45 N . E . 12
9 ; Wells v . Cay
wood , 3 Colo . 487 ; Burdeno v . Amperse , 14 Mich . 91 ; Ransom v . Ran .
som , 30 Mich . 328 ; Savage v . Savage , 80 Maine 472 ; 15 Atl . 43 .
452 $ 372THE LAW OF CONVEYANCING .
conferring upon the wife the capacity of a feme sole do
not abrogate the common law rule , for no such question
can arise as to a feme sole and that it is not the disability
of the wife alone that renders such conveyances void ,but
that the husband was at common law asmuch disabled to
take from her as she was from him , and that this com
mon law disability should be expressly removed by
statute before conveyances can be made from one to the
other . 10
0
Hence , where this view is taken later statutes
have been sometimes enacted , ' especially permitting con
veyances between husband and wife .
$ 372 . Dower and its statutory substitute . - In the
United States the matter of the rights of a surviving wife
in the lands o
f
her husband is so far regulated b
y
statute
that it is perhaps correct to say , speaking strictly , that the
common law estate o
f
dower hardly exists . In about half





old characteristics are preserved . In
many states dower has been expressly abolished ,but in its
place an interest o
r
estate has , in some o
f
these states ,
been created more valuable to the wife than dower , and
which it is therefore even more important to the purchaser
o
f
the husband ' s title to have released or barred than it
ever has been to have dower released or barred . Where it
has been thus abolished and a statutory substitute sup
plied , the courts and the legal profession continue to use
the term " dower " as applied to this substitute . And
many o
f
the principles applicable to the release o
f
dower
will be found to apply in those states where it has been
abolished .
§ 373 . Generally no act of the husband alone can de




Dean v . Metropolitan R . Co . , 1890 , 11
9
N . Y . 540 ; 23 N . E . 1054 ;
White v . Wager , 25 N . Y . 328 ; Aultman v . Obermeyer , 6 Neb . 260 .
1 For example , in New York , see supra , note 96 .
? For example ,see Daugherty v . Daugherty , 69 Iowa 677 ; 29 N . W . 778 .
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that no act or conveyance of a husband without the
concurrence of his wife can defeat her right of dower .3
This is generally true also of the statutory substitute for
dower in those states where dower has been abolished or
substantially modified .
But a purchase money mortgage made by the husband
alone , that is, a mortgage given by him to his vendor to
secure the payment of the purchase price of land bought
by him , is superior to his wife ' s interest , though given
without her consent, as is also a vendor 's lien for the
price where this is recognized .6
Moreover , where a dedication of land has been made
by the husband alone to public uses , as for markets ,
streets or parks , the wife is not dowable in the land , and
this rule has been held to apply where the conveyance has
been made for purposes not in the fullest sense public ,
for example fo
r
railroad purposes . 8
It is therefore generally important for a purchaser in






states , however , though provision is made for
a wife if she survive her husband , he may transfer his
8House v . Jackson , 50 N . Y . 161 ; Grady v . McCorkle , 57 Mo . 172 ; 17
Am . R . 676 .
Indiana , Burns ' R . S . 1901 , $ 2652 ; Iowa Code , $ 3366 ; Kansas Gen .
Stat . 1901 , $ 2510 ; Minnesota Gen . Stat . 1894 , § 4471 ; Utah R . S . 1898 ,
$ 2826 .
5 Denton v . Arnold , 1898 , 151 Ind . 188 ; 51 N . E . 240 ; Hurst v . Dula
ney , 1891 , 87 Va . 444 ; 12 S . E . 800 ; Frederick v . Emig , 1900 , 186 Ill .
319 ; 57 N . E . 883 . By statute in Illinois and Indiana as in other states .
For example , Michigan C . L . 1897 , $ 8921 ; Nebraska Com . Stat . 1901 ,
$ 2517 ; New York Real Prop . L . , Art . V , § 173 ; Wisconsin Stat . 1898 ,
$ 2163 .
6 Elliott v . Plattor , 43 Ohio St . 198 ; 1 N . E . 222 ; Noyes v . Kramer , 54
Iowa 22 ; Cocke v . Bailey , 42 Miss . 81 .
? Duncan v . Terre Haute , 85 Ind . 104 ; Gwynne v . Cincinnati , 3 Ohio
2
4 ; 17 Am . D . 576 .
8 Venable v . Wabash Ry . Co . , 1892 , 11
2
Mo . 103 ; 20 S . W . 493 ; 18 L .
R . A . 68 ; Baker v . Atchison & c . R . Co . , 1894 , 122 Mo . 396 ; 30 S . W .
301 . But see contra , Nye v . Taunton Ry . Co . , 11
3
Mass . 277 .
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land during his life without her concurrence and is re
lieved from all claims by her, provided the transaction is
not merely colorable and a fraud on her .' And as in a few
other states , for example Michigan , Nebraska and Wiscon
si
n , a non -resident wife is entitled to dower only in the
lands o
f
which her husband dies seised , she need not join
in his conveyance . 10
In a fe
w
states ' l while a resident married man whose
wife is not , and never has been , a resident of the state
may convey his lands without her concurrence , it is im
portant for her to join in his conveyance if she has been
a
t any time a resident o
f
the state . 12
§ 374 . Inchoate right of dower not strictly property
Released not conveyed . - While this inchoate interest of
the wife is necessarily considered in conveyancing , we do
not properly speak of a conveyance o
f
" dower . ” This
interest of the wife while for some purposes considered
a
n
interest in lands , is not generally regarded as property
in the ordinary sense , but as a right incident to another
thing : namely , the estate of her husband in the land . 13
During the life of the husband and u
p




9 Phillips v . Phillips , 1903 , 30 Colo .516 ; 71 Pac . 363 ; Smith v . Smith ,
1896 , 22 Colo . 480 ; 46 Pac . 128 ; 34 L . R . A . 49 ; 55 Am . S
t
. R . 142 ;
Flowers v . Flowers , 1892 , 89 Ga . 632 ; 15 S . E . 834 ; 18 L . R . A . 75 ;
Thayer v . Thayer , 14 V
t
. 107 ; 39 Am . D . 21
1
. See Connecticut Gen .
Stat . 1902 , $ $ 38
6 , 391 ; Tennessee Co . 1896 , SS 4139 , 4140 , 4149 .
1
0 Michigan C . L . 1897 , $ 8938 ; Ligare v . Semple , 32 Mich . 438 ; Ne
braska Com . Stat . 1901 , $ 2533 ; Atkins v . Atkins , 18 Neb . 474 ; 25 N . W .
724 ; Wisconsin Stat . 1898 , $ 2160 . See Bennett v . Harms , 51 Wis . 251 ,
holding that the non -residence intended is at the time of death ; it
would seem , therefore , better that a non -resident wife should join , as
she might be resident at the time o
f







1 Kansas Gen . Stat . 1901 , $ 2510 ; Montana Civ . Co . 1895 , $ 233 ; Utah
R . S . 1898 , $ 2826 .
1
2 Kennedy v . Haskell , 1903 (Kan . ) ; 73 Pac . 913 .
1
8 See Hoy v . Varner , 1902 , 100 Va . 600 ; 42 S . E . 690 ; 8 Va . L . Reg .
666 ; Haggerty v . Wagner , 1897 , 148 Ind . 625 ; 48 N . E . 366 ; Flynn v .
Flynn , 1898 , 171 Mass . 312 ; 50 N . E . 650 ; Penfold v . Warner , 1893 , 96
Mich . 179 ; 55 N . W . 680 .
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" assignment ” to the widow , dower is an interest which
cannot be bargained , sold and conveyed in the ordinary
sense , but may be released , relinquished or barred .
Hence where the conveyance by thehusband of his lands,
in which his wife joins , is set aside as fraudulent against
creditors , 14 or because of his incapacity , 15 her interest is
revived or re -established .
On the same principle , there must be a conveyance of
the husband 's lands ; fo
r
if husband and wife join in a
deed for the purpose o
f conveying her inchoate interest
alone ,while the fee remains in him ,the deed is a nullity . 16
She cannot , therefore , release her dower to one who does
not in some way hold under her husband ; her release
cannot b
e
to a mere stranger . 17
S
o , generally , after the death o
f
her husband , unas
signed dower is not the subject o
f
sale and transfer in
la
w , but of release to one who has the fee . 18
§ 375 . Wife cannot generally release dower to her
husband . - In the absence o
f
a statute permitting her to
do so , a wife cannot bar her dower by a release to her hus
band during coverture , 19 and the married women ' s acts
removing the wife ' s disabilities and giving her power to
contract with reference to her property have more gen
erally been considered not to have affected this common
Hinchliffe v . Shea , 103 N . Y . 153 ; Frederick v . Emig , 1900 , 186 Ill .
319 , 322 ; 57 N . E . 883 ; Wells v . Estes , 1900 , 154 Mo . 291 , 297 ; 55 S . W .
255 .
is Brothers v . Bank , 1893 , 84 Wis . 381 , 396 ; 5
4
N . W . 786 .
1
6 Davenport v . Gwilliams , 1892 , 133 Ind . 142 ; 31 N . E . 790 .
1
7 Reiff v . Horst , 55 Md . 42 ; Hart v . Burch , 130 III . 426 ; 22 N . E . 831 ;
6 L . R . A . 371 ; French v . Lord , 69 Maine 537 ; Mason v . Mason , 140
Mass . 63 ; 3 N . E . 19 .
1
8 Fletcher v . Shepherd , 1898 , 174 Ill . 262 ; 51 N . E . 212 ; Grubbs v .
Leyendecker , 1899 , 153 Ind . 348 ; 53 N . E . 940 . Though by virtue o
f
statute unassigned dower may be transferred by the widow in some
states . For example ,Missouri R . S . 1899 , $ 2934 ; and it may be trans
ferred in equity . Mut . Life Ins . Co . v . Shipman , 1890 , 119 N . Y . 324 , 330 .
1
9 Wilber v . Wilber , 52 Wis . 298 ; 9 N . W . 163 ; Pillow v . Wade , 31
Ark . 678 ; Rowe v . Hamilton , 3 Maine 63 .
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law rule;20 though in Michigan it is settled that, because
of the statutes enlarging in general a wife 's powers, she
may release her dower directly to her husband , provided
there is a fair consideration fo
r
her release . 21
A wife may , however , in some states contract with her
husband to release o
r extinguish her inchoate interest in
his lands in consideration o
f receiving it
s equivalent in
value ; 22 while , on the other hand , the policy o
f
the com
mon law inhibiting such contracts is in some states pre
served by express statutes , though the married woman ' s
general disabilities are to a great extent removed in the
same states . 23
Agreements between husband and wife under which







all interest in the estate o
f
the other , have
been held , in some cases , not to bar the wife ' s dower , 24
while in others their validity has been sustained and her
dower held to have been barred 25
§ 376 . Release of dower generally by deed o
f
husband
and wife . — While , therefore , dower is not property ,
strictly speaking , it has nevertheless generally been con
sidered such a
n
interest in lands a
s
to require under the
statute o
f
frauds some instrument in writing for its re
2
0 Pinkham v . Pinkham , 1901 , 95 Maine 71 ; 49 Atl . 48 ; 85 Am . St . R .
392 ; Land v . Shipp , 1900 , 98 Va , 284 ; 36 S . E . 391 ; 50 L . R . A . 560 .
2
1 Rhoades v . Davis , 51 Mich . 306 ; 16 N . W . 659 ; Dakin v . Dakin , 97
Mich . 28
4 ; 56 N . W . 562 ; in the Virginia case , Land v . Shipp , supra ,
decided under statutes similar to those o
f Michigan , this doctrine is
criticised .
2
2 Higgins v . Ormsby , 1901 , 156 Ind . 82 , 85 ; 59 N . E . 321 ; McBreen
v . McBreen , 1900 , 154 Mo . 323 ; 55 S . W . 463 ; 77 Am . St . R . 758 . See
Luttrell v . Boggs , 1897 , 168 Ill . 361 ; 48 N . E . 171 .
2
3 Newberry v . Newberry , 1901 , 114 Iowa 704 ; 87 N . W . 658 ; Pottery .
Potter , 1903 (Ore . ) ; 72 Pac . 702 .
2
4 Land v . Shipp , 1900 , 98 Va . 284 ; 36 S . E . 391 ; 50 L . R . A . 560 ;
Stephenson v . Osborne , 41 Miss . 119 ; 90 Am . D . 358 ; Whitney v .
Closson , 138 Mass . 49 .
2
6 Hitner ' s Appeal , 54 Pa . St . 110 ; Scott ' s Estate , 1892 , 147 Pa . St . 102 .
See cases cited in note 22 to $ 375 supra .
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lease ; a wife cannot bar her dower by parol.26 And , gen
erally speaking, if the writing is anything short of a deed
properly executed it will not amount to a release .
Statutes usually make provision for the release by the
wife during coverture of her interest , and the statutory
provisions must be strictly complied with .
Where a statute requires an acknowledgment , a convey
ance of the husband joined in by the wife but not prop
erly acknowledged will not bar her dower,27 nor will one
where there is no separate examination of the wife in
states where the separate examination is required ,28 and
in general the same rules are applied concerning the ac
knowledgment of the wife 's release of dower as are applied
to her acknowledgment of other deeds .
The general rule is that the wife must join in her hus
band 's conveyance of his lands in order to release her
interest in them ;29 and there have been decisions that she




f releasing dower . 30 But it has also
been held that a joint deed o
f
husband and wife will bar
her dower though it contains no express relinquishment . 31
It seems that the common and proper practice in the
greater number o
f
states is for the wife to join with her
husband in the granting clause o
f
the conveyance . There
are exceptional cases where the wife ' s merely signing her
husband ' s deed has been considered enough , though she
is not mentioned in the deed , either as a grantor or as re
7
8 Davis v . Davis , 61 Maine 395 ; Worthington v . Middleton , 6 Dana
300 ; Wright v . DeGroff , 14 Mich . 164 ; Carnall v . Wilson , 21 Ark . 62 ;
Davis v . McDonald , 42 Ga . 205 .
3
1Maynard v . Davis , 1901 , 127 Mich . 571 ; 86 N . W . 1051 ; Grove v .
Todd , 41 Md . 633 ; 20 Am . R . 76 .
2
8 Stidham v .Matthews , 29 Ark . 650 ; Hand v . Weidner , 1892 , 151 Pa .
S
t . 362 ; 25 Atl . 38 .
3
9 As to the release o
f
an insane wife ' s dower , see ante , p . 423 .
3
0 Lathrop y . Foster , 51 Maine 367 ; Carter v . Goodin , 3 Ohio St . 75 ,
7
8 ; Leavitt v . Lamprey , 13 Pick . 382 ; 23 Am . Dec . 685 .
8
1 Jones v . Des Moines , 43 Iowa 209 ; Learned v . Cutler , 18 Pick . 9 .
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leasing her interest ,32 but this is clearly not the best prac
tice .
A wife' s sole or separate deed (made after a deed by her
husband ) will not generally release her rights in his
lands , unless such a deed is expressly authorized by stat
ute. It is therefore so authorized in a few states , among
them Alabama , Maine , Massachusetts and Michigan .33
§ 377. Married women 's powers of attorney to convey
lands or release dower . - A married woman not having
capacity at common law to convey real property by at
torney , the same rule prevails in those states where it
has not been changed by statute 34
Statutes , however , empowering her to convey her land
without expressly authorizing her to convey by attorney
have been construed as authorizing her to do so , on the
general ground that the power to convey directly includes
the power to appoint an attorney to do the same thing. 35
On the other hand there have been decisions holding
that where she may convey by deed acknowledged after a
" separate examination ,” she may not convey by attorney ,
since she cannot delegate to another the power given to
her by statute to convey in this particular way ,36
To remove all doubt statutes have been enacted in many
states expressly authorizing a married woman to convey
32 Lancaster v. Roberts , 144 Ill . 213 , 222 .
3
3Ala . Co . , $ $ 1509 , 1510 ; Maine R . S . , ch . 103 , $ 6 ; Mass . R . L . 1902 ,
ch . 132 , $ 5 ; Mich . C . L . 1897 , $ 8930 ; but the Michigan statute pro
vides that the intent to bar dower must be expressed in the deed , and
the deed must be to one who then holds the husband ' s title , and she
may do this though under twenty -one years o
f
age , if over eighteen .
Michigan Pub , Acts 1899 , p . 284 .
8
4 Drury v . Foster , 2 Wall . 24 ; McCreary v . McCorkle , 1899 ( Tenn . ) ;
5
4
S . W . 53 ; Bank o
f
Louisville v . Gray , 84 Ky . 565 ; 2 S . W . 168 .
8
5 Williams v . Paine , 1897 , 169 U . S . 55 ; Morris v . Linton , 1901 , 61
Neb . 537 ; 85 N . W . 565 . Such would seem to be the effect o
f general
statutes removing a wife ' s disabilities . For example , Ohio R . S . ,
$ $ 3112 , 3114 , 4108 .
3
6 Mott v . Smith , 16 Cal . 533 ; Sumner v . Conant , 10 Vt . 9 ; Dawson
v . Shirley , 6 Blackf . 531 .
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by attorney . Many of these statutes require that her hus
band shall join in her " power of attorney , ” while some
expressly authorize her to constitute her husband her
attorney .37
Under the statutes of some states she may release her
dower by attorney ,38 and may appoint her husband her
attorney for this purpose ;39 though , as powers of attorney
are generally strictly construed , a general power of attor
ney by a wife to her husband to convey her lands has been
held not to authorize him to release her dower,40 nor does
her power of attorney to him to " sign deeds and mort
gages '' in general terms, but not referring to the home
stead nor describing any real estate , authorize him to
mortgage the homestead where the " joint consent ' of
husband and wife is neccessary to create a valid encum
brance on it.41
37 Arkansas Pub . Acts 1895 , p . 58 ; California Ci
v
. Co . , $ 1094 ; In
diana , Burns ' R . S . 1901 , $ 3369 ; Iowa Co . 1897 , S $ 2919 , 3150 , 3161 ; Mis
souri R , S . 1899 , 902 ; Rhode Island Gen . L . 1896 , ch . 194 , $ $ 3 , 6 , 12 ;
Utah R . S . 1898 , $ 1205 ; Virginia Co . 1900 , $ 2502 ; West Virginia Co .
1899 , ch . 66 , § 3 ; Wisconsin Stat . 1898 , $ 2223 .
3
8 Bertschy v . Bank , 1895 , 89 Wis . 473 ; 61 N . W . 1115 ; Hull v . Glover ,
126 Ill . 123 ; 18 N . E . 198 ; Penfold v . Warner , 96 Mich . 179 ; 55 N . W .
680 ; Alabama C
o . 1896 , § 1509 .
8
9 Wronkow v . Oakley , 1892 , 133 N . Y . 505 ; 31 N . E . 521 ; 16 L . R . A .
209 ; 28 Am . St . R . 661 ; Wilkinson v . Elliott , 1890 , 43 Kan . 590 ; 23
Pac . 614 ; 19 Am . St . R . 158 .
4
0 Security Savings Bank v . Smith , 1900 , 38 Ore . 72 ; 62 Pac . 794 ; 84
Am . St . R . 756 , see note to this case .
4
1 Wallace v . Ins . Co . , 1894 , 54 Kan . 442 ; 38 Pac . 489 ; 45 Am . St . R .
288 .
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§ 378 . The homestead in general. — Certain real prop
erty may become, under the laws of most states , a “ home
460
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stead ," and , as such , may have legal characteristics dis
tinguishing it from other real property .
Provisions concerning the homestead exist in the con
stitutions of about one-third of the states , and in most of
these statutes also have been enacted fo
r
carrying the con
-stitutional provisions into effect ; in the other states the
subject is regulated b
y
statute alone .
The general object o
f
these laws is to protect the family
in the possession and enjoyment of a home , secure , not






For the attainment of this object the laws generally
provide :
1 . That the homestead shall be exempt from sale on




2 . That the owner may not convey or incumber it as
freely a
s he may convey or incumber his other real prop
erty ;
Less generally it is held :
3 . That the owner may not dispose of it by will , this
inhibition being usually implied from the statute rather
than expressly provided for . 2
1 The states which seem to have n
o
homestead in the technical sense
of the term are Delaware , Indiana , Maryland , Pennsylvania and Rhode
Island .
In these states certain real property , as well as personal , may be ex
empt by law from sale for the payment of debts , but the laws allowing
this exemption are not , properly speaking , " homestead laws . "
The homestead provided for by state laws is to be distinguished from
that provided for by the federal laws , under which land is donated by
the United States to settlers on certain conditions .
2 The homestead being considered a
s
a provision for the family , it has
been held often that surviving wife and children cannot be deprived o
f
it by the will o
f
the husband and father . Bell v . Bell , 84 Ala .64 ; 4
So . 189 ; Kleimann v . Geiselmann , 114 Mo . 437 ; 21 S . W . 796 ; 35 Am .
S
t
. R . 761 ; McCrae v .McCrae , 103 Tenn . 719 ; 54 S . W . 979 ; Hall v .
Fields , 81 Tex . 553 ; 17 S . W . 82 ; Hatch ' s Estate , 62 Vt . 300 ; 18 Atl .
814 ; Sulzberger v . Sulzberger , 50 Cal . 385 ; Pratt v . Pratt , 161 Mass .
276 ; 37 N . E . 431 .
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While the general design of the homestead laws is the
same there is great variance in the constitutional and stat
utory provisions, the variance existing not only as to
matters of detail but often as to matters of fundamental
importance affecting the nature of the homestead .
The courts , moreover , have often placed different con
structions upon these laws, even where they are similar
in terms.
For these reasons, and because the statutes have been
frequently amended , only the leading principles can
be here stated , with a reference to such exceptional stat
utes or decisions as are important in themselves or serve
to make more distinct the general rules . In practice it is
necessary to refer to the details of the controlling law and
to the latest decisions in the jurisdiction where the land
lies .
In conveyancing it becomes necessary , because of these
laws, to consider something more than the mere title and
possession of real property attempted to be conveyed , for
if the property is a homestead a special release or waiver
will sometimes be required , or, at least, there will be
found special restraints on alienation not applying to
other real property .
Homestead laws have generally been liberally construed
in order that their purpose may be made effectual ; that
is, they have been construed liberally as to the owner and
his family , but strictly as to the owner ' s creditors and
purchasers from him . They are not considered as in der
ogation of the common law , because at common law real
property was not liable to be taken on execution for the
payment of debts .3
In determining whether real property is a technical
homestead and to what extent the general rules of con
veyancing are affected by this fact , the chief points in the
controlling law to notice are : (a ) who may have a home
53 Bl. Comm . 418 , 419 ; Poll. & Mait. Hist. Eng . L ., II , p . 596 .
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stead , (b ) in what property and to what extentmay it ex
exist , ( c ) how may it be selected , (d ) what restraints , if
any , are placed on the alienation of the homestead .
In considering some of these matters those points re
lating to alienation only will be generally discussed , and






s exempt property alone will not be referred to .
· § 379 . Who may have a homestead — Not necessarily a
married person only . — The chief object of the homestead
laws being to protect the family home , the person entitled





a family or a householder having a family .
Such a person is generally a husband o
r
father ; but one
may be married without being the head o
f
a family , o
r
one may be the head of a family without being married .
S
o far as restraints on alienation are concerned , they af
fect , generally , those only who are married . But the home
stead is not necessarily dependent on marriage , and some
statutes provide for certain formalities in conveying land
impressed with the character o
f
a homestead without re
gard to whether the owner is at the time married o
r
single .
For example , in Illinois every householder having a
family is entitled to an " estate " of homestead to the ex
tent in value of one thousand dollars in land owned and
occupied a
s
a residence , which can be aliened only in the
mode prescribed b
y
statute . Among the statutory formal
ities required are a releasing clause in the body o
f
the
conveyance and a similar clause in the certificate o
f ac
knowledgment . "
If the property , therefore , does not exceed in value the
amount named in the statute , the estate embraces the en
tire title and interest o
f
the householder therein , leaving
* Illinois R . S . , ch . 52 , $ 1 .
• Illinois R . S . , ch . 30 , $ $ 12 , 28 . A like statute requiring this special
release exists in Wyoming , R . S . 1899 , § 2770 .
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no interest in him which he can alien by a deed not con
forming to these requirements ;6 and while there is a stat
ute of the state requiring additional formalities where the
owner is married , the requirements mentioned above are
applicable to those having a homestead who are not at
the time married , and conveyances by such persons not
conforming to these statutory requirements are nullities
so far as the homestead is concerned . ?
§ 380 . But restraints on its alienation apply usually
to married persons only . - In many other states an un•
married person may b
e
entitled to a homestead , which is






owner ' s debts : for example , in Alabama , Michigan , Min
nesota , North Carolina , Wisconsin and probably other
states , the exemption is expressly allowed to " any resi
dent o
f
this state , ” 8 and under such laws the benefits of
the exemption are not restricted to married persons or to
heads of families .
The exemption may be allowed , as in Missouri and




a family , ” 10 or ,
a
s
in Arkansas , to " a resident o
f





a family , " 11 and under such laws one
may be entitled to the exemption whether married o
r
single , and it would seem whether man or woman . 12
In all these cases , while an unmarried person may have
a homestead , as in Illinois , he is not required as he is
6 Unless the property is abandoned to the grantee in pursuance o
f
such conveyance .
? Davis v . McCullouch , 1901 , 192 Ill . 277 ; 61 N . E . 377 .
& Ala . Const . , art . 10 , $ 2 ; Civ . Co . , $ 2033 ; Mich . Const . , art . 16 , $ 2 ;
Com . L . 1897 , § 10362 ; Minn . Stat . 1894 , $ 5521 ; N . C . Const . , art . x ,
§ 2 ; Wis . Stat . 1898 , $ 2983 .
'Myers v . Ford , 22 Wis . 139 ; Gardner v . Batts , 114 N . C . 49
6 ; 19 S .
E . 794 ; Beard v . Johnson , 87 Ala . 729 ; 6 S
o . 383 .
1
0 Mo . R . S . 1899 , $ 3616 ; Vt . R . L . 1894 , $ 2179 .
1
1 Ark . Const . art . 9 , $ 3 ; S . & H . Dig . Stat . 1894 , § 3710 .
1
2 Hyser v . Mansfield , 1899 , 72 Vt . 71 ; 47 Atl . 105 ; Broyles v . Cox ,
1899 , 15
3
Mo . 242 ; 54 S . W . 488 ; 77 Am . St . R . 714 .
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there to execute a conveyance with any special formalities
unless he is married ; and this is generally so , the Illinois
requirements being , it seems, exceptional .
§ 381. Restraints on alienation apply usually to resi
dents only . - Generally to entitle one to a homestead in a
particular state he must be a resident of that state, so that
when one owns real property in a state other than that of
his residence it is not generally necessary when he con
veys it to consider the homestead laws of the state where
his property lies . While this is true, generally , he may ,
nevertheless , according to some decisions , acquire a resi
dence (not a “ homestead " ) in one state and yet his
former home in another state may still retain its home
stead character , if it is occupied as a home b
y
his family ;
his conveyance , therefore , of this property would seem to
b
e governed by the homestead law o
f
the state where it
lies - - the state o
f
his former , though not his present , resi :
dence . 13
§ 382 . Occupancy generally essential — “ Constructive








cial decision where such provision is wanting , generally
necessary that the premises in question be occupied and
used as a home b
y
the owner . 14 Some courts have been
more strict than others in this regard and have held that
actual occupancy is essential to the creation and continued
existence o
f
the homestead . 15
But , owing to the liberal construction placed upon the
1
3 Savings Bank v . Kennedy , 58 Iowa 454 ; 12 N . W . 479 .
· Exempt realty though not occupied by its owner is in some states
called “ homestead , ” especially if used in connection with the home .
Folsom v . Asper , 1902 , 25 Utah 299 ; 71 Pac . 315 ; Howell y . Jones , 1892 ,
91 Tenn . 402 ; 19 S . W . 751 ; Vance v . Hill , 26 S . C . 227 ; 1 S . E . 897 .
1
5 Turner v . Turner , 1894 , 107 Ala . 465 ; 18 S
o . 210 ; 54 Am . S
t
. R .
110 ; First National Bank v . Hollingsworth , 78 Iowa 575 ; 43 N . W . 536 ;
6 L . R . A . 92 ; Currier y . Woodward , 62 N . H . 63 ; Quehl v . Peterson ,
4
7 Minn . 13 ; 49 N . W . 390 ; Boreham v . Byrne , 83 Cal . 23 ; 23 Pac . 212 .
3
0 - BREWS . CON .
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homestead laws by many other courts , in order to effect
the law 's “ humane purpose ” of preserving a home for
the family , it is by no means universally necessary that
there shall be actual occupancy and use of premises as a
home, to constitute them a homestead . A legal home
stead may in many states be created provided land is held
with the intention of making a home thereon within a
reasonable time, such intention being manifested by some
acts of home preparation on the land — though such acts
are often only slightly indicative of this intention .
For example , though in Michigan and Wisconsin the
laws give the homestead character to certain lands
“ owned and occupied by a resident of the state " it has
been held in Michigan that a vacant lot situated on the
main business street of a village, purchased by husband
and wife who erect on it a store building , part of which
they intend to occupy as a dwelling , becomes a home
stead , so that it cannot be made subject to a mechanic 's
lien for the building so erected under a contract executed
by the husband alone, though made with the wife 's
knowledge and consent ; 16 and in Wisconsin , that vacant ,
uncleared land may become a homestead from the date of
it
s purchase , if obtained with the intention on the pur
chaser ' s part of making it such , and partially prepared
for occupancy , though not occupied b
y
the owner or his
family for three years , during a year of which period , it
is occupied b
y
a tenant . 17
Many other decisions to the same general effect have
been rendered under homestead laws similar in terms as
to the requirement o
f
occupancy to those o
f Michigan and
Wisconsin ; “ constructive occupancy , " as it is sometimes
called , being regarded as sufficient , actual occupancy as a
home not being deemed essential . 18
1
6 Jossman v . Rice , 1899 , 121 Mich . 270 ; 80 N . W . 25 .
1
7 Shaw v . Kirby , 1896 , 93 Wis . 379 ; 67 N . W . 700 ; 57 Am . St . R . 927 .
1
8Gill v . Gill , 1901 , 69 Ark . 596 ; 65 S . W . 112 ; 86 Am . St . R . 213 ; 55
L . R . A . 191 ; Upton v . Coxen , 1898 , 60 Kan . 1 ; 55 Pac , 284 ; 72 Am . St .
R . 341 .
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The reason given for such decisions is that “ the acqui
sition of a completed homestead is seldom instantaneous.
Generally it requires years of industry and economic liv
ing. The purpose necessarily precedes the inception of
the work , and that is followed by successive steps until
completion is attained . * * * These successive steps
in the acquisition of a completed homestead ,made in good
faith , come within the spirit of the statute and are each
entitled to the protection afforded by it . " 19
§ 383 . Occupancy — Abandonment - Temporary ab
sence.” — As actual occupancy is not in al
l
cases required
for the creation of a homestead , so when the homestead
character has once been fixed it is not always dependent
upon an actual , continued and continuous personal resi
dence o





The homestead may b
e
abandoned , and the property
then ceases to b
e exempt as a homestead , and any re
straints as to its alienation under homestead laws no
longer apply to it . 20
But a temporary absence o
f
the owner from it with an
intention on his part o
f returning to it as a homestead is
not such an abandonment , 21 and under this rule it has
been held that an owner ' s absence from his homestead
for two years , 22 three years , 23 or even six years , 24 will not
1
9 Scofield v . Hopkins , 61 Wis . 370 ; 21 N . W . 259 . But mere inten
tion to make the premises , at some future time , a homestead with n
o
preparatory acts , will not be sufficient " occupancy . ” Feurt v . Caster ,
1903 , 174 Mo , 289 ; 73 S . W . 576 ; Davis v . Kelly , 1901 , 62 Neb . 642 ; 87
N . W . 347 ; Ball v . Houston , 1901 , 11 Okla . 233 ; 66 Pac . 358 ; Brokken
v . Baumann , 1901 , 10 N . D . 453 ; 88 N . W . 84 .
2
0 Smith v . Kneer , 1903 , 203 Ill . 264 ; 67 N . E . 780 .
2
1 Rand Lumber C
o . v . Atkins , 1902 , 11
6
Iowa 242 ; 89 N . W . 1104 ;
Blumer v . Albright , 1902 , 64 Neb . 249 ; 89 N . W . 809 ; Kelly v . Duffy ,
3
1 Ohio S
t . 437 .
2
2Gardner v .Gardner , 1900 , 123 Mich . 673 ; 82 N . W .522 .
2
3Minnesota Stoneware C
o . v . McCrossen , 1901 , 110 Wis . 316 ; 85 N .
W . 1019 ; 84 Am . St . R . 927 .
2
4 Kaeding v . Joachimsthal , 1893 , 98 Mich . 78 ; 56 N . W . 1101 .
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amount to an abandonment if during such absence he had
a continuing intent to return and occupy it as a home
stead .
The practical importance of such liberal doctrines as to
occupancy will be realized when it is remembered that in
many of the states where they prevail no other notice of
the homestead character of real property is given to per
sons who may deal with it as creditors of, or purchasers
from , its owner than that furnished by occupancy ; that
is , no record is required ormade of the fact that the owner
claims the property as a homestead . 25
§ 384 . Occupancy as a home - Use for business pur
poses . — The occupancy (actual o
r
" constructive ' ' )must be
a
s
a home , and , generally speaking , occupation o
f prem
ises for business purposes will not give them the character
o
f
a homestead . 26
But where part of the premises occupied as the owner ' s
home is used for business purposes , the general rule is
that they may still be his homestead in spite of such par
tial use for business . For example , the use ofabout one
half a house by a tinner as a tinshop and the use of the
other half both fo
r
ordinary living purposes and for the
millinery business o
f
the tinner ' s wife , do not destroy the
homestead character o
f
the premises in whole or in part . 27
In Michigan , even if the premises are primarily used
b
y
the owner in his business as hotel proprietor , they
may still be his homestead if also used as the sole home
o
f
himself and his family , 28 and in other states nearly the
2
5 See post , § 385 , n . 35 .
2
6 Unless the constitution o
r
statute authorizes a business homestead ,
a
s in Texas .
8
7 Ogburn ' s Estate , 1894 , 105 Cal . 95 ; 38 Pac . 498 . See , also , Berry v .
Meir , 1902 , 70 Ark . 129 ; 66 S . W . 439 ; Marx y . Threet , 1901 , 131 Ala .
340 ; 30 So . 831 ; Groneweg v . Beck , 1895 , 95 Iowa 717 ; 62 N . W . 31 ;
Sever v . Lyons , 1897 , 170 Ill . 395 ; 48 N . E . 926 .
2
8 Lamont v . Le Fevre , 1893 , 96 Mich . 175 ; 55 N . W . 687 ; King v .
Welborn , 1890 , 83 Mich . 195 ; 47 N . W . 10
6 ; 9 L . R . A . 803 .
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same rule has been adopted .29 Sometimes a distinction
has been made, however, between the use of a residence
for hotel purposes and the use of a hotel fo
r
residence
purposes ; and in determining whether or not the prem
ises are a homestead , consideration has been given to the
primary and principal use , and if the premises are thus
used primarily in the owner ' s business of keeping an ho
tel they have been held not to be his homestead , though
he and his family may dwell on them . 30









a home do not in all the states having homestead laws




render it such there must be , in about one -third o
f
the states , somesort of recorded claim or notice or declara
tion b
y
the owner ( or in some cases b
y
his wife ) , that the
property described in the notice or declaration is a home
stead within the meaning o
f
the statutes making it exempt




owner . 31 Occupancy and use as
a home are very generally necessary to impress the prop
erty with the homestead character , 32 butwhere this method
o
fmaking some record o
f
the selection ismade necessary b
y
statute ,mere residence and use as a home are not o
f
them
selves enough without the statutory declaration , 33 and
where this record or declaration is essential to establish the
2
9 Cass Co . Bank v . Weber , 1891 , 83 Iowa 63 ; 48 N . W . 1067 ; 32 Am .
S
t . R . 288 ; 12 L . R . A . 477 ; Harriman v . Queen Ins . Co . , 49 Wis . 71 ,
8
4 ; 5 N . W . 12 ; Kiesel v . Clemens , 1899 , 6 Idaho 444 ; 56 Pac . 84 .
3
0 McDowell v . Creditors , 1894 , 103 Cal . 264 ; 35 Pac . 1031 ; 42 Am . St .
R . 114 ; Beronio v . Ventura & c . Co . , 1900 , 129 Cal . 232 ; 61 Pac . 958 .
But see King v . Welborn , 1890 , 83 Mich . 195 ; 47 N . W . 106 ; 9 L . R . A .
803 .
3
1 Among such states are : California , Colorado , Connecticut ,Georgia ,
Idaho , Louisiana , Maine ,Massachusetts ,Montana ,Nevada , New York ,
Utah , Virginia , Washington , West Virginia .
3
2 Ante , $ $ 382 , 384 .
$ 3 Bank o
f
Woodland v . Oberhaus , 1899 , 12
5
Cal . 320 ; 57 Pac . 1070 .
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homestead and has not been made , restraints which apply
to the alienation of the legal homestead do not apply to
the alienation of property merely because it is a home.34
But in the majority of states having homestead statutes
no special record or written declaration of any kind need
be made in order to select and establish a homestead , fo
r ,
unless the constitution or statute requires some special
form o
f
dedication or selection , occupancy alone of a piece
o
f
land as a home constitutes it a homestead and is notice







. The limits of the homestead . — The extent of the
homestead is generally limited b
y
statute . The methods ,
however , o
f fixing its limits are so varied that it is im
practicable to attempt to se
t
them out in any detail . It
s
extent may be fixed in one state by its value , o
r
in another






value and area .




this may be as high a
s
$ 5 ,000 ( as in California , Idaho ,
Nevada and the Dakotas ) , or as low as $500 ( as in Maine ,
New Hampshire and Vermont ) .
Where it
s









acres , a greater area is generally allowed where
the property is rural or farm property than where it is
urban property : 40 , 80 or 160 acres being common limits
in the former case ,while in the latter the quantity is often





In a few states no monetary limitation is fixed , provided







ute — as in Kansas , Minnesota and Texas (under certain
circumstances ) . 36
8
4 Lowenthal v . Coonan , 1902 , 135 Cal . 381 ; 67 Pac . 324 ; Child v .
Singleton , 15 Nev . 461 .
8
5 Evans v . The Grand Rapids & c . R . Co . , 68 Mich . 602 ; 36 N . W .
687 ; Barton y . Drake , 21 Minn , 299 ; Feas ' s Estate , 1902 30 Wash ,
5
1 ; 70 Pac . 270 .
8
8 Improvements may be o
fany value , e . g . $60 ,000 . Chase v . Swayne ,
8
8 Texas 218 ; 30 S . W . 1049 . Until 1901 there was no limit in Wiscon
sin (Wis . L . 1901 , ch . 269 ) .
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§ 387 . May be a homestead in an estate less than fee
simple - Joint estates. While the statutes usually require
that the real property claimed as a homestead shall be
" owned ” by the claimant , it is not generally necessary
that he have title in fee, for the character of his estate is
not designated in the statutes .
There may be a homestead in a life estate ,87 and , as a
lessee may have a homestead in lands leased and occu
pied by him , an assignment of the lease without his wife ' s
concurrence (which is usually necessary for any aliena
tion of the homestead ) is invalid ;38 as is also an assign
ment of a contract under which land is held and occupied
as a homestead .39
Where land is held by husband and wife in common or
jointly ,40 or as tenants by the entirety ,41 it may be a home
stead , and according to some decisions an occupying ten
ant in common may in any case have a homestead ,42 though
this doctrine is denied by others .43
A partner , it is generally considered , has no such indi
vidual and separate interest in partnership property as to
enable him to acquire a homestead in it .44
87Kendall v . Powers , 96 Mo. 142 ; 8 S . W . 793 ; 9 Am . St. R . 32
6 ;
Tyler v . Jewett , 82 Ala . 93 ; 2 So . 905 .
8
8Maatta v . Kippola , 1894 , 102 Mich . 116 ; 60 N . W . 300 .
3
9 Rawles v . Reichenbach , 1902 (Neb . ) ; 90 N . W . 943 ; Anderson
v . Cosman , 1897 , 103 Iowa 266 ; 72 N . W . 523 ; 64 Am . St . R . 177 . A
chattel mortgage may not be made on a house owned and occupied as a
homestead standing on leased land , without compliance with statutory
requirements as to the alienation of a homestead . Gage v . Wheeler ,
129 111 . 197 ; 21 N . E . 1075 ; Hogan v . Manners , 23 Kan . 551 .
4
0 Lozo v . Sutherland , 38 Mich . 168 .
" 1 Cole v . Cole , 1901 , 12
6
Mich . 569 ; 85 N . W . 1098 .
4
² Thompson v . King , 54 Ark . 9 ; 14 S . W . 925 ; Giles v . Miller , 1893 ,
3
6 Neb . 346 ; 54 N . W . 551 ; 38 Am . S
t . R . 730 .
4
8 Howes v . Burt , 130 Mass . 36
8 ; Case Threshing Machine Co . v .
Joyce , 89 Tenn . 337 ; 16 S . W . 147 .
4
4 Michigan Trust C
o . v . Chapin , 1895 , 10
6
Mich . 384 ; 64 N . W . 334 ;
5
8 Am . St . R . 490 ; Hoyt v . Hoyt , 69 Iowa 174 ; Trowbridge v . Cross , 117
Ill . 109 ; but see Hunnicutt v . Summey , 63 Ga . 58
6 ; Clements v . Lacy , 51
Texas 150 .
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§ 388. Owner of a homestead may alienate it unless
restrained - Partial restraints . — The mere exemption of
a homestead from a forced sale does not of itself restrict the
power of alienation by the owner , and in the absence of
constitutional or statutory provisions restraining him
from freely conveying the homestead , he has as full a
right to convey it as to convey any other property . So,
for example , under the former laws of Missouri , Nebraska
and Utah , which provided for the exemption of the home
stead from forced sale ,but placed no restraint on its alien
ation , 45 a husband could freely convey lands owned b
y
him and occupied as a homestead without the consent o
f
his wife , though subject to her dower or analogous
rights . 46
S
o also there may b
e merely restrictions against cer
tain kinds o




Kentucky a married man owning a homestead may
sell and convey it absolutely without consulting his
wife , but he may not mortgage it without her joinder , 47










the premises . 48
Special restraints as to mortgaging lands impressed
with the homestead character are probably due to the fact
4
5 Except , in Missouri , where the wife had filed a claim of homestead
under R . S . 1889 , $ 5435 .
4
6 Cook v . Higley , 1894 , 10 Utah 228 ; 37 Pac . 336 ; Greer v . Major ,
1893 , 114 Mo . 145 ; 21 S . W . 481 ; Rector v . Rotton , 3 Neb . 171 . See
Moran v . Clark , 30 W . Va . 358 ; 4 S . E . 303 ; 8 Am . S
t
. R . 66 . The
present statutes in Missouri , Nebraska and Utah require the wife ' s con
sent : Mo . R . S . 1899 , $ 3616 ; Gladney v . Sydnor , 1903 , 172 Mo . 318 ;
7
2
S . W . 554 ; 60 L . R . A . 880 ; Neb . Com . Stat . 1901 , $ 3259 ; Utah R . S .




This was also true in Colorado but has been changed b
y
a very re
cent statute . Colo . L . 1903 , pp . 153 , 247 . Now a husband and his wiie
must join in any conveyance .
1
7 Wright v . Whittock , 1892 , 18 Colo . 54 ; 31 ·Pac . 490 ; Gullett v . Ar
nett , 1898 , 19 Ky . Law 1892 ; 44 S . W . 957 ; Carr v . Winlock , 1900 , 109
Ky . 488 ; 59 S . W . 747 . Such restrictions as exist in New York and Ohio
relate simply to mortgages : N . Y . Civ . Co . , § 1404 ; Obio R . S . , $ 5442 .
4
8 See Parrish v . Hawes , 1902 , 95 Texas 185 ; 66 S . W . 209 ; Maxwell
v . Roach , 1901 , 106 La . 123 ; 30 So . 251 . An unmarried man may mort
gage his homestead in Texas : Davis v . Converse , 46 S . W . 910 .
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that property is generally mortgaged for much less than
its full value , and may thus be lost to its owner and his
family withoutadequate return , whereas an absolute con
veyance is generally made fo
r




§ 389 . Some restriction on voluntary alienation usual .
- Butwhile restraint on alienation is not necessarily in
cident to the exemption o
f
the homestead from sale on exe
cution , the purpose o
f
the homestead laws is generally
considered to be promoted b
y
the imposition of some re
straint on the owner ' s right of transfer .
In those states where some sort o
f
recorded declaration
by the owner is necessary to secure to him the exemption
o
f
certain property as a homestead , he voluntarily accepts
such restraints as the statute imposes on his freedom o
f
transfer b
y declaring and recording his homestead ; 49 and
in those states where he obtains the exemption by occu
pancy without such a record the restraint is accepted by
him when he places himself , b
y becoming a householder ,
in the class entitled to the exemption on the one hand and
subject to the restraint on the other .
$ 390 . Usually husband and wife must concur in the
transfer . — Themost usual constitutional or statutory pro
vision which amounts to a restraint on the freedom o
f
alienation of the homestead is the requirement that hus
band and wife ( if the owner be married ) shall unite in the
conveyance .
This requirement appears in some form in most o
f
the
states having homestead laws , though the terms in which
the requirement is expressed vary greatly . The provision
may b
e
that husband and wife “ must execute and ac
knowledge " the same instrument , or that they must
“ concur in and sign the same joint instrument , ” or that
4
9 Virginia and Tenn . Coal Co . v . McClelland , 1900 , 98 Va . 424 ; 36 S .
E . 479 .
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there must be “ joint consent " of husband and wife , or
that the husband 's conveyance shall not be valid “ with
out the signature of the wife . '' 50
The husband or wife who joins in the instrument con
veying or incumbering thehomestead by the other spouse
who has the legal title, usually conveys nothing by this
joinder , for having , strictly speaking , no estate in the




f transferring an interest in land but is simply
a means o
f manifesting that consent to the transfer which
the statute requires . 51
The wife ' s joining in her husband ' s homestead convey
ance is not analogous to her release o
f
dower , because he
may convey a valid title to his own lands subject to her
dower interest , while he may not convey any title ( in
many states ) to the homestead without her consent . 52





the homestead when the
instrument of alienation is not executed in accordance
with the statutory requirement as to the joinder of hus . !
band and wife is not the same in all the states , even where
the statutory provisions are expressed in similar terms .
The restriction on alienation by the husband alone is
considered in many o
f
the states having homestead stat
5
0By such provisions it is intended that the real wife shall concur ; a
purchaser o
rmortgagee takes the risk o
f
the pretended wife ' s being the
actual wife o
f
the grantor : Security Loan Co . v . Kauffman , 1895 , 108
Cal . 214 ; 41 Pac . 467 ; Sherrid v . Southwick , 43 Mich . 515 . But see as
to a non -resident deserted wife : Stanton v . Hitchcock , 64 Mich . 316 ;
Black v . Singley , 91 Mich . 5
0 .
5
1 Hamilton v . Detroit , 1901 , 85 Minn . 83 ; 88 N . W . 419 ; Pounds v .
Clarke , 1892 , 70 Miss . 263 ; 14 So . 22 ; Creath v . Creath , 86 Tenn . 659 ;
8 S . W . 847 ; Godfrey v . Thornton , 46 Wis . 677 .
5
2 Although it has been sometimes said that a wife has a right o
r
in
terest in the homestead , title to which is in her husband , which she
may protect and which she may refuse to “ release . ” Rogers v . Mc
Farland , 1893 , 89 Iowa 28
6 ; 56 N . W . 504 ; California Fruit Trans . Co .
v . Anderson , 1897 , 79 Fed . R . 404 .
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utes as applying to the land constituting the homestead









e may transfer other property , his disa
bility being established for the protection o
f
the family ,
and , according to the views of some , fo
r
his own protec
tion as well . 53
In other states , however , the restraint on alienation is
regarded as applying only to whatever right o
r
interest in
the homestead premises is necessary fo
r
family protection ;
and it is considered that it is not the alienation of the land
itself that is prohibited o
r
restrained , but the privilege o
f
occupancy and the right o
f
exemption . 54
§ 392 . Effect of non -compliance with statute - The
alienation void in many states . - It follows from these
constitutional and statutory restraints on alienation that
the transfer o
r
incumbrance ( except it be a purchase
money mortgage ) o
f
land impressed with the character o
f
a homestead made b
y
the husband alone when the legal
title is in him is , in many states , an absolute nullity , so
far as that land is concerned . It is not merely void as to
the wife , but as to the husband also , and the grantee or
mortgagee acquires n
o title . 55 When the law makes his




r mortgage , to which his wife has not assented in statu
tory form , to dispute its validity , for the general doctrine
o
f
estoppel cannot apply to acts that are nullities , and his
grantee or mortgagee is presumed to know that the hus
5
3 See post , $ 392 .
5
4 Post , $ 397 .
5
5 Goodwin v . Goodwin , 1901 , 113 Iowa 319 ; 85 N . W . 31 ; Pritchett v .
Davis , 1897 , 101 Ga . 236 ; 28 S . E . 666 ; 65 Am . St . R . 298 ; Webster v .
Warner , 1899 , 119 Mich . 461 ; 78 N . W . 552 ; Hubbard v . Sage Land
& c . Co . , 1902 , 81 Miss . 616 ; 33 So . 413 ; Virginia - Tennessee Coal Co .
v . McClelland , 1900 , 98 Va . 424 ; 36 S . E . 479 .
5
6 See post , $ 394 , note 68 , as to estoppel when the conveyance is not
made void , and see Marler v . Handy , 1895 , 8
8 Texas 421 ; 31 S . W . 636 .
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band cannot thus convey or mortgage the homestead
premises ,57 and the fact that his conveyance contains cov
enants for title is held immaterial where the doctrine that
the instrument of transfer thus made is void prevails.58
Whether the restraint be regarded as imposed for the
benefit of his wife and children ,59 or as imposed , not
merely for their benefit and protection , but for his own





he may convey his other property .
§ 393 . Effect of wife ' s insanity . — The fact that his wife
is insane and residing in another state will not enable a
married man to mortgage his homestead without her
joinder when the statute requires that the mortgage
shall be signed and acknowledged b
y
both husband and
wife , 61 nor on the other hand will the insane wife ' s join
ing with him in his alienation render it valid when the
statute provides that husband and wife must “ concur ”
in and sign the same joint instrument , 62 or that it shall
not be valid without her “ voluntary signature and as
sent , ' * 63 nor may an insane wife ' s guardian act fo
r
her in
such cases in the absence o
f
a statute authorizing him to
do so . 64
5
7 Cowan v . Southern R . Co . , 1898 , 11
8
Ala . 544 ; 23 So . 754 ; Garner
v . Black , 1901 , 95 Texas 125 ; 65 S . W . 876 ; Whitlock v . Gosson , 1892 ,
3
5 Neb . 829 ; 53 N . W . 980 .
6
8 Stickel v . Crane , 1901 , 189 III . 211 ; 59 N . E . 595 ; Rogers v . Day ,
1898 , 11
5
Mich . 664 ; 74 N . W . 190 ; Alt v . Banholzer , 39 Minn . 511 ; 40
N . W . 830 ; 12 Am . St . R . 681 .
5
9Gadsby v .Monroe , 1897 , 115 Mich . 282 ; 73 N . W . 367 .
6
0 Martin v . Harrington , 1901 , 73 Vt . 193 ; 50 Atl . 1074 ; 87 Am . St . R .
704 .
6
1Whitlock v . Gosson , 1892 , 35 Neb . 829 ; 53 N . W . 980 ; Anderson v .
Stadlemann , 1898 , 17 Wash . 433 ; 49 Pac . 1070 .
6
7 Alexander v . Vennan , 61 Iowa 160 ; 16 N . W . 80 .
6
3 Thompson v . New Eng . Mort . Co . , 1895 , 110 Ala . 40






. R . 29 .
6
4 Flege v . Garvey , 47 Cal . 371 ; a
s
to such statutes see ante , p . 423 .
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§ 394 . Subsequent abandonment will not make the
conveyance valid - Nor death or divorce - Transfer by
wife alone . — The result is that the subsequent abandon
ment of the premises as a homestead will not render valid
a conveyance that was invalid when made ;65 nor will the
wife 's subsequent death 66 or divorce67 make it valid .68
And in those states where husband and wife must both
execute the conveyance , irrespective of which of them has
the legal title , the same consequences in general will result
from a conveyance by the wife alone when the title is in
her ,69 though in other states where there is no such re
quirement as to execution by both of them in all cases ,
but simply one as to the wife 's execution or consent to
her husband ' s alienation , it seems that she may convey
the homestead without her husband 's joining with her if
in those states she has capacity to so convey other real
property .
.65Gleason y . Spray , 81 Cal. 217 ; 22 Pac . 551; 15 Am . St. R . 47 ; Bru -
ner v. Bateman , 66 Iowa 488 ; 24 N . W . 9 ; American Savings & Loan
Ass' n v . Burghardt , 1897 , 19 Mon . 32
3 ; 48 Pac . 391 . ; 61 Am . St . R . 507 .
Though , on acquiring a new homestead , the husband may be estopped
by his sole deed previously made of his former homestead ; Marler V .
Handy , 1895 , 88 Texas 421 ; 31 S . W . 636 .
6
6 Shoemaker v . Collins , 49 Mich . 595 ; 14 N . W . 559 ; Martin v . Har
rington , 1901 , 73 Vt . 193 ; 50 Atl . 1074 ; 87 Am . S
t
. R . 704 .
6
7 Alt v . Banbolzer , 39 Minn . 511 ; 40 N . W . 830 ; 12 Am . St . R . 681 ;
Lange v . Geiser , 1903 , 138 Cal . 682 ; 72 Pac . 343 .
6
8 In the recent case o
f
Adams v . Gilbert , 1903 ( Kan . ) , 72 Pac . 769 , it
is held that , while the husband ' s deed without his wife ' s consent is in
effectual while the property remains a homestead , he may be estopped by
it , or may confirm it by silence after his wife ' s death . It is to be noted
that the Kansas constitution and statute provide simply that the home
stead “ shall not be alienated without the joint consent of husband and
wife when that relation exists , ” and though alienations not so con
sented to have been called void ( Schermerhorn v . Mahaffie , 34 Kan .




9 Lange v . Geiser , 1903 , 13
8
Cal .682 ; 72 Pac . 343 ; France v . Bell , 52
Neb . 57 ; 71 N . W . 984 ; Low v . Anderson , 41 Iowa 476 .
T
Ừ Morley Bros . v . National Loan & c . Co . , 1899 , 120 Mich . 171 ; 78 N .
W . 1078 ; Price v . Osborn , 34 Wis . 34 .
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§ 395 . To what extent husband may lease - Sell tim
ber — Grant rights of way . The statutes of most states
are broad enough in their terms to restrain the husband
from transferring any interest in the homestead premises
without his wife 's concurrence in the form prescribed by
statute .
He may not generally , for example , lease the premises
without her properly expressed consent; at least this
would seem to be the general rule when , by the terms of
the lease, the lessee 's occupation would interfere with the
use of the premises as a homestead , or when the lease
gives the lessee the right to remove substantial portions
of the realty - as minerals and timber — and creates en
cumbrances on the premises by giving him extensive
rights of ingress and egress .71 Nor may the husband
alone convey the minerals or timber in and upon the
premises , at least when the conveyance is in general
terms and is in reality an alienation of a substantial part
of the property ; 72 though it has been held that a license by
the husband alone to remove ore from a part of home
stead lands is not invalid when their possession for the
uses of the homestead is not interfered with , especially
when the wife hasknowledge of the expenses incurred by
the licensee under the license and makes no objection .73
It appears also that under most of the homestead stat
utes a husband may not grant by his sole deed a right of
way across the homestead premises ,74 nor may he alone
71Pritchett y . Davis , 1897 , 101 Ga. 23
6 ; 28 S . E . 666 ; 65 Am . St . R .
298 ; Wea Gas , Coal , etc . , Co . v . Franklin Land Co . , 1895 , 54 Kan . 533 ;
3
8 Pac . 790 ; 45 Am . St . R . 297 ; Barrett v . Cox , 1897 , 112 Mich , 220 : 70
N . W . 446 .
7
2 Virginia -Tennessee Coal Co . v . McClelland , 1900 , 98 Va . 424 ; 36 S .
E . 479 ; McKenzie v . Shows , 1892 , 70 Miss . 388 ; 12 So . 336 ; 35 Am . St .
R . 654 .
7
8 Harkness v . Burton , 39 Iowa 101 .
3
4 Cowan v . Southern R . Co . , 1897 , 11
8
Ala . 354 ; 23 So . 754 ; Evans
v . Grand Rapids & c . R . Co . , 68 Mich . 602 ; 36 N . W . 687 ; Pilcher v .
Atchison & c . R . Co . , 38 Kan . 516 ; 16 Pac . 945 ; 5 Am . St . R . 770 ;
Gulf & Ship Isd . R . Co . v . Singleterry , 1901 , 78 Miss . 772 ; 29 So . 754 .
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dedicate a portion of them to the public as a street ; 75
though it has been held that where the grant of an ease
ment, or of a right of way to a railroad , does not interfere
with the actual use and occupancy of the homestead it
may be made by the husband alone .76
$ 396 . The defective conveyance valid as to the excess
over homestead . Nevertheless, while the conveyance is
thus often said to be “ void , ” it is not void for all pur
poses, but simply as an alienation of the homestead ; for ,
even in the states where the courts have been most em
phatic in declaring it void , when there is included in it
other lands besides the homestead itmay be a valid con
veyance as to these other lands, though invalid as to the
homestead . If, however , severance of the parcels is
impracticable , the conveyance will be wholly invalid , at
least where the measure of the homestead is territorial
and does not depend upon its value entirely ; 78 while ,
where value ( rather than territorial extent) regulates or
measures the homestead , the excess over the statutory
value may be conveyed by the husband 's sole deed , 79 and
the grantor and grantee become co-owners and may have
partition .80
§ 397 . Non -compliance with statute does not make
alienation void in some states . - If the restraints as to the
75 San Francisco v .Grote , 1898 , 120 Cal . 59; 52 Pac . 127 ; 41 L . R . A .
335 ; 65 Am . St. R . 155 .
76Stokes v .Maxson , 1901, 113 Iowa 122 ; 84 N . W . 949 ; 86 Am . St. R .
367 ; Chicago & c . R . Co. v . Titterington , 1892, 84 Texas 218 ; 19 S. W .
472 ; 31 Am . St. R . 39 .
77Engle y . White , 1895 , 104 Mich . 15 ; 62 N . W . 154 ; Weitzner y .
Thingstad , 1893 , 55 Minn . 244 ; 56 N . W . 817 ; Pryne v . Pryne , 1902 ,
116 Iowa 82 ; 89 N . W . 10
8 ; Townsend v . Blanchard , 1902 , 117 Iowa
3
6 ; Thorp v . Thorp , 70 V
t
. 46 ; 39 Atl . 245 .
7
8 Sammon v . Wood , 1895 , 107 Mich . 506 ; 6
5
N . W . 529 .
7
9 Donahue v . Cricket Club , 1898 , 177 II
I
. 351 ; 52 N . E . 351 .
8
0 Anderson v . Smith , 1895 , 159 Ill . 93 ; 42 N . E . 206 ; Gray v . Scho




. 36 ; 51 N . E . 684 .
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alienation of the homestead are considered as applying to
the right of exemption or privilege of occupancy rather
than to the exempt land , an effect is given to the hus
band ' s sole conveyance different from that given to it
when they are regarded as applying to the land itself .





ute 81 in terms similar to those o
f many states . " A home
stead , * * * consisting , when not included within any
city o
r village , of any quantity of land , not exceeding
forty acres , used for agricultural purposes , and when in
cluded in any city or village , of any quantity o
f
land not
exceeding one - fourth of an acre , and the dwelling house




this state shall b
e exempt from sale on execution , "
e
tc . , and another statute82 provides that “ no mortgage or
other alienation b
y
a married man o
f
his homestead , ex
empt by law from execution , shall be valid or of any effect
a
s
to such homestead without the signature o
f his wife . ”
Under statutes almost identical with these , it has been
held b
y many courts , as the cases cited in the preceding
sections show , that a conveyance b
y
the husband alone is
void . But in a recent decision in this states3 it is held ,
following the settled rule there , that the prohibition
against the husband ' s conveying , without his wife ' s sig
nature , applies only to the homestead as a right or interest
in the land , and that a warranty deed b
y
a married man ,
which his wife refused to sign , will convey an equitable
interest to the grantee , which will entitle him to the legal
title when the homestead right ceases by the death o
f
both
husband and wife or otherwise ,and that the deed may be
enforced against the grantor ' s child who takes the legal
title to the homestead upon his death . 84
8
1 Wis . R . S . 1898 , $ 2983 (amended b
y
laws 1901 , ch . 269 , limiting the
exemption to the amount o
f
$ 5 ,000 ) .
8
2 Wisconsin R . S . 1898 , $ 2203 .
8
8 Jerdee v . Furbush , 1902 , 115 Wis . 277 ; 91 N . W . 661 .
8
6 Some decisions in other states which influenced the Wisconsin
court in earlier cases , e . g .McQuade v . Whaley , 31 Cal .526 , and White .
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In North Carolina the constitution 85 provides that
“ every homestead and the dwellings and buildings used
therewith , not exceeding in value $ 1 ,000 , to be selected 86
by the owner thereof,” or at his option a city lot , " owned
and occupied by any resident * * * shall be exempt ”
from sale on execution ; and that 87 he may dispose of
“ the same ” by deed , “ but no deed made by the owner
of a homestead shall be valid without the voluntary sig
nature and assent of his wife , signified on her private ex
amination according to law .” .
These clauses were recently the subject of an interesting
series of opinions by the justices of the supreme court of
that state ,88 and while one member of the court on the
first hearing89 considered that the “ homestead ” of the
constitution is the land and that any conveyance of it by
a husband alone is void , and the other justices then com
posing the court did not agree as to its legal character , the
doctrine finally established on rehearing is that the con
stitutional restraint on alienation applies only to a con
veyance o
f
the owner ' s homestead right of exemption and
that a deed of trust b
y
the husband alone , reserving the
homestead o
f the grantor , conveys the entire land subject
only to the “ determinable exemption ” in one thousand
dollars worth of it from the payment o
f
the grantor ' s
debts during his life , which exemption ceases on his
death .
Such a conveyance b
y
the husband alone , reserving the
man v . Field , 53 Vt . 554 , would not now be followed in these states .
See Powell v . Patison , 1893 , 100 Cal . 236 ; 34 Pac . 677 ; Martin v . Har
rington , 1901 , 73 Vt . 193 ; 50 Atl . 1074 ; 87 Am . St . R . 704 .
8
5 Art . X , $ 2 .
8
6 There is n
o provision a
s
to the method o
f
selection , and occupancy
seems sufficient .
8
7 Const . , Art . X , $ 8 .
8
8 Joyner v . Sugg , 1902 – 1903 , 131 N . C . 324 ; 42 S . E .828 ; on rehearing
132 N . C . 580 ; 44 S . E . 122 .
8
9 Furches , C . J . , in 131 N . C . 332 .
3
1 - BREWS . Con .
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use and occupancy during the lives of himself and his
wife , or reserving the “ homestead right, " would proba
bly be held valid by other courts ,90 though under the view
generally taken of the character of the homestead and the
purpose of restraints on its alienation , such a reservation
would not make his sole deed effective in most states . 91
$ 398 . The mode of manifesting consent to the aliena
tion of the homestead . The proper forms and methodsof
expressing the consent of husband or wife to an aliena
tion of the homestead by the other vary somewhat in the
different states .
A constitutional provision as to the mode will , of
course , control a statutory provision conflicting with it ;
so , for example , where the constitution provides for the
“ joint consent " of husband and wife , a statute purport
ing to authorize an alienation of the homestead by the
joinder of a guardian of an insane husband or wife with
the other spouse in the instrument of transfer is uncon
stitutional, as the guardian cannot give the consent re
quired by the constitution .92
As a general rule the concurrence or consent of hus
band and wife to the alienation should be expressed by
their joint act, and not separately . This is clear from
the terms of many of the statutes , but even where not
expressly so provided the laws have been construed so as
to render ineffective separate releases and consents .23
90See Allbright v . Hannah , 1897 , 103 Iowa 98 ; 72 N . W . 421 - not de
ciding the matter ; Adams v . Gilbert , 1903 (Kan . ) ; 72 Pac. 769 . See
ante , $ 394 , note 68 ; Gunnison v . Twitchel , 38 N . H . 62 , the N . H .
statute ( Pub . Stat. 1901, ch . 138 , § 4 ) now provides that " no deed shall
convey or incumber the homestead right" unless executed by both
husband and wife , a very different provision from those of most states.
91Gadsby v . Monroe , 1897 , 115 Mich . 282 ; 73 N . W . 367 .
92Locke v . Redmond , 1897 , 6 Kan . App . 76 ; 49 Pac . 670 ; affirmed , 59
Kan . 773 ; 52 Pac. 97 .
93 Donahoe v . Chicago Cricket Club , 1898 , 177 III . 351 ; 52 N . E . 351 :
Hart v . Church , 1899 , 12
6
Cal . 471 ; 58 Pac . 91
0 ; 77 Am . St . R . 19
5 ;
Hubbard v . Sage Land & c . Co . , 1902 , 81 Miss . 616 ; 33 8o . 413 .
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It results necessarily from the terms of most of the
laws that the consent required must be manifested by at
least some writing , but where the constitution provides
that the homestead cannot be alienated ' without the joint
consent of husband and wife , " and nothing further is re
quired by any statute, it is held that the consent need not
be written . 94
Usually the joinder of the husband and wife in a con
veyance in ordinary form is a sufficient release , convey
ance or consent, without special reference being made to
the homestead , though in two states — Illinois and Wyo
ming — a special releasing clause is required .
Even though the consenting husband or wife may,
strictly speaking , have nothing to convey , 9 it seems gen
erally the more prudent practice for both of them to appear
as grantors in the instrument of conveyance , and this has
been considered essential under a statute providing that
they shall “ concur in and sign the same joint instru
ment ; ' 96 though under the statutes of some states which
require simply the “ signature " of the wife she need not
be named as grantor in her husband 's conveyance of the
homestead .97
In any case a wife joining in her husband 's conveyance
should not restrict its effect as to her , if it is intended to
convey o
r
release the homestead , by declaring that she
joins to “ release her dower . " 98
9
4 Sullivan y . Wichita , 1902 , 64 Kan . 539 ; 68 Pac . 55 ;Matney v . Linn ,
1898 , 59 Kan . 613 ; 54 Pac . 668 .
9
5 Ante , $ 390 , n . 51 .
9
6 Seiffert & c . Lumber Co . v . Hartwell , 1895 , 94 Iowa 576 ; 63 N . W .
333 ; 58 Am . S
t
. R . 413 .
9
7Shelton v . Aultman & c . Co . , 82 Ala . 315 ; 8 So . 232 ; Barrett v .
Cox , 1897 , 112 Mich . 220 ; 70 N . W . 446 ; Lawyer v . Slingerland , 11
Minn . 447 ; Godfrey v . Thornton , 46 Wis . 677 ; 1 N . W . 362 . See Davis
v . Jenkins , 1892 , 93 Ky . 353 ; 20 S . W . 283 ; 40 Am . St . R . 197 .
9
8 Burrows v . Pickens , 1901 , 129 Ala . 648 ; 29 So . 694 ; Pipkin v . Wil .
liams , 1893 , 57 Ark . 242 ; 21 S . W . 433 ; 38 Am . St . R . 241 ; Sharp v . .
Bailey , 14 Iowa 387 ; 81 Am . D . 489 .
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§ 399 . The acknowledgment to the conveyance of the
homestead . — It is required in many states that the instru
ment by which the homestead is conveyed shall be
acknowledged. 99 Such a requirement must be fulfilled in
order that the alienation may be effectual ; therefore , if the
instrument has not actually been acknowledged , or if it
has been acknowledged before some one not authorized to
take the acknowledgment , as an officer disqualified by
reason of interest ; 10
0
the conveyance is generally consid
ered invalid a
s
to the homestead .
S
o , if the certificate of acknowledgment is substantially
defective the conveyance to which it is attached is of no
more effect than if not acknowledged . And if the wife ' s
" separate examination " 2 is required to be certified to in
such cases this is also essential to its validity ; 3 and so ,
for instance , a conveyance not conforming to this require
ment , being a nullity , cannot be made valid b
y
the wife ' s
acknowledgment after her husband ' s death .
Unless , however , the homestead laws of the state ex
pressly require an acknowledgment to a conveyance o
f
the
homestead , or unless some other law makes an acknowl
edgment essential to conveyances generally , there is no




have any other effect upon the alienation o
f
the home
stead than upon that of other property . 6
9
9




Watkins v . Youll , 1903 (Neb . ) ; 96 N . W . 1042 . See ante , & $ 281 , 282 ,
285 - 287 and cases cited .
'Penny v . British & c . Mortgage Co . , 1901 , 132 Ala . 35
7 ; 31 So . 96 ;
American Savings & Loan Ass ' n v . Burghardt , 1897 , 19 Mon . 323 ; 48
Pac . 391 ; 61 Am . S
t
. R . 507 .
2 Ante , $ 365 .
3 Marx v . Threet , 1901 , 131 Ala . 340 ; 30 So . 831 ; Garner v . Black ,
1901 , 95 Texas 125 ; 65 S . W . 876 .
4 Richardson v . Woodstock Iron Co . , 1890 , 90 Ala . 266 ; 8 So . 7 .
5 For example , the statute relating to married women . Fisher v .
Meister , 24 Mich . 447 , 452 .
6 Barrett v . Cox , 1897 , 11
2
Mich . 220 ; 70 N . W . 446 ; Lawyer v . Sling .
erland , 11 Minn . 447 ; Karcher v . Gans , 1900 , 13 S . D . 383 ; 83 N . W .
431 ; 79 Am . St . R . 893 ; Godfrey v . Thornton , 46 Wis . 677 ; 1 N . W . 362 .
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§ 400 . Conveyance of the homestead between husband
and wife. - Owing to the requirement that husband and
wife must execute and acknowledge the conveyance of the
homestead , or that the wife must execute her husband ' s
conveyance, some question has arisen as to conveyances
of the homestead between husband and wife .
Its transfer by the husband to the wife has often been
held valid when the instrument of transfer has not been
executed by her , although her signature , or joinder , or
acknowledgment , after a separate examination , are essen
tial in the same jurisdictions in conveying it to other per
sons.?
The reason usually given for sustaining conveyances in
this form from husband to wife is that as the restraint on
alienation is imposed for the benefit of the family there is
no violation of the spirit of the law in themaking of such
a conveyance by the husband to the wife . And some
times it is also said that such a conveyance is not within
the statute , because to require her signature or joinder
under such circumstances would be to make her both
grantor and grantee in the same conveyance — " a vain
and senseless thing .” 8 .
But this latter reason is based on the view that she has
in such cases some estate to convey , which is not univer
sally recognized as the correct view of the nature of her
interest.' And in Illinois the fact that the wife appears
in such cases (where she joins in her husband 's transfer
to her ) to be both grantor and grantee is considered to be
no obstacle to such a transfer , for a direct conveyance of
the homestead from him to her without her joinder is in
valid as to the homestead property ,10 though it conveys
Thompson v . McConnell , 1901 , 107 Fed . 33 ; Burkett v . Burkett , 78
Cal. 310 ; 20 Pac. 715 ; 12 Am . St. R . 58 ; 3 L . R . A . 781 ; Turner v .
Bernheimer , 1892 , 95 Ala . 241 ; 10 So . 750 .
* Lynch v . Doran , 1893 , 95 Mich . 395 ; 54 N . W . 882 ; Furrow v. Athey ,
21 Neb . 671 ; 59 Am . R . 867 ; Harsh v . Griffin , 72 Iowa 608 ; 34 N . W .
441 ; Hall v . Powell , 1899 , 8 Okla . 276 ; 57 Pac . 168 .
9 Ante , $ 390 , n . 51 .
10Shields v . Bush , 1901 , 189 Ill. 534 ; 59 N . E . 962 ; 82 Am . St . R . 474 .
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title to the excess in value over $ 1 ,000 , but nothing if
the homestead attempted to be so conveyed is worth less
than that sum ; 12 and the same principles apply to a con
veyance from the wife to the husband of the homestead to
which she has the legal title .18
In the foregoing cases from various states where con
veyances of the homestead between husband and wife
have been sustained , the homestead character of the prop
erty has been preserved , though the legal title to the realty
has passed from one to the other, and it has been therefore
considered that the spirit of the statutes has not been vio
lated . But where the transfer between husband and wife
would tend to destroy the homestead a more strict con
struction has been placed upon the statute requiring joint
execution and acknowledgment , and it has been held that
a mortgage of homestead community property executed
by the wife alone to the husband , to secure a debt from
him to her , is void in the hands of his assignee .14
11 Stickel v , Crane , 1901 , 189 Ill . 211 ; 59 N . E . 595 .
1
3 Anderson v . Smith , 1895 , 159 Ill . 93 : 42 N . E . 306 .
1
3 Despain v . Wagner , 1896 , 163 Ill . 598 ; 45 N . E . 129 . It does not
seem to have been decided in Illinois that a conveyance executed and




inferred from the foregoing decisions .
1
4 Freiermuth v . Steigleman , 1900 , 130 Cal . 392 ; 62 Pac . 615 ; 80 Am .
S
t . R . 138 . The question as to when conveyances o
f
the homestead be
tween husband and wife may be considered fraudulent a
s
to creditors
is one not within the scope o
f
this work . See Kettleschlager v . Fer
rick , 1900 , 12 S . Dak . 45
5 ; 76 Am . St . R . 623 ; White Sewing Machine
Co . v . Wooster , 1899 , 66 Ark . 382 ; 74 Am . S
t
. R . 100 .
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§ 401. Capacity of corporation to take title at com
mon law – Statutes of mortmain . — At common law a
corporation has capacity to purchase and hold such lands
as are reasonably required for the purposes of its creation
without any special authority .1
By a series of " statutes of mortmain ,” 2 designed
primarily to prevent the accumulation of lands by eccle
siastical foundations — bodies having some of the attri
butes of the later “ corporation ” 3 — this power was , in
England, taken from corporations, both ecclesiastical and
lay , which were prohibited from purchasing lands with
" Lathrop v . Commercial Bank , 8 Dana 114 ; 33 Am . D . 481 ; First
Parish in Sutton v . Cole 3 Pick . 232, 239 ; Page v . Heineberg , 40 Vt.
81 ; 94 Am . Dec . 378 .
? Beginning with Magna Carta (1225 ) , 9 Hen . III . c. 36.
• See Poll . & Mait . Hist . Eng . L ., 2d ed . I, pp . 494 et seq .
• ( 1391 ) 15 Rich . II, c . 5 .
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out a license from the crown (and originally also from
the lord , if any, from whom the land was held ) ; the vio
lation of the prohibition being a cause for forfeiture .
Though these statutes of mortmain have not been rec
ognized as being in force in this country ,” except in Penn
sylvania , their policy has been adopted where restrictions
have existed on the power of corporations to acquire real
estate by devise , or on their power to acquire more than
a specified amount of land , a restriction frequently im
posed by statute on religious and charitable corporations
especially .
§ 402. Capacity to take title - May take in fee though
it
s
duration is limited . — The capacity of corporations in
this country being unaffected b
y
the English statutes o
f
mortmain , they may take , hold and convey such lands as
are reasonably necessary for carrying out the business for
which they were created unless some restriction is im
posed b
y
their charters or b
y
statute . A corporation ,
moreover , though its duration is limited , may take an es
tate in fee , so that it may convey title in fee ; its grantee ' s




own subsequent dissolution . 10
$ 403 . Effect o
f corporation ' s dissolution on title . - It
has been said that a
t
common law , on the dissolution of
5 See decisions note 1 , supra , and Perrin v . Carey , 24 How . ( U . S . )
465 , 498 ; Mallett v . Simpson , 94 N . C . 37 ; 55 Am . R . 594 ; Fayette
Land Co . v . Louisville & c . R . Co . , 1896 , 93 Va . 274 ; 24 S . E . 1016 .
6 Methodist Church y . Remington , 1 Watts 218 ; 26 Am . D . 61 . A
corporation is not prevented from acquiring lands , but from holding
those which it has acquired without a license . Leazure v . Hillegas , 7
Serg . & R . 313 ; 1 Wilgus Corp . Cas . 1008 .
? Downing v . Marshall , 23 N . Y . 366 ; 80 Am . D . 290 ; In re Mc
Graw ' s Estate , 111 N . Y . 66 , 137 ; 19 N . E . 233 ; 2 L . R . A . 387 ; 1 Wil
gus Corp . Cas . 1034 .
8 Thompson v . Waters , 25 Mich . 214 ; 12 Am . R . 243 .
9 Nicoll v . N . Y . & E . R . Co . , 12 N . Y . 121 ; Bailey v . Platte & c . Ca
nal Co . , 12 Colo . 230 .
1
0 Wilson v . Leary , 1897 , 12
0
N . C . 90 ; 26 S . E . 630 ; 58 Am . St . R .
778 ; 1 Wilgus Corp . Cas . 903 . As to the use o
f
the word successors in
creating a fee , see ante , $ 137 .
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a corporation it
s
real estate reverted to the original grantor
o
r
his heirs , 11 but whether this is a correct statement o
f
the common law o
r
not , 12 the modern doctrine is that on
the dissolution of a private business corporation , lands







assets , and do not
revert to the grantor . 13
On the dissolution , however , o
f
a charitable corpora
tion , not organized fo
r
the purposes o
f private gain o
r
profit , the rule that its real estate reverts to the donor is
sometimes applied , 14 though in such a case the property
is said to be still subject to the charitable use — a
t
least
where no private donor is entitled to it , - o
r
if this use is
contrary to public policy it is subject to a legitimate char
itable use conforming a
s nearly a
s practicable to that to
which the property was originally dedicated . 15
§ 404 . May purchase and hold only lands appropriate
to corporate purpose - Presumption that land is so held .
- Statutory provisions are general in the United States
declaring that private business corporations may acquire ,
hold and convey such real property as may be necessary
for the transaction o
f
their business , and limitations are
a
t
the same time often placed upon the power thus con
ferred . But without regard to such statutes it is a settled
general principle that corporations have the right to pur
chase and hold such real property , and such only , as is
necessary o




1 State Bank v . The State , 1 Blackf . 267 ; 12 Am . D . 234 ; 1 Wilgus
Corp . Cas . 891 ; Bingham v . Weiderwax , 1 N . Y . 509 .
1
3
See Gray Perpetuities , $ $ 44 , 50 , 51 .
1
8 People v . O 'Brien , 111 N . Y . 1 ; 18 N . E . 692 ; 7 Am . St . R . 684 ; 2
L . R . A . 255 ; 2 Wilgus Corp . Cas . 1426 .
1
4 See Danville Seminary v . Mott , 1891 , 136 Ill . 289 ; 28 N . E . 54 , there
having been generally in such cases a gift without consideration for a
particular purpose , such a reverter resembles that which may occur on
the breach of an express condition subsequent . Mott v . Danville Sem
inary , 129 Ill . 403 , 415 ; 21 N . E . 927 .
1
5 Mormon Church v . United States , 1890 , 13
6
U . S . 1 ; 1 Wilgus Corp .
Cas . 906 .
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legitimate corporate purposes ; 16when , however , a purchase
of lands has been made by a corporation there is, in gen
eral, a presumption , in the absence of evidence to the con
trary , that the purchase was made for a legitimate purpose ,
and the contrary must be shown by one alleging it .17
§ 405 . Where its power is exceeded the state only may
complain - Conveyance to corporation in such case void
able , not void . — Moreover , the question whether a corpo
ration which has acquired title to real estate has exceeded
it
s powers in so doing is one that can be raised , generally




r the national government in proper cases ) , 18 and
even if the corporation has exceeded its powers , a forfei
ture o
f
the lands so acquired does not follow as a conse
quence unless this is made b
y
statute the penalty for the
corporation ' s act . 19
Therefore , though the law of a state provided that no
foreign o
r
domestic corporation maintained for pecuniary
profit should purchase or hold real estate in the state ex•
cept as provided for in the act , and a foreign corporation ,
without attempting to comply with the provisions of the
act relating to foreign corporations , purchased lands in
the state and afterward conveyed them , it was held that
the conveyance to the corporation was not void , but void
1
6 Case v . Kelly , 1890 , 133 U . S . 21 ; 1 Wilgus Corp . Cas . 1012 ; South
and North Alabama R . Co . v . Highland Ave . R . Co . , 1898 , 119 Ala .
105 ; 24 S
o . 114 ; People v . Pullman ' s Palace Car Co . , 175 Il
l
. 125 ; 51
N . E . 664 ; 1 Wilgus Corp . Cas . 926 . :
1
7 Stockton Savings Bank v . Staples , 1893 , 98 Cal . 189 ; 32 Pac . 93
6 ; 1
Wilgus Corp . Cas . 1007 ; Regents of University v . Detroit Y . M . Soc ' y ,
1
2 Mich . 13
8 ; Conn . Mut . L . Ins . Co . v . Smith , 1893 , 11
7
Mo . 261 ; 22
S . W . 623 ; 38 Am . St . R . 656 .
1
8 National Bank v . Matthews , 98 U . S . 621 .
1
9 People v . Stockton Savings & Loan Soc ' y , 1901 , 13
3
Cal . 611 ; 65
Pac . 1078 ; 85 Am . St . R . 22
5
; Commonwealth v . N . Y . & c . R . Co . ,
1890 , 132 Pa . St . 591 ; 19 Atl . 291 ; 1 Wilgus Corp . Cas . 1014 ; Fayette
Land Co . v . Louisville & c . R . Co . , 1896 , 93 Va . 274 ; 24 S . E . 1016 . See
“ Consequences o
f illegal or ultra vires acquisition of real estate b
y
a
corporation , " A . M . Alger , 8 Harv . L . R . 15 .
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able at the instance of the state , and that title passed to
the corporation which then could convey good title not
subject to be defeated by one holding from the grantor of
the corporation .20
Where the corporation has power to acquire title to
land at all, its power in a particular instance to hold land
already conveyed to it cannot be questioned b
y
the grantor
himself , 21 or b
y
his heirs , 22 or b
y




his creditors . 24 And , on the other hand , the corpo
ration is itself estopped , and cannot , for example , defeat
the foreclosure o
f
a mortgage executed b
y
it on the ground
that it was not authorized b
y
law to acquire title to the
land mortgaged . 25
As the corporation may in such cases convey good title ,




f equity to perform his contract ,
and cannot successfully defend a suit brought b
y
the cor
poration for specific performance , on the ground that the
corporation could not acquire title to the lands ; 26 normay
the grantee o
f
a corporation , when it is sought to enforce
the conditions o
f
the conveyance under which h
e has
taken title , deny the validity of the title conveyed to him ,
alleging the incapacity o
f



















0 Fritts v . Palmer , 132 U . S . 282 .
1
1 Long v . Georgia Pacific R . Co . , 1890 , 91 Ala . 519 ; 8 So . 706 .
2
2 Shelby v . Chicago & c . R . Co . , 1892 , 143 Il
l
. 385 ; 32 N . E . 438 ; Mal .
lett v . Simpson , 94 N . C . 37 ; 55 Am . R . 594 . That the heirs of devisor
may not complain in such a case , see Farrington v . Putnam , 1897 , 90
Maine 405 ; 37 Atl . 652 ; 1 Wilgus Corp . Cas . 1029 ; 38 L . R . A . 339 .
Contra , that they may complain , see In re McGraw ' s Estate , 111 N . Y .
6
6 ; 19 N . E . 233 ; 2 L . R . A . 387 ; 1 Wilgus Corp . Cas . 1034 .
2
3 Hafner v . S
t
. Louis , 1901 , 161 Mo . 34 ; 61 S . W . 632 .
2
4 Gilbert v . Berlin , 1900 , 70 N . H . 396 ; 48 Atl . 279 .
2
5 Butterworth & Lowe v . Kritzer Milling Co . , 1897 , 115 Mich . 1 ; 72
N . W . 990 . See Hagerstown Mfg . & c . C
o . v . Keedy , 1900 , 91 Md . 430 ;
4
6 Atl . 965 .
2
6 Banks v . Poitiaux , 3 Rand . 136 ; 15 Am . D . 706 .
2
7 Cowell v . Springs Co . , 10
0
U . S . 55 ; and that a lessee o
f corporation
may not deny its title on such grounds when sued for rent o
r posses
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A distinction , however , is made in the application of
this general rule , that the state only may complain when
a corporation exceeds its power in taking real estate , be
tween contracts or conveyances that are incomplete or ex
ecutory and those that are completed . While the courts
will not generally interfere , except at the instance of the
state , to deprive a corporation of land already acquired by
it, they will not aid it to acquire land which it has not




$ 406 . Capacity of private corporation to alienate real
property . — A corporation having general capacity to take
title to real property has as an incident to its ownership
authority and capacity in general to alienate such prop
erty . 29 Moreover , although a corporation may not in a
particular instance have the power to retain land which
it has acquired , as against the state , yet , until the state
complains , it may , as the decisions previously cited indi
cate , convey good title to its own grantee ; and it may
grant to another corporation rights to use land for a pur
pose within the powers of the grantee corporation , though
it could not itself use the land fo
r
the same purpose . 30
But whether a corporation has the same power to alien
ate it
s real property that an individual has will depend
upon the character o
f




duties to the public , for some corporations are under
greater disabilities in this regard than others are . 31
itle
to
sion , see Rector v . Hartford Deposit Co . , 1901 , 190 II
I , 380 ; 60 N . E .
528 ; First Eng . Evangelical Church v . Arkle , 1901 , 49 W . Va . 92 ; 38 S .
E . 486 .
2
8 Case v . Kelly , 133 U . 8 . 21 ; 1 Wilgus Corp . Cas . 1012 ; Pacific R .
Co . v . Seely , 45 Mo . 212 ; 100 Am . D . 369 .
2
9 The case o
f
Sutton ' s Hospital , 10 Coke 30a . Some matters of form
have already been referred to : execution o
f conveyance by corpora
tion , ante , $ $ 240 , 241 ; the corporate seal , $ 249 ; acknowledgment ,
$ 294 .
3
0 Benton v . Elizabeth , 1898 , 61 N . J . L . 411 , 693 ; 39 Atl . 683 , 906 ; 40
Atl . 1132 .
3
1 See next section .
.
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A private corporation , having no peculiar public duties
to perform , has full power to dispose of its property , un
less specially restrained , if such disposition is assented to
by its stockholders and does not injuriously affect credit













who , in the exercise o
f
a sound discretion , deem it expe
dient to do so and thus close its business to prevent a
loss . 33
But a distinction a
s





stockholders to direct an alienation of it
s property has
been made between such cases a
s
these and those where
such a
n alienation would have the effect of putting an
end to a corporation which was doing a fairly prosperous
business for which it was organized , and which it might
have continued but for the alienation o
f
it
s property . It
has been held that under such circumstances the transfer
will not be sustained as against dissenting stockholders , 34







§ 407 . Capacity of public and quasi -public corpora
tions to alienate real property . — Much of the real prop
erty o
f
a municipal corporation is held b
y
it in trust for
the public , and the duties imposed b
y
this trust can be
properly discharged only when it continues in theman
3
2 Aurora Agricultural & c . Society v . Paddock , 80 Ill . 263 ; 1 Wilgus
Corp . Cas . 1065 ; Holmes & c . Mfg . Co . v . Holmes & c .Metal Co . , 1891 ,
127 N . Y . 252 ; 27 N . E . 831 ; 24 Am . S
t
. R . 448 ; Spokane v . Amsterdam
Sch . Trustees , 1900 , 22 Wash . 172 ; 6
0 Pac . 141 .
8
3 Treadwell v . Salisbury Mfg . Co . , 7 Gray 393 ; 66 Am . D . 490 ; 2
Wilgus Corp . Cas . 1787 ; Phillips v . Providence Steam Engine Co . , 1899 ,
2
1
R . I . 302 ; 43 Atl . 598 ; 45 L . R . A . 560 .
* * Harding v . American Glucose Co . , 1899 , 182 Ill . 551 ; 55 N . E . 577 ;
7
4
Am . St . R . 189 ; Forrester v . Boston & Montana Copper Co . , 1898 , 21
Mon . 544 , 565 ; 55 Pac . 229 , 353 .
8
5 People v . Ballard , 1892 , 134 N . Y . 269 ; 32 N . E . 54 ; 17 L . R . A . 737 ;
1 Wilgus Corp . Cas . 1066 .
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agement and control of such property . It cannot relin
quish its management and control by an alienation of
such of its lands as the public has an interest in . There
fore , streets and parks which have been dedicated or set
apart for public purposes , and property of similar char
acter , may not generally be conveyed by the municipal
authorities .36
But a municipal corporation may have title to real
property which has not been dedicated to a public use,
and which is held much as an individual holds his prop
erty . As an incident to its ownership of such property





a statute . 37
Quasi -public corporations that have obtained fran





the public is interested cannot deprive themselves , with
out special authority , o
f
such property as is necessary to
the proper discharge o
f
these duties . Railroad companies
are the most familiar bodies o
f
this class , and the rule has
been frequently applied to them when , under various
forms o
f
alienation , attempts have been made to transfer
all or the chief part of their real property , 38 though they
may convey such o
f
their real property a
s
is not needed
for railway purposes . 39 Among other kinds of quasi
public corporations to which the rule has been applied
are plank -road and turnpike companies , gas and electric
3
6 San Francisco v . Itsell , 80 Cal . 57 ; 22 Pac . 74 ; Methodist Church
v . Hoboken , 33 N . J . L . 13 ; 97 Am . D . 696 ; Brooklyn Park Com ' rs
V . Armstrong , 45 N . Y . 234 ; Southport v . Stanley , 1899 , 125 N . C . 464 ;
3
4
S . E . 641 .
8
7 Ames v . San Diego , 1894 , 101 Cal . 390 ; 35 Pac . 1005 ; Chicago v .
Middlebrooke , 1892 , 143 Ill . 265 , 269 ; 32 N . E . 457 ; Fort Wayne v . Lake
Shore & c . R . Co . , 1892 , 132 Ind . 558 ; 32 N . E . 215 ; 32 Am . S
t
. R . 277 .
8
8 Oregon Railway v . Oregonian Railway , 130 U . 8 . 1 ; Memphis & c .
R . Co . v . Grayson , 88 Ala . 572 ; 7 So . 122 ; 16 Am . S
t
. R . 69 ; Middlesex




. 372 ; 75 Am . D . 518 .
8
9 Branch v . Jesup , 10
6
U . S . 468 , 478 ; Yates v . Van D
e Bogert , 56 N .
Y . 526 ; Walsh v . Barton , 24 Ohio S
t
. 28 .
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lighting companies and canal companies and other corpo
rations charged with the performance of public duties .40
40 Snell v . Chicago , 1893 , 152 U . S . 191 ; Ammant v . New Alexandria
Turnpike Co ., 13 Serg . & R . 210 ; 15 Am . D . 593 ; Visalia Gas & c. Co .
v . Sims, 1894 , 104 Cal. 326 ; 37 Pac . 1042 ; 43 Am . St. R . 105 ; Brunswick
Gas Light Co. v . United Gas Co ., 1893, 85 Maine 532 ; 27 Atl . 525 ; 35
Am . St. R . 385 . See Central Trans. Co . v . Pullman 's Palace Car Co ., 139
U . S. 24 .
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CAPACITY OF ALIENS TO PURCHASE AND CONVEY REAL
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§ 408. At common law aliens could acquire title by
purchase , not by descent . - At common law an alien could
acquire a defeasible title to real property by purchase,
but could not inherit from either an alien ancestor or a
citizen .2
Real property acquired by devise is generally considered
as acquired by purchase within this rule , as " purchase "
includes devise not only at common law , but under stat
utes which relate to the acquisition of real property by
aliens .4
§ 409 . Nature of the title thus acquired - Office found .
- The title to real property thus acquired by an alien was
defeasible by the sovereign . The alien could hold the
property until “ office found '' - a proceeding by a public
1 Manuel v . Wulff , 1894 , 152 U . S. 505 .
? Wunderle v .Wunderle , 1893 , 144 I11 . 40 ; 33 N . E . 19
5 ; 19 L . R . A . 84 ;
Crane v . Reeder , 21 Mich . 24 ; 4 Am . R . 430 ; Glynn v . Glynn , 1901 , 62
Neb . 872 ; 87 N . W . 1052 .
5 Fairfax v . Hunter , 7 Cranch . 603 ; Jones v . Minogue , 29 Ark . 637 ;
Guyer v . Smith , 22 Md . 239 ; 85 Am . Dec . 650 .
* Doehrel v . Hillmer , 1897 , 102 Iowa 169 ; 71 N . W . 204 ; Stamm v .
Bostwick , 1890 , 122 N . Y . 48 ; 25 N . E . 233 ; 9 L . R . A . 597 .
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officer upon an inquest by which the fact of alienage was
established and made a matter of record .5
A conveyance , therefore , to an alien is not void , but
voidable merely , and until the state or sovereign power
procures an escheat or forfeiture upon proceedings in the
nature of office found the alien has complete dominion
over the property ;6 and to divest his estate during his life
time an office found, or some proceeding equivalent to it ,
on the part of the state is necessary .?
Nor may the alien 's title be assailed because of alienage
by any person except the state.8
§ 4.10 . Alien may convey before office found . — Having ,
therefore , a title subject to be divested by the state alone,
the alien may , before office found , convey real property ,
acquired by him by purchase , to any one capable of tak
ing and holding title ; and the title of his grantee , accord
ing to the weight of authority , will not thereafter be sub
ject to be defeated on account of the grantor 's alienage.
It has, however , been sometimes said that the grantee
of the alien takes a title liable to be defeated by the state ; 10
but as the real reason for the disability of aliens is that it
is against public policy to allow those owing no allegiance
to the government to own lands within its jurisdiction
and protection , it would seem unreasonable and unjust
that the state , after refraining from enforcing a forfeiture
5 Phillips v . Moore , 10
0
U . S . 208 .
6 McKinley Creek Mining Co . v . Alaska Mining Co . , 1902 , 183 U . S .
563 .
? Jackson v . Adams , 7 Wend . 36
7 ; Elmondorff v . Carmichael , 3 Litt .
472 ; 14 Am . D . 86 . :
8Governeur ' s Heirs v . Robertson , 11 Wheat . 332 ; Justice Mining Co .




. R . 216 .
9 Halstead v . Board Comm ’ rs , 56 Ind . 363 ; Goodrich v . Russell , 4
2
N .
Y . 177 ; Oregon Mortgage Co . v . Carstens , 1896 , 1
6 Wash . 165 ; 47 Pac .
421 ; 35 L . R . A . 841 ; Strickley v . Hill , 1900 , 22 Utah 257 ; 62 Pac . 893 ;
8
3 Am . S
t
. R . 786 .
1
0 Harley v . State , 40 Ala . 689 ; Scanlan v . Wright , 13 Pick . 523 ; 25
A
m . D . 344 ; Purczell v . Smidt , 21 Iowa 540 .
3
2 BREWS Con .
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while the land is held by an alien , should have the right
to divest the title of one - especially if he be a citizen
simply because the land had been conveyed to him by an
alien .
When , however , an alien that holds title to land by
purchase , dies without having conveyed the land and
without having had his title divested in proceedings taken
by the state , the state at once becomes entitled thereto ,
although hemay have left thosewho might have inherited
his land had he been a citizen . Nor is any proceeding in
the nature of office found necessary to vest title in the
state in such a case .11
§ 411 . Common law as modified by statute. — The com
mon law principles as to the property rights of aliens are
still generally recognized in the United States except in
so far as they have been expressly modified by statute .
Both in England and in most of the United States ,
however, there have been extensive modifications of the
common law in this respect , and in some of the states al
most all distinctions between citizens and aliens regard
ing property rights have been removed ,12 while in about
one-half the states special privileges are conferred only
upon aliens resident in the state (or in some cases in the
United States ) , non -resident aliens being prohibited in
some cases from holding more than a certain amount of
land, or from inheriting at all, or from inheriting unless
11Slater v . Nason, 15 Pick . 345 ; Crane v . Reeder , 21 Mich . 24 ; 4 Am .
R . 430 ; Colgan v . McKeon , 24 N . J. L .566 ; Sands v .Lynham , 27 Gratt.
291 ; 21 Am . R . 348 . See , for the application of this principle , where a
statute has enabled alien heirs to inherit under certain circumstances ,
State v . Stevenson , 1898 , 6 Idaho 367 ; 55 Pac . 886.
12 In the following states the disabilities of aliens are substantially re
moved , though in some (Maryland , Virginia , West Virginia ) their re
moval is expressly restricted to " alien friends” : Alabama , Arkansas ,
Colorado , Florida ,Maine, Maryland ,Massachusetts ,Michigan , Nevada
( except Chinese ), New Jersey , North Carolina , North Dakota , Ohio ,
Oregon , Rhode Island , South Dakota , Tennessee , Utah , Virginia , West
Virginia .
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within a certain time they claim the land , and either be
come citizens or sell it. 13
In other states the policy has been to impose by consti
tution or statute somewhat greater restrictions on the
right of aliens to take and hold real property than were
imposed by common law . 14
§ 412 . Power of the states to remove disabilities. — The
removal of all an alien ' s common law disabilities or the
addition of other disabilities is a matter within the control
of each state , subject to the treaty -making power of the
United States, under which the disabilities of aliens
may be removed irrespective of the policy of any state ; 15
though , plainly , in the absence of any treaty the power of
the state to legislate upon the subject is absolute. 16
As constitutional provisions regarding land -holding by
aliens exist in many states, the legislatures of such states
have not complete control of the subject . Yet constitu
tional provisions in a particular state enlarging the rights
of aliens do not of themselves prevent the legislature of
that state from still further removing their disabilities .
So, fo
r
example , where a state constitution gives certain
special privileges to “ resident aliens , ” while the legisla
ture may not deprive this class o
f
the privileges thus con










value , and they cannot
here be set out at length . Some conditions as to residence appear in
those o
f
the following states : California , Connecticut , Delaware , Idaho ,
Illinois , Iowa , Indiana , Kansas , Kentucky , Minnesota , Mississippi ,
Montana , Nebraska , New Hampshire , New York , Pennsylvania , Texas ,
Wisconsin , Wyoming .
1
4 For example : By the constitution of Washington conveyances to
a
n alien , except under certain circumstances , are void ; and a lease for
forty -nine years to a corporation , the majority o
f
whose stock is held
by aliens , is void . State v . Hudson Land Co . , 1898 , 19 Wash . 85 ; 52
Pac . 574 ; 40 L . R . A . 430 .
1
5
See ante , & 4 .
1
6 Blythe v . Hinckley , 1901 , 18
0
U . S . 333 ; Blythe v . Hinckley , 1900 ,
127 Cal . 431 ; 59 Pac . 787 .
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privileges , unless some other clause of the constitution
prohibits such action . 17
17Nicrosi v . Phillipi , 1890 , 91 Ala . 299 ; 8 So . 561 ; State v . Smith , 70
Cal. 153 ; 12 Pac. 121 ; Blythe v. Hinckley , 1900 , 127 Cal. 431 ; 59 Pac .
787 ; Thompson v. Waters , 25 Mich . 214 , 227 .
CHAPTER XXVI.
CAPACITY OF CONVICTS TO TAKE AND CONVEY REAL
PROPERTY .
$ 413 . Attainder at common law ,
Statutory changes in Eng
land .
$ 414 . Effect o
f
sentence for crime
in this country - Statutes .
§ 413 . Attainder a
t
common law - Statutory changes in
England . – At common law among the consequences of at





the attainted person to the crown as part of the pun
ishment for the crime , the forfeiture being enforced b
y
office found . Moreover , the blood o
f
the attainted person
was corrupted so that it was no longer inheritable , and
consequently his lands escheated to the lord , as if the
tenant had died without heirs , though this escheat was
subject to the paramount right of the crown to forfeiture .





destruction or suspension of the rights o
f
the attainted
person , that he was accounted in law " civilly dead . "
One attainted of treason or felony could , however , both
take and alienate lands , subject to the crown ' s right to
enforce a forfeiture . 3
In England statutory modifications were made in the
' B
l
. Comm . II , 251 , 25
2 , 254 ; IV , 381 - 387 ; Digby Hist . L . Real Prop .
9
1 , 132 , 426 .
Civil death arose in other cases as where one entered a monastery ,
o
r
abjured the realm a
s
a consequence o
f claiming sanctuary . B
l
.
Comm . I , 132 ; IV , 332 .
Shep . Touchstone 232 ; Doe d .Griffith v . Pritchard , 5 Barn . & Ad .
765 ; 27 Eng . C . L . 179 .
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law of attainder , until in 18704 the crown' s claim of for
feiture and escheat (except in the rare case of forfeiture
following outlawry ) was abolished , as well as corruption
of blood . Under the act ( somewhat similar to some
American statutes ) an administrator may be appointed
by the crown to have the custody and management of the
convict ' s property with power to alienate it , or a curator
may be appointed whose duties are merely to preserve the
property . The convict is not deprived of his lands , but
if adjudged guilty of treason or felony and sentenced
either to death or penal servitude , he is rendered legally
incapable of alienating them during the continuance of
the sentence . Upon the completion of his sentence , orhis
pardon or death , such of his property as has not been
disposed of reverts to him or his representatives .
§ 414 . Effect of sentence fo
r
crime in this country
Statutes . In this country forfeiture o
f
estates in fee and
corruption of blood are generally impossible under our
constitutions , nor is civil death generally recognized .
Therefore as a rule , the disabilities consequent upon con




Legislation , however , in several states has placed one
sentenced to imprisonment under some disability in re
gard to taking and transferring property , though the ex
tent of the disabilities varies among the states having
statutes on the subject .
For example , in Rhode Island no person sentenced to
* By the Forfeiture Act , 33 & 34 Vict . , c . 23 .
5 Donnelly ' s Estate , 1899 , 125 Cal .417 ; 58 Pac . 61 ; 73 Am . S
t
. R . 62 ;
Willingham v . King , 23 Fla . 478 ; 2 So . 851 ; Smith v . Becker , 1901 , 62
Kan . 541 ; 64 Pac . 70 ; 53 L . R . A . 141 ; Rankin ' s Heirs v . Rankin ' s
Exrs . , 6 T . B . Mon . (Ky . ) 531 ; 17 Am . Dec . 161 ; Avery v . Everett ,
1881 , 110 N . Y . 317 ; 18 N . E . 148 ; 6 Am . S
t
. R . 368 ; 1 L . R . A . 264 :
Commonwealth v . Clemmer , 1899 , 190 Pa . St . 202 , 210 ; 42 Atl . 675 ;
Davis v . Laning , 1892 , 85 Texas 39 ; 19 S . W . 846 ; 34 Am . St . R . 781 ;
1
8
L . R . A . 82 ; Baltimore v . Chester , 53 Vt . 315 ; 38 Am . R . 677 .
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imprisonment in the state prison may , during his im
prisonment , make any will or conveyance of his prop
erty ; 6 and while this does not deprive him of his prop
erty nor of his capacity to enforce his rights in it,” he is
unable to convey it, and there may be an administrator
appointed to take charge of it.
While there appear to be few American statutes di
rectly prohibiting , as does this statute , any alienation by
the convict, those of Kansas, Missouri , Oregon and South
Dakota may have that effect in providing that a sentence
of imprisonment fo
r
any time less than fo
r
life suspends
all the civil rights of the person so sentenced , for it has




f alienating or incumbering his property during
the term o
f
his imprisonment ,and that a mortgage given
by him during this period is void . This would seem to
b
e the effect o
f
similar statutory provisions in California ,
Idaho , Montana , North Dakota and Utah 10 were it not for
provisos in those states that the statutes shall not be
construed to render the convict incompetent to convey his
property .
In most of the states already mentioned and in some
others — as Maine , Minnesota and New Yorkul — one sen
tenced to imprisonment for life is deemed civilly dead ,
and such a statute has been held to prevent the convict
from inheriting : 12 Under some statutes his estate may
be " administered and disposed o
f
” a
s if hewere naturally
6 R . I . Gen . L . 1896 , ch . 285 , $ 53 .
' Kenyon v . Saunders , 1894 , 18 R . I . 590 ; 30 Atl . 470 ; 26 L . R . A . 232 .
8 Kansas Gen . Stat . 1901 , § 2301 ; Missouri R . S . 1899 , § 2382 ; Oregon ,
Hill ' s Stat . , $ 2021 ; S . Dak . Ann . Stat . 1901 , § 8237 .
Williams v . Shackleford , 97 Mo . 322 ; 11 S . W . 222 ; but see La
Chapelle v . Burpee , 69 Hun 436 .
1
0 California Penal Co . , $ $ 673 , 674 ; Idaho Penal Co . 1901 , $ $ 5124 ,
5125 ; Montana Penal Co . , $ $ 1239 , 1240 ; North Dakota R . Co . 1899 ,
$ $ 7706 , 7707 ; Utah R . S . 1898 , 8 4501 .
1
1 Maine R . S . 1883 , ch . 64 , $ 18 ; Minnesota Stat . 1894 , § 6836 ; New
York Penal Co . , $ 708 .
1
2 Donnelly ' s Estate , 1899 , 12
5
Cal . 417 ; 58 Pac . 61 ; 73 Am . St . R . 6
2 .
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dead , and though it has been held that such a provision
does not necessarily produce the effects of natural death
in regard to the descent of his property ,13 there appear to
have been no decisions as to the effect of slightly different
statutes providing that upon imprisonment fo
r
life the
convict ' s property shall be “ divided among his heirs at
law and distributed a
s though he were dead . " ' 14
In a fe
w
states - for example , Kentucky , Missouri , New
York and Virginia15 — there may be appointed a commit
tee , curator or trustee o
f
the convict ' s estate , and upon
such appointment being made the convict ' s power to
alienate any o
f his property would seem to be suspended
during the continuance of the curatorship on principles
analogous to those applied when a guardian has been





8 Smith v . Becker , 1901 , 62 Kan . 541 ; 64 Pac . 70 ; 53 L . R . A . 14
1
.
See Avery v . Everett , 110 N . Y , 317 ; 18 N . E . 148 ; 6 Am . St . R . 368 ;
1 L . R . A . 264 .
1
4
R . I . Gen , L . 1896 , ch . 285 , $ 56 . See Maine R . S . 1883 , ch . 64 , & 18 .
1
5 Kentucky Stat . 1903 , $ $ 1383 – 1385 ; Missouri R . 8 . 1899 , $ 8930 ;
New York L . 1889 , ch . 401 , Birdseye ' s 3d ed . Gen . L . , II , p . 1814 ; Vir .
ginia Code , $ $ 4115 -4121 .
1
6 See ante , 88 332 , 333 .
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POSSESSION .
$ 415 . Disability of disseisee at
common law - Statute 32
Henry VIII.
416 . Statutes in this country
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§ 415 . Disability of disseisee a
t
common law - Statute
3
2 Henry VIII . - At common law a right of entry was not
assignable , though it might be released to the person in
actual seisin or possession o
f
the freehold ; ' and , as by the
earlier common law such importance was attached to the
possession o
f
land and to the real , actual transfer of this
possession when a freehold was conveyed , there could be
no conveyance of land held in adverse possession ; there
fore in this sense it may be said that it was a rule o
f
the
common law that the conveyance o
f
land in the adverse
possession o
f
another was void ,
After the statute o
f
uses and when it was possible to
transfer the legal title to land without this actual change
? C
o . Litt . 214a ; Digby Hist . L . Real Prop . 149n ; 2 Poll . & Mait .
Hist . Eng . L . 91 .
2
2
Poll . & Mait . Hist . Eng . L . 42 , 81 , 84 .
3 Bernstein v . Humes , 60 Ala . 528 ; 31 Am . R . 52 ; Bruckner ' s Lessee
v . Lawrence , 1 Doug . (Mich . ) 19 , 38 .
* ( 1535 ) 27 Hen . VIII , c . 10 .
(505 )
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of possession there was enacted a statute which prohib
ited the buying or selling of any pretended rights or titles
to any lands , tenements or hereditaments, unless the sel
ler or his ancester , or those by whom he claimed , had
been in possession of the same , or of the reversion or re
mainder thereof , or had taken the rents or profits thereof ,
for a year next before the sale; this statute also confirmed all
previous statutes against champerty and maintenance , but
permitted the purchase of a pretended title by one in the
lawful possession of the rents and profits of lands. The




f maintaining or assisting a suit and to





others who might expect to share
in the property recovered . 6
$ 416 . Statutes in this country adopting the principles
o
f
this statute . - The statute of Henry VIII has been fol
lowed more o
r
less closely in statutes in some o
f
the
United States ; the chief reason given for its adoption
being that , in accordance with a wise policy , it prevents
the purchase o
f doubtful claims b
y
strangers to them for
the purpose o
f litigation . "





the conveyance are in the adverse possession
o
f
another are declared by statute to be void ; 8 and in some
states the buying o
r selling o
f
such pretended titles is de
clared to b
e
a misdemeanor . 9
5 The bill of bracery and buying of titles ,usually called “ The Pretended
Title Act , ” 32 Hen . VIII , c . 9 (1540 ) .
6 Baker v . Whiting , 3 Sumn . 475 .
? Russell v . Doyle , 84 Ky . 386 , 389 ; 1 S . W . 604 ; McMahan y . Bowe ,
| 11
4
Mass . 140 ; 19 Am . R . 321 .
8 Connecticut Gen . Stat . 1902 , $ 4042 ; Kentucky Stat . 1903 , $ 210 ; New
York Real Prop . L . , $ 225 ; N . Y . R . S . Birdseye ' s 3d ed . III , p . 3057 ;
Tennessee Code 1896 , SS 3171 , 3172 , 3175 .
9 New York Penal Co . , $ 130 ; N . Y . R . S . Birdseye ' s 3d ed . I , p . 407 ;
North Dakota C
o . 1899 . $ 7002 ; a similar provision in South Dakota




, $63171 , . 31
5 . Birdseye ’ s 3d e
d .w
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§ 417 . Disseisee 's conveyance not void for all pur
poses . — Nevertheless a conveyance made under such cir
cumstances where these statutes exist (as also in those
states where the same doctrine is recognized without legis
lation ) are not generally regarded as absolutely void for
all purposes .
As against the party in possession , holding the land
mentioned in the conveyance adversely to the grantor, the
conveyance passes no title and is thus often said to be
void ,10 or voidable ” as to him , and it gives the grantee ,
generally , no right to maintain an action in his own
name against the adverse claimant.
Yet such a conveyance is usually regarded as valid be
tween the parties to it and as transferring to the grantee
the right to maintain an action of ejectment against the
adverse possessor in the name of his grantor .12
The grantee in such cases uses his grantor 's title ,which
still remains in the grantor in spite of his deed , for the
purpose of getting possession of the land ; and , therefore ,
if the grantor , before the grantee brings an action against
the adverse possessor , releases his legal title to the ad
verse possessor , the latter has then the legal title and
possession under it, and neither the grantor nor the
grantee in the former deed can recover the land. 13
§ 418 . The principle recognized in some states without
legislation . In a fe
w




f Henry VIII has been recently recognized irre
spective o
f express statutes adopting it .
have been repealed in 1899 , see Ci
v
. Co . , $ 4492 ; Campbell y . Equitable
Loan & c . Co . , 1903 ( S . Dak . ) , 94 N . W . 401 .
1
0 Mead v . Fitzpatrick , 1902 , 74 Conn . 521 ; 51 Atl .515 ; Green v . Cum
berland & c . Co . , 1903 ( Tenn . ) , 72 S . W . 459 ; Farmers ' Bank ' s As
signee v . Pryse , 1903 (Ky . ) , 76 S . W . 358 .
1
1 Fort Jefferson Improvement C
o . v . Dupoyster , 1899 , 108 Ky . 792 ; 51
S . W . 810 ; 48 L . R . A . 537 .
1
2 Farnum v . Peterson , 111 Mass . 148 ; Galbraith v . Paine , 1903
( N . Dak . ) , 96 N . W . 258 ; Key v . Snow , 90 Tenn . 663 ; 18 S . W .251 . But
see contra Crowley v . Vaughan , 11 Bush (Ky . ) , 517 .
1
3 Dever v . Hagerty , 1902 , 169 N . Y . 481 ; 6
2
N . E . 586 .
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In Alabama , for example , a conveyance of lands which
at the time of the execution of the conveyance are in the
adverse possession of a third person , while good as be





adverse possessor ; 14 and in Florida the same doctrine pre
vails . 15 ,
In Indiana , a
t
a
n early period , the general rule that a
conveyance o
f land in the adverse possession o
f
another
is void as against the adverse possessor , was adopted as
part o
f
the common law ; 16 but the grantee could main
tain a
n
action in the name of his grantor ; for , as the deed
was valid between the parties to it , the grantor could not
deny the use of his name for this purpose , and if the land
was recovered b
y
the grantee in the name o
f
the grantor ,
the recovery inured to the benefit of the grantee . 17
As the present statute , 18 while not directly authorizing
the conveyance o
f
lands held adversely to the grantor ( as
d
o
statutes in half the states ) , provides that any person
having the right to recover the possession of real estate ,
o
r to quiet the title thereto in the name o
f any other per
son , shall have a right to recover possession o
r quiet
title in his own name , the older doctrine seems to be prac
tically abolished . 19
T
o what transfers the rule does not apply . - -





invalid as against the disseisor , does not apply to certain
conveyances , even though the lands are adversely pos
1
4 Berry v . Tennessee & c . R . Co . , 1902 , 134 Ala .618 ; 33 So . 8 ; Pear
son v . Adams , 1901 , 129 Ala . 157 ; 29 So . 977 ; Chevalier v . Carter , 1899 ,
124 Ala . 520 ; 26 So . 901 .
1
5 Reyes v . Middleton , 1895 , 36 Fla . 99 ; 17 So . 937 ; 29 L . R . A . 66 .
1
6 Patterson v . Nixon , 79 Ind . 251 , 255 .
1
7 Steeple v . Downing , 60 Ind . 478 , 484 .
1
8 Burns ' R . S . 1901 , $ 1086 .
1
9 See Peck v . Sims , 120 Ind . 345 ; 22 N . E . 313 ; Chapman v . Jones .
1897 , 149 Ind . 434 ; 47 N . E . 1065 ; Winstandley v . Stipp , 1892 , 132 Ind .
548 ; 32 N . E . 302 .
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sessed when the conveyances are executed . For instance ,
such a conveyance is not invalid if made in pursuance of
a valid contract entered into while the land was not held
adversely :20 Nor is the doctrine that the conveyance of a
disseisee is void , applicable to a patent or deed of land
from the state , because the state cannot be disseised ;21 nor
does the rule apply to judicial sales .22 It has also been
held that one in possession under a conveyance from a
minor does not hold adversely within themeaning of these
statutes so that his possession will render void a convey
ance by the former infant to another after his majority in
disaffi rmance of his former voidable conveyance .23 A re
lease made to one in possession by the disseisee seems to
have been always allowable 24
§ 420 . Character of possession rendering the transfer
void . - While the possession of a third person which will
render void a conveyance of the land must be adverse to
the grantor , and such as, if continued long enough , will
give the possessor title , 25 it need not generally be under
color of title or claim of some specific title , unless the
statute provides that the possession shall be by one
“ claiming under a title adverse to that of the grantor , ”
in which case it has been construed to require a claim un .
der some specific title ;26 not every invasion , however, of a
grantor ' s rights as landowner , even though of a charac
ter which if continued would ultimately ripen into a per
20 Harral v . Leverty , 50 Conn . 46 ; 47 Am . R . 608 ; Greer v . Winter
smith , 85 Ky . 516 ; 4 S. W . 232 ; 7 Am . St. R . 613 .
21Candee v . Hayward , 37 N . Y . 653 ; Cassedy v . Jackson , 45 Miss .
397 , 407 .
22 Ward v . Edge, 1897 , 100 Ky. 757 ; 39 S . W . 440 ; Coleman v . Man
hattan Beach Co., 94 N. Y . 229.
25Moore v . Baker, 1892 , 92 Ky. 518 ; 18 8 . W . 363 .
24 Adams v. Buford , 6 Dana 406 , 413 .
25Merwin v . Morris, 1899 , 71 Conn . 555 ; 42 Atl. 855 ; Murray v.
Hoyle, 1890 , 92 Ala, 559 ; 9 So . 368 .
26 Arents v. Long Island R . Co ., 1898 , 156 N . Y . 1 ; 50 N . E . 422 ;
Kreuger v . Schultz , 1896 , 6 N . Dak . 31
0 ; 70 N . W . 269 .
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petual easement , will amount to such adverse possession ,
or ouster of possession , as will render the grantor 's con
veyance invalid ; so , for example , the possession and
occupancy of a structure projecting over, but not touch
ing , the grantor 's land is not such ouster .27
While the possession of the adverse holder must gener
ally be actual as distinguished from construction ,28 it is
enough to make his possession adverse within the policy
of these statutes that he is in actual possession of a part
of the land claiming the whole tract under an assurance
of title in which the boundaries of the whole are specified
and defined .29
§ 421. The old rule generally abrogated in the United
States. - In a few states the principle of the statute of
Henry VIII has never been recognized by either the
courts or legislatures . The reasons for the statute have
been considered inapplicable to this country, and it has
been deemed the better policy to render the transfer of
land as free as possible and to disregard the question as
to whether the grantor is in or out of possession .30
And in accordance with the same policy statutes have
been enacted in more than half the states , and in many
where until recently the statute of Henry VIII had been
recognized , abrogating entirely the old doctrine . These
statutes either declare that no grant or conveyance of
lands shall be void for the reason that the lands are in
the adverse possession of another than the grantor when
the conveyance is executed , or they provide that one may
convey his interest in lands in the adverse possession of




8 Dawley v . Brown , 79 N . Y . 390 .
2
9Green v . Cumberland & c . Co . , 1903 ( Tenn . ) ; 72 S . W . 459 .
3
0 Hall ' s Lessee v . Ashby , 9 Ohio 96 ; 34 Am . D . 424 ; Borland ' s Les
see v . Marshall , 2 Ohio St . 308 , 314 ; Stoever v . Whitman , 6 Binn . (Pa . )
4
1
6 , 420 ; Overfield v . Christie , 7 Serg . & Rawle ( Pa . ) 173 ; Campbell v .
Everts , 47 Texas 102 .
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another with the same effect as if they were not so
held . 31
The abolition , however , of the rule making void con
veyances of land in adverse possession will not render
valid contracts and conveyances which are essentially
champertous in their nature and thus void .82
30
,54:Ga.Code ta
t . 1894 , 8 701S1 Ark . Dig . Stat . 1894 , $ 701 ; Cal . Civ . Co . , $ 1047 ; Colo . Mill ' s Co . ,$ 431 ; Ga . Code 1895 , $ 3605 ; Idaho Civ . Co . 1901 , $ 2393 ; Ill . R . S . , ch .
3
0 , $ 4 ; Iowa Ann . Co . 1897 , $ 2916 ; Kan . Gen . Stat . 1901 , $ 1208 ; Maine
R . S . 1883 , ch . 73 , $ 1 ; Mass . Rev . L . 1902 , ch . 127 , $ 6 ; Mich . C . L .
1897 , $ 8961 ; Minn . Gen . Stat . 1894 , $ 4165 : Miss . Co . 1892 , $ 2433 ; Mo .
R . S . 1899 , $ 905 ; Montana Co . 1895 , § 1443 ; Neb . Com . Stat . 1901 ,
$ 4123 ; Nev . Com . L . 1900 , $ 2673 ; Ore . Hill ' s L . 1892 , S3009 ; R . I .
Gen . L . 1896 , ch . 201 , $ 23 ; So . Dak . Civ . Co . 1901 , $ 4492 (though , see
Penal Co . , $ 7648 ) ; Utah R . S . 1898 , $ 1980 ; Vermont Stat . 1894 , § 2240 ;
Wis . Stat . 1898 , $ 2205 ; Wyoming R . S . 1899 , $ 2735 .
3
9 Johnson v . Hilton , 1895 , 96 Ga . 577 ; 23 S . E . 841 ; Illinois Land
& c . Co . v . Speyer , 1891 , 138 Ill . 137 ; 27 N . E . 931 ; Burton v . Perry ,
1893 , 146 Ill . 71 ; 34 N . E . 60 ; Stewart v . Welch , 41 Ohio St . 483 .
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$ 422 . General characteristics of the recording sys
tem . - Certain prominent characteristics of our prevailing
system of recording conveyances will be noticed with the
purpose of considering the principalmatters to be regarded
in the investigation of title to real property , and with the
further purpose of introducing in the following chapter a
brief consideration of that means of reform popularly
· known as the “ Torrens System .”
The chief characteristic of our system of conveyancing
is that , generally speaking , title to land passes on the de
livery by the grantor to the grantee of a deed of convey
ance properly signed (and , in many states , sealed , etc .)
by the grantor .
Registration of instruments affecting the title to real
property is provided for in each state and this registration
(512 )
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is held to impart notice of the contents of instruments
lawfully recorded .
In order , however , to be recorded , each instrument
must be properly executed by the grantor and then prop
erly authenticated by some public officer . It is then re
corded by another public officer in books provided at
public expense . It is the duty of these public recording
officers to record only those instruments that are executed
and authenticated with all the formalities prescribed by
law . As a means of securing prompt recording by the
grantee , statutes provide in general that his unrecorded
conveyance , while good as between him and his grantor ,
is invalid as against any subsequent deed which a bona
fide grantee may receive from the grantor ; in some states
( about one- third of them ) this preference to the subse
quent conveyance over the prior unrecorded one is given
only when the later is first recorded .
This general system is distinctively American . At
common law there was no obligation to record convey
ances , though it is probable that the statute of enrolments
( 1535 ) which related to deeds of bargain and sale , sugo
gested to the colonists the idea of recording deeds . Stat
utes of Queen Anne ' s time provided for record in certain
English counties ; but for half a century before this in
several American colonies laws had provided for such
records .
The American design was to place a record of titles to
real estate in a public office within the reach of anyone,
on which record anyonemight rely in buying the land or
accepting an incumbrance , and the theory of this system
is that the records will show the condition of the title:
which is generally true in practice , but with important
exceptions which the lawyer must have in mind .




1 Ante , $ 12 ; 27 Hen . VIII , c . 16 .
? (1703 ) 2 & 3 Anne , c . 4 ; (1708 ) 7 Anne , c . 20 .
3
3
— BREWS . Con .
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pends on the fact of alienation from one person to another,
it shall be evidenced by some solemn written instrument ,
and that there shall be some evidence preserved of most
of these written instruments by record , and , further , that
the record of an instrument entitled to be recorded shall
be notice to all who may deal with the property .
There may, however , be a good title to land in onewho
has never had written evidence of his title ; and this
either by descent or by a voluntary , though parol, trans
fer , with lapse of time, or by adverse possession fo
r
a
sufficient time . And , on the other hand , there may be
what seems to be evidence , from writings and records , o
f
good title in one who really has no title .
§ 423 . Imperfections in title . — Lord Hardwicke once
said : “ It is impossible in the nature of things there
should be a mathematical certainty o
f
a good title , " and
while this is true , it is yet possible to establish , with
reasonable certainty , the true condition o
f
every title , al
though in many instances it costs much pains to do so .
Imperfections in the title may proceed from various
causes . Thus particular defects may arise :
1 . From matters apparent on the face of the instru
ments themselves through which title is claimed .
2 . From matters appearing in the record of these in
struments , and in the record of other instruments affect
ing the title .
3 . From matters appearing neither on the face of the




the defects that will appear from an inspec
tion o
f
the original instruments through which title is
claimed will be shown also from the records o
f
those in
struments , provided the records are true copies of the
originals . But there are matters that may affect the title
* See ante , $ 17 . .
* In Lyddal v . Weston , 2 Atk . 20 (1739 ) .
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which can be discovered only by an examination of the





interlineation or erasure . It is
probably true that in most cases persons intending to pur
chase land rely rather on the records ( o
r copies , or ab
stracts o
f
them ) than on the original instruments , but it
is not entirely prudent to do so , and wherever it is possi
ble all original instruments in the chain of a vendor ' s
title should be read b
y
the proposing purchaser .
§ 424 . Defects shown by original instruments in the
chain o
f title , and by records o
f
them . - Among defects
shown b
y
the records , if they are true copies , as well as
b
y
the originals , may be noted the following , most of
which have been discussed in the preceding pages .
There may be insufficient operative words , or words of
conveyance ; 5 or an insufficient description which may be
so defective as to make the conveyance void , or so de
fective as to make the record ineffectual as notice . The
title may be incomplete o
r
incumbered by reason of cove





condition , or covenant , o
r
reservation
appearing in instruments directly in the chain of title ; 8
there may b
e




insufficient recitals when full recitals are required b
y
stat
ute , and there may be insufficient signing , sealing , attes
tation o
r acknowledgment .
These defects will appear in the records as well as in the
originals , if the records are correct copies o
f
the originals ,
but in order that they may be seen to be defects one must
have some knowledge of forms and the substantive law o
f
real property in conveyancing . The examination of rec
5 Ante , $ 71 .
6 Ante , $ $ 76 , 77 , 80 .
? Ante , $ 74 .
8 Ante , $ $ 227 - 232 .
9 Ante , $ $ 49 , 50 .
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ords, whether in the original or abstracted , by those
really unfamiliar with the law of the subject , is practi
cally of little value, though it is the method often re
sorted to .
§ 425 . Defects shown by other records — The abstract
of title . - A title may be defective because of what ap
pears in the public records relating to the land con
cerned , but not necessarily involved in a consideration of
the instruments through which the present owner claims .
The “ public records ” which may contain matter affect
ing the title are not merely the registers in which deeds
and mortgages are recorded , but books and documents of
various sorts which are open to the inspection of the pub
lic , such as court records , original papers in suits , and
records kept in other books than those which contain the
copies o
f
deeds and mortgages .
When one intends to buy land o
r accept a mortgage a
s
security , he practically seldom sees many of the original
documents relating to the land , nor does he even examine
the records , by himself or his attorney . He usually exam
ines , or has examined for him , an abstract o
f
title . The
American abstract of title is generally an examination o
f
the title to a particular piece o
f
land ; the English abstract o
f




a particular person to






a particular piece o
f




s beginning that it is an " abstract o
f
title to
lot No . — . ” As its name indicates , it is an abstract , a
summary or condensed history o
f
the title , containing
statements o
f




every kind which affect the land , as shown b
y
the records .
When it is considered that there is such great variety of
matters o
f
record that may affect land titles , it is clear
that it requires a person of special skill and training to
properly prepare an abstract . He must determine not
only what instruments are to be summarized , but what
$ 426 EXAMINATION OF TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY . 517
parts of them are to be noted . An abstract should show
not merely patents , deeds and mortgages , but wills ; judi
cial proceedings relating to the land , - for example ,
partition suits , proceedings to quiet title , etc . ; notice of
liens , such as taxes , assessments , lis pendens ,mechanics '
liens , execution sales , etc . " An abstract in a legal sense
is a summary or a
n epitome of the facts relied on as evi
dence o
f
title * * * and must contain a note o
f
all
conveyances , transfers o
r




the title , together with all such facts ,appearing
o
f
record , as may impair it . " ' 10 Abstracts are not gener
ally prepared by practicing lawyers , but b
y
men who
make a specialty o
f
that line of work , and who are in a
greater o
r
less degree fitted for it ; they are required in
some states to give bonds , and , generally , for a failure to
use due care they are liable in damages to the person em
ploying them , directly or through an agent " , and b
y
some decisions to any one else who relies in good faith on
the correctness o
f
the abstract . 12
§ 426 . Defects not shown b
y
records - Forged instru
ments . - Assuming that the abstract is skillfully prepared ,
it is important to remember that , inasmuch as it is taken
from the records , it cannot show more than the records
show , and that there are many things which may affect
the legal title that the records cannot show . A proposing
purchaser is not bound to inquire as to whether any equi
ties may possibly exist in favor o
f
third persons , unless





third persons : if this were not so
there would b
e practically no limit to his inquiries outside
1
0 Heinsen v . Lamb , 11
7
Ill . 549 , 556 ; 7 N . E . 75 .
1
1 Young v . Lohr , 1902 , 118 Iowa 624 ; 92 N . W . 684 ; Kenyon v . Char
levoix Imp . Co . (Mich . ) , 1903 , 97 N . W . 407 ; 10 Det . Leg . News 713 .
1
2 See Brown v . Sims , 1899 , 22 Ind . App . 317 ; 5
3
N . E . 779 ; 72 Am .
S
t
. R . 308 , note ; Gate City Abst . Co . v . Post , 1898 , 5
5 Neb . 742 ; 76 N .
W . 471 ; Dickle v . Abst . Co . , 1890 , 89 Tenn . 431 ; 14 S . W . 896 ; 24 Am .
S
t
. R . 616 .
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the records . But this rule applies only where the vendor
has the legal title to the land , while others may hold
equities therein . Where the vendor has no complete
legal title to convey , the rule caveat emptor applies .
For example , the record affords no means of verifying
the genuineness of the signature of a grantor . If an
instrument purporting to affect the title to land is forged
it cannot affect the title . Therefore the registration of a
forged instrument has no effect on the title , and even an
innocent purchaser takes the risk of forgery. 13 This
principle applies not merely , of course , to deeds, but to
other instruments which may be recorded as affecting
title , as, for example , a mortgage ,14 and so where a re
lease of a mortgage is a forgery , an innocent purchaser
buys subject to the mortgage.15 Nor can the genuineness
of the signature of the official taking the grantor 's ac
knowledgment be verified from the records .
It is to be remembered also that forgery may be accom
plished in other ways than by signing some other person 's
name as grantor . The grantee 's name may be changed
by a slight erasure , so that some other person 's name will
appear as grantee , and the latter by then giving a deed or
a mortgage , though he signs his own name, cannot con
vey a good title , for he is not the grantee ; and the fact
that such a deed is recorded will not help the innocent
purchaser . 16
Or the alteration of a date, by giving an apparent prior
13 Austin v . Dean , 40 Mich . 38
6 ; Haight v . Vallet , 1891 , 89 Cal . 245 ;
2
6 Pac . 897 ; 23 Am . St . R . 465 ; Gray v . Jones , 14 Fed . 83 .
1
4 Lee v . Kellogg , 1896 , 108 Mich . 535 ; 66 N . W . 380 .
1
5
D 'Wolf v . Hayden , 24 Ill . 525 .
1
6 Pry v . Pry , 109 Ill . 466 . In this case the deed was made to John
W . Pry and Hamilton Pry , and placed in the hands of John Pry , a rel
ative , for them , they being infants . The depositary changed the deed
b
y
erasing “ Hamilton Pry ” and the initial “ W , " and recorded the
deed , which then appeared to convey title to bim , and afterward con
veyed parts o
f
this land to innocent purcbasers . On a bill filed by John
W . Pry , it was held that all these deeds should be set aside .




to a deed over a judgment and making the record title
seem clear , may cause loss to an innocent purchaser . 17
Even though the grantor ' s signature and that of the ac
knowledging officer both b
e genuine , they yet may be
considered in law as forgeries , because obtained b
y
a
trick , and an innocent purchaser or mortgagee may in
such a case be the loser by relying on the records alone .
This is forciby illustrated b
y
a case18 where one obtained
the signature o
f
his mother - in -law to a deed which she
did not intend to execute or deliver , and also b
y
a trick
obtained the notary ' s signature to the certificate of ac
knowledgment , and then mortgaged the land for $ 5 ,000
to one person and for $ 1 ,300 to another . Both of these
mortgagees relied on the record , but it was held that
their mortgages should be canceled , as well , o
f
course , as
the original recorded deed — as in effect it was a forgery ,
though the signature was genuine .
In a similar case19 a lawyer obtained a deed from an old
man who supposed h
e
was signing the duplicate o
f
a lease
he had just executed . The deed thus obtained was put
o
n record , and a mortgage given on the land to secure
$ 6 ,000 . The mortgagee examined the record , and found
the title clear . On a bill filed b
y
the owner to set aside
the deed and the mortgage , it was held that the deed was




7 Reck v . Clapp , 98 Pa . St . 581 .
1
8Marden v . Dorthy , 1899 , 160 N . Y . 39 ; 54 N . E . 726 ; 46 L . R . A .694 .
1
9 McGinn v . Tobey , 62 Mich . 252 ; 28 N . W . 818 ; 4 Am . S
t
. R . 848 .
2
0 In Marden v . Dorthy , 160 N . Y . , at p . 50 , it is noticed that such
cases a
s
these are to b
e distinguished , as far as innocent purchasers are
concerned , from those where a deed is obtained b
y
fraud : a fraudu
lent grantee may create a valid incumbrance on the property in favor
o
f
innocent parties , since as to such parties he has the title and has
been clothed with power to deal with the property : the deed obtained
by fraud is voidable , but until set aside it transfers the title , but a
forged deed is n
o
deed and conveys n
o
title . See Cornell v . Maltby ,
1901 , 16
5
N . Y . 557 , reported as Carr v . Maltby , 5
9
N . E . 291 .
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§ 427 . Defects not shown by records — Identity of per
son - Delivery — Infancy - Homestead . — The identity of the
grantor with the owner of the land is not shown by the
records, and if the signature of the person taking the ac
knowledgment be genuine, there may be a question
whether he was at the time the official he is represented
to be, and the records cannot show this . For example ,
in some states no officer of a bank can be a notary public ,
and his acceptance of any such office vacates his appoint
ment as notary ; and in some, no person holding any official
relation to any bank , banker or broker can act as notary
in any matter in which the bank , banker or broker is in
terested .21
The records do not conclusively show delivery , though
it should be said that where there has been a record stand
ing for some years it is practically sufficient evidence of
delivery to warrant one ordinarily in relying upon it.22
Infancy or unsoundness of mind are not disclosed by
the records , and the effect of conveyances by persons so
incapacitated has been discussed . 22
a
While in some states there will be some record showing




o means universally true , and there is often
nothing on the record to show the character o
f
the land
in this respect ; and yet conveyances of a homestead in
which the special formalities required are neglected , are
often void . 23
§ 428 . Defects not shown b
y
records - Questions on
death o
f







his will . Sub
sequent purchasers from his devisees or his heirs claim
2
1 See ante , $ 287 , n . 92 . As to the effect of the officer ' s undisclosed
interest see $ $ 285 – 288 .
2
3 See ante , $ 304 .
2
8 Chapters XX and XXI .
» Ante , $ $ 392 – 395 .
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title to the land through his will or through descent .
Suppose , for example , that one of the links in a chain of
title is a devise , and a purchaser has taken his title from
the devisee . The will containing the devise is of record ,
in one office or another , and the devisee may be identified .
It would seem at first sight that the devisee has a valid
title , and may give one to his grantee , and that the chain
of title is complete and may be relied on . But facts ,
shown by no records , may render the title imperfect .
For example ,24 there was a will executed in 1849 , by which
the testator devised his real estate to his widow . Five
years afterwards he died ( 1854 ) , and his will was duly
probated . Sixteen years after his death (1870 ) his
widow , as devisee under the duly probated will, conveyed
the land to the present holder . Between the time of
making the will and the testator 's death ( 1849 - 1854 ) a
child was born to the testator . Itwas held that the birth
of a child to the testator before his death , but after the
execution of his will, operated as a revocation of the will .
The child now (twenty -three years after the testator 's
death ) claims the title as heir , and regains the land from
the purchaser from the widow ,who was the original deve
isee .25
The question of implied revocation of a will by such
a change in the domestic circumstances of a testator ,
as well as the effect of the omission of a child 's name
from a will , is generally regulated by statute , and these
statutes vary greatly . By marriage and the birth of a
child after the making of a will , the will is by many stat
utes either partially or wholly revoked ,26 so that a person
24 Fallon v . Chidester, 46 Iowa 588 .
25 See also Salem Nat 'l Bank v. White , 1895 , 159 II
I
. 136 ; 42 N . E .
312 , explained in Hawhe v . Chicago & c . R . Co . , 1897 , 165 Ill . 561 ; 46
N . E . 240 .
2
6 In some states adoption will produce this effect : Hilpire v . Claude ,
1899 , 109 Iowa 159 ; 80 N . W . 332 ; 46 L . R . A . 171 ; 77 Am . St . R . 524 ;
Glascott v . Bragg , 1901 , 111 Wis . 605 ; 87 N . W . 853 .
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taking as purchaser from a devisee named in the will, or
from an executor with power of sale, cannot from that
fact alone be sure of his title .27
If, however, the devise is regular , but a later will is
discovered , making a different disposition of the same
property , the effect may be serious as to those who have
derived title from the devisees named in the first will ; for
a will may be admitted to probate at any time after the
testator 's death , in the absence of statutory limitations to
the contrary . 28
It may be that there seems to be no will , and one hav
ing possession as heir of the deceased landowner may
convey ormortgage real property , and on the subsequent
discovery of a will the devisees under it may deprive the
heir 's grantee of the land .29
In case there is actually no will the land passes to the
intestate 's heirs ; title to it depends subsequently upon the
question of heirship . Administration may be or may not
be taken out upon the deceased ' s personal estate , but even
if it be, decrees , recitals and records as to who are his






property , are not necessarily conclusive concerning the
heirs ' title to real estate . A subsequent holder must , at
his peril , ascertain whether those claiming as heirs are
really such , and , if so , whether they are all the heirs . As
time goes on this becomes more difficult to ascertain , and
in fact in the case of persons of foreign birth , leaving no
issue , it is often practically impossible to learn whether
2
7 Robeno v . Marlatt , 1890 , 136 Pa . St . 35 ; 20 Atl . 512 ; Smith v . Olm
stead , 1891 , 88 Cal . 582 ; 26 Pac . 521 ; 22 Am . S
t
. R . 336 ; 12 L . R . A .
4
6 . See “ Subsequent birth o
f
children as a revocation o
f
a will , " b
y
M . H . Altizer , Va . L . Reg . , IX , pp . 473 , 579 .
2
8 In Haddock v . Railroad , 14
6
Mass . 155 , 15 N . E .495 , a will was ad
mitted to probate sixty -three years after death o
f
testator , and in Reb
han v . Mueller , 114 Ill . 343 ; 2 N . E . 75 , thirteen years . The matter is
regulated b
y
statute in many states , but the length of time varies from
a “ reasonable time " to several years .
2
9 Reid ' s Admr . v . Benge , 1902 (Ky . ) , 66 S . W . 997 .
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those who claim as heirs are such , or are all the heirs .
The statutes of limitation may in time remove some diffi
culties arising from this cause , but owing to the many ex
ceptions made in them a defect arising from uncertainty
as to heirs may not be settled for a long time.30
§ 429 . Purchaser's risk in relying on the records alone.
- There may be other interests than those yet named , the
existence of which can be ascertained only by investiga
tion outside the records , as: rights of dower or curtesy , or
analogous statutory rights ; questions of fact as to the
happening or not happening of various conditions on
which the title depends; the existence of incumbrances of
a physical nature , such as a right of way , et
c
.
The purchaser , therefore , that relies upon the records
alone takes the risk that the actual state o
f
the title shall
correspond with the title that appears of record , and this
is a
s





to the desirability of doing any
thing else . O
r
h
e may pursue inquiries outside the rec
ord . In many cases this latter course is feasible , and
involves but little trouble and expense . In some cases ,
however , it is expensive and troublesome , and very often
purchasers , though advised of the necessity and impor
tance o
f investigating beyond the records , prefer to take
the risk than to g
o
to the expense and trouble of investi
gation . When , however , a lawyer is consulted as to the
title , he should , in justice to his client and to himself ,
advise the client that there is much beyond the abstract
o
f
title and the records to b
e
examined . While it is
not strictly his duty to look u
p
equities not apparent o
r
fairly to be inferred from the abstract , nor to consider
the matter of unrecorded evidence , nevertheless , as he is
3
0 Statutes in some states exist for determining who are the heirs of a
deceased person . But by the terms o
f
some such statutes the result is
only prima facie evidence : see , for example , Michigan C . L . ' 97 , § 9471 ;
Lorimer v . Judge , 1898 , 116 Mich . 682 ; 75 N . W . 133 .
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consulted about the title to the land , both his client ' s in
terests and his own require that he should at least direct
attention to those matters not shown by the records which
may affect the title .
§ 430 . Possession , not shown by records , always easily
investigated . - One matter which the records do not show
is often overlooked , though easily investigated ; this is
the matter of possession ,which , as it affects the title most
seriously should not be ignored . The general rule is that
the possession of land is notice of the possessor ' s rights .
If, therefore, for example , one is asked to lend money
on a mortgage security on land the record title to which
is in the proposing mortgagor ,but there is an unrecorded
land contract given by the mortgagor by which he has
agreed to sell the same land to another , and this other is
in possession of the land when the mortgagee takes his
mortgage , relying on the records, the mortgagee will take
what title he gets subordinate to the prior equity of the
vendee under the land contract, because the possession by
the vendee under his unrecorded contract is notice of the
contract and of his equity in the land ; until actual notice
of the mortgage the vendee in possession may continue to
pay his purchase money to his vendor , and if he makes
full payment to his vendor before actual notice , he may
get a deed cutting out the mortgage .31
So the possession of land by the grantee named in an
unrecorded deed is in most states notice of his title to a
subsequent purchaser from the same grantor ; an unre
corded deed is valid as between the parties and as against
subsequent purchasers having notice of it , and possession
is notice.32 And the principle applies to the actual pos
31 Jaeger v . Hardy , 1891, 48 Ohio St. 335 ; 27 N . E . 863 ; Williams v .
Spitzer , 1903 , 203 11
1
.505 ; 68 N . E . 49 ; Van Baalen v . Cotney , 1897 , 113
Mich . 202 ; 71 N . W . 491 ; Corey v . Smalley , 1895 , 106 Mich . 257 ; 64 N .
W . 13 ; 58 Am . St . R . 474 ; Chapman v . Chapman , 1895 , 91 Va . 397 ; 21
S . E . 813 ; 50 Am . S
t
. R . 846 .
3
2 Beattie v . Crewdson , 1899 , 124 Cal . 57 ; 57 Pac . 463 ; Roberts v .
§ 430 525EXAMINATION OF TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY ,
session of an easement , though there is no record of any
instrument creating it.33
Where this doctrine is recognized it is generally held
that a tenant's possession gives notice of hi
s
landlord ' s
title as well as of his own ; his possession imposes upon a
purchaser the obligation o
f inquiring by what right the
tenant holds the land . 34
As a title good on the records may amount to nothing






adverse possession , the
importance o
f looking into the possession cannot be over
estimated where there is an interval of several years be
tween the conveyances a
s
recorded ; and as contracts and
deeds are often drawn in one state for land in another , a
matter to be noted in this connection is that the statutes
of limitation vary much in the different states .
It should , however , be noticed in this connection , that
if one is in possession of land and the records show some
conveyance under which he is entitled to possession , his
possession will generally be referred to this record title ,
and a subsequent purchaser will not be charged with no
tice , b
y
his possession alone , of any other title or equity
which the occupant may have ; for , as his possession is
consistent with the record title , it will be presumed to be
under that title . 35
Decker , 1903 (Wis . ) , 97 N . W . 519 . See Miner v . Wilson , 1895 , 107
Mich . 57 ; 64 N . W . 874 , for the combined effect o
f misdescription and
possession . Where a statute requires actual notice of the former deed
by a subsequent purchaser in order to dispense with recording the oc




n unrecorded deed . Lamb v . Pierce , 113 Mass . 72 .
3
8 Ashelford v . Willis , 1902 , 194 Ill . 492 ; 62 N . E . 817 ; Robinson v .
Thrailkill , 110 Ind . 117 ; 10 N . E .649 .
8
4 Haworth v . Taylor , 108 Ill . 275 ; O 'Neill v . Wilcox , 1901 , 115 Iowa
1
5 ; 87 N . W . 742 ; Wilkins v . Bevier , 43 Minn . 213 ; 45 N . W . 157 ; 19
Am . St . R . 238 ; United States v . Sliney , 21 Fed . 894 .
8
5 Schumacher v . Truman , 1901 , 134 Cal . 930 ; 66 Pac . 591 ; Mullins v .
Butte Hardware C
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§ 431. Possession by grantor , after conveyance , as no
tice . - It is sometimes stated as a general rule, that pos
session by a grantor after a conveyance from him is
recorded , is no notice to subsequent purchasers of any
rights reserved to the grantor .36 On the other hand ,
there are many later decisions holding that the grantor ' s
continued possession is notice ; because , as the law allows
possession to have the effect of notice , there is no good
reason for making a distinction between possession by a
stranger to the record title and possession by the grantor
after delivery of his deed .37
86Bloomer v . Henderson , 8 Mich . 395 , 404 ; 77 Am . D . 453 ; Van
Keuren v . Railroad , 38 N . J . L . 165 ; May v. Sturdivant , 75 Iowa 116 ;
39 N . W . 221 ; 9 Am . St. R . 463 ; Love y. Breedlove , 1890 , 75 Texas 619 ;
13 S. W . 222 . Bloomer v . Henderson , 8 Mich . 39
5
— though often cited
has been somewhat modified b
y
later decisions : it has been held that
the continued possession o
f
a grantor for a long time after the record .
ing o
f
his deed to another may raise a presumption that he has either
retained , o
r
since acquired , some right to the land ; Bennett v . Robin
son , 27 Mich . 26 ; Stevens v . Hulin , 53 Mich . 93 .
3
7Groff v . Bank , 50 Minn . 234 ; 52 N . W . 651 ; 36 Am . St . R . 640 ; Ro
nan v . Bluhm , 173 Ill . 277 , 288 ; 50 N . E . 694 ; Turman v . Bell , 54 Ark .
273 ; 15 S . W . 886 ; 26 Am . St . R . 35 .
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§ 432 . Defects in present system suggest desirability
of reform in registration laws. - Such defects in our pres
ent system as are indicated in the preceding chapter , and
the uncertainties as to land titles now quite generally ex
isting, have induced the consideration of measures of re
form . It is because of defects in this system that title
guaranty companies have been formed for the purpose of
investigating titles and taking risks that an individual
may not feel warranted in taking for himself . And it has
been urged that our system now furnishes ample security
to any owner or purchaser , especially as he may generally
get his title insured . The policies of these guaranty
1 See “ The Torrens System ; Its Cost and complexity , ” by Wm . C .
Niblack , 1903 . The author of this work admits thathis judgment may
be affected by the fact that he is a stockholder in , and attorney for ,
the Chicago Title and Trust C
o .
(527 )
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companies , however , usually contain important excep
tions, and , while they offer protection against pecuniary
loss to the extent of the policy , they cannot, of course ,
make the title indefeasible , nor can they protect the in
sured in the possession of the land , which is what he de
sires , especially where expensive improvements have been
made.
At its best the present system is simply the putting on
record a
t length o
f great numbers of documents that do
not , after al
l
, show what the title to the land concerned
really is . The accumulation o
f
these copies as time goes
o
n
is one of the objections made to the present method ,
for the records must be safely kept in buildings provided
a
t public expense . Each time the land , or a part o
f
it , is
dealt with , these records must be examined , that is , the
abstract must be “ brought down to date , ” fo
r , while rec
ords cannot absolutely show the title , they cannot be ig





each purchaser or mortgagee , with repeated expense
and delay . And one o
f
the incidents of such a method is
the liability to error in transcribing and indexing so
many documents .
§ 433 . The “ Torrens System ” — Briefly Historical .
Among the reforms considered within recent years the
“ Torrens System ” o
f registering title to real property and
o
f dealing with the title after registration , has been most
discussed and is the most radical . ? This system takes it
s
name from Robert Torrens . He was born in Cork ; emi
grated to South Australia in 1841 ; was collector of cus
toms and thus , though not a lawyer , became familiar with
the shipping laws . It is said that the starting point of
? The American statutes providing for registration o
f
land titles differ
materially in important particulars from the Australian , and are not
appropriately designated “ Torrens laws . " As Torrens was , however ,
the first to direct the attention o
f English speaking people to registra
tion o
f
title , any scheme of title registration at all like the Australian
will probably be called b
y
his name .
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his system was the application of the principles which
regulate the transfer of vessels by means of registration ,
to the transfer of land .
In parts of Europe the same general plan has been in
use for centuries, and there is nothing new about the
fundamental principles involved , but it does not appear
that Torrens had studied these continental methods or
was, at first , even aware of them .
He suggested the reform in 1850 , but met with much
opposition . The chief justice of South Australia told him
the proposed system was “ both unwise and impractica
ble, ” but in 1858 it was adopted in that colony and has
since been adopted throughout Australia , where it has
become so popular that about eighty per cent . of all the
land of Australia has been brought under the law . New
Zealand and several Canadian provinces then adopted the
system , and after years of discussion England has fol
lowed the colonies .
By it
s adoption in Illinois ( 1895 and 1897 ) , California
( 1897 ) , Massachusetts ( 1898 ) , Oregon (1901 ) , Minnesota
( 1901 ) , Colorado ( 1903 ) , and its discussion in many
other states , it has become to such an extent American
that the Australian , Canadian and English acts and de




one who wishes to get a




Title in Germany and Austria
Hungary . ” (Am . Law Rev . , vol . 31 , p . 827 . )
+ 3
8 and 39 Vict . , c . 87 ( 1875 ) ; 60 and 61 Vict . , c . 65 ( 1897 ) .
5 The acts to which references are made in this chapter are : Califor
nia , Stat . 1897 , ch . CX . ; Colorado , L . 1903 , in effect July 12 , 1903 ; Illi
nois , L . 1897 , p . 139 , Hurd ' s R . S . 1899 , ch . 30 , SS 44 – 154 , Starr & Curt .
Supp . , vol . 4 , pp . 259 - 282 ; Massachusetts , Stat . 1898 , ch . 562 , to be found
as amended ( in 1899 aud 1900 ) in Mass . R . L . 1902 , ch . 128 - in the re
vision , $ 1 o
f
the original act is omitted ,and the section numbers , there
fore , are not the same a
s
in the original act ; Minnesota , Laws 1901 , ch .
237 ; amended , Laws 1903 , ch . 234 ; Ohio , 92 0 . L . 220 ( 1896 ) , this act
was declared invalid in 1897 and repealed in 1898 , 93 0 . L . 8 ; Oregon ,
Gen . L . 1901 , p . 438 .
3
4 - BREWS . Con .
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the foreign models is detrimental . 6
§ 434 . General principles of the title registration acts .
- The details of the American statutes vary , and at some
points the differences extend beyond details ; nevertheless ,
the underlying principles of the several acts are the same .
The features o
f




s distinguishing it from the present system are that
it provides for the registration o
f
title , not merely for the
registration or recording o
f
deeds , or instruments affect
ing the title ; under it title to land passes only by the en
try o
f
the transfer upon the official register , not by the
execution and delivery o
f
the deed ; it is intended that
this register shall show the condition of the title to real
property upon a single page , and a
ll dealings with the land
must be entered on this page .
In this system two main objects are sought to be a
t
tained :
First , certainty and facility in proof o
f
title .
Second , simplicity in dealings with land after the title
is thus proved .
The chiefmeans by which the first result is secured is
the issuance o
f
a document called a certificate o
f
title ,
which authoritatively declares that the person named in
it owns a specified estate in a specified piece of land .
The first and important step , then , is to secure the reg .
istration o
f
title , the “ initial registration , " as it is called .
§ 435 . Proceedings to determine and register title are
judicial — The application — The court . - In order that
general constitutional provisions may be complied with ,
the " initial registration ” o
f
title , upon which the certifi
• The Ohio law , 1896 ,was declared unconstitutional in 1897 . State v .
Guilbert , 56 0 . St . 57
5 ; 47 N . E . 551 ; 38 L . R . A . 519 ; 60 Am . St . R . 75
6
.





N . E . 454 ; 36 L . R . A . 10
5
; in each case because the Australian
model was followed too closely .
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cate of title is issued , must be the result of judicial pro
ceedings to establish title; there must be notice to all hav
ing interests adverse to those of the applicant for registra
tion ; and only judicial officersmay exercise judicial func
tions, whether as to the initial registration or as to subse
quent dealings with the registered title.
The first proceeding under the registration acts is the
application by the person claiming to own the land in fee
simple , or , under the Massachusetts and the proposed
Virginia acts , the person having the power of appointing
or disposing of an estate in fee simple in the land , for the
registration of his title .
The application is in writing, signed and sworn to by
the applicant , describing the land , and naming the occu
pants and adjoining owners . The owner begins , by
this application , a proceeding in court to have ascertained
and confirmed his title . In Illinois the application is
addressed to the judges of the circuit court fo
r
the county
in chancery . In Massachusetts it is addressed to the
judge o
f
the “ court o
f
land registration , " a court specially
constituted b
y
the registration act , and having exclusive
original jurisdiction of all applications made under the
act , with power to hear and determine all questions aris
ing upon such application . In Colorado and Minnesota
it is made to the district court o
f
the county in which the
land is situated .





cial court to administer the law , is thought by many to
have advantages over the Illinois plan o
f having the pro
ceedings before the circuit court , or the Minnesota plan ,
which is similar . The courts named in the laws o
f
these
latter states , being chiefly occupied with other matters ,
will not be able to give the necessary attention to the im
portant and often intricate questions arising in registra
tion cases , while under the Massachusetts plan there is
always at hand a judge , supposed to b
e well versed in real
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property law , who may be consulted at all times by the
recorder or his assistants , or by any applicant or owner,
in regard to questions that may arise . Under the Massa
chusetts plan the recorder of the court of land registration
is it
s
clerk , and acts under its direction . The registers
o
f
deeds throughout the state are assistant recorders , and
in executing the provisions of the act are subject to the
general direction o
f
the recorder , and act " in accordance
with the rules and instructions o
f
the court . " If an as
sistant recorder is in doubt upon any question , o
r
if any
question is raised b
y
a party interested in subsequent
dealings with registered land , the question is referred to
the court , which determines the matter after notice to all
parties and a hearing . "
§ 436 . Notice to adverse claimants - Process - Consti
tutional objections . — On the filing o
f
this application
provision is made for giving notice to all who may have
interests in the land adverse to those o
f
the applicant .
At this point difficulties occur , and objections have been
raised on constitutional grounds to every method sug
gested .
Under our constitutional provisions that no man shall
b
e deprived o
f his property without due process of law , it
has been maintained b
y many that each American statute
is unconstitutional in that there is no sufficient notice re
quired to b
e given to , and no sufficient process against ,
persons having claims adverse to the applicant . It ap
pears to b
e further claimed b
y
some that no scheme can
be devised which will fully meet this constitutional objec
tion . This was one of the chief objections to the Ohio




the court ' s decision
? Before the Massachusetts plan can be adopted in some states their
constitutions need amendment . The Virginia constitution o
f
1902 pro
vides : “ The legislature shall have power to establish such court or
courts o
f
land registration as it may deem proper for theadministration
o





titles to lands in the commonwealth , o
r any part thereof . "
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against it. But the provisions as to the issuance and
service of summons , and giving of notice , were materi
ally different in the Ohio law from the provisions as to
these matters in the Illinois and Minnesota laws and the
later acts of Colorado and Oregon .
· The last Illinois act, which was held constitutional ,9
and the Minnesota act, which has been declared so , in
spite of this objection ,10 are certainly less objectionable in
this regard than the Ohio law . These acts practically re
quire a
ll
adverse claimants who reside within the juris
diction o
f
the court to be made parties defendant , and to
be served with process . All other persons are to be made
parties defendant under the name and designation o
f
" all
whom it may concern , ” and notice is to be published ,




The original Massachusetts act provides at this point
for mailing notices and for publication b
y
the recorder ,
and for the posting of notice on the land . The supreme
court of that state holds the act constitutional - two jus
tices dissenting . 11
The Massachusetts act thus disregards what appears
to have been the general practice , under statutes in
volving the determination of land titles , o
f bringing
resident defendents into court b
y
summons served , in re
quiring simply mailing of notices , publication , and post
ing on the land . Justice Holmes says in this connection
that , with the rest of the court , he thinks the act should
b
e
amended in the direction o
f still further precaution to
secure actual notice before a decree is entered ; and that if
8 State v . Guilbert , 56 Ohio St . 575 , 617 ; 47 N . E . 551 ; 38 L . R . A .
519 ; 60 Am . St . R . 756 .
People v . Simon , 1898 , 176 Ill . 165 ; 52 N . E . 910 ; 44 L . R . A . 801 ;
6
8
Am . St . R . 175 .
1
0 State v . Westfall , 1902 , 85 Minn . 437 ; 89 N . W . 175 ; 89 Am . St . R .
571 ; 57 L . R . A . 297 .
1
1 Tyler y . The Judges , & c . , 1900 , 17
5
Mass . 71 ; 55 N . E . 812 ; 51 L . R
A . 433 .
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it is not amended the judges of the court ought to do al
l
that is in their power to satisfy themselves that there has
been n
o
failure in this regard before they admit a title to
registration . In accordance with this suggestion the act
has been amended so that the land registration court is re
quired to , ' ' so far as it considers it possible ,require proof
o
f
actual notice to all adjoining owners and to all persons
who appear to have any interest in or claim to the land
included in the application . Notice to such person b
y
mail shall be by registered letter . " 12
§ 437 . The investigation of title - Functions o
f
the ex
aminer . — After the application and notice , the question
of the applicant ' s title is investigated by official “ exam
iners o
f
title , " who report to the court . The court , if sat
isfied with the applicant ' s title , then makes a decree , order :
ing the title to be registered , and that a duplicate certificate
o
f
title issue to the applicant . In this way it is hoped
to attain the first general object o
f
the system , - to make
the decree conclusive a
s
to showing title . These ques
tions , it will be noticed , are determined b
y





examiner of titles .
Under the system adopted in the Australian colonies
the application to have land placed on the register o
f
titles
was submitted , together with deeds , abstracts of title
and plans of the land , to a barrister and a conveyancer ,
styled “ examiners o
f
titles , ” for their examination .
These “ examiners ” then reported to the “ recorder ” o
r
“ registrar ” their conclusions upon the applicant ' s title .
1
2 Mass . R . L . 1902 , ch . 12
8 , s 31 . The Supreme Court of the United
States has not yet passed directly on the constitutional questions in
volved in these laws . In Tyler v . Judges , & c . , 1900 , 179 U . S . 405 , the
court held - four justices dissenting - that it had no jurisdiction to pass
o
n the questions involved , as it did not appear that the plaintiff was
personally interested in the litigation , or had been , or was likely to be ,
deprived o
f
his property without due process o
f
law . The writ o
f
error
which had been sued out for the purpose o
f testing the constitutionality
o
f
the Massachusetts act was therefore dismissed .
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They made such recommendations regarding the serving
of notices as the nature of the case and the domicile of
parties likely to be interested in the land seemed to re
quire . It was not essential , however , that there should
be in all cases , as a basis for the registration of the appli
cant 's title , any other proceeding than this .
The adoption in the Illinois law of 1895 ofthis scheme of
giving the registrar authority to determine the applicant' s
title on the advice of two competent attorneys acting as
examiners , rendered that law unconstitutional , as confer
ring judicial power on the registrar in violation of the
constitutional restriction against the legislative grant of
such powers to non -judicial officers .13
Under the later statutes in the several states which pro
vide for constitutional judicial proceedings it would be
possible for the court, which must ultimately determine
whether or not the applicant 's title is good , to undertake
the investigation of the title , upon evidence submitted by
the parties interested and without independent investiga
tion . Each American act, however , provides for the ap
pointment of an examiner of titles to aid the court in
this investigation . The application is referred to him
immediately after it
s filing , and his duty is to investigate
the facts stated therein and to see that all persons having
claims to the land are before the court . When the exam





fendant , his recommendation cannot be ignored b
y
the
applicant without rendering the decree of registration o
f
the applicant ' s title void as against this person and as
against all persons in privity with him and who are not
defendants . 14
The examiner has extensive powers and responsibilities .
1
8 People v . Chase , 1897 , 165 Ill . 527 ; 46 N . E . 454 ; 36 L . R . A . 105 .




the decision in the Ohio case ad
verse to the constitutionality o
f
the law . State v . Guilbert , 1897 , 56
Ohio S
t . 575 ; 47 N . E . 551 ; 38 L . R . A . 519 ; 60 Am . St . R . 756 .
1
4 Dewey v . Kimball (Minn . ) , 1903 , 95 N . W . 317 , 895 ; 96 N . W . 704 .
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Though he may hear the parties and their evidence , he
also investigates the title independently of proofs offered .
By some of the acts it is his especial duty to ascertain if
the land is occupied , and if so , the nature of the occupa
tion , and even where there is no such express require
ment this would be a part of his duty , as the application
must state the facts in regard to occupation , and the ex .
aminer must report on all matters stated in the applica
tion . He looks into all matters affecting the title , whether
they are of record or in pais . His report is similar to that
of a master in chancery where that officer is recognized ,15
or to that of a referee . 16 As the effect of a decree of reg .
istration is far reaching , it is evident that the examina
tion of title should be thoroughly conducted by one well
qualified fo
r
such work . This is especially true where
there is no separate land registration court established
and where , therefore , the court to be aided b
y
the exam
iner is one o
f general jurisdiction . In statutes strictly
following the Illinois act additional importance attaches
to the office o
f
examiner of titles because of the power
given him in regard to dealing with registered land when
a





trust . Most o
f
the acts provide that no instru
ment dealing with land so held shall be registered with
out an order o
f
court approving it as being in accordance
with the trust . But under the Illinois act this may be
done either “ pursuant to the order o
f
some court , o
r upon
the written opinion o
f
two examiners ” that such instru
ment is in accordance with the true intent of the trust ,
and when the registrar is satisfied with this opinion the
validity o
f
this later transfer is conclusively established . 17
1
5Gage v . Consumers ' E
l
. Lt . Co . , 1901 , 194 II
I
. 30 ; 64 N . E . 653 .
1
6 Minnesota Act , $ 24 . Minn . Laws 1901 , ch . 237 .
1
7 Illinois Act , $ $ 68 , 69 , Ills . Hurd ' s R . S . 1899 , ch . 30 ; the Oregon
Act , $ $ 67 , 68 , Oregon Gen . L . 1901 , p . 438 , makes the later deal .
ing dependent upon the order o
f








the person applying for registration " o
f
the instrument , that
it is in accordance with the meaning of the trust . To peculiar provi
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§ 438 . Appearance of interested parties — The conclu
sive effect of the decree . — The decree mentioned in the
last section is not made until every party interested has
had an opportunity to appear and answer , stating objec
tions to the application ; but if there is no appearance de
fault may be entered ,18 and the report of the examiner of
titles is considered by the court , with such other proof as
the court may require ; fo
r
example , as to boundaries , etc .
If interested parties appear and answer there is a hearing
before the decree is made and entered . Evidence estab
lishing title good as against the world is essential to war
rant a decree awarding initial registration of title . 19 It is
held in the case last cited that the proceeding to register
title is not a bill in equity to remove a cloud , and that
the applicant must establish that the true title is in him
before he can have relief or require those whom he has
brought in a
s
defendants to bring their titles before the
court fo
r
adjudication ; the defendant , therefore , may be
heard to urge that the applicant has not shown a title
proper to be registered , and if this be true the application
should be dismissed , without regard to the question
whether the title o
r
claims of the defendant are but mere
clouds ; if , however , the applicant shows a title proper to
b
e registered , he may not only have a decree to that ef
fect , but may also have the claims of defendants decreed
to b
e invalid or but clouds on his title . 20
The Massachusetts law makes the decree conclusive
from it
s entry against all persons if no appeal is taken
sions in the California law regarding the investigation o
f
the applicant ' s
title is undoubtedly largely due the fact that the act is practically inop
erative . The examiner ' s compensation is made a part of the costs of
the proceeding , to be paid by the applicant ( $ 18 ) , and an abstract o
f




him ,but the abstract can be furnished b
y
those only who have given bonds in the sum of not less than ten thou




the court . " ( § 6 . ) California Act , Cal . Stat . 1897 , ch . CX .
1
8 Reed v . Carlson , 1903 (Minn . ) , 95 N . W . 303 .
1
9Glos v . Kingman & Co . , 1904 ( Ill . ) , 69 N . E . 632 .
2
0 See Lancy v . Snow , 1902 , 180 Mass . 411 ; 62 N . E . 735 .
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within thirty days , except that one deprived of an inter
est in land by a decree of registration obtained by fraud
may file a petition for review within a year , provided no
innocent purchaser for value has acquired an interest .
In Illinois persons residing within the state if not par .
ties to the decree may assert such rights as they may
have within two years — the act providing this short period
of limitations ; otherwise , and as to parties to the decree ,
the decree is conclusive , subject to the right of appeal as
in other chancery cases .
No exception as to the conclusiveness of the decree is
made in the acts, as a rule , as to infants or persons oth
erwise under disability .21
The provision of theMassachusetts law for the conclu
siveness of the decree practically at once , is regarded by
many as preferable to that of the Illinois la
w .
It has been adopted in Minnesota , though with a mod .
ification - sixty days being there allowed , from the entry
o
f




f irregularity , etc . , may bring action , provided no inno
cent purchaser for value has acquired an interest .





limitations , saying : “ The time




a short one , but , in view of the
complete and far - reaching provisions of the act for notice
to all parties , and the fact that the right of appeal as in
civil actions is given , we cannot hold that the legislature
arbitrarily exercised its discretion in fixing the limit , ” and
ment , in opposition to the decree , of any action to recover
the land after sixty days cannot apply to an adverse claim
ant in actual possession upon whom no summons is
served . 22
2
1 The constitution of the United States gives to minors no special
rights beyond others , and it is within the legislative competency of a
state to make o
r




sons under disability . Vance v . Vance , 103 U . S . 514 , 521 .
2
2 State v . Westfall , 85 Minn . 437 ; 89 N . W . 17
5 ; 89 Am . St . R . 571 ;
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§ 439 . Subsequent dealings with the land appear on
the registry . The acts uniformly provide that the ob - '
taining of a decree of registration and the entry of a cer
tificate of title shall be regarded as an agreement run
ning with the land , and binding upon the applicant
and all his successors in title , that the land shall be and
always remain registered land , and subject to the provi
sions of the act and all amendments thereof. An owner
of registered land may convey or mortgage or lease it as
if it were not registered , and he may use for these pur
poses the same forms of instruments that he would use
had his land not been registered ; but none of these in
struments ( except a lease for a short term ) shall take
effect as conveyances , but shall operate only as a contract
between the parties and as evidence of authority to the
recorder to make registration , when accompanied by the
owner 's certificate of title . This certificate , on a convey
ance of an estate in fee , is surrendered and canceled ,
though not necessarily always so when a lesser estate is
conveyed .
The act of registration is the operative act to convey or
affect the title , not the delivery of a deed as is now the
case .
These features are of importance and are essential to
the proper working of the system . The subsequent deal
ing with the land in this way is one of the fundamental
principles upon which registration of title is based .
The reform was much delayed in England by the un
workable character of Lord Westbury ' s Act of 1862,
57 L . R . A . 297 . The Massachusetts provision in regard to the conclu
siveness of the decree against all persons not named in the proceed
ings - except by the general designation “ to all whom it may con
cern ” - even though residing within the state , is regarded by the dis
senting justices of the court of that state as rendering the act unconsti
tutional ; Tyler v. Judges, 175 Mass ., at p . 91. But as the court holds
it constitutional , the certificate of title based on the decree is conclusive ,
and purchasers may so regard it, and thus one of the chief objects of
the law is at once attained .
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which provided that “ registered land may be conveyed ,
charged , etc ., * * * by any deed * * * or in
strument by which such land , if not registered , might
now according to law , be charged , et
c
. ; " theuse of deeds ,
thus sanctioned , involving a combination of two incom
patible principles , “ registration of deeds ” and “ regis
tration o
f
titles . " 23 The principle is similar to that ap
plied in the transfer o
f
stock in a corporation ; the stock
is generally transferable only on the books o
f
the com
pany ; the “ certificate o
f
stock " is the certificate of title
to the stock — it is the evidence o
f
title ; and when a trans
fe
r
is made the certificate is surrendered and canceled ,
and entries are made on the books b
y
the proper officer of
the company authorized b
y
the owner . And the owner
when he takes the stock practically agrees that the title to
it shall be transferred in this way only .








f his certificate , and
for the issuance to him o
f
a certificate , in place o
f
one
lost , on proper proof .
§ 440 . No title can be acquired to registered land b
y
adverse possession . - In adherence to this principle that
title shall be acquired to registered land only through a
transfer on the books , is the provision of each ac
t
relating
to adverse possession : that no title to registered land in
derogation o
f




prescription or adverse possession .
Mere possession , therefore , becomes no notice of rights ,
and all rights appear as entered on the original certificate
o
f title . No adverse possession can ever ripen into title .













most admirable features — fo
r , they say ,
the more wrongful the “ squatter ' s " acts are in gaining
and keeping possession , the more sure he is to acquire
2
3 Torrens , “ Essay on Transfer of Land b
y
Registration ” - Cobden
Club , 1881 .
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the title in fee simple under our present system . Its op
ponents, on the other hand, argue that title by limitation
of time is a most reasonable and proper basis of owner
ship , and that a law which abolishes it is opposed to the
best interests of society .
It will be noticed that the provisions of these acts will
work a radical change in law in this respect , and if all
land should be registered the owners might remain out
of possession and leave land unimproved for any length of
time, without the possibility of any one ' s acquiring the
title .
Statutes of limitation have been said to rest on the pol
icy of compelling those who have a right of entry to take
actual possession of the land and settle the country , at
the peril of being ousted by those who will settle the land
and improve the country .24 This provision of these acts ,
therefore , not only makes a radical change in our present
la
w , but opens u
p
a
n important question o
f public policy .
§ 441 . Transmission of title on death o
f
owner of reg
istered land . — Under our present system certain diffi
culties arise 24
8
when title to real property is transmit
ted on the death o
f
the owner in fee . Uncertainty and




f ascertaining who are the successors to the title . Many
difficulties would be removed by letting the property pass
a
t
the owner ' s death to his executor or administrator , to
b
e
dealt with in themanner in which personal estate is
dealt with under such circumstances .
The Illinois Torrens law , section 70 , provides that in





the deceased owner in like man
ner a
s personal estate , whether the owner dies testate or
intestate , and shall be subject to the same rules o
f
admin
istration , as if the same were personalty , except as other .
4
4 Kinney v . Vinson , 32 Texas 12




See ante , $ 428 .
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wise provided in this act, and except that the rule of di
vision shall be the same as in the descent of real property ,
or as shall be provided by will ; ” and the law also , in sec
tion 76 , provides fo
r
filing in the registration office proof
o
f heirship before the distribution o
f
undevised registered
land , which shall be conclusive evidence in favor of all
persons subsequently dealing with the land that certain
persons named a
s







owner are such heirs . That is , the executor or adminis
trator will be registered on production of evidence of his




tion ) , and the rights o
f
those beneficially interested will
b
e
ascertained and enforced , and it may be settled defi
nitely and without great delay what persons are the suc
cessors to the title . Questions concerning heirship ,
dower , homestead , creditors ' rights , may be conclusively
settled once and for all , and cannot arise some time after
wards , as possible defects o
f
title , needing investigation
a
t
each later transfer .
It seems that a reform of this nature could be made
without adopting the whole plan o
f registering titles , and
it further seems desirable , whether or not the general plan
is adopted . If , however , the general scheme of registering
titles is adopted this part o
f
it appears almost essential to
the proper working o
f
the system .
The Massachusetts law , section 91 , and the Minnesota
law , section 74 , provide for more direct transmission to
the heirs or devisees ,who themselvesmay make application
for the entry o
f
a new certificate ; upon which application
the court issues notice to the executor or administrator and
others interested , and , after hearing , directs the entry of




These latter acts d
o not , it seems , expressly provide for
conclusively establishing the matter of heirship , - but the
provisions as to transmission on death are such that they
will probably be construed to have that effect .
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§ 442 . The assurance or indemnity fund. The acts
generally provide for the accumulation of a fund formak
ing good any loss one may suffer through mistake , negli
gence orwrong in the practical operation of the law . This
provision is made in recognition of the fact that no system
of transferring title has yet been devised in which there
is not liability to loss . But the provision is not an essen
tial feature of this system of land title registration and




the California act , and the Illinois Supreme Court gives
this part o
f
the Illinois law no consideration , saying : “ The
law can , aswe think , stand and accomplish its purpose
without it . ” 25 Each of the acts , however , except that o
f
California , makes provision fo
r
such a fund b
y requiring
the payment , when lands are brought under the act , o
f
a
small sum - one - tenth of one per cent . of the value of the
land , the value being , generally , ascertained b
y
reference
to its appraisement for taxation . The payment is to be
made to the public treasurer . The methods by which re
covery may be had from it b
y
those entitled to compensa
tion are prescribed in detail . Wherever the system has
been in operation , however , the demands upon the fund
have been extremely rare .
The Supreme Court of Ohio especially criticises this
part of the act , stating that the fund is to be raised to in
demnify those whose lands have been " wrongfully
wrested ” from them , and that the " penitential scheme ”
is both inadequate and forbidden b
y
the constitution , as
taking private property for public use without compensa
tion ; 26 but in the Massachusetts case27 the provision is not
referred to — a
s itmust have been had there been grounds
fo
r
regarding it as so clearly unconstitutional .
2
5 People v . Simon , 176 II
I
. 165 , 177 ; 52 N . E . 910 ; 44 L . R . A . 801 ;
6




6 State v . Guilbert , 56 Ohio S
t
. 575 , 623 , 625 ; 47 N . E . 551 ; 38 L . R .
A .519 ; 60 Am . St . R . 756 .
3
7 Tyler v . Judges , 175 Mass . 71 ; 55 N . E . 812 ; 51 L . R . A . 433 .
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There appears to be nothing in the state constitutions
prohibiting the legislature from incorporating provisions
practically guaranteeing titles or furnishing indemnity ,
in case it is considered best to do so .
§ 443 . Voluntary , or compulsory , registration . The
American laws so fa
r
enacted provide that registration o
f
title shall be entirely optional : as they now stand , no
land in any state where the system exists need b
e regis
tered .
It is the opinion o
f
those who have closely followed the
practical working o
f
the system that provision should be
made for compulsory registration to some extent . It has
been suggested that this could be brought about , without




r executors to register title , before heirs or devisees can
legally acquire title to the lands o
f
a deceased owner .
Under this method all land would gradually come under
the new system .










the land in any county named in the order , and
orders have been made by which registration is compul
sory in certain parts o
f
the county of London : a pur
chaser does not , therefore , where the order applies , ac




The Illinois act has been amended - subject to adoption
by the people of any county where the act is operative
so that upon the death o
f
one owning real estate in any
county where the “ Torrens law " is in force his adminis
trator or executor must , within six months after his a
p
pointment as such , apply to the circuit court for the
2
8 Land Transfer Act , 1897 , 60 and 61 Vict . c . 65 , s . 20 .
§ 443 545REGISTRATION OF TITLE .
registration of the title to the land - unless the probate
court shall excuse him from so applying .29
29 Laws Ills . 1903, p . 121 .
Most of the literature on the subject of registration of title is in the
form of addresses , papers in legal periodicals , etc .
In Theo. Sheldon ' s “ Land Registration in Illinois ,'' 1901, a full list of
treatises and papers relating to the subject will be found . Among the
papers published since Mr. Sheldon 's list was prepared are :
Land Title Registration in the United States , by Leonard A . Jones ,
36 Am . Law Rev . 321.
Virginia and the Torrens System , by Eugene C . Massie , 35 Am . Law
Rev . 727 , 14 Reports Va . State Bar Association .
The Torrens System of Land Registration , by Alex . H . Robbins , 54
Cent . L . J. 282 .
Practical Operation of the Torrens System in Massachusetts, by Clar
ence C . Smith , 54 Cent. L . J . 285 .
A report of the case of State v . Westfall , with note , 54 Cent. L . J .
290 , 293.
Address by Edward T . Taylor, Reports Colorado State Bar Associa
tion for 1902.
Discussion on The Recording of Land Titles and Transfers by Judi
cial Process , by Chas. Wetherill and Paul H . Gaither , 9th Ann . Rep .
Pa . Bar Association ( 1903 ).
" The Torrens Acts ," Some Comparisons, J . H . Brewster ,Mich . Law
Rev ., Vol. 1, p . 444 ; The Court of Land Registration , by Chas. T. Davis ,
Yale Law Jour., February , 1904 .
The proposed Virginia act , most carefully drafted , may be found in
16 Va . Bar Ass 'n Reports (1903 ) .
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ABANDONMENT ,
of guardianship of insane, effect of , 333 .
of homestead , 383 .
will not generally make valid conveyance of homestead that
was invalid when made , 394 .
of wife by husband , she may convey , 363 .
ABBREVIATION ,
of official title in acknowledgment , 291 .
“ ABOUT,"
effect of in naming quantity , 92 .
ABSENCE ,
signing in grantor 's , 238 .
ABSTRACT OF TITLE , 425 .
should show conditional clauses , 187 .
ACCEPTANCE ,
as an element of delivery , 29
8 , 300 -302 .
assuming control o
f property shows , 301 .
express , acceptance o
f
deed , when necessary , 301 .
presumed until dissent shown , 300 .
when parent conveys to child , 301 .
prevented , title does not pass , 302 .
surrender and acceptance need not be concurrent acts , 302 .
ACCESS ,
to navigable water , private property , 106 .
to water cannot be cut off , 117 .
ACCRETIONS ,
o
n half street , 91 .
to riparian owner ' s land , 117 .
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ACKNOWLEDGMENT ,
“ acknowledge ,” whether necessary , 270 .
by corporation , 294 .
by married women , 264, 361, 365 , 367 .
certificate of , clerical errors do not vitiate , 267 .
date , 34 , 290 .
date differing from that in deed , effect of, 34.
conclusive , when , 293 .
fact of acknowledgment must appear in , 269.
forgery may be shown , 293 .
form of , 265 , 294 ,
impeachment, 293 .
in foreign language , 280 , n .
parts of , 289 .
" personally known ,” 272.
prima facie evidence of, due execution of deed , 259.
seal of officer , 292 .
signing by officer, 291.
defined , 254 .
grantor or grantee cannot take, 281 .
identity of person acknowledging with grantor , 271, 272 .
jurisdiction of officer to take , 289 .
of grantor to witness , 252 .





several grantees may take , 281 .
partner o
f party cannot take , 285 .
party cannot take , 281 .
purposes o
f , 257 - 264 .
record o
f
deed with defective acknowledgment , 258 , 260 , 366 .
stockholder cannot take , when , 285 .
substantial compliance with statute necessary , 267 -272 , 367 , 399 .
taken in state other than that where land is , 276 – 279 .
to conveyance o
f
homestead , 399 .
trustee in deed cannot take , 283 .
venue , 289 .
what instruments may have , 255 .
when necessary to validity , 261 , 262 , 365 , 399 .
when required for release of dower , 376 .
who may take , 274 – 277 .
ACQUIESCENCE ,
by former infant in deed made during minority , 316 , 317 .
o
f




number , effect , 92 .
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ACTION ,
on covenants running with the land governed by lex situs , 213.
ADDITIONS ,
to name by way of recital,44 .
ADJOINING LOT ,
as monument , 87 .
ADMINISTRATOR ,
covenantee 's need not be named ,196 .
deed of, recitals in , 50 .
naming of, in covenants for title , 193 .











several grantors , 248 .
o
f signature by grantor , 238 .
ADVERSE POSSESSION ,
character o
f , to render deed void or voidable , 420 .
conveyance o
f
land held in , 415 -421 .
generally valid now , 421 .
valid between the parties , 417 , 41
8
.
disability from , 415 -421 .
title not acquired b






deed made during infancy , not needed , 313 .





insane person , 342 .
AFFIRMATIVE CONDITIONS , 171 .
AFTER ACQUIRED TITLE ,
enures to grantee in warranty deed , 188 .
to mortgagee , when , 189 .




extreme age does not show grantor ' s incapacity , 340 .
misrepresentation by infant as to , 320 .
AGENT . See ATTORNEY .
AGREEMENT ,
o
f grantee to pay mortgage , how shown , 65 .
to convey , distinguished from deed , 28 .
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ALIEN ,
capacity to purchase and convey real property , 408 –412 .
may convey before office found , 410 .
may not acquire title by descent at common law , 40
8
.
property rights affected by treaty , 4 , 412 .
states may add to o
r
remove common law disabilities , 412 .
treaty may remove disabilities o
f , 412 .
LIENATION ,
by joint tenant , 150 .
b
y
owner in fee , 1 , 139 .
by tenant in common , 157 .





tenant in tail , 140 .
general restraint on , void , 186 .
restraint on , valid in creating " separate estate , ” 354 .
restrictions on , 312 .
ALLEYS . See STREETS .
ALTERATION ,
forgery b
y , 426 .
o
f
date , 426 .
o
f grantee ' s name , 426 .
AMBIGUOUS ,
clause , of condition , 172 .
construed as a covenant , 177 .
o
f exception and reservation , 121 .
description o
f property , 76 - 80 .
AMERICAN ACTS FOR REGISTRATION OF TITLE ,
inappropriately called " Torrens Acts , ” 433 , n .
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION FORMS ,
form o
f acknowledgment recommended b




to covenants running with the land , 217 .
ANCIENT DEEDS ,
recitals in , evidence , 44 .
APPLICATION ,
to register title , 435 .
to sell infants ' lands , 326 .
APPROVAL
by court , o
f
sale o
f infant ' s land , 328 .
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easement , reservation o
f , 125 .
land not appurtenant to land , 99 , 118 .
ARTIFICIAL POND ,










deed , 70 .
“ ASSIGNS , ”
covenantee ' s , naming o
f , 197 .
covenants broken do not pass to , 217 .
effect o
f , in covenant , 224 .
not needed to create a fee , 138 .
o
f grantee in deed poll bound b
y




one under , valid , 43 .
deed to one under , valid , 43 .
ASSURANCE ,
further , covenant fo
r , 205 .
ASSURANCE FUND ,
under “ Torrens System , ” 442 .
ASYLUM ,
commitment to , effect o
f , 333 .
ATTAINDER ,
forfeiture o
n , 413 .
ATTESTATION ,
a
t common law not necessary , 250 .
b
y
one interested in the conveyance invalid , 253 .
clause o
f , not essential , 252 .
generally , 250 - 253 .
in United States , 251 .
method o
f , 252 .
o
f signature by mark , 236 .
proof by witness attesting , 295 .
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married woman ' s power of , 377 .
o
f
party may generally take acknowledgment , 288 .
power o
f , by infant , when void , 314 .
by insane person , 336 .
signing under power o




statute dispensing with , 202 .
“ BANK , "
effect o
f , in description , 100 .
BARGAIN AND SALE ,
after statute of uses , 20 , 56 .
consideration in , 55 .
deed o
f , 12 .
deeds in United States usually based on , 56 .
operative words in deed o
f , 57 , 69 .
BENEFITS AND BURDENS ,
distinction between in covenants , 226 .
BLANKS ,
authority to fill , 39 .
filling in , certificate of acknowledgment , 267 , 269 , 271 .
forms o
f
covenants for title , 192 .
BOND ,
guardian ' s , on sale of infant ' s lands , 32
8
.
BOUNDARY . See DESCRIPTION .
a
t
water ' s edge , 117 .
lake as , 111 .
meander line as , 103 .
street as , 89 .
uncertain starting point , 80 .
water a
s , 98 - 117 .
BREACH OF COVENANT ,
against incumbrances , what constitutes , 200 - 203 .
for further assurance , 205 .
for good right to convey , 198 .
for quiet enjoyment , 206 .
for seisin , 198 .
o
f warranty , 20
6 , 209 , 210 .
BUILDING LINE ,
o
n plat referred to in deed , 227 .
purchaser may b
e
held to , b
y
another lot owner , 228 .
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BUILDING RESTRICTION ,
as a condition , 182 .





a general plan , 228 .
BUILDINGS ,
a
s monuments , 8
8 .
BULK ,










homestead for , 384 .
CANCELATION ,
o
f grantor ' s name does not revest title in him , 311 .
CAPACITY ,





alien to convey , 410 -412 .
o
f convict , 413 , 414 .
o
f corporation , 406 , 407 .
of disseisee , 415 -421 .
o
f
infant , 313 , 314 .
of insane person , 332 -337 .
ofmarried woman , 340 – 372 .
of tenant in tail , 143 .
CAPACITY TO TAKE TITLE ,
o
f
alien , 408 , 409 .
of convict , 413 , 414 .
of corporation , 401 -405 .
o
f
infant , 323 .




monument boundary , 88 , 89 .
“ CENTER RULE , " .
what expressions prevent operation of ,when way is boundary , 90 .
CERTAINTY







f , 34 , 290 .
defective , to deed o
f
married woman , 36
6
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CERTIFICATE OF ACKNOWLEDGMENT — Continued .
form of, 265 , 291,
form , when taken in another state , 278.
how far evidence , 259 .
impeachment of, 293 .
parts of , 289 .
what should show , 266 , 268.
CERTIFICATE OF CONFORMITY , 279 .
CERTIFICATE OF OFFICIAL CHARACTER ,
of officer taking acknowledgment , 275 , 27
7 , 278 .
CHAMPERTOUS ,
conveyances invalid , 421 .
CHAMPERTY ,





f , to authorize conveyance of infants ' lands , 330 .
CHANGE ,
in character o
f neighborhood , a
s affecting right to enforce restric
tione , 229 .
CHILD ,
unborn , cannot be grantee of immediate eetate , 43 .
may be grantee in remainder , 43 , n .
“ CHILDREN . "
" heirs " construed as , 40 .
CHRISTIAN NAME ,
signing b
y , 237 .
CHURCH SOCIETY ,
deed b
y , 241 .
CIRCUMSTANCES ,
considered in construing conveyances , 181 , 183 , 187 .
“ CIVIL DEATH , ” 413 , 414 .
CLERICAL ERRORS ,
in certificate o
f acknowledgment , 267 .
COKE ' S ,
definition o
f
deed , 19 .
COLLATERAL LIMITATION , 173 .
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COMMITTEE . See GUARDIAN .
COMMON RECOVERY, 18 .




tenancy in , 156 – 158 .
exceptions to rule favoring , 153 .
tenant in , conveyance by , 157 .
homestead of , 387 .
COMMON LAW DEEDS , 20 .




officer to take acknowledgment affected b
y





e , though in asylum , 333 .
COMPETITION ,




deed , 31 .
CONCLUSIVE ,
certificate o
f acknowledgment , when , 293 .
CONCURRENT OWNERSHIP , 148 – 167 .
CONDITIONAL FEE , 139 .
CONDITIONAL LIMITATION , 175 .
CONDITIONS ,
capricious ,may be disregarded , 186 .
conveyances for specified purposes , not always on condition , 180 .
difficulties in construing , 176 .
drawing and construing , 187 .
express , 170 .




f crime ,void , 185 .
for separation o
f
husband and wife , void , 185 .
implied , 169 .
imposing a general restraint on alienation , void , 186 .
in short statutory deeds , follow the description , 178 .
nominal , o
f no benefit , void , 186 .
place for , 31 , 178 .
precedent and subsequent compared , 172 .
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CONDITIONS — Continued .
precedent defined , 170 .
impossible , grantee takes nothing , 170 .
through act of person imposing it , discharged , 170, n .
unlawful , grantee takes nothing , 170 .
repugnant to estate granted , void , 186 .
restraining marriage, how far void , 185 .
subsequent , affirmative in character , 171 .
advantage can be taken of, only by grantor or his heirs , 17
1 ,
characteristics o
f , 171 .
construed strictly against grantor , 177 .
distinguished from estates on conditional limitation , 17
5
.
upon deterininable limitation , 173 , 174 .
expressed ambiguously construed as covenants , 177 .
grantor conveying subject to , has no estate , 171 .
impossible cannot defeat estate , 171 .
negative in character , 171 .
place for , 178 .
preferred to precedent , 172 .
re -entry clause in , 179 .
technical words not necessary to create , 177 . .
until entry , the estate continues , 171 .
unreasonably restricting use , void , 186 .
void , when , 185 , 186 .
waiver o
f , 187 .








infant ' s lands , 328 .
CONFLICTING PARTS O
F
DESCRIPTION , 83 , 84 .
rules fo
r
construing , 84 .
CONFORMITY ,
certificate o
f , when acknowledgment in another state , 279 .
CONSENT ,
parol , to alienation of homestead sufficient , when , 398 .
CONSERVATOR . See GUARDIAN .
CONSIDERATION ,
additional , evidence a
s
to , 59 .
agreement to support a
s , 184 .
assumption o
f mortgage as , 64 .
contractual statement o
f , 63 .
effect o
f , in construing conveyances for special purposes , 181 .
equitable doctrine as to , 55 .
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CONSIDERATION - Continued .
evidence of, different than that named , 60–61 .
feoffment did not require , 53 .
" good " and " valuable ,” 55 .
inadequate , combined with weakness ofmind , 341 .
necessity for , 52 .
not essential to sealed contract at common law , 245 .
parol evidence as to , 59 .
return of, on disaffirmance of infant ' s deed , 321 .
on disaffirmance of insane person 's deed , 346 .
" seal importing ,” 54 .
third parties not bound by statement of, 67 .
true , may be shown, 61, 64 .
may not be shown to defeat conveyance , 66 .
CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIONS ,
to “ Torrens System ,” 433, 436 , 437 , 438 , 442.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ,
as to separate estate of wife , 358.
CONSTRUCTION ,
lex situs controls , 8.
of deed as a whole , 132.
rule in Shelley ' s case not a rule of construction , 146.
CONSTRUCTIVE EVICTION , 21
0
.
“ CONSTRUCTIVE OCCUPANCY , ”
o
f
homestead , 382 .
CONSTRUCTIVE POSSESSION , 420 .
CONSTRUING ,
conditions , 187 .
difficulties in , 176 .
CONSUL ,
United States , certificate o
f , to acknowledgment in foreign lan
guage , 280 , n .
CONTINGENT REMAINDER , 144 .
CONTRACT ,
courts d
o not make , 192 .
deed o
f
wife ' s lands in which husband not properly joined con
strued as , 364 .
married woman ' s unacknowledged deed not , 365 .
reference to , for description , 97 .
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CONTRADICTION ,
between premises and habendum , 129.
CONTROL ,




equitable , question of, settled by lex situs, 8 .
“ CONVEY ."
as operative word , 69 .
“ CONVEY AND WARRANT,"
effect of, 30, 211 , 212 , 213 .
later words restricting , 130 .
CONVEYANCE ,
between husband and wife , 368 - 371 .
by alien , 410 -412 .
by corporation , 240 , 406 , 407 .
by joint tenant , 150 .
by married woman , 355 – 372.
by parcener , 159 .
by tenant in common , 157 .
for specified use , when conditional , 180 .
of community property , 167 .
of estate by entireties, 166 .
of infants ' real property , 312 - 330 .
of land held in adverse possession , 415 -421 .
party wall agreement in , 231 .
CONVEYANCING ,
includes what, 2 .
CONVICTS ,
capacity to take and convey real property , 413 , 414 .
COPARCENARY ,
tenancy in , 159 .
COPIES OF RECORDS ,
as evidence , 259, 260 .
CORPORATION ,
acknowledgment , form , 294 .
as party , 46 .
capacity to alienate real property , 406 , 407.
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CORPORATION - Continued .
effect o
f




y , 240 .
may convey good title to land held in excess o
f power to hold ,
405 .
may take a fee though it
s
duration is limited , 402 .
officer o
f , may take acknowledgment when , 287 .
presumption that it holds only lands appropriate to corporate
purposes , 404 .
seal o
f , 249 .
stockholder can not take acknowledgment of conveyance to , 285 .
what lands may hold , 404 , 405 .









indentures , 21 .
COUNTY ,
name of , part o
f
notary ' s signature , 291 .
named in description , 82 .
COURSES AND DISTANCES ,
control description b
y
monuments , when , 87 .
statements o
f quantity , 84 , 92 .
controlled generally b
y
monuments , 84 , 87 .
COURT OF LAND REGISTRATION , 435 .
COURTS ,







n agreement under seal , 188 .
deed may be without , 188 .
grantee liable in action o
f , on assuming mortgage , 24 .
heir ' s liability on , 193 .
“ negative , ' ' 230 .
not essential in a covenant , 191 .
restraining competition , 230 .
to stand seised , 55 .




need not be named , 196 .
assigns , naming of in covenant , 197 , 224 , 232 .
designation o




e named , 196 .
heirs o
f , naming in covenant , 197 , 224 .
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COVENANTOR ,
designation of, 192.
wife of, when not bound by covenant , 194 .
COVENANTS , 188– 232 .
as to party walls , whether run with the land, 232.
bind grantee in deed poll, 225 .
broken do not run with the land, 219 .
condition placed among , 178 .
in law , 211 .
in praesenti do not run with the land , 215 , 217 .
other than for title , 222 - 232 .
form of such covenants , 223 .
relating to party walls , 231 .
pattern , 30 .
personal, 221.
place for , 31 .
real, 221 .
restrictive , 227 .
running with the land , 21
4 , 22
4 , 232 .
special , 190 .
effect o
f , 188 .
implied from " grant , ” 211 .
COVENANTS FOR TITLE , 188 - 221 .
designation o
f parties , 196 .
executors and administrators named in , 193 .
form o
f , 191 .
husband joining in wife ' s conveyance , how far liable o
n , 194 .
implied , 30 , 211 .
in mortgages , 189 .
ineffective in void conveyance o
f homestead , 392 .
place for , 191 .
running with the land , 214 –221 .
pass b
y
quitclaim deed , 220 .
special , 191 .
succeeded the ancient warranty , 19
7
.
usual covenants , 190 .
against incumbrances , 199 .
breach o
f , 200 -203 .
form o
f , 191 , 199 .
in a mortgage , 189 .
runs with the land , when , 218 .
when a covenant in futuro , 199 .
for further assurance , 205 .
breach o
f , 205 .
runs with the land , 205 .
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COVENANTS FOR TITLE - Continued




runs with the land , 219 .
for seisin , 198 .
breach of , 198 .
runs with the land in some states , 216 .
o
f good right to convey , 198 .
o
f warranty , 206 .
breach o
f , 206 , 209 , 210 .
attaches only to estate granted , 207 .
runs with the land , 219 .
fo
r
title , wife of grantor not generally bound b
y , 194 .
CREDITOR ,
o
f infantmay not disaffirm deed , 319 .
o
f
insane grantor may not disaffirm deed , 345 .
o




consideration , 67 .
CRIME ,
conviction and sentence fo
r , effect , 414 .
CROSS ,
a
s signature , 236 .




common law , 350 .




married woman , where , 360 .
effect o
f , on contract for conveyance , 190 .
DAMAGES ,
for negligently preparing abstract , 425 .
not generally recoverable under the ancient warranty , 197 , 206 .
measure o





grantee , 202 .
o
n breach o
f covenant for further assurance not sole remedy , 205 .
possibility o
f recovery o




seldom sought for breach o
f
restrictive covenants , 228 .
DATE ,
deed valid without , 32 .
delivery presumed a
t , 33 .
figures o
r words for , 32 .
3
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DATE - Continued .
in certificate of acknowledgment , 34 , 290 .
in deed and certificate of acknowledgment, 34.
generally controls date of acknowledgment, 34 .
place for , 32 .
recording within limited time after, 35 .
true , may be shown , 35 .
DEATH ,
delivery at grantor's, 305 , 307 .
of grantee in conveyance conditioned for support , 184 .
of landowner, effect of under " Torrens System ,” 441, 443 .
questions on , 428 .






deed , effect of , 302 .
“ DEDI , "
warranty implied from , 197 , 211 .
DEDICATION ,
by husband alone , wife not dowable , 373 .
o
f
streets and parks , 95 .
DE DONIS ,
statute , 140 .
in United States , 143 .
DEED ,
acceptance o
f , presumed when , 300 , 301 .
assignment indorsed , 70 .
bargain and sale , 12 , 56 , 57 .
conditions in , 168 - 187 .
consideration in , 52 - 66 .
construed in its entirety , 132 .
conveys a present interest , 2
7 , 29 .
covenants in , 188 - 232 .
date o
f , 32 - 35 .
definitions o
f , 19 .
delivery essential , 19 , 296 .
does not transfer title under " Torrens System , ” 434 , 439 .
description o




f , effect , 311 .
disaffirmance o
f , by infant , 31
5
-318 .
distinguished from contract to convey , 28 .
from will , 29 .
effect given to if possible , 25 , 58 , 69 , 79 .
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DEED - Continued .
execution of, what, 233 .
in consideration of support, 184 .
insane person 's, when void , 332.
instrument in form of,may be inoperative , 29 .
Kent' s form , 25.
kinds of, 20 , 21.
married woman ' s , unusual at common law , 360 .
may be delivered though in grantor ' s possession , 298 .
of corporation , 46 , 240 , 241, 406 , 407 .
operative words in , 15, 68 -72.
appropriate to a will, 29 .
parties to , 36 -46 .
parts of, 31.
passing no present interest may operate as a will, 29 .
possession of as evidence of delivery , 303.
preserved a record of early transfers , 15.
recitals in , 47 -51 .
reference in one to another for description , 97 .
seal essential , 19 , 242.
short statutory form , 30 .
stolen , effect of , 299 .
superfluous operative words , 15.
tendency to shorten , 25 .
to take effect at death , 29 , 30
5
- 308 .
under title registration acts , 434 , 439 .
warranty deed probated a
s will , 29 .
without covenants for title , effect , 188 .
DEED POLL , 21 .
containing covenants b
y
grantee , acceptance b
y
grantee , 225 .
effect , 24 .
form , 22 , 23 .
DEFECTIVE ,
certificate o
f acknowledgment , effect , 258 , 260 , 262 .
DELIVERY , 296 – 311 .
acceptance , as an element of , 298 , 300 , 301 .
if prevented , no delivery , 302 .
accomplished in many ways , 296 .
a
t death o
f grantor , 305 , 307 .
blanks in deed filled after , 19 , 39 .
by insane grantor , 339 .
cancelation o
f grantor ' s name after , 311 .
date , may be shown , 35 .
presumption o
f , at date ofdeed , 33 .
deed should be completely written before , 19 .
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DELIVERY - Continued .
destruction of deed after, does not revest title , 311.
deposit among grantee ' s papers not , 306 .
elements of, 298.
essential to deed , 19, 296 .
grantee ' s possession of deed does not show , 299 , 303 , 310 .
grantor 's intention as an element of, 299 .
possession of deed after delivery , 306 .
retaining possession till death , generally no delivery , 306 .
in escrow , 309 .
may not be to grantee , 309 .
manual , not necessary , 298 .
name of grantee inserted after , 39 .
not necessary , when , 297 .
not conclusively shown by records, 304 , 427 .
of conveyance from parent to child , 298 .
patent of public lands needs no delivery, 297 .
presumed from certain facts , 303 , 304 .
recording , 304 .
surrender and acceptance need not be concurrent acts , 302 .
takes the place of livery of seisin , 297 .
title passes on , 296 .
title does not pass on , under Registration of Title Acts, 434 , 439.
to third person , for grantee , 307 .
grantor reserving control of the deed , not delivery , 308 .
DEMANDANT, 18.
DEMENTIA , 338 .
DEMISE ,
operative word , 72.
DEPOSIT ,
by grantor , of deed among grantee 's papers not delivery , 30
6
.
with third person , 30
7
.
DERIVATIVE DEEDS , 20 .
DESCENT ,
alien could not acquire title b
y , at common law , 408 .
in parcenary , 159 .
DESCRIPTION ,
addition to sufficient description to b
e
avoided , 83 .
certainty necessary , 75 .
conflicting parts o
f , 83 .
controversies regarding , arise in a variety o
f ways , 73 .
course and distance control quantity , 92 .
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DESCRIPTION - Continued .
construed liberally , 73.
essential, 73 .
exception must be described , 78, n .
false , rejected , 85.
general , allowable , 81.
in contract, incorporated into deed by reference , 97 .
intention , when plain prevails , 86 .
maps referred to , 93 , 96 , 100 .
monuments control courses , distances and quantity , 84 .
incorrect maps, 96 .
" more or less ” in , 92 .
notice to subsequent purchasers , 74 .
of land on water , 98 -117 .
of the property , 73 -118 .
parol evidence , can not supply , 76 .
to apply , 75 .
part of larger tract, 78 .
particular , controls general , 86 .
place for , 73 .
quantity in , 92.
rules for construing , 84 .
specific usually , 82 .
streets and ways in , 89 .
uncertain , starting point , 80 .
void , 76, 77 , 80 , 81 .
uncertainty avoided, when , 78.
DESTRUCTION ,
of deed after delivery , effect , 311.
DETERMINABLE FEE , 174 .
DETERMINABLE LIMITATION , 173 .
DEVISEE ,
purchaser from , 428 .
DIAGRAM ,
of land described , 82
DISABILITY ,
grantor 's , arising from adverse possession , 415 - 421 .
from alienage , 408 –412 .
from conviction for crime , 413 –414 .
from infancy , 313 -323 .
from insanity , 331 - 348 .
legal and natural , 312
married woman ' s to convey , 359.
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DISABILITY — Continued .
of corporations, 401 -407 .
of disseisee , 415 -421 .
ofdrunkard , 334, 338 .
of tenant in tail , 140 , 143 .
DISAFFIRMANCE ,
of deed by an infant, 315 - 318.
by infant , what constitutes , 322 .
by infant 's heirs , 319 .
of insane person on restoration to sanity , 343 .
of insane person 's deed against subsequent grantee , 347 .
restoration of consideration on , 321 , 346 .
DISCLAIMER ,
by grantee , 300.
DISQUALIFICATION ,
of witness , 253 .
to take acknowledgment arising from interest , 281 -288 .
DISSEISEE ,
conveyance of land by, 415 -421 .
invalid at common law , 415 .
by statute , 416 .
now generally valid , 421.
DISSOLUTION ,
of corporation , effect of, 403 .
DIVORCE ,
effect on invalid conveyance of homestead , 394 .
on estate by entireties , 162 , n .
DOWER ,
barred by common recovery , 360 .
husband ' s sole act cannot generally defeat , 373 .
incumbrance , 201.
insane wife cannot release , 348 .
released under statutes , 348 .
none under community system , 167 .
not released generally to husband , 375 .
to a stranger , 374 .
not shown by records, 429 .
release of , by attorney , 377 .
requires separate examination ,when , 366 .
released generally by deed of both husband and wife , 376 .
not conveyed , 374 .
wife joining in insane husband ' s deed does not release , when ,
332.
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DRUNKARD ,
conveyance by , when void , 33
4
.






to use , 229 .
EASEMENT ,
a
s appurtenance , 118 .
grant o
f , in form o
f
covenant , 223 .
incumbrance , when , 203 .
in fe
e appurtenant to other land , 125 .
possession o
f , notice , 430 .
reservation o
f , 119 , 121 , 125 .
right o
f flowing passes as appurtenance , 118 .
transferred b
y




infant ' s lands to provide for , 327 .
ELEMENTS ,
o




to covenants running with the land , 215 , 216 .
ENROLMENTS ,
statute o
f , 12 .
suggested recording to colonists , 422 .
ENTIRETIES ,
estate b
y , conveyance of , 16
6
.
homestead in , 387 .
husband may convey to wife , where , 16
6
.
not now general , 165 .
tenancy b
y , 162 – 166 .
effect o
f
divorce , 162 , n .
married woman ' s property acts as affecting , 164 , 165 .
in United States , 163 , 164 .
statutes regarding joint tenancy , as affecting , 164 , 165 .




none necessary to terminate conditional limitation , 175 .
to defeat estate on condition , 177 .
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EQUITABLE ,
doctrines as to seal, 245 .
interest in homestead transferred by defective conveyance , 397 .
separate estate of married woman , 352 , 355 .
not abolished by statutes creating separate estate , 358 .
title , corporation not organized has, as grantee , 46 .
passes by instrument without seal, 245 .
EQUITY ,
cancelation in , of conveyance in consideration of support , 184 .
covenant for further assurance enforced in , 205 .
doctrine of, as to consideration , 55 .
as to conveyances between husband and wife , 370 .
effect in , of infant 's misrepresentation as to age , 320 .
forfeiture not enforced in , 184 , n .
instrument without seal enforced in , 245 .







f , to authorize conveyance o
f
infant ' s property ,
324 , 330 .
wife ' s power in , over separate estate , 355 .
will enforce contract to purchase land of corporation acquired in
excess of power , 405 .
will not aid corporation to acquire land in excess o
f power , 405 .
will not enforce restrictions , when , 229 , 230 .
ERASURE ,
forgery by , 426 .
ERRONEOUS DESCRIPTION ,
rejected , 85 .
ESCHEAT ,
o
n attainder , 413 .
ESCROW ,
delivery in , 309 .




wife joining in alienation of homestead has none , 390 .
in which homestead may exist , 387 .
limited in habendum , 128 .
ESTATES TAIL ,
in United States , 142 , 143 .
kinds o





[References are to Sections . ]
ESTOPPEL ,
by misrepresentation as to age , 320 .
grantor not estopped to contradict recital of receipt o
f
considera
tion , 59 .
married woman estopped by covenents , when , 195 .
not applicable to transfers of homestead not complying with
statute , 392 .
o
fmortgagor by covenants in mortgage , 189 .
silence on former infant ' s part not , 316 .
EUROPEAN SYSTEMS ,
o
f registering title , 433 .
EVICTION ,
constructive , 210 ,
covenant o
f warranty a covenant against , 206 .
necessary to breach o
f
covenant o
f warranty , 209 .
o
f grantee by grantor , when a breach o
f
covenant , 210 .
what is , 210 .
EVIDENCE ,
acknowledgment as , 259 .
o
f additional consideration , 60 .
o
f grantor ' s intention when street is boundary , 89 .
parol , as to consideration , 59 .
inadmissible to except incumbrance , 204 .
to apply description , 75 .
to identify grantee , 40 .
records a
s , 259 , 260 .
to prove attested deed , 250 .
EXAMINATION OF TITLE , 4224431 .
EXCEPTION ,
and reservation , difference in effect o
f , 120 .
annexed to one covenant , inapplicable to others , 208 .
description o
f , 78 , n .
" excepting , " " reserving , ” used synonymously , 123 .
o
f incumbrance from covenant , 204 .
o
f
minerals , 124 .
o
f part o
f property granted , 119 – 127 .
o
f riparian rights , 100 .
o
f
timber , 124 .
place for clause o
f , 122 .
relates to thing in esse , 119 .
repugnant to estate granted void , 126 .
to rule that delivery is essential , 297 .
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EXCHANGE ,
covenants implied in , 211 .
primary deed , 20.
EXECUTE ,
authority to execute sealed instrument, 245.
EXECUTION ,
by corporation , 240 .
by one not named as party , 37 .
certificate of acknowledgment evidence of, 259 .
includes what , 233 .
of deed by attorney , 239 .
proved by grantor , when , 250 .
real property not taken on , at common law , 378.
EXECUTOR ,
covenantee ' s need not be named , 196 .
deed of, recital in , 51.
naming of, in covenants for title , 193 .
when not bound by testator's covenant , 193.
EXEMPTION ,
restraints on conveyance of homestead apply to right of, where ,
97 .
EXPIRATION OF COMMISSION ,
date of, to be stated by notary , 291.
EXPRESS ,
and implied covenants combined , effect of, 212 .
conditions , 170 , 171 .
warranty distinct from covenant , 197 .
FALSA DEMONSTRATIO , 85 .
FALSE DESCRIPTION REJECTED , 85 .
FEE ,
alienable generally , 1.
arising by implication restricted in habendum 130 .
conditional , 139 .
corporation may take though it
s
duration is limited , 402 .
determinable , 174 .
" heirs ” essential to creation o
f , 135 .
when not necessary , 125 , 136 , 137 .
qualified , 174 .




f , without “heirs , ' ' 136 .
INDEX .
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FEE SIMPLE ,
conditional , 139 .
subject to special limitation , 174 .
FEE TAIL , 140 .
a fee simple , where, 143.
FENCE ,
covenant to , binds assigns , 225 .
FEOFFMENT,
by insane person voidable , 336 .
by married woman at common law , 360 .
consideration not essential to , 53 .
consists simply and solely in livery of seisin , 11.
conveyances equivalent to , when , 53 , 58 , 336 .
deed required for, when , 14 .
form , 14, 15 .
in United States , 16 .
recorded deed given effect as , 58 .
warranty implied , 197 .
FICTITIOUS ,
name, deed valid to one in fictitious name, 43 .
person , deed to , invalid , 43 .
FIDUCIARY RELATION ,
effect of , 341 .
FILING ,
for record without acknowledgment , effect , 258 , n .
FILLING BLANKS ,
authority for , 39 .
in certificate of acknowledgment , 267 , 269, 271 .
in forms for covenants of title , 192 .:
FINE , 18 .
advantage of, 18 .
conveyance ofmarried women by , 360 , 361 .
not usual in United States , 362 .
FIRM NAME,
conveyance in , 45 .
FISHING
right of riparian owner, 107 .
FOREIGN LAW ,
certificate of conformity to , 279 .
FOREIGN LANGUAGE ,
certificate of acknowledgment in , 28
0 , n .
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FORFEITURE ,
enforced against one attainted , 413 .
by state against alien , 409 .
none, of land held by corporation in excess of power , 405 .
not enforced in equity , 184 , n .
FORGERY ,
certificate of acknowledgment may be shown to be, 293.
effect of, on title , 426 .
presumption against , from acknowledgment, 259 .
records do not show , 42
6
.
undelivered deed in grantee ' s possession as ineffective as if
forged , 299 .
what is , 426 .
" FOR HIS HEIRS , ”










corporation , 294 .
o
f
covenants for title , 191 .
o
f
deed poll , 22 , 23 .
o
f
feoffment , 14 .





attorney , 239 .
Coke ' s advice as to , 26 .
FRAUD ,
effect o
f , in conveyance in consideration of support , 184 .
in absence o
f , grantee assumes risk as to quantity , 92 .
in public survey , 103 .
inferred , when , 341 .
FRAUDS , see also STATUTE OF FRAUDS .
statute o
f , required writing for feoffment , 14 .
for release o
f
dower , 376 .
title b
y
voluntary transfer without writing , passes , how , 17 .




homestead , 400 , n .
FREEHOLD ,
transferred by feoffment , 11 .
“ FULL COVENANTS , ”
contract for deed with , 190 .
FURTHER ASSURANCE , '
covenant for , 205 .
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FUTURE DELIVERY ,
dependent on performance of condition is in escrow , 309 .
GAS COMPANY ,
capacity to alienate real property , 407 .
GENERAL DESCRIPTION ,
allowable , 81.
controlled by particular , 86 .
GENERAL PLAN ,
restrictions in pursuance of, 228 .
GIFT ,
parol, 17 .
primary deed , 20.
“ GIVE , DEVISE AND BEQUEATH ,”
as operative words , 29 .
“ GIVE , GRANT, BARGAIN AND SELL ,"
as operative words , 72 .
GOOD FAITH ,











s operative word , 6
9 , 72 .
“ bargain and sell , " effect o
f , 211 .
effect of , in statutory deeds , 211 .
instrument under seal , 242 .
GRANT OF LAND ON STREET ,





y , presumed when , 300 .
accepting deed without covenants for title , position o
f , 188 .
assuming mortgage , 24 .
assumption o
f mortgage b
y , must be shown by express accept
ance o
f
deed , 301 .
incumbrance by , 204 .
blank a
s
to , 38 , 39 .
corporation as , 46 .
covenantor when , 222 .
death o
f , effect on conveyance conditioned for support , 184 .
deed uncertain a
s
to , 40 .
void for lack o
f , 38 .
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GRANTEE - Continued .
designation of, 38 .
erroneous designation of, 40 .
identified by parol , 40 .
in deed poll bound by covenants , 225 .
infant as , 19, 301 , 323.
in warranty deed , his knowledge of defects immaterial , 206 .
knowledge of incumbrance when material , 204 .
may recover excess over true consideration ,64 .
must be in esse , 43 .
name erroneous , deed valid , 40 .
named in habendum , 133 .
in premises usually , 38 .
no delivery in escrow to , 309 .
of land on street takes to center of street , 89 .
when takes entire way , 91 .
partnership as, 45 .
possession by , ofundelivered deed , 299, 303, 310 .
rights of in street shown on map, 94 .
should not be witness , 253 .
subsequent , effect on , of insanity of prior grantor, 347 .
surrender ofdeed by , after delivery , effect , 311.
surrendering to superior title , 210 .
taking acknowledgment , 281 , 282.
when must show that grantor acted freely , 341 .
GRAVTOR ,
corporation as, 46 , 406, 407 .
cannot take acknowledgment , 281 .
covenanting " for his heirs ,'' 192 .
designation of, 37 .
estopped to deny existence of streets , 94 .
identity of, with person acknowledging , 271 , 272 .
intent to deliver deed , 299 .
may use assumed name, 43.
mental capacity required in , 338 .
name same as that of previous grantee shows identity of person ,
41 .
named in deed not signing, 234.
not estopped by statement of consideration , 59 .
one , should not attest deed of others , 253 .
possession of land by , after his conveyance , 431 .
of deed by , after delivery , 306 .
signing by another , 238 .
by mark , 236 ,
surrender of control of deed by , necessary to delivery , 298 .
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GRANTORS ,
adoption of one seal by several , 248 .
whether husband and wife should both be, in conveyance of her
land , 364 .
“ GREAT LAKES , ”
public grants on , 101.
title to bed , 112 .
GUARDIAN ,
application by, to convey ward ' s lands , 326 .
assent of, to insane ward ' s conveyance ineffective , when , 332.
bond of, on sale of infant' s land , 326 , 328 .
conveyance by , of infant' s land , 324 -330 .
insane person 's may convey how , 348 .
wife ' s ,may not release homestead , 393 .
may not release dower , 348 .
may disaffirm insane ward ' s deed , 344 .
not convey ward ' s lands without authority , 324 .
natural , may not convey ward 's real property , 324 .
of insane person may not confirm deed , when , 342 .
GUARDIANSHIP ,
insane person under , conveyance void , 332 .
of drunkards , spendthrifts and others , 334 .
of insane, while continues , ward presumed incompetent, 333 .
HABENDUM , 31, 128 - 147 .
condition in or after , 178 .
contradiction between habendum and premises , 129 .
enlarges estate granted in premises , when , 130 , 131 .
estate arising by implication from the premises may be abridged
by , 130 .
limited in , 128.
grantee named in , 133 .
not essential to a deed , 128 .
one named in , but not in premises may take in remainder , 133 .
reconciled with premises if possible , 132 .
repugnant as to estate in premises , void , 129 .
trusts declared in , 134 .
HEAD OF FAMILY ,
entitled to homestead , 380 .
HEARING ,
on application to convey infant's lands, 328 .
to register title , 438 .
“ HEIR OF,”
as describing party , 44 .
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HEIRS ,
conveyance by , discovery of will , 428 .
covenantee 's , naming of, 196 , 197 .
deed to heirs of a living person when void , 40 .
grantor covenanting for, 192 .
infant grantor ' s , may disaffirm his deed , 319 .
insane grantor 's , may disaffirm bis deed , 345 .
lex situs determines who are , 7 .
liability of, on ancestor 's covenants , 193 .
uncertainty as to , 428 .
“ HEIRS . "
“ construed as children ,” 40 ,
necessary to create a fee , 135 .
estate tail , 141 .
statutes as to use of , 136 .
when a word of purchase , 14
6
.
when necessary in reservation , 119 .
when not needed to create a fee , 125 , 136 , 137 .
" HEIRS AND ASSIGNS , ” .
effect o
f , in covenants , 214 , 224 .
“ HEIRS OF BODY , "
effect o
f , 139 , 140 .
HIGH WATER MARK ,
in rivers , 109 .
shore below not private , 104 .
HIGHWAY ,
a
s boundary , 89 , 90 , 91 .
grantee , generally takes to center , 89 .
takes entire when , 91 .
not always an incumbrance , 203 .
“ HIS MARK , ”
when used , 236 .
НОМЕ ,
occupancy a
s , essential to homestead , 384 .
HOMESTEAD , 378 -400 .
abandonment of , 383 .
after invalid conveyance , 394 .
acknowledgment to conveyance o
f , 263 , 399 .
alienation o
f , void when , 392 .
constitutional provisions as to , 378 .
“ constructive occupancy , ” 382 .
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HOMESTEAD - Continued .
conveyance of , between husband and wife , 400 .
defective , valid as to excess , 396 .
not void where , 397 .
of reserving ' homestead right ,” 397 .
or release of, separate examination needed when , 366 .
extent of, 386 .
federal , 378 , n .
grant of right of way over homestead premises, 395 .
hotel as , 384 .
insane wife ' s release of, 348 .
in estates less than fee , 387 .
laws providing for , liberally construed , 378 .
lease of, 395 .
mode of conveying , 398 .
not generally shown by records , 427 .
occupancy essential to , 382 , 383 , 384 .
as a home , 384 .
partial restraints on alienation of, 388 .




by record , 385 .
by occupancy , 385 .
who may have , 379 .
HOTEL ,
a
s homestead , 384 .
HOUSEHOLDER ,






wife ' s deed , 298 .
assent o
f , to wife ' s conveyance , how shown , 37 .
cannot generally defeat dower b
y
his sole act , 373 .
conveyance to wife creates separate estate , 352 .
executing wife ' s conveyance , 37 .
insane , statutes for release of his interests in wife ' s land , 348 .
joinder o
f
in wife ' s fine , 361 .
in wife ' s conveyance , 362 , 363 .
joining in wife ' s deed when liable on covenants , 194 .
power over community property , 167 .




f , in wife ' s property at common law , 350 .
wife cannot generally release dower to , 375 .
3
7
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HUSBAND AND WIFE ,
conveyance between , 166 , 368 - 371 .
of homestead between , 400 .
grant to , creates estate by entireties , 162 .
joint act necessary in alienation of homestead , 398 .
must generally concur in alienation of homestead , 390 .
separation agreements , 375 .
ICE ,
in navigable rivers, ownership of, 107 .
IDEM SONANS, 42 .
IDENTITY ,
of name shows identity of person , 41, 281.
of party acknowledging with grantor , 271 , 272.
IDIOCY , 338.
ILLEGAL ACTS ,
condition requiring void , 185 .
ILLEGAL CONSIDERATION ,
may not be shown by grantor to defeat deed , 66 .
IMPEACHMENT ,
of certificate of acknowledgment , 29
3
.
IMPLIED CONDITIONS , 160 .
IMPLIED COVENANTS , 30 , 211 .
words necessary for , 212 .
IMPRISONMENT ,
effect o
n capacity to take and convey title , 414 .
IMPROVEMENTS ,
after gift , 17 .
INADEQUATE CONSIDERATION ,
effect of , 341 .
INCHOATE RIGHT OF DOWER ,






certain incumbrance not shown by records , 429 .
covenant against , 199 .




f warranty , 209 .
what are , 200 – 203 .
whether covenant against , runs with the land , 218 .
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INDEFEASIBLE ESTATE IN FEE ,
when needed to satisfy covenant for seisin , 198 .
INDEMNITY ,
covenants for title intended to indemnify , 215 , 216 .
INDENTURE , 21 .
effect , 24 .
form , 22 , 23 .
more usual than deeds poll, 23 .
technically appropriate when covenants are to bind grantee , 225 .
IN ESSE ,
grantee must be , 43, 46 .
INFANCY ,
not shown by records, 427 .
INFANT ,
as grantee , 323.
conveyance by , in general , 312 -330 .
voidable, 313 .
deed of infant and of insane person similar , 331 .
disaffirmance of conveyance by , 315 -318 .
how soon after majority must be, 316 , 317 .
not during minority, 315 .
of deed by , what constitutes , 322 .
though land held by subsequent purchaser , 318 .
guardian can not convey land of, without special authority , 324 .
heirs of, may disaffirm deed , 319 .
land of , conveyed for certain purposes , 327 .
may repudiate purchase atmajority , 323 .
misrepresentation of age by, 320 .
one in possession under deed of, does not hold adversely , 419 .
parent can not convey land of, 324 .
power of attorney of, void , when , 314 .
real estate of, conveyed , how , 324 .
restoration of consideration on disaffirmance by , 321 .
right of former , to disaffirm deed is personal , 319 .
statute authorizing conveyance of lands of, must be strictly fol
lowed, 325 .
statutes affecting right to disaffirm , 32
0 , 321 .
unborn , can not be grantee o
f




estate in remainder , 43 , n .
INFERENCE ,





undue , presumed when , 341 .
580 INDEX .
[References are to Sections.]
INHERITANCE ,
words of, not needed in exception , 120 .
INITIALS ,
signing by , 237 .
IN REM ,
proceeding to sell infant' s lands, 326 .
INSANE HUSBAND ,
wife may by statute convey without joinder of, 363 .
INSANE PERSON ,
conveyance of lands of, 331 - 348 .
deed of, may be affirmed by him while sane , 342 .
disaffirmed by him while sane , 343 .
generally voidable , 335 .
whether transmits title , 337 .
disaffirmance , restoration of consideration , 346 .
lands of , statutes authorizing conveyance of , 348 .
under guardianship , conveyance void , 332 , 333.
INSANITY ,
adjudication of, without appointment of guardian , effect of, 333.
kinds and degrees of, 338 .
not shown by records , 427 .
partial , effect of, 340 .
question as to , must relate to time of act, 338 , 339
weakness ofmind not , 310 .
wife 's,doesnot make valid husband 's sole deed of homestead , 393 .
INSTRUMENT ,
recital in , as to sealing, effect of, 247 .
INSURANCE ,
of title, 432 .
INTENT ,
essential element of delivery , 299 .
grantor ' s, to deliver must be evidenced by acts , 299, 306 .
of parties given effect if possible , 25 , 58 , 69 , 132, 18
0
.




e made clear , 121 .
separate estate must be expressed , 353 .
INTEREST ,
disqualifies witness , 253 .
o
f
officer taking acknowledgment , 281 -288 .
undisclosed a
s affecting competency to take acknowledgment ,
285 , 286 .
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INTERPRETATION ,
rule that grantee takes to center of way , a principle of interpre
tation , 89. .
INTOXICATING LIQUORS ,
condition not to sell valid , 171, 179 .
parol agreement not to sell , may be shown as part of considera
tion , 61.
restriction against selling , 230 .
INTOXICATION ,
insanity caused by , 338 .
IRREGULARITIES ,
in sale of infant 's land , cured by statute , 329 .
ISLANDS,












JOINT DEED , .
o
f
husband and wife o
f





homestead , 390 , 398 .
wife joining with insane husband as grantor does not make , 332 .
JOINT ESTATE ,
homestead in , 387 .
JOINT TENANCY , 149 – 15
5
.
abolished , where , 155 .
alienation o
f
estate , 150 .
created , how , 152 .
exceptions to rule that it is not favored , 153 .
not favored , 151 .
statutes as to , apply to estate by entireties , 165 .
JOINT TENANTS ,
partition among , 16
0
.
JUSTICE OF THE PEACE ,
certificate o
f
clerk when necessary to acknowledgment before ,
275 .
may abbreviate official title to J . P . , 291 .
not generally required to have a seal , 292 .
KNOWLEDGE
grantee ' s as to incumbrance , effect of , 203 , 204 .
a
s
to grantor ' s insanity , effect o




[References are to Sections. ]
“ KNOWN,"
in certificate of acknowledgment , 272 .
LACHES ,
effect of, on right to enforce restrictions , 229 .
LAKES ,
beds of, privately owned , 116 .
boundries on , 111 .
common law as to ownership of bed , 113 .
conflicting views as to private ownership of bed , 114 .
effect of Massachusetts ' colonial ordinances as to " great ponds ,"
111 , n .
meandered , public in some states , 112 , n . , 117 .
ownership of bed , 113 .
sectional line rule , 115 .
state owns beds of great lakes , 112
all in some states , 117 .
LAND ,




control courses and distances, 84 .
“ LAWFULLY SEISED ,' .
effect of, 198 .
LEASE ,
implied covenants in , 211 .
incumbrance when , 202 .
of homestead , 395 .
LEASE AND RELEASE , 13 .
LEGAL SEPARATE ESTATE ,
of married women , 358 .
LEX LOCI CONTRACTUS ,
effect of, when covenants implied , 21
3
.
LEX SITUS , 2 - 10 .
contract for deed controlled b
y , 190 .
controlling , reason for doctrine , 5 .
effect o
f , when covenants implied , 213 .
limitations on doctrine , 10 .
married woman ' s deed governed b
y , 365 .
INDEX 583
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" LIE IN GRANT,”
incorporeal interests , 242.
LIEN ,
declared in conveyance conditioned for support , 184 .
LIFE ESTATE ,
created in absence of " heirs ,'' 13
5
.
homestead in , 387 .
LIMITATION ,
collateral , 173 .




infant has statutory period of limitation in which to disaffirm ,
316 .
special , 173 .
LIMITS OF HOMESTEAD , 386 .
LITERARY CORPORATION ,
deed b
y , 241 .
LIVERY OF SEISIN ,
abolished , 16 , 53 .
by infant , effect , 314 .




f , 11 , 14 .
in United States , 16 .
“ L . S . , "
not a seal , when , 246 .
LUCID INTERVAL ,
grantor may affirm voidable deed during , 342 .
LUNACY , 338 .
MAINTENANCE ,
statutes against , 415 .
MAJORITY ,




infant may not disaffirm deed before , 31
5
.
MANUAL DELIVERY OF DEED ,




monuments , 96 .
may aid description though not referred to , 95 .
referred to incorporated in description , 93 , 100 .
streets shown on , grantee ' s rights in , 94
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MARK ,
signing by, 236 .
MARRIAGE ,
not essential to acquisition of homestead , 379, 380 .
property acquired by wife after, whether separate estate , 358 .
restraint of, by condition , 185 .
settlement , form , 36.
valuable consideration , 55 .
MARRIED WOMAN . See , also , HUSBAND AND WIFE.
acknowledgment by , 261, 26
4 , 365 , 367 .
alienation by at common law , 360 .
covenants in deed o
f , 195 .
deed o
f
husband ' s joinder in , 362 , 363 .
disabilities , exist unless removed by statute , 359 .
generally , 349 -377 .
equitable separate estate o
f , 352 -357 .
intention to create separate estate o
f , must be expressed , 353 .
legal separate estate of , 358 .
not liable on covenants , when , 194 , 195 .
power over separate estate , 355 .
o
f , to convey statutory separate estate , 359 .
o
f attorney by , 377 .
restraint on anticipation , 354 .
separate examination o
f
in acknowledging , 36
0 , 365 - 367 .
sole deed when authorized , 363 .
statutory separate estate o
f , 358 .
MARRIED WOMEN ' S ACTS ,
effect o
f , on conveyances between husband and wife , 371 .
estate by entireties , 164 , 165 .
MEANDER LINE ,
not generally a boundary , 102 .
when a boundary , 103 .
MEANDERED LAKES ,
public where , 117 .
MENTAL CAPACITY ,




flowage appurtenant to , 118 .
MINERALS ,
exception o
f , 124 .
ownerships o
f ,may be distinct from that of surface , 148 .
reservation o
f right to remove , 124 .
transfer o
f , in homestead premises , 395 .
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MINORS . See INFANT .
MISREPRESENTATION ,
by infant , of his age , effect , 320 .
MISTAKE ,
in public survey , 103 .
MONOMANIA ,




controls course and distance , 84 , 87 .
incorrect map , 96 .
part o
f , taken as boundary , 88 .
usually named in description , 82 .
what may be , 87 .
“ MORE OR LESS , "









acceptance , 301 .
in deed poll , 24 .
may be sbown b
y parol , 65 .
covenants for title in , 189 .
excepted from covenant against incumbrances not from covenant
of warranty , 208 .
implied covenants in , 212 .
incumbrance , 201 .
not allowed o
f




f warranty , 209 .
purchase -money , superior to dower , 373 .
short form , 30 .
MORTGAGOR ,
estopped by covenants , 189 .
MORTMAIN ,
statutes o
f , 401 .
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION ,
capacity to alienate real property , 407 .
deed b
y , 241 .
NAME ,
additions to , b
y
recital , 44 .
correct name desirable , 41 .
deed need not be signed b
y , 236 .
execution o
f
deed with grantee ' s , blank , 39 .
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NAME - Continued .
fictitious , 43 .
firm name, describing grantee by , 45.
grantee may be designated otherwise than by name, 38 .
idem sonans , 42 .
identity of, shows identity of person , 41, 281 .
initials of, in signing, 237 .
mark as grantor' s, 236 .
middle name, 42 .
one name at common law , 42 .
parol evidence to show grantee when name erroneous, 40 .
part of, in signing, 237 .
NATURAL MONUMENT ,
preferred to artificial , 84 .
NAVIGABILITY ,
how far the test of public ownership at common law , 10
5 , 108 .
test o
f , unreliable , 108 .
NAVIGABLE ,
river , bed privately owned , where , 10
5 , 106 .
public grant on , 101 .
when rivers are , 110 .
NAVIGATION




NEGATIVE CONDITIONS , 171 .




parol , 61 .
NEXT FRIEND ,
action b
y , to disaffirm insane person ' s deed , 344 .
application by , to convey infant ' s lands , 32
6
.
NOMINAL CONDITIONS , 18
6
.
NON COMPOS MENTIS . See INSANITY , INSANE PERSONS .
NON -NAVIGABLE RIVERS , 110 .
NON -RESIDENT ,
alien ,may not always hold lands , 411 .
restraints as to alienation o
f
homestead inapplicable to , 381 .
NON -TIDAL , NON -NAVIGABLE RIVERS ,
riparian owner ' s rights , 110 .
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NON -TIDAL WATERS ,
public grants on , 101 .
NOTARY PUBLIC ,
date of expiration of commission to be stated , 291.
interested should not take acknowledgment , 281 - 283 , 285 .
may not always take acknowledgments, 273 , n ., 274 .
name of his county part of his official signature, 291 .
residence , statement of when required , 291 .
seal of, effect, 278.
signature official , not personal, 291.
NOTICE ,
from possession , 430 .
by grantor after conveyance , 431 .
from recitals , 49 .
from records , 74, 422 .
improperly recorded instrument not, 258 , 366 .
of application for conveyance of infant' s lands , 326 .
to register title, 436 .
of grantor ' s insanity , effect of, 335 , 316 .
of incumbrance by grantee , effect of , 203 , 204 .
purchaser with notice of restriction bound , 228 .
tenant's possession , notice of landlord 's title , 430 .
to one co -tenant of adverse possession of another , 158 .
NUMBER ,
sale of lot by , 95.
OCCUPANCY ,
ofhomestead , 382 , 383 .
selection of homestead by, 385 .
OCCUPATION ,
party ' s, as means of identification , 44 .
OFFICE FOUND ,
alien may convey before , 410 .
hold until , 409 .
not necessary to vest title in state on alien ’s death , 410 .
OFFICER ,








another state , taking acknowledgment , how shown ,
278 .
OFFICIAL SEAL ,
what intended , 292 .
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OFFICIAL SIGNATURE ,
to certificate of acknowledgment , 291.
OLD AGE,
dementia from , 338 .
impairment of mind by , does not always overcome presumption
of sanity , 340 .
OPERATIVE WORDS , 63 – 72 .
essential, 71.
" assign " as , 70 .
“ convey ” as, 69 .
" exchange" as , 68 .
" give , devise and bequeath ” as, 29.
" give , grant, bargain and sell ” as, 72 .
“ grant ” as , 69 , 72 , 211.
" grant , bargain and sell ” as , 211.
" remise , release and quitclaim ,” as , 57 .
“ waive and renounce , ” not, 71 .
“ warrant and defend , ” not, 71 .
superfluous , 69.
ORDER OF PARTS ,
of deed , 31 .
ORIGINAL DEEDS , 20 .
OUSTER ,
of co - tenant, 158.
of possession , invasion of rights are not always, 420 .
OWNERSHIP ,
concurrent, 148 – 167 .
PARCENARY ,
estate in , 159 .
PARENT ,
as custodian of child ' s deed , 298 , 301 .





assent , of husband to wife ' s deed not enough , 364 .
authority to fill blank , 39 .
wife may not bar dower b
y , 376 .
PAROL EVIDENCE ,
admissible to show real grantee , erroneously named , 40 .
can not supply description , 75 .
inadmissible to except incumbrance from covenant , 204 .
o
f
additional consideration , 60 .
o
f negative easement , 61 .
rule , 59 -62 .
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PARTICULAR DESCRIPTION ,
controls general, 84 , 86.
PARTICULARS ,
to regard in description , 82 .
PARTIES , 36 - 46 .
conveying , should be grantors , 37 .
designation of, 36 .
in covenants for title , 192 .
essential to deed , 36 .
order of , 36 .
partnerships as , 45 .
PARTITION ,
deed of, 160 .
parol, 161.
PARTNER ,
cannot take acknowledgment , when , 285 .
may not generally have homestead in partnership property , 387 .
PARTNERSHIP ,
as party , 45 .
PART,
of larger tract designated , 78.
PARTS ,
of certificate of acknowledgment , 268 , 289.
of deed , all reconciled if possible , 132 .
the several, of the deed, 31 .
PARTY ,
cannot take acknowledgment , 281 .
PARTY WALL ,
agreements as to , not always in a conveyance , 222 , 232 .
may be personal, 232 .
run with the land , 232 .
covenants as to , 231 .
PATENT ,
by government, recorded , need not be delivered , 297 .
not invalid because of adverse possession , 419 .
“ PERSONAL COVENANTS ,” 22
1
.
action on , effect of lex loci contractus , 213 .
law o
f place not controlling , 10 .
PERSONAL PROPERTY ,
not appurtenant to land granted , 118 .
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" PERSONALLY KNOWN,"
in certificate of acknowledgment , 272 .
PERSONS OF UNSOUND MIND . See INSANE PERSON , INSANITY .
conveyance of real property of, 331 -348 .
PHYSICAL INCUMBRANCES , 203.
PLACE ,
for clauses of exception and reservation , 122 .
for condition , 178 .
for covenants for title , 191 .
for signature of grantor, 235 .
witness , 252.
of taking acknowledgment , how determined , 289.
PLANK ROAD COMPANY ,




reference to in description , 93 .
showing building line , effect o
f , 227 .
statutory , 95 .
streets shown on , grantee ' s rights in , 94 .
POND ,
boundary on , 111 .
ownership o
f
bed , 113 .
POSSESSION ,
adverse by one co -tenant , 158 .
conveyance of land held in , 415 - 421 .
notice o








f delivery , 303 .
o
f delivered deed b
y grantor , 298 .
of land by grantor after conveyance , 431 .
referred to record title , 430 .
seisin signifies , 198 .
title not acquired b
y , under " Torrens System , ” 440 .
unity o




till grantor ' s death , 305 .
POWER OF ATTORNEY ,
acknowledgment o
f conveyance under , 294 .
by infant , when void , 314 .
form o
f
deed poll , 23 .
of insane person , 336
o
fmarried woman , 377 .
signing under , 239 .
INDEX . 591
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habendum repugnant to , void , 129 .
limitation o
f
estate in , 128 .




name , 41 , 281 .
o





f sanity , 340 .
o
f
undue influence , 341 .
that grantor o
f
land on highway reserves n
o part o
f it , 89 , 90 .
that land held by corporation is held for corporate purpose , 404 .
that possession is under record 'title , when , 430 .







PRIMARY DEEDS , 20 .
PRINCIPAL ,
name o








of beds of great lakes , 112 .
PRIVY EXAMINATION ,
o
f married woman , 360 , 365 - 367 .
PROOF ,




f acknowledgment , 295 .
PUBLIC CORPORATION ,




meander line , 102 .
o




beds of great lakes , 112 .
PUBLIC SURVEYS , 102 .
592 INDEX .
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PURCHASE
alien could acquire title by , at common law , 40
8
.
PURCHASE -MONEY MORTGAGE ,
superior to dower , 373 .
PURCHASER ,
how far takes the risk o
f sanity o
f prior grantors , 347 .
o
f infant ' s lands under statute presumed to have knowledge of
all proceedings , 325 .
right to relief if title defective , depends on covenants , 188 .
PURPOSE ,
o









special , 180 , 181 .





f , when important , 92 .
QUIA EMPTORES ,
statute , 31 , 174 .
QUIET ENJOYMENT .
covenant against incumbrances connected with covenant for , 199 .
covenant for , 206 .
not broken b
y wrongful eviction , 210 .
runs with the land , 219 .
QUITCLAIM DEED ,
effect o
f , on title , 188 .
grant of “ right , title and interest ” equivalent to , 207 .
grantee in , has benefit o
f
covenants that run with the land , 220 .
RAILROAD COMPANY ,
capacity to alienate real property , 407 .
RAILROAD ,
right o
f way , incumbrance , 203 .
RATIFICATION ,
by infant of conveyance to him , 323 .
during lucid interval , 342 .
infant ' s conveyance passes title without , 313 ,
“ REAL ” COVENANTS , 221 .
party wall agreement may b
e , 232 .
INDEX . 593
[ References are to Sections . ]
REASONABLE TIME ,




grantor reserving right to , no delivery , 308 .
RECALLING DEED ,






contradicted , 59 , 63 .
RECITAL ,
as to seal , effect of , 247 .
containing history o
f
title , 47 .
ignorance of , no excuse , 49 .




n grantor ' s death , 307 .
in deed poll , 22 .
notice from , 49 .
o
f power o
f attorney , 239 .
prima facie evidence , 51 .
required when , 50 .
useful though not required , 51 .
RECORD ,
acknowledgment necessary to , 258 .
copies o
f , as evidence , 259 , 260 .
defects in title not shown by , 426 –431 .
liability to err in indexing , 432 .
notice from , when description adequate , 74 .
o





homestead , 385 .
o
f properly acknowledged deed admitted in evidence , 259 , 260 .
title b
y , not always reliable , 304 , 306 .
witnesses sometimes necessary to record deed , 251 .
RECORDABLE INSTRUMENT ,
not always admissible in evidence without proof , 260 .
RECORDED ,





f delivery , 304 .
RECORDING SYSTEM ,
characteristics of , 422 .
3
8 - BREWS . Con .
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RECOVERY , 18.
REDDENDUM , 31.
RE -ENTRY CLAUSE , 179 .
REFERENCE ,
in deed to description in other instrument , 97 .
to maps, 93, 100 .
REGISTRATION OF TITLE , 432 –443 ,
adverse possession after , cannot give title , 440 .
appearance of parties defendant , 438 .
application to register , 435 .
assurance or indemnity fund , 442 .
certificate of title , 437 , 439 .
compulsory , or voluntary , 443 .
constitutional objections to , 433 , 436 , 437 , 442 .
dealings with registered land , 439 .
decree , effect of , 438 .
effect of death of owner of registered land, 441, 443 .
examiner ' s functions, 437 .
general principles , 434 .
initial registration , 434 , 435 , 438 .
in what states acts provide for , 433 .
notice to adverse claimants, 436 .
parties to the proceedings , 435, 436 , 437 .
proceedings are judicial , 435 .
process , 436 .
RELATIONSHIP ,
to parties as affecting competency to take acknowledgment , 284 .
RELEASE ,
by disseisee , to one in adverse possession , valid , 419 .
consideration clause in form of, 59 .
of sealed instrument must be sealed at common law , 245 .
RELIGIOUS CORPORATION ,
deed by , 241 .
REMAINDER , 144 .
one first named in habendum may take , 133 .
REMEDY ,
for breach of covenant for further assurance , 205 .
of warranty , 206 .
in equity , for violation of condition to support , 184 .
restrictive covenants , 227 .
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RENT ,
reservation of, in reddendum , 31.
vendee' s right to , does not relieve grantor from liability on cove
nant, 202 .
REPUGNANT ,
condition , void , 186 .
exceptions and reservations void , 12
6
.
habendum , void , 129 .
RESERVATION .
creates new interest , 119 .
exception , difference in effect o
f , 120 .
grantor ' s , of rights to water , 100 .





easement , 121 , 122 .
appurtenant to other land o
f grantor , 125 .
o
f right to take minerals , timber & c . , 124 .
repugnant to estate granted , void , 126 .
" road ” reserved , an easement , 121 .
to third party , 127 .
words o
f
inheritance necessary , when , 119 .
unnecessary , when , 119 , 125 .
RESIDENT ,
entitled to homestead , 380 .
RESIDENT ALIENS ,
privileges accorded , 411 , 412 .




infant ' s deed , 321 .
insane person ' s deed , 346 .
RESTRAINT ,
o
n alienation in general , void , 18
6
.
RESTRAINT OF MARRIAGE ,
b
y
condition , 185 .
RESTRAINT ON ANTICIPATION , 354 .
RESTRAINTS ON ALIENATION OF HOMESTEAD ,
apply generally to married persons , 379 , 380 .
RESTRICTED COVENANT ,
when does not affect other covenants , 208 .
RESTRICTION ,
building , 182 , 227 , 228 .
enforced how , 227 , 228 .
notice o
f , from recital , 49 .
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RESTRICTION - Continued .
on alienation , 312 .
on use not void , 186 .
right to enforce , how lost , 229 .
RESULTING USE , 55 .
REVERSION , 144 .
RIGHT OF WAY ,
grant of, over homstead premises , 395 .
incumbrance , 203.
reservation of, 120 , 121.
“ RIGHT, TITLE AND INTEREST,"
effect of these words , 207 .
RIPARIAN RIGHTS .
controlled by state laws, 104 , 112 .
on lakes, 117 .
reserved , 100 .
RIVERS ,
as monuments, 87
“ bank , ” effect of in description , 100 .
bed of navigable , privately owned , when , 105 , 106 .
islands in , owned by shore owner when , 107 .
meander line not a boundary , 102 . .
navigable , when , 10
5 , 110 .






n navigable , 107 .
private title to bed in some states , 106 .
o
f navigable , not recognized where , 108 .
" shore , ” effect o
f , in description , 100 .
tidal , public , 105 .
three rules as to ownership o
f
bed , 109 .
ROYAL CHARTERS ,
rights under passed to states , 104 .
RULE IN SHELLEY ' S CASE , 145 – 147 .
RULES ,
for construing description , 84 .
flexible , 84 , 86 , 87 .
RUN WITH THE LAND ,
covenants for further assurance run , 205 .
covenants may when , 224 .
whether covenants against incumbrances d
o , 199 .
- depends o
n




[References are to Sections . ]
SANITY ,
deed made on restoration to , effect , 343 .
presumption of, 340 .
“ SCRAWL,"




a seal in some states , 246 .
“ SEAL , "




that on instrument , 248 .
corporate , 240 , 249 .
effect o
f
statute abolishing use o
f , 243 .
effects o
f , 245 .
essential a
t
common law , 19 , 242 , 244 .
“ importing consideration , ” 54 , 245 .
in general , 242 - 249 .
notary ' s , effect o




f deeds , 276 .
o
f
officer taking acknowledgment , 278 , 280 , 292 ,
still required in some states , 246 .




actions on , 245 .
SECURITY ,
by guardian on sale o
f
infant ' s lands , 326 .
SEISIN ,
covenant for , 198 .
livery o
f , 11 .
abolished , 16 .
signifies possession , 198 .
whether covenant o






homestead , 385 .
SEPARATE ESTATE ,
intention to create must b
e expressed , 353 .
of married woman , 352 .
effect o
f
statutes on , 357 .
her power over , 355 .
method o
f conveying , 356 .
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SEPARATE EXAMINATION ,
of married woman , 360 , 361, 365 , 366 .
of wife in conveyance of homestead , 399 .
SEPARATION AGREEMENTS ,
between husband and wife , 375 .
SHAREHOLDER ,
cannot take acknowledgment , when , 285 .
SHELLEY ' S CASE ,
rule in , 145 – 147 .
abolished , 147 .
SHERIFF ,
deed of, recitals in , 50 .
“ SHORE , ”
effect of, in description , 100 .
private title not beyond , when , 117 .
SHORE OWNER ,
on great lakes , extent of title , 112 .
SHORT FORM ,
deeds usually dated , 32 .
not always useful, 26.
SHOOTING ,
rights of, on navigable rivers , 107 .
SIDE ,
of way as boundary , 90 .
SIGNATURE ,
form of, 236 , 237 .
genuineness of, not shown by records, 42
6
.
name not necessary to , 236 .
notary ' s official , county part of , 291 .




another , 238 .
by assumed name , 4
3 .
by corporation , 240 , 241 .
by mark , 236 .
b
y
officer taking acknowledgment , 291 .
deed b
y
one not named a
s party , 37 .
in general , 233 – 241 .
namenot necessary , 236 .
not essential to deed at common law , 233 .
now generally necessary , 234 .





[ References are to Sections . ]
SILENCE ,
after majority , not affirmance o





r religious , deed b
y , 241 .
“ SOLE AND SEPARATE USE , ” .
in creating separate estate , 353 .
SOLE DEED .
o
f wife , when authorized , 363 .
wife ' s , will not bar dower unless authorized b
y
statute , 376 .
SPECIAL COVENANTS ,




infant ' s land , 330 , n .
SPECIAL LIMITATION , 173 .
SPENDTHRIFT ,
conveyance o
f , when void , 334 .
guardianship o








disseised , 419 .
each has power to regulate conveyance o
f
infants ' lands , 324 .
grant from , on water , 101 .
named usually in description , 8
2 .
only , may complain of alien ' s holding real property , 409 .
o
f corporation ' s holding land in excess o
f
power , 405 .
power o
f , to remove alien ' s disabilities , 412 .
to regulate transfers , 3 .
“ STATED , ”
fo
r





f irregularities in sale o
f
infants ' land , 329 .
STATUTE DE DONIS , 140 .
STATUTE OF ENROLMENTS , 12 .
STATUTE OF FRAUDS ,
bargain and sale in writing after , 13 .
feoffment after , 14 .
parol gift valid ,when , 17 .
requires writing for release o
f
dower , 376 .
whether required signing o
f deeds , 233 .
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STATUTE OF USES ,
applied to the lease and release , 13.
deed under , 20 .
sustained as a conveyance under , when, 58 .
effect of, in transferring legal estate , 56.
on feoffment , 56 .




affecting infant ' s right to disaffirm , 32
0 , 321 .
against conveying lands held in adverse possession , 416 .
as to execution , adoption of in another state , 9 .
authorizing conveyance o
f
infants ' lands , 324 -329 .
insane person ' s lands , 348 .
concerning aliens , 411 .
concerning estates tail , 143 .
estates tail , affect , rule in Shelley ' s case , 147 .
implied covenants , 30 , 211 .
joint tenancy , 151 – 155 .
nominal conditions , 186 .
use of “ heirs , ” 136 .
effect o
f , on rule preventing conveyances between husband and
wife , 371 .
English recording acts , 422 .
wife liable on covenants , under , 194 .
STATUTES OF MORTMAIN , 401 .
STATUTORY DEEDS , 30 , 211 ,
conditions in , 178 .
dual capacity o
f , 213 .
no habendum in , 128 .
STATUTORY SEPARATE ESTATE ,
o
f married woman , 358 .
what is , 358 .
STATUTORY SUBSTITUTE FOR DOWER , 372 .
STOCKHOLDER ,





f , effect , 299 .
STRANGER ,
reservation to , 127 .
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STREAM . See RIVERS .
as boundary , 10
0
.
grantor owning both sides does not grant to center , 98 .
STREET ,
a
s boundary , 89 , 90 , 91 .
a
s monument , 87 .
grantee takes title to center , when , 89 .
rights in street shown on map , 94 .
laid out on edge o
f grantor ' s land , 91 .
named in description , 82 .
“ SUBJECT TO INCUMBRANCE , ”
effect o
f , 208 .
" SUBSCRIBE . "
signing a
t
end , 235 .
SUBSEQUENT ,
conditions , 171 .
SUBSEQUENT GRANTEE ,
former infant may disaffirm conveyance against , 318 .
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE ,
what is as to acknowledgment , 268 , 269 .
with statute concerning acknowledgment necessary , 266 , 267 , 367 .
SUPPORT ,
condition for , 183 .
SURNAME
baptismal name , once more important than , 42 .
firm name composed o
f , 45 .
SURRENDER ,
acceptance and , need not be concurrent act , 302 .
by grantor of control o
f
deed necessary to delivery , 298 , 306 .
derivative deed , 20 .
grantee ' s , of deed after delivery , effect , 311 .
SURVEY
named in description , 82 .
o




entireties , 162 .










statutes abolishing , 154 .
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TAIL
estate , barred by recovery , 18 .
in United States , 142 , 143 .




from homestead , not abandonment , 383 .
TENANCY . See ENTIRETIES ; Estate BY , ETC .
by entireties , 162 – 166 .
joint , 149 - 155 .
TENANCY IN COMMON , 156 – 158 .
alienation by one tenant , 157 .
exceptions to rule favoring , 153 .
TENANT ,
possession b
y , notice of landlord ' s title , 430 .
TENANTS IN COMMON ,
partition among , 160 .
TENENDUM , 31 .
TESTIMONIUM CLAUSE , 22 – 31 .
THIRD PERSON ,
conveyances between husband and wife through , 369 .
reservation to , 127 .
TIDAL ,
rivers , public , 105 .
test o
f public ownership , 10
5
.
waters , land bounded b
y , 104 .
TIMBER ,
exception o
f , 124 .
reservation o
f right to cut , 124 .
transfer o
f , on homestead , 39
5
.
TITLE . See , also , REGISTRATION O
F
TITLE and “ TORRENS SYSTEM . "
abstract o
f , 425 .
after acquired , inures to grantee in deed , when , 188 .
covenant o





in mortgage , 189 .
running with the land , 214 .
defects in , not shown , b
y
records , 426 .
shown by original instruments , 424 .
records , when , 424 , 425 .
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TITLE - Continued .
delivery necessary to transfer, 296 .
effect of death of landowner on , 428 .
forgery on , 426 .
of insane person 's deed , 337.
form of covenants for , 191 .
grantee's wrongful possession of, escrow , does not convey , 310 .
how far does it extend to land under water, 104 , 105 .
imperfections in , 423 .
insurance of, 432 .
one may have without any writing, 422 .
possession , notice of, 430 .
records do not show , 304 , 306 .
registration of, 432 -443 .
" TO HAVE ,”
as operative words ,69.
“ TORRENS SYSTEM .” See REGISTRATION OF TITLE
constitutional objections to , 133, 436 , 437 , 438 , 442 .
registration of title , 18, 304 , 437 -443 .
TRACT OF LAND ,
as monument , 87 .
TRADE ,
competition in , provisions restraining , 230 .
TRANSCRIPT ,
of records, evidence , 259 , 260.
TRANSLATION ,
of certificate ofacknowledgment in foreign language , 280 , n .
TREATY ,
effect of, on state law , 4 .
may remove alien ' s disabilities , 412 .
TRUE DATE ,
of acknowledgment may be shown , 290 .
ofdeed may be shown , 35 .
TRUST ,
déclared in habenbum , 134 .
imposed by grantor as to use , 180 .
notice of, from recital, 49 .
TRUSTEE
cannot take acknowledgment , 283 .
deed of, recital in , 51 .
for separate estate , 352 .
604 . INDEX .
[References are to Sections.)
TRUSTEE - Continued .
husband is, of wife's equitable separate estate , 352 .
joint tenants , when , 153 .
title held by , for literary or religious society , 241.
UNBORN CHILD ,
as grantee , 43 .
UNCERTAIN ,
description , void , 76 .
general description not always , 81 .
UNCERTAINTY ,
deed void fo
r , 40 , 76 .
in description ,arises , how , 77 , 80 .
UNDEFINED PART ,
o
f larger tract , 77 .
UNDISCLOSED INTEREST ,
a
s affecting competency to take acknowledgment , 285 , 286 .
UNDIVIDED INTEREST ,
conveyance o
f , creates tenancy in common , 79 , 156 .
UNDUE INFLUENCE ,
presumed , when , 341 .
UNITED STATES ,
acknowledgment taken out o
f , 280 .
courts o
f , follow state laws , 4 .
devise to , 7 .
“ UNMARRIED . "
addition o
f , to name , 44 .
UNRECORDED ,
deed , effect of grantee ' s destruction of , 311 .
possession under , effect o
f , 430 .
map or plat , referred to , 93 .






f , 331 -348 .
USE ,
restrictions as to , how enforced , 228 .
when condition , 182 .
resulting to grantor , 55 .
USES ,
deeds under , 20 .
statute o
f , 56 .
INDEX . 605
(References are to Sections. ]
USUAL COVENANTS ,
for title , 31, 190 .
VALIDITY ,
of deed , acknowledgment when necessary to , 261 .
witnesses not generally necessary to , 251 .
VALUE ,
of homestead , 386 .
VARIANCE ,
in name, in parts of conveyance , 237 .
of one signing and acknowledging , 271 .
VENDOR ,
possession by , after his conveyance , 431 .
when may be compelled to execute deed with covenants, 188 .
VENUE ,
in certificate of acknowledgment , 289.
VESTED REMAINDER , 144 .
“ VOID ” AND “ VOIDABLE,”
compared , 312 .
VOID ,
condition , 185 , 18
6
.
repugnant , 186 .
conveyance b
y
drunkard , when , 334 ,
b





homestead , when , 392 .
o
f
land held in adverse possession , how far void , 416 , 417 .
description o
f person o
r property inherently uncertain render
deed void , 40 , 76 .
exception o
r
reservation when void , 126 .
insane person , conveyance so held often , 335 - 336 .
under guardianship , conveyance void , 332 .
married woman ' s deed not properly acknowledged , 365 .




infant , generally , 313 .





husband alone , when , 394 , n .
o
f
land held in adverse possession , 417 .
to alien , 409 .
to corporation , when , 405 .
606 INDEX .
[References are to Sections.)
“ WAIVE AND RENOUNCE , ”
as operative words, 71.
WAIVER ,
of conditions , 187 .
of right to enforce restriction , 229 .
WALLS ,
party covenants as to , 231 .
WARD . See GUARDIAN ; INFANT ; INSANE PERSON .
“WARRANT AND DEFEND ,”
as operative words , 71 .
“ WARRANT ,”
not essential to covenant of warranty , 206 .
WARRANTY ,




f , 206 .
runs with the land , 219 .
incident o
f
feudal tenure , 197 .
“ WARRANTY DEED , ”
contract for , 19
0
.
grantee in , takes after acquired title , 188 .
short form , 30 , 211 ,
WATER . See Rivers , LAKES .
a
s
a boundary , 98 - 11
7
.
land under , title to , 104 , 10
5 , 106 , 110 , 116 .
non - tidal , public grants on , 101 .
tidal , public grants on , 101 .
WAX ,
not essential to seal , 246 .
WAY ,
right o
f , as incumbrance , 203 .
passes with land , 11
8
.
WEAKNESS OF MIND ,
combined with inadequate consideration , 341 .
not insanity , 340 .
WIDOW ,
grant to , for life o
r during widowhood , 173 .
INDEX . 607
[References are to Sections .]
WIFE ,
as witness to husband 's conveyance , 253 .
could not alienate at common law without husband 's consent ,
350 .
insane, guardian of may release dower & c ., when , 348 .
joining in husband's deed , when not bound by covenants , 19
4
.
may convey homestead alone , when , 394 .
may not convey directly to husband , when , 371 .
non -resident , whether entitled to dower , 373 .
power over separate estate , 355 .
signing husband ' s deed not generally enough to bar dower , 376 .
statutory separate estate o
f , 358 .
WILL ,




y , 378 .
less capacity required in testator than in grantor , 338 .
probated , when , 428 , n . 28 .
revocation o
f , by changed domestic circumstances , 428 .
WINDOWS ,
condition that there shall be no , unreasonable , 186 .
WITNESSES . See ATTESTATION .
disqualified by interest , 253 .
how they sign , 252 .
in general , 250 – 253 .
necessary for what purpose , 251 .
not needed a
t
common law , 250 .
proof by , 295 .
to signature b
y
mark , 236 .
WORDS ,
appropriate to create condition , 177 .
determinable fee , 174 .
o
f
conveyance , 63 - 72 .
WRITING ,
deeds superior to other writings , 5
4 .
generally necessary in alienation o
f
homestead , 398 .
other than deeds , acknowledged how , 256 .
title may pass without , 1
7 .
what may be acknowledged , 255 .







f warranty , 210 .
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